I came here to vote for the proposal but after reading through it I ultimately couldnt. Here are my extended views:
https://discuss.ens.domains/t/draft-executable-next-era-of-ens-dao-empowering-the-ens-foundation/22329/14?u=avsa
# [6.48][Executable] Renewal of the Security Council (Term 2)
https://discuss.ens.domains/t/6-45-renewal-of-the-security-council/22145
## Abstract
The ENS DAO Security Council's veto authority expires on 24 July 2026, when renounceTimelockRoleByExpiration() becomes callable at Fri, Jul 24, 2026, 18:52:59 UTC. This proposal renews the council for a further two-year term. It deploys an updated SecurityCouncil contract that adds a extend() function callable only by the DAO timelock, so future renewals are a single governance vote rather than a fresh deployment and role re-grant. The new contract is audited before it is deployed, with the Meta-Governance Working Group funding the audit. The 4-of-8 multisig and the council's cancel-only emergency mandate are unchanged, with one signer rotation: lefteris.eth, who is no longer active in the DAO, is removed and coltron.eth, the largest active delegate not currently on the council, is added. This post has gone through the temperature check; and the Snapshot social vote, and now we are voting on the executable.
## Specification
### Background
The Security Council is a 4-of-8 [Safe multisig](https://app.safe.global/home?safe=eth:0xaA5cD05f6B62C3af58AE9c4F3F7A2aCC2Cdc2Cc7) with a single power: to cancel malicious proposals in the ENS timelock. It cannot propose, amend, or initiate any governance action. It was approved through [EP 5.7 \[Social\]](https://snapshot.box/#/s:ens.eth/proposal/0xf3a4673fe04a3ecfed4a2f066f6ced1539a5466d61630428333360b843653c54), [EP 5.10 \[Social\]](https://snapshot.box/#/s:ens.eth/proposal/0xa0b1bfadf6853b5b0d59d3c4d73c434fc6389339887d05de805361372eb17c3a), and [EP 5.13 \[Executable\]](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/ens/proposal/42329103797433777309488042029679811802172320979541414683300183273376839219133) (passed 25 July 2024). The current contract is deployed at [0xb8fa0ce3f91f41c5292d07475b445c35ddf63ee0](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb8fa0ce3f91f41c5292d07475b445c35ddf63ee0) and its authority is time-limited: two years plus a 7-day buffer after deployment, anyone may call renounceTimelockRoleByExpiration() to permanently disable the cancel power, which occurs on 24 July 2026. The threat that motivated the council, a large treasury relative to active voting power, has not changed, so the recommendation is to renew rather than let it lapse.
### New contract
The current contract has no way to extend its own expiration, so renewing it requires deploying a new contract, passing an executable proposal to grant PROPOSER\_ROLE, and letting the old role expire. We propose deploying an updated SecurityCouncil contract ([blockful/security-council-ens](https://github.com/blockful/security-council-ens)) with the same cancel-only mandate and 4-of-8 ownership, plus an extend() function.
The key safety property is that only the timelock can call extend(), so only a passed ENS DAO proposal can extend the term and the multisig cannot extend its own power. After this renewal, each subsequent renewal is a single extend() proposal with no redeploy and no re-grant.
# [6.47][Executable] Delegation Incentives Program (Funding Transfer)
https://discuss.ens.domains/t/temp-check-delegation-incentives-program/21824
## Abstract
This is the on-chain executable proposal to fund the **Delegation Incentives Program**, already [approved](https://snapshot.box/#/s:ens.eth/proposal/0xf0ad5ad5a1ee353a65424a83e74f2b8846b16885a4be99af26b5162bfa78c644) by ENS governance via Snapshot (\[6.31] Delegation Incentives Program). It transfers **90,000 ENS** and 5 ETH from the DAO treasury to the **MetaGov stewards multisig**, which will manage distribution over the program's three monthly rounds.
The program is ready to launch:
* **Start date:** July 1st, 2026
* **Duration:** 3 months (three monthly distribution rounds)
* **Launch campaign:** Planned (redelegation campaign with sponsored gas via `delegateBySig`, plus a visibility campaign).
