0x49b4…6c52

All memos sent from and to 0x49b4…6c52.

# Removal of ETHx from the collateral basket [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-removal-of-ethx-from-the-collateral-basket/1623](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-removal-of-ethx-from-the-collateral-basket/1623) ### Summary - This RFC proposes the removal ETHx from the collateral basket, reallocating its 5% weighting to frxETH, resulting in a basket comprised of 50% stETH, 25% weETH and 25% frxETH. - ETHx liquidity has deteriorated significantly over the past year. Removing the position now avoids the risk of a more difficult or costly exit if this trajectory continues. - ETHx also has the lowest yield of the current collateral assets, while its 5% allocation provides only a limited diversification benefit. - The rebalance has limited impact on ETHplus at a high level. Blended yield increases from 2.33% to 2.35% while the diversification ratio decreases only slightly from 0.65 to 0.63. - Redemption capacity improves from approximately 65% to 100% of current ETHplus supply in a single transaction below the 0.5% slippage threshold. - The proposal therefore represents a proactive simplification of the basket while ETHx remains small and manageable, rather than a reactive response to an immediate ETHplus-level liquidity constraint in the future.
# eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 29-08-2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-29-08-2026/1622](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-29-08-2026/1622) An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal and the subsequent revenue share update proposal which saw 10% of Fintech Revenues redirected to stRSR holders. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/5/57e9f6297b8a2ea0e5c483d2dedb2e19ba40a196.png) ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/7/70c92cae7cd0644e1248bea602dea550a3edcf29.png)
# eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 13-08-2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-13-08-2026/1601](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-13-08-2026/1601) An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal and the subsequent revenue share update proposal which saw 10% of Fintech Revenues redirected to stRSR holders. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/optimized/2X/f/f55de69ab1f940297ac9eb38b97aa9f1913cf5c0_2_1380x346.png) ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/4/4a6a641b2a6f8f373de5f4c09f4fef39fd1bc87e.png)
# [IP] eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 02-08-2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-02-08-2026/1597](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-02-08-2026/1597) An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal and the subsequent revenue share update proposal which saw 10% of Fintech Revenues redirected to stRSR holders. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/4/48bd1203537c1db87243b3970a980002b36ff596.png)
# ETHplus Rebalance Proposal Q2/3 2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/ip-ethplus-rebalance-proposal-q2-2026/1531/14](https://forum.reserve.org/t/ip-ethplus-rebalance-proposal-q2-2026/1531/14) The first step of the Q1 2026 rebalance was successfully completed on 13th June 2026. As the backing buffer was heavily overfilled, ~150%, prior to the rebalance, the rebalance did not drop the buffer below 100%. As a result, ETHplus holders and RSR stakers experienced no interruption in yield distribution, as any debt burdens to the buffer must be filled in with new appreciation before yield distributions can continue. While the completion of the interim basket hasn’t materially improved the executional depth of ETHplus, with 100% of the supply (5,000 ETH) being able to enter and exit ETHplus in a single transaction with under 0.5% slippage before and after the rebalance, we do see material improvements in the holder yield profile which is now trails it’s stETH benchmark by 3% Vs 7% before the completion of the first step of the rebalance. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/a/ae80419f65b71a28874f0897197853d5a8f8d705.png) ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/b/bbf34ceec88408cde4b2add93bdfdd056282dad0.png) ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/7/7a9e4404b36ddaa583b15b15dee6792d9d63838d.png) ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/f/f7f2852f7bda2b8603f6817d93d4b2ec0bb349d9.png)
# eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 07-16-2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-07-16-2026/1582](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-07-16-2026/1582) An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal and the subsequent revenue share update proposal which saw 10% of Fintech Revenues redirected to stRSR holders. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/0/093c5f608c4e925dbd4826784b62f7c5be7bceb3.png)
# eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 02-07-2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-02-07-2026/1575/1](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-02-07-2026/1575/1) An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal and the subsequent revenue share update proposal which saw 10% of Fintech Revenues redirected to stRSR holders. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/optimized/2X/e/e8f1d01e37f139387ded0eebaaa1f071538701ed_2_1380x348.png)
# eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 19-06-2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-19-06-2026/1569](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-19-06-2026/1569) An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal and the subsequent revenue share update proposal which saw 10% of Fintech Revenues redirected to stRSR holders. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/optimized/2X/7/79a725d5f21c2124c61c5f25c477036a477725bd_2_1380x340.png)
# ETHplus Rebalance Proposal Q2 2026 - Step 1 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-ethplus-rebalance-proposal-q2-2026/1531](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-ethplus-rebalance-proposal-q2-2026/1531) The April 2026 ETHplus Liquidity Analysis highlighted a growing misalignment between the current collateral basket and the ETHplus mandate. Most notably, ETHx has become the primary bottleneck to redemption liquidity, causing basket slippage to exceed the mandated 0.5% threshold at approximately 5,000 ETH, while the recent increase in the ETHplus take rate from 5% to 10% has pushed holder yield below the benchmark stETH rate. At the same time, increasing concentration within individual collateral assets requires closer monitoring to ensure compliance with the mandated 10% dependency limits. This proposal seeks to address these issues through a rebalance which removes rETH, reduces ETHx exposure, increases weETH and frxETH allocations and maintains stETH at 50%. The proposed basket improves redemption capacity, improves the holder yield profile while remaining diversified across multiple ETH staking protocols. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/0/0c72328a01dce716d41595d862b3ae0e780d8830.png) ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/b/b349cc5307aae1e2adda752c61a23559e7828865.png)
# eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 04-06-2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-04-06-2026/1553](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-04-06-2026/1553) An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal and the subsequent revenue share update proposal which saw 10% of Fintech Revenues redirected to stRSR holders. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/optimized/2X/4/445f40303e65000555087cb38a6c6ac4eaa95518_2_1380x346.png) ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/0/01fe2a2021b58c2de2224950f11165dbe8741158.png)
# eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 21-05-2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-21-05-2026/1552](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-21-05-2026/1552) An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal and the subsequent revenue share update proposal which saw 10% of Fintech Revenues redirected to stRSR holders. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/1/14f06bdf41f25b2903b40862476fd441a986f416.png) ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/6/621605502845ba8c71693cd3b1d5ffdfe4c365e9.png)
# eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 07-05-2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-07-05-2026/1529](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-07-05-2026/1529) An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal and the subsequent revenue share update proposal which saw 10% of Fintech Revenues redirected to stRSR holders. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/7/73c5ce32840b1cd3d92d9576c9fbccb9c2581bc1.png)
# eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 23-04-2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-23-04-2026/1522](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-23-04-2026/1522) An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal and the subsequent revenue share update proposal which saw 10% of Fintech Revenues redirected to stRSR holders. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/3/378aa97ad1b7f73b8b075a037f7214c10e47aa87.png)
# ETHplus Upgrade to Release 4.2.0 and Removal of Legacy Onchain State [https://forum.reserve.org/t/ip-ethplus-upgrade-to-release-4-2-0-and-removal-of-legacy-onchain-state/1452](https://forum.reserve.org/t/ip-ethplus-upgrade-to-release-4-2-0-and-removal-of-legacy-onchain-state/1452) This proposal recommends upgrading ETHplus to Reserve Protocol v4.2.0 to align it with the latest supported smart contract release. The upgrade consists of a single onchain spell that upgrades core contract implementation contracts and rotates governance and collateral plugins to their v4.2.0 equivalents. The proposal also aims to remove legacy onchain state. Specifically, obsolete TimelockControllers that still retain pauser and freezer roles will be removed. These controllers were not removed after the v3.4.0 upgrade and represent an unnecessary governance grief vector.
# eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 09-04-2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-09-04-2026/1510](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-09-04-2026/1510) An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal and the subsequent revenue share update proposal which saw 10% of Fintech Revenues redirected to stRSR holders. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/7/7376571acec47f38c63910dd6e36a7eed63f3ae5.png)
# eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 26-03-2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-26-03-2026/1495](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-26-03-2026/1495) An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal. Original Revenue Share Programme [Proposal](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-rev-share-with-fintech-apps/801). ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/optimized/2X/c/c3708fe457b2ecd0a5b3b1ddfd0815b63d8cca4f_2_1380x344.png)
# eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 12-03-2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-12-03-2026/1470](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-12-03-2026/1470) An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal. Original Revenue Share Programme [Proposal](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-rev-share-with-fintech-apps/801). ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/optimized/2X/d/d155b8d21b64b189b2a01901a3e075198728baee_2_1380x410.png)
# eUSD 4.2.0 Upgrade [https://forum.reserve.org/t/ip-eusd-4-2-0-upgrade/1436](https://forum.reserve.org/t/ip-eusd-4-2-0-upgrade/1436) Summary Upgrade all eUSD core contracts and assets from version 3.4.0 to version 4.2.0. This new version of the software includes updates from 4.0.0, 4.1.0, and 4.2.0. Abstract The proposed proposal, if enacted, would use a spell contract prepared by ABC Labs and moved onchain by governors via the Register app and voted on through the standard governance process.
# Return External Revenue to RSR Stakers (Reproposed) [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-return-external-revenue-to-rsr-stakers/1459](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-return-external-revenue-to-rsr-stakers/1459) **The IP has been reproposed as USD3 recent upgrade to protocol version 4.2.0. changed the governor, effectively loosing the previous IP.** This proposal returns 3% (2.5% for KNOX) of the Rev Share distribution that is directed to Sawyer as DTF Champion back to stRSR for the following RTokens: eUSD, hyUSD(base+mainnet), USD3, and KNOX. **Proposed Revenue Distribution** RToken Holders: 85% RSR Stakers: 15%
# Revenue Share Programme - Fintech Revenue Share Adjustment [https://forum.reserve.org/t/ip-revenue-share-programme-fintech-revenue-share-adjustment/1463/1](https://forum.reserve.org/t/ip-revenue-share-programme-fintech-revenue-share-adjustment/1463/1) his proposal updates the eUSD Revenue Share Programme by moving from a 100/0 revenue split in favour of participating fintechs to a 90/10 split, with 10% of revenue generated on fintech-held balances redirected to eUSD RSR stakers. The original 100% allocation played an important role in bootstrapping early distribution and market growth. As eUSD and its distribution partners have matured, however, no future transition framework was established in order to rebalance revenue towards a more equitable split, fairly compensating stakers for their ongoing work in governance and for over-collateralising the asset. Under the proposed change, UC and Sentz each retain 90% of revenue generated on their respective eUSD balances, with the remaining 10% aggregated and distributed to eUSD stRSR. Based on the 26/02/2026 snapshot, this represents an annualised redistribution of approximately $31.6k to stRSR. Following the in-flight Revenue Share Programme update that reduces staking APY to 5.86%, the 90/10 adjustment partially offsets this decline, increasing staking APY to approximately 6.59%. The proposal is intentionally minimal in scope. It does not alter the biweekly update cadence, distribution mechanics or operational processes. Instead, it establishes a clearer long-term revenue framework that better aligns incentives across fintech partners and RSR stakers while preserving revenue predictability and ecosystem stability. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/d/dbbacac87164230817d33c5c651a486dbb6264df.png)
# Return External Revenue to RSR Stakers [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-return-external-revenue-to-rsr-stakers/1459](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-return-external-revenue-to-rsr-stakers/1459) This proposal returns 3% (2.5% for KNOX) of the Rev Share distribution that is directed to Sawyer as DTF Champion back to stRSR for the following RTokens: eUSD, hyUSD(base+mainnet), USD3, and KNOX. **Proposed Revenue Distribution** RToken Holders: 85% RSR Stakers: 15%
# eUSD Revenue Share Programme Update 26-02-2026 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-26-02-2026/1462](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eusd-revenue-share-programme-update-26-02-2026/1462) An update to the existing ongoing proposal of sharing eUSD Revenue with participating fintechs, Ugly Cash and Sentz. The proposed proposal, if enacted, would update the Revenue Share in order to maintain compliance with the rules of the original revenue share proposal. ![image](https://europe1.discourse-cdn.com/flex005/uploads/reserve/original/2X/e/e0aa90e756f29acd9d89a750139f0e3b59fbb264.png)
# Upgrade to Protocol Version 4.2.0. [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-usd3-4-2-0-upgrade/1435](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-usd3-4-2-0-upgrade/1435) Upgrade all USD3 core contracts and assets from version 3.4.0 to version 4.2.0. This new version of the software includes updates from 4.0.0, 4.1.0, and 4.2.0.
