0x32d1a53f…d4f5sent to0xf790a5f5…1365·#19,742,229·view on Etherscan
another thing to add after some thought is i think proposals in general are not something to incentivize; if anything there would be a cost or deposit which dao could return if proposal is deemed not malicious. Successful proposals, could receive an outsize reward.
I suggest allowing proposalreward% to go negative (maybe it can?) meaning registered ids could incur a liability/slash in theory if it transacts malicious props.
finally, rewarding votes is imo also not quite right tho i get there is contention around this (fans of token vote, might-makes-right crypto ethos etc) . You simply just need a sybil resistance layer for it to work well. The economies of scale/asymmetry for large blocks is a problem:
Legitimate clients with favored big voters will simply pass through value in one way or another to that controlling individual. it effectively destroys the credible neutrality of the client layer