* **Website:** Live.
## Motivation
ENS is safer when voting power sits with active delegates rather than idle wallets. This 90-day pilot pays viewpoint-neutral incentives to active delegates and their delegators, using time-weighted balances, per-recipient caps, a 1 ENS minimum payout, and a lottery for sub-1 ENS amounts. Full program design, reward formulas, and guardrails are specified in the approved Snapshot proposal.
* **Funding:** 90,000 ENS, managed by the MetaGov stewards for distribution. Actual usage scales with results and can range from 15,000 to 90,000 ENS. **Any remainder is returned to the treasury after the program ends.** 5 ETH is transferred to sponsor gas on delegations, votes for the long term.
* **Distribution:** Monthly, claimless transfers executed by the MetaGov multisig, with public snapshots, data, and distribution files published each round.
## Specification
90,000 ENS tokens + 5 ETH sent to [MetaGov multisig](https://etherscan.io/address/0x91c32893216dE3eA0a55ABb9851f581d4503d39b).
I look forward to working with unruggable and funding their work in february, when the Service Provider program is renewed. If this was a smaller ask, or if the renewal of the program wasn't happening so soon, or if they were already been a service provider for longer, I would have voted for the proposal.
As the submitter any error in communication is my fault. I am voting abstain to decrease the quorum and allow the majority opinion to be reached faster.
# [EP 5.24] [Executable] Term 5 Q4, Collective Working Group Funding Proposal
[Temp Check Discourse link](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/ep-5-24-executable-term-5-q4-collective-working-group-funding-proposal/19801)
## Description
This proposal executes all three Working Group funding requests for the October 2024 funding window as passed in [EP 5.17.1](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/5-17-1-social-funding-request-ens-meta-governance-working-group-term-5-oct-window/19677), [EP 5.17.2](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/5-17-2-social-funding-request-ens-ecosystem-working-group/19678), and [EP 5.17.3](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/5-17-3-social-funding-request-ens-public-goods-working-group/19679) as well as [EP 5.21](https://snapshot.org/#/ens.eth/proposal/0x5067725bef9cde0de0024adedb653a7a1752aefa726adf628b77048d85821a6d) and [EP 5.19](https://snapshot.org/#/ens.eth/proposal/0xfa54ff2b55f0495c96ec2d8645241bcff48ca6afe1f4925fb51f29c4667252df). For more detail, view the [ENS Governance docs](https://basics.ensdao.org/funding-requests/funding-requests)
## Proposal Components
---
### 1) [Meta-governance Funding Request [EP 5.17.1]](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/5-17-1-social-funding-request-ens-meta-governance-working-group-term-5-oct-window/19677)
The Meta-governance Working Group requests funding to fulfill anticipated budgetary needs through the next formal funding window in April 2025.
| Destination | USDC | ETH | $ENS |
|:------------|:----:|:---:|:----:|
| [ENS Meta-Gov Main Multisig](https://etherscan.io/address/0x91c32893216dE3eA0a55ABb9851f581d4503d39b) | 354,000 | 0 | 45,000 |
This amount will cover all expected expenses (including the ENS required for vesting on 5.19 and 5.21) while maintaining a 100,000 USDC prudent reserve to ensure continuity if future funding is delayed.
---
### 2) [Ecosystem Funding Request [EP 5.17.2]](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/5-17-2-social-funding-request-ens-ecosystem-working-group/19678)
The ENS Ecosystem Working Group requests funding to support operations through April 2025. This is the only funding request of Term 5. The working group is responsible for growing and improving the ENS Ecosystem by funding builders and projects that are ENS-specific or ENS-centric.
| Destination | USDC | ETH | $ENS |
|:------------|:----:|:---:|:----:|
| [ENS Ecosystem Main Multisig](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2686a8919df194aa7673244549e68d42c1685d03) | 836,000 | 0 | 0 |
---
### 3) [Public Goods Funding Request [EP 5.17.3]](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/5-17-3-social-funding-request-ens-public-goods-working-group/19679)
The ENS Public Goods Working Group requests funding to support operations through the next funding window in April 2025. The funds requested extend current needs through to next term to ensure that next season's stewards have available funding before the next funding window.