# ETH+ revenue share adjustment [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eth-revenue-share-adjustment/1450](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-eth-revenue-share-adjustment/1450) This proposal aims to adjust the ETH+ revenue distribution methodology to better align with the current risk profile of the product and the long-term health of the Reserve ecosystem. The ETH+ revenue share is currently defined within the ETH+ methodology, which passed an IP vote in early January. This RFC proposes a change to that methodology. Proposed changes: Total take rate: 5% → 10%. RSR staker share: 5% → 3%. Platform fee (RSR buy & burn): 0% → 7% *The platform fee is to be directed to the community ran multi-sig. Currently, all funds sent to this address are used to buy and burn RSR.*
# ETHplus Rebalance Proposal Q1 2026 - Step 2 [https://forum.reserve.org/t/ip-ethplus-rebalance-proposal-q1-2026/1407/7](https://forum.reserve.org/t/ip-ethplus-rebalance-proposal-q1-2026/1407/7) The first step of the Q1 2026 ETHplus rebalance was completed successfully on 27th Jan 2026 with no interruption to yield distribution. Execution was completed safely, with only 15% of the backing buffer utilised and the buffer remaining above 100% throughout. Step 1 has improved executional depth relative to the December basket. The interim basket now supports redemptions below the 0.5% slippage threshold up to 22,500 ETH, compared to approximately 5,250 ETH previously, while mint capacity below the same threshold remains above 50,000 ETH. These improvements have been achieved without compromising yield or diversification. Blended yield remains unchanged at 2.61% and concentration risk has been reduced, with ETHplus’ share of total frxETH TVL falling from 9.19% to 6.56%. Completing the second step of the rebalance is expected to extend redemption capacity below the 0.5% slippage threshold to approximately 30,000 ETH while maintaining yield and diversification profiles, furthering ETHplus into mandate compliance and providing significant headroom for further supply growth. I now plan to liaise with ABC Labs on scheduling the second step of the rebalance. Their operational oversight is greatly appreciated in order to mitigate loss. Once timing is confirmed I will announce it here and on ETHplus socials. As always, feedback from governors is welcomed.
# [IP] ETHplus Rebalance Proposal Q1 2026 / Ratification of mandate and methodology update [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-ethplus-rebalance-proposal-q1-2026/1407](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-ethplus-rebalance-proposal-q1-2026/1407) This on-chain vote combines approval of a quarterly collateral rebalance for ETHplus and ratification of an updated mandate with a formalised DTF methodology. The Rebalance Proposal responds to the December 2025 liquidity analysis showing that the current collateral basket’s redemption performance no longer meets the slippage standards in the proposed methodology, driven by concentrated risk in rETH and frxETH. The proposed solution reallocates weight toward deeper-liquidity assets, notably including weETH under the expanded mandate, which increases redemption capacity significantly while only modestly reducing yield. To manage execution risk, the rebalance is staged, beginning with an interim basket followed by a transition to the target allocation once defined liquidity criteria are met. The Mandate and DTF Methodology Update formalises ETHplus’ governing principles and expands eligible collateral to include both liquid staking tokens and liquid restaking tokens, with clear guidelines on diversification, liquidity standards (e.g., slippage ≤ 0.5% for up to 20 % of supply), maximum asset concentration, yield benchmarking, and reporting. Ratifying this methodology on-chain aligns ETHplus with standards used by newer DTFs and supports consistent, transparent governance decisions. The combined vote authorises moving ETHplus into an interim basket and ratifying the updated mandate and methodology as the foundational governance framework for future rebalances and risk management. More information on either of these two proposals can be found below: ETHplus Rebalance Proposal Q1 2026: https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-ethplus-rebalance-proposal-q1-2026/1407 