0x04be…b14a

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You bought 605 of the ShapeShift DAO Convertible Bond in the Arbor auction on 2022-12-21 (your purchase: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x033d67f5c37cf494044b57e66cb2e1d5abd187b0430f532bd19f4b6f3ef134ce ). This wallet still holds them and can redeem for about $605 USDC at https://arbor.finance . Verify on Etherscan yourself.
# [DIP-05] Self-limiting Diva # [DIP-05] Self-limiting Diva ## Abstract The staking ecosystem is still young, and Diva will be offering the lowest bond available to potential Node Operators in the Liquid Staking Derivative market. It’s not outside the realm of possibility that Diva’s new product offering is a “killer app” in this space and Diva could be set to take a large amount of market share. With that in mind, I propose that Diva should self limit. ## Motivation Danny Ryan has identified some [key thresholds](https://notes.ethereum.org/@djrtwo/risks-of-lsd) and their consequences: - above 33% - an LST can prevent finalization - above 50% - an LST can censor - above 66% - an LST can achieve finalization For further context, Danny elaborated on his views in [this interview with Evan Van Ness](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y0ddkSa1ZuI&t=2s). Empirically, the liquid staking market has centralizing dynamics; this is an externality that the free market is unable to express - a classic tragedy of the commons. One way liquid staking protocols can mitigate this risk is by committing to self-limiting to 22% of staked ETH - a threshold that both mitigates Danny Ryan's concerns listed above, while also allowing staking protocols enough breathing room to be competitive on the open market. Anthony Sassano and Eric Conoar also have [a great discussion about the risks here.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQO2rHQze-4&t=1137s) [Superphiz’s rationale for limiting to 22%](https://twitter.com/superphiz/status/1525224461380747268?s=20) are: - It requires at least four parties to affect finalization. - We can lose one provider at 22% and not miss a step on the network. - It is capture-resistant so third parties are comfortable building on the network. A few other protocols have committed to self-limiting: - Rocket Pool has passed a DAO resolution to [self-limit to a maximum of 33%](https://github.com/rocket-pool/RPIPs/blob/main/RPIPs/RPIP-17.md) - Stakewise has [stated on Twitter](https://twitter.com/stakewise_io/status/1525225299146944513?s=20) that they would self limit to 22% - Vitalik suggests [self-limiting via increasing its protocol fee](https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin/status/1525301234516652032?s=20) Even though Diva is still nascent, Diva deciding to self-limit would indicate to the wider Ethereum community that Diva puts Ethereum’s health before itself. ## Specification **Diva Staking will take measures to avoid greater than 22% of the ETH deposited on the beacon chain being deposited through the Diva protocol.** - This may imply a number of actions, such as stopping the creation of validators, or any other feasible measure which can be reasonably implemented by the community to accomplish the above outlined aim. **One such action could be for Diva to stop the creation of validators, should Diva reach that threshold, but for Diva to continue minting divETH tokens.** This will dilute divETH's staking APR, creating an economic incentive to stake with other liquid staking providers , while also preventing Diva from crossing that same threshold. This will have the added benefit of making integrations with other protocols, and especially immutable protocols, simple and less prone to failure. ## This Proposal, if passed, represents the DAO's Intent This specification represents the community's intent and is not a direct call for a code implementation. The Diva DAO acknowledges and respects the operational boundaries and legal considerations of Diva BVI. The DAO understands that Diva BVI retains its autonomy and is not subordinate to the DAO's intents. Our aim is to convey the collective values of our community, fully recognizing that the final implementation decisions rest with Diva BVI and its associated entities. Please comment with your thoughts below! ## Classification Low risk, no executable smart contract code. ## Copyright waiver Copyright and related rights waived via CC0 1.0 (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
# [DIP-04] Adopt Diva Staking DAO Community Guidelines # DIP-04: Adopt Diva Staking DAO Community Guidelines ## Description The Diva Staking DAO was launched 3 months ago, and has now gone through several Drafts and Voting Proposals. A set of Community Guidelines was proposed and used in practice, and has been recently updated with changes like: - Deprecating the "DCP, DIP, DUP" terminology in favor of a simpler unified DIP-XX + Low/Medium/High Impact classification - Updating all values to the most recent voting periods, which were modified by DUP-01 - Clarifications on the Request For Comments step - Writing improvements This proposal proposes to ratify the following document as the current Diva Staking DAO Community Guidelines. - [Github's Pull Request](https://github.com/staking-foundation/diva-dao/pull/3) - [Discord discussion](https://discord.com/channels/1041618287500460083/1133466096763158629) - [Forum discussion & temperature check](https://commonwealth.im/divastaking/discussion/12343-voting-periods) With this proposal passing, the DAO resolves to adopt the following Community Guidelines: ``` # Diva Staking DAO INITIAL COMMUNITY GUIDELINES ## Section 1. Definition and Purpose The Diva Staking Decentralized Autonomous Organization (the ‘Diva Staking DAO’) is an unincorporated association of individuals, entities, associations and/or other persons or groups of persons holding the DIVA token AND having completed a process referred to as “delegation”. The Diva Staking DAO is not intended to, and shall not be deemed to, be a legal person or have a legal personality separate from the DAO Members. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the DAO is not intended to be, and shall not be deemed to be, a partnership. The primary objective of the Diva Staking DAO is to curate and maintain the publicly available software resources known as the Diva Staking protocol. It is important to note that the Diva Staking DAO does not engage in administering or managing the Diva Staking protocol in any way. Instead, its mission is focused on enhancing the accessibility, efficiency, and resilience of the blockchain interaction commonly referred to as 'staking' through the utilization of non-proprietary software. ## Section 2. Governance Tokens Diva Staking DAO governance tokens (the "DIVA Tokens" or "Governance Tokens") means the effectively delegated tokens associated with the Diva Staking protocol and referred to in https://github.com/staking-foundation and designated as Delegated DIVA, D-DIVA, or any other designation the Diva Staking DAO may find appropriate from time to time. ## Section 3. Excluded Tokens DIVA Tokens that have not been revocably delegated, either through self-delegation or delegation to third parties, using the designated governance smart contract of the Diva Staking DAO, are not considered as Diva Staking DAO governance tokens. These tokens do not possess the authority to submit any type of DAO proposal or participate in the voting process for any DAO proposals. ## Section 4. DAO Resolutions. As per the token amount thresholds outlined in Section 5 below, every holder of Governance Tokens holds the right to submit and participate in the voting of proposals, referred to as 'DAO Proposals.' Once a proposal is duly approved by the Governance Token holders and has not been invalidated by the DAO governance mechanism, it is recognized as a 'DAO Resolution'. ## Section 5. DAO Proposals. Proposals may be submitted by any D-DIVA Token holder holding **at least 1 Million D-DIVA Tokens** subject to any applicable threshold, and/or any frequency restriction or other parameter designated by the Diva Staking DAO through the passage of a Diva Improvement Proposal (as defined below). There are three types of Proposals based on risk and potential impact levels: 1. **Low Impact** - intended to distribute governance power among communities, sealing strategic partnerships, etc. 2. **Medium Impact** - aiming to adapt or modify a configurable feature of the Diva Staking protocol. 3. **High Impact** - complex proposals aiming to update core infrastructure and require some code implementation. ## Section 6. DAO Proposals Quorum and Thresholds. In order for a Proposal to be valid a **Quorum of at least 10 Million D-DIVA Tokens** is required (as of the time of this writing). The thresholds initially set for each kind of proposal are as follows, - **Low Impact** - more than 50% of favourable votes - **Medium Impact** - more than 66% of favourable votes - **High Impact**- more than 75% of favourable votes ## Section 7. DAO Proposals Procedures Any DAO proposal starts with an idea, which can discussed organically by the community. Several channels in use are: - [Diva's Discord](https://discord.gg/diva) - [Commonwealth forum](https://commonwealth.im/divastaking/discussions) Once the idea start to formalize, it should follow the steps below. ### 7.1. Request For Comments (RFC) / Temperature Check In order for a proposal to be formally considered by the community, a Request for Comments and Temperature Check must be carried. This process has two parts: - A **Request For Comments (RFC)** discussion thread to collect community feedback. - A **non-binding poll** to evaluate if the proposal gains enough interest and community support. The [Commonwealth forum](https://commonwealth.im/divastaking/discussions) is a good way to do this, as it allows for both discussion and off-chain voting, but any openly accessible platform or channel can be used. The RFC is intended to provide all necessary information and collect feedback to prepare the formal proposal which would later be submitted for its voting and subsequent approval or rejection. Any member of the community at large may open a thread in the Diva Forum outlining the proposal which needs to be debated or any suggestion which may be deemed as beneficial to the community at large. The RFC shall contain at least the following: - **Title**: RFC + Proposal title. - **Description**: Short and concise description of the proposal. - **Rationale**: why the proposal is necessary and what benefit will bring to the community. - **Tentative classification**: Low, Medium or High Impact proposal. - **A non-binding community poll** to indicate the level of support the