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0x66cd…65f9

All memos sent from and to 0x66cd…65f9.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#25,029,605·0x9c42a0c7…3e7793
This proposal is what the community has been asking for since it converged on the establishment of a Foundation as the path forward following significant turbulence in 2024-2025. The ask is large, but the vision for V4 will create a competitive edge for Compound both at the protocol level and at the market acquisition level. While moving forward with these proposals is a bit clunky amidst the rsETH resolution, I agree with the Foundation that it doesn't make sense to delay these important and time-sensitive initiatives. Passage of proposals 581 and especially 580 will contribute to the success of 582, so I am glad to see them moving together through governance.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#25,029,599·0x5708cad2…d90bfd
This is the second initiative to establish a delegate compensation program. I abstained from the first such proposal on principle as a delegate who stood to gain from the initiative despite my conviction that such an initiative was overdue given the significant time and effort required to be an informed and productive delegate. That proposal was defeated by a single actor who obfuscated their voting power and acted to kill the initiative at the 11th hour. While I still feel like abstention is the best path philosophically, at a practical level given the way the vote was decided last time, I regret my previous abstention and vote in favor of this proposal.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#25,029,593·0x247f5d33…59fc83
Given the scale of the Foundation's upcoming V4 request from the DAO, it is prudent to structure management of these funds and related DAO assets under a committee structure. The structure balances accountability to the DAO with a degree of discretion and industry expertise suited to the need. I acknowledge the existence of a conflict of interest insofar as I have been identified in the proposal as a community member on the committee. That said, this proposal is an important complement to the Foundation's ask: I support Proposal 582 (funding V4) and see passage of this proposal as critical infrastructure to protect and strengthen the DAO under the initiatives launched by Proposal 582.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#25,019,242·0x633f0eee…5fce7f
I am supportive of Gauntlet's relatively strict tightening of supply caps on non-USD mainnet Comets. In addition to the general TVL outflows I cited in my support for Proposal 578, the need to carefully manage caps on staked ETH collateral is especially fraught due to strong correlation among these assets and potential edge-case risks in case an unexpected turn of events in the rsETH recapitalization campaign propagates through these markets.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#25,019,212·0x85b6fbfd…5191bf
Significant liquidity exited lending protocols across mainnet following the exploit of the rsETH LayerZero bridge. Conditions justify the significant supply cap reductions proposed by Gauntlet. The ruleset they introduce meaningfully and appropriately tightens risk tolerance across these Comets.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#24,539,604·0x97af9f5c…b51649
I've been a staunch supporter of SP payment in COMP, but as a SP myself who was paid in COMP that was mostly held, it has been difficult to watch other SPs sell and contribute to driving down the market value of others' earned COMP. This transition won't fully stem the tide, but it is aligned with the current DAO consensus on the need to buttress the market value of COMP.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#24,507,099·0xa9002f14…685e07
While the DAO should start to conserve COMP for a future V4 launch, curtailment of incentives needs to be discussed in the open, in advance, rather than effectuated by starving out the rewards contract
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#24,503,255·0x798bac01…f6603c
USDe's stabilization mechanism is insufficiently robust to serve as collateral on Compound's flagship USDT and USDC mainnet markets. Adding it as collateral will drive away users averse to USDe's risk model and will generate negative sentiment for the DAO if (as was the case for Elixir) stablecoin depositors take a hit because of a failure in USDe collateral they didn't even understand they were exposed to.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#24,503,251·0x43c0ba9e…eefcc4
USDe's stabilization mechanism is insufficiently robust to serve as collateral on Compound's flagship USDT and USDC mainnet markets. Adding it as collateral will drive away users averse to USDe's risk model and will generate negative sentiment for the DAO if (as was the case for Elixir) stablecoin depositors take a hit because of a failure in USDe collateral they didn't even understand they were exposed to.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#24,464,394·0x0ac941ae…37ebde
My support of this proposal is rooted in the Foundation's judgment that such an EPCF may be necessary for ecosystem integrity. There is an element of trust involved, but some trust is necessary in the present adversarial environment.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#24,463,857·0x066a5ff1…305092
V2 reserves are the protocol's legacy; the DAO should not surrender control easily. However, it also made a bit bet on the Foundation which will require flexibility to fulfill its mandate effectively. This proposal strikes a good balance by only seeking management of the DAI and giving the DAO an opportunity to see how stewardship and reporting go before discussing any further V2 reserves.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#24,461,671·0x5c58791b…464f46
Proposal Guardian extension is a necessary and time-sensitive evil to defend the DAO from entities that have demonstrated intent to capture governance. I am holding my nose but suspect that failure of this proposal could be an existential threat to the DAO.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#23,163,635·0xcca9c1b6…877b62
Although I'm not a huge fan of staked ETH derivatives as collateral on this market, there are already others with similar risk profiles that can be used as collateral. It would be unfair and capricious to deny rsETH.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#22,873,057·0xe0c1a9d3…147e2d
I think setting the supply cap at half of the sdeUSD/deUSD Balancer pool TVL (the only real-time liquidity; unstaking takes a week) is too aggressive. I'd prefer assessing performance of deUSD before adding sdeUSD.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#22,873,053·0xe0838cc5…c1e6d6
I think setting the supply cap at half of the sdeUSD/deUSD Balancer pool TVL (the only real-time liquidity; unstaking takes a week) is too aggressive. I'd prefer assessing performance of deUSD before adding sdeUSD.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#22,813,551·0xc1499be3…f3c6a6
I am skeptical of making deUSD a significant portion of collateral in this market, but the suggested 8M cap is less than atomically redeemable deUSD, making this a conservative addition
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#22,186,743·0x0075c53e…b414e1
AG's 4th proposal is aligned with community feedback to sustain, not expand its mandate. I am excited about Labs' announcement of a Foundation concept but find the timing suspicious and disrespectful of the forum governance process.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#21,954,808·0x73dca336…d2b247
I'm still a bit skeptical about Unichain's identity (is it really general-purpose or just an appchain?), but if a DeFi ecosystem blossoms there, it's good to have Compound already established there.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#21,842,635·0xb81970f4…d6cb57
While my skepticism over the security structure of WBTC itself has increased, this Comet is suitable for folks who are comfortable lending or borrowing WBTC, including risks associated with the different custodial properties of the base and collateral assets.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#21,842,606·0x3d1fbe06…e661ea
Similarly to my vote for upgrading Comets on Base, Arbitrum has a large number of LSTs and other high-quality collaterals with sufficient liquidity that it makes sense to support additional collateral assets.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#21,842,544·0x730f8d3c…31fe9e
Comets on Base are particularly likely, given current trends, to have a variety of suitable collaterals with sufficient on-chain liquidity to justify expanding the number of collaterals on Base Comets.
0x66cd62c6…65f9sent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#21,812,101·0x803d5090…2fb4d3
While this update seems less urgent than the collateral expansions for other markets currently under voting, there's no compelling reason not to set the stage for diversifying collaterals on the USDe comet.
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