| Destination | USDC | ETH | $ENS |
|:------------|:----:|:---:|:----:|
| [Public Goods Main Multisig](https://etherscan.io/address/0xcD42b4c4D102cc22864e3A1341Bb0529c17fD87d) | 226,000 | 0 | 0 |
---
## Specification
The following transfers are to be made from the DAO treasury:
1. Transfer 354,000 USDC to the Meta-governance safe:
- Address: `0x91c32893216dE3eA0a55ABb9851f581d4503d39b`
2. Transfer 836,000 USDC to the Ecosystem safe:
- Address: `0x2686A8919Df194aA7673244549E68D42C1685d03`
3. Transfer 226,000 USDC to the Public Goods safe:
- Address: `0xcD42b4c4D102cc22864e3A1341Bb0529c17fD87d`
4. Transfer 45,000 ENS to the Meta-governance safe:
- Address: `0x91c32893216dE3eA0a55ABb9851f581d4503d39b`
#### Total transfer amount: 1,416,000 USDC and 45,000 ENS
# [EP 5.12] Roles Modifier V2 Migration & Updates to Endowment Permissions
# Abstract
This proposal aims to roll out an updated version of the Zodiac Roles Modifier module. The new version improves usability and transparency of treasury management operations. Upon approval, the Roles Modifier v2 module will be activated.
Furthermore, this proposal requests authorization from the DAO to revise the permissions policy. A notable change includes enabling swapping actions on CoW Swap while the other permissions primarily focus on eliminating obsolete actions and protocols, and refining parameters within the existing permissions.
# Roles v2 Migration
## Motivation
As [previously stated](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/endowment-initiation/15952#a-list-of-zodiac-roles-modifier-permissions-for-the-manager-role-9), the Zodiac Roles Modifier facilitates karpatkey’s proxy management of the Endowment by ensuring that only pre-approved transactions, defined by the permissions policy voted on by the DAO, can be executed. In collaboration with karpatkey, the Gnosis Guild team has significantly upgraded the Zodiac Roles Modifier module and the Zodiac Roles app. These enhancements have resulted in a more powerful and robust on-chain permissions infrastructure with the following improvements:
* **Introduction of Allowances**: Implementation of spending limits within permissions.
* **Enhanced Call Data Scoping Toolset**: This toolset considerably broadens the range of functions that can have permissions set, increasing flexibility.
* **Advanced Logical Conditions**: Allows for the creation of complex permissions structures to accommodate sophisticated operational needs.
* **Compatibility with** [**DeFi Kit**](https://kit.karpatkey.com/): This feature integrates with karpatkey’s permissions policy building module, facilitating the straightforward crafting of protocol actions.
* **Improved Visualisation and User Interface**: the new [Zodiac Roles app UI 1](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/) not only displays permissions clearly but also provides a user-friendly interface to compare changes in each policy update, enhancing transparency and simplifying audits.
For more detailed information, please refer to the following resources:
* **Documentation**: [The Zodiac Roles Modifier](https://docs.roles.gnosisguild.org/)
* **Articles**: [Evolving Smart Accounts with Onchain Permissions](https://gnosisguild.mirror.xyz/oQcy_c62huwNkFS0cMIxXwQzrfG0ESQax8EBc_tWwwk), [Permissions as code 1](https://engineering.gnosisguild.org/posts/permissions-as-code)
## Contract Audits
The Zodiac Roles Modifier v2 contract has been rigorously audited by G0 Group, the internal auditing team of Gnosis DAO, and by [Omniscia](https://omniscia.io/). The detailed audit reports are available for review [here 1](https://github.com/gnosisguild/zodiac-modifier-roles/tree/main/packages/evm/docs).
