0x98dd78f2…e5dcsent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#24,936,310·view on Etherscan
Voting against the 2.8 ETH reserve, but I'm aligned on what you're trying to fix.
Rationale: at current clearing prices, a NAV-pegged reserve doesn't filter bidders, it stops the auction. No new ETH in, no new holders, governance ages faster. Fork already gives anyone a NAV exit, and Prop 384 deliberately made that exit easier -> adding an auction reserve at NAV is doubling down on a problem the DAO already chose to solve via fork.
Top of my head, better solutions:
- Governance-side fixes: extend the existing Client Incentives rewards rail
- Targeted buybacks at/below NAV: directionally right, but the existing TokenBuyer is USDC↔ETH only, so we'd need to scope a new mechanism.
- Dynamic reserve tied to trailing clearing prices (not NAV): worth exploring, but only if calibrated to almost never bind.