proposal may have. ### 7.2. DAO Proposal submission Proposals can only be submitted by those which have **at least 1 Million D-DIVA Tokens** (as of the time of this writing) and it implies an on-chain transaction. Proposals can be submitted on [Tally](https://tally.xyz/gov/diva) by selecting “Create a new proposal”. The proposal shall include the following structure: - **DIP code**: Proposals start at DIP-01, DIP-02, and continue sequentially. - **Title**: Short name of the proposal - **Classification**: Low, Medium or High Impact - *Low Impact* proposals shall include a short description of the proposed action to be taken - *Medium Impact* proposals shall include a risk assessment of the proposed implementation of such proposal and the executable code (Tally provides a list of executable functions which can be implemented) - *High Impact* proposals shall include a thorough description of the technical features aimed to be implemented, executable code and test cases. Any proposal shall include a copyright waver. Further, any code or material included in any proposal shall be open sourced and released to the public domain without any restriction whatsoever. ### 7.3. Proposals Voting Delay Once the proposal has been created “on-chain” there is a waiting period (voting delay). During that period token holders can still delegate their tokens (either self delegate or delegate to third parties). Such delegation will affect the necessary quorum for a proposal to become valid as only Delegated DIVA tokens are accounted for any governance purpose. **The voting delay period is set to 2 days** as of the time of this writing. ### 7.4. Proposal Voting Period Once the voting delay period has elapsed, all the proposals have a voting period upon submission under which any Delegated DIVA token holders can vote in favour or object. **The voting period is set to 5 days** as of the time of this writing. After such period has elapsed, considering **a valid quorum of 10 Million D-DIVA Tokens** (as of the time of this writing) has been met and the correspondent voting threshold has been exceeded the proposal shall be considered passed and will become a DAO Resolution ## Section 8. DAO Resolutions ### 8.1. Queueing for Execution and Cooldown Period Upon successful confirmation that the corresponding threshold and quorums have been met, an on-chain transaction is required to set the approved DAO Resolution in queue for its execution, starting a Cooldown Period. The current Cooldown Periods (as of the time of this writing) are: - **Low and Medium Impact** proposals: 9 days. - **High Impact** proposals: 14 days. The Cooldown Period is designed to provide a window for cancelling malicious proposals by submitting a Cancellation Proposal. During the Cooldown period, an approved DAO Resolution still can be disputed and cancelled, as detailed in Section 9. ### 8.2 Execution Once the Cooldown Period has elapsed, anybody can execute the transaction to implement a DAO resolution. As the required functions to effectively implement the desired outcome have been previously registered within the proposal, the execution of said transaction does not alter in any manner the terms of the DAO Resolution. ## Section 9. Disputes Any DAO Resolution can be challenged before it is executed due security considerations such as governance attacks or fraudulent code implementation. In order to challenge a DAO Resolution, a Cancellation Proposal must be submitted by a community participant counting with a governance power of **at least 1 Million D-DIVA Tokens** (as of the time of this writing). The Proposal shall clearly specify “Cancellation Proposal” and set clearly and consciously what is the harm prevented by the cancellation and other remedies proposed to avoid further damage to the Diva Staking protocol and or community. In order to be valid a cancellation proposal requires a quorum of at least 10 Million D-DIVA Tokens and more than 50% of favourable votes (as of the time of this writing). The execution of said Cancellation Proposal can be fulfilled after 2 hours cooldown period after its approval. ``` ## Classification Low risk, no executable smart contract code. ## Copyright waiver Copyright and related rights waived via CC0 1.0 (https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
the biggest for argument seems to be better liquidity mining and not overpaying enzyme, both of which are very weak args to me. i think not knowing token value is actually very good for LM - see zk sync and etherfi. further, the deal with enzyme has vol both ways. we could very well end up underpaying enzyme if the token value ends up being low but moreover, i don't think anything yet discussed has a direct correlation between payment and token price so i'm not exactly sure where those args are coming from. renegotiating on enzyme would be bad form if the token ends up being very valuable.
Very happy that the timeline has been adjusted to mainnet-30 days. The size of the reward to Avantgarde is hard to reason about and I am a bit worried about locking in a yet unknown token price, however, the community sentiment seems to be very in favor.
There was significant discussion about further requirements that will be added in a second vote including node operator incentives and a more concrete timeline so that the DAO is not incentivizing TVL needlessly for too long.