Mandate and Methodology update: https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-ethplus-mandate-and-dtf-methodology-update/1383
# Proposal to Turn Off Default Detection of ETHplus Collateral Assets [https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-modelling-how-ethplus-would-react-to-a-deep-and-sustained-steth-depeg-and-what-actions-we-can-take-via-governance-to-mitigate-loss/1238](https://forum.reserve.org/t/rfc-modelling-how-ethplus-would-react-to-a-deep-and-sustained-steth-depeg-and-what-actions-we-can-take-via-governance-to-mitigate-loss/1238) ETHplus currently holds 50% of its collateral basket in stETH as it is considered a safe and liquid asset that dominates the LST category. However, over the last few months we have seen the withdrawal queue increase from less than a day to where it sits now at ~26 days. stETH holders looking to exit their position now have an option, exit via DEX liquidity at a slight discount or wait in the withdrawl queue where a 1:1 redemption is guarenteed. As the queue length increases more and more holders are chosing to exit via DEX LPs leading to a sustained 25-50bps depeg against ETH. This sustained depeg has led to some unwinding of the levered stETH trade extending the queue and the depeg even further. Current Risk: The sustained 25-50bps depeg of stETH has raised concerns about a possible default which if triggered by the protocol at 0.975 would causing the collateral basket to sell off it's defaulting collateral and to flee to ETH, this sell-off by the protocol would likely incur significant slippage and leave ETHplus holders and RSR stakers with significant losses. Protocol Mechanics: Currently, the protocol will programmatically sell off stETH if a 2.5% or greater depeg persists for 24 hours. The protocol will auction off the stETH to bidders but it’s likely the majority will be sold through on-chain liquidity. A previously moddeled worse case scenario, which sells stETH entirely through DEX liquidity led to a complete seizure of the RSR backing in an attempt to re-collateralise the basket but still left ETHplus holders with a ~10% haircut. Likely Exit Dynamics: The worst case scenario modeled above is not likely to happen in practice as many ETHplus holders will exit their ETHplus positions and choose illiquidity via the withdrawal queue rather than choosing liquidity with the protocol seen as though this option allows for 1:1 redemption. The actions of these ETHplus holders reduces the amount of stETH that has to be sold via DEX liquidity, reducing loss for the remaining ETHplus holders first and then RSR stakers. Mitigation Options: A number of options exist; accept current parameters as safe and do nothing, increase the default detection threshold, increase the default delay, a combination of both or turn off default detection on ETHplus collateral entirely. Proposal: Forum discussion and an off chain poll saw most governors and ABC labs members to be in favour of turning off default detection for ETHplus. Given this majority the proposal to turn off the default detection, completed by setting the diversity factory of the emergency collateral to zero, has graduated to a onchain vote.
# Collateral Basket Change Proposal 7 - Updating the ETH+/WETH Convex LP Plugin [https://app.reserve.org/ethereum/token/0x005f893ecd7bf9667195642f7649da8163e23658/governance/proposal](https://app.reserve.org/ethereum/token/0x005f893ecd7bf9667195642f7649da8163e23658/governance/proposal) This proposal seeks to update the dgnETH collateral basket by migrating its 75% allocation from the Convex CryptoSwap ETH+/ETH LP to the StableSwap variant. The migration aligns the dgnETH basket with ETHplus’s own liquidity optimisations. The new StableSwap pool offers tighter spreads for pegged assets, reduced slippage on large trades, and improves ETHplus scalability. The StableSwap pool has recently delivered higher yields than the CryptoSwap pool (5.91% vs. 2.27% 30d average), though dilution is expected as liquidity migrates, mitigated in part by a subsequent migration of incentives by ABC Labs. In addition, the new plugin introduces gas optimisations that cuts dgnETH transaction costs by ~33%, albeit with a modest increase in stale-data risk as it moves the plugin uses 24h refresh window compared to the current plugin which refreshes on every action.