# Changes to the Permissions Policy
This proposal outlines the following modifications to the permissions policy:
1. **Token Arrays for Swapping**:
1. Considering the tokens involved in the existing permissions, we have updated the token arrays to ensure they can be seamlessly swapped across the various whitelisted protocols and aggregators.
2. **Token IN Allowlist**: \[CRV, DAI, USDT, BAL, AURA, CVX, ETHx, COMP, rETH, SWISE, wstETH, LDO, WETH, ankrETH, USDC, stETH].
3. **Token OUT Allowlist**: \[DAI, USDT, USDC, rETH, wstETH, WETH, stETH].
4. The above arrays are to be utilised for swapping on CoW Swap, with equivalent lists replicated for Uniswap v3 and Balancer.
2. **Introduction of CoW Swap** ([diff 4](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/C0zUV4NtNErufEpbpNc2S55F2oiAGw8aKE2jYwWjLg?annotations=false#right-0x23da9ade38e4477b23770ded512fd37b12381fab)): 5. Addition of a **CoW Swap Order signer** to enable gas-minimised and MEV-protected swaps. This includes an extensive set of aggregated exchange routes, improving the efficiency and effectiveness of required swaps. 6. Tokens will be swapped on CoW Swap according to the token IN/OUT allowlists mentioned above.
3. **Deprecations and Removals**: 7. **Uniswap v2 Swaps** ([diff 1](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/C0zUV4NtNErufEpbpNc2S55F2oiAGw8aKE2jYwWjLg?annotations=false#left-0x68b3465833fb72a70ecdf485e0e4c7bd8665fc45-0x472b43f3)): Removed due to insufficient liquidity in V2 pools. 8. **Stakewise v2**: Deprecated functions related to deposit ([diff 1](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/C0zUV4NtNErufEpbpNc2S55F2oiAGw8aKE2jYwWjLg?annotations=false#left-0xc874b064f465bdd6411d45734b56fac750cda29a)) and claim ([diff 1](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/C0zUV4NtNErufEpbpNc2S55F2oiAGw8aKE2jYwWjLg?annotations=false#left-0xa3f21010e8b9a3930996c8849df38f9ca3647c20)) functions in light of the recent launch of Stakewise v3. Consequently, permitted actions related to Stakewise v2’s sETH2-ETH Uniswap pool are also removed ([diff](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/C0zUV4NtNErufEpbpNc2S55F2oiAGw8aKE2jYwWjLg?annotations=false#left-0xc36442b4a4522e871399cd717abdd847ab11fe88)). 9. **Compound v2** ([diff](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/C0zUV4NtNErufEpbpNc2S55F2oiAGw8aKE2jYwWjLg?annotations=false#left-0x39aa39c021dfbae8fac545936693ac917d5e7563)): Discontinued all actions targeting v2 contracts and v2 cTokens (cUSDC and cDAI) due to the ongoing transition of the protocol to its v3. 10. **Revocation of Existing/Obsolete Allowances:** All existing and outdated allowances previously set by the Endowment are revoked (set to zero). The ability to call the corresponding approve functions is included in the newly proposed policy. Accordingly, the payload contains a bundle of transactions to revoke these allowances.
4. **Updates**: 11. **Uniswap v3** ([diff 1](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/C0zUV4NtNErufEpbpNc2S55F2oiAGw8aKE2jYwWjLg?annotations=false#right-0x68b3465833fb72a70ecdf485e0e4c7bd8665fc45-0x04e45aaf)) **and Balancer** ([diff](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/C0zUV4NtNErufEpbpNc2S55F2oiAGw8aKE2jYwWjLg?annotations=false#right-0xba12222222228d8ba445958a75a0704d566bf2c8)): Adjusted to allow the mentioned token IN/OUT allowlists. 12. **Curve Pools**: Addition of stETH-ng (factory) pool ([diff](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/rMNui3Yp9LlBScVLFjY9cWkk4QGYoIVkkYxURs16ys?annotations=false#right-0x21e27a5e5513d6e65c4f830167390997aa84843a)) and removal of cUSDC + cDAI pool ([diff 1](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/rMNui3Yp9LlBScVLFjY9cWkk4QGYoIVkkYxURs16ys?annotations=false#left-0xa2b47e3d5c44877cca798226b7b8118f9bfb7a56); Compound v2 tokens). 13. **Curve ZAP Deposit Contract** ([diff](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/rMNui3Yp9LlBScVLFjY9cWkk4QGYoIVkkYxURs16ys?annotations=false#right-0x56c526b0159a258887e0d79ec3a80dfb940d0cd7)): Introduced to allow depositing and staking of LP tokens in a single step. 14. **Convex Staking** ([diff](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/C0zUV4NtNErufEpbpNc2S55F2oiAGw8aKE2jYwWjLg?annotations=false#right-0x6b27d7bc63f1999d14ff9ba900069ee516669ee8)): Added the CVX/stETH Rewards contract. 15. **Lido Withdrawals** ([diff](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/C0zUV4NtNErufEpbpNc2S55F2oiAGw8aKE2jYwWjLg?annotations=false#right-0x889edc2edab5f40e902b864ad4d7ade8e412f9b1)): Enhanced to include new withdrawal methods using permits for both wstETH and stETH; methods include `requestWithdrawalsWstETHWithPermit` and `requestWithdrawalsWithPermit`. 16. **Spark Rewards Claim** ([diff 1](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/C0zUV4NtNErufEpbpNc2S55F2oiAGw8aKE2jYwWjLg?annotations=false#right-0x4370d3b6c9588e02ce9d22e684387859c7ff5b34)): Added functionality to claim wstETH rewards in Spark.
# Audit Considerations
We highly value the community’s involvement in reviewing and providing feedback on this proposal. We encourage members with the necessary technical expertise to examine the content carefully (including this [payload 1](https://gist.github.com/santinomics/773117b729152f31a121045f4ba26b5b)) and share their insights with us.
For effective testing of the permissions policy configuration, we have utilised a [Testing Avatar Safe 1](https://app.safe.global/balances?safe=eth:0xC01318baB7ee1f5ba734172bF7718b5DC6Ec90E1). This safe mirrors the current state of the [permissions policy v4 1](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Ker_TkBJV0xmQ9Li9HB-vtdlpx1vEeVEQwpIH6WoK0o) granted by the Endowment to the Manager SAFE operated by karpatkey. The enhancements in the Zodiac Roles app interface now allow for a clear visualisation of all existing permissions, accessible [here 2](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xbd1099dfd3c11b65fb4bb19a350da2f5b61efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1).
The updated interface also simplifies the process of identifying [changes](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/C0zUV4NtNErufEpbpNc2S55F2oiAGw8aKE2jYwWjLg?annotations=false) by displaying the current permissions policy on the left side and the newly proposed policy on the right side. To further aid in the adoption and understanding of these tools for audit purposes, we have detailed the proposed changes in [version 5 documentation](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KU4a7s-AxAAAPJxd8vexn7kCl8hsr3-c7VIDfEPHbKc/edit), following our standard Policy Update Request (PUR) format.
# Additional considerations
## Roles Modifier v1 and Enabling of v2
The existing Roles Modifier v1 module will remain active to ensure a smooth transition and prevent any unexpected disruptions in operational execution. Ownership of the deployed [Roles Modifier v2 module 1](https://etherscan.io/address/0x703806E61847984346d2D7DDd853049627e50A40), equipped with the new proposed permissions policy, has been [transferred 1](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x78c69c7ad0c5f430d97ec5c3bac5cb649d831a756b3d4c5b09b45152427ae8f4) to the Endowment’s Avatar Safe. These permissions are displayed [here 4](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0x703806e61847984346d2d7ddd853049627e50a40/roles/MANAGER) and match those shown on the comparison interface [here 1](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/rMNui3Yp9LlBScVLFjY9cWkk4QGYoIVkkYxURs16ys?annotations=false). The payload will only activate this module, marking the first phase of the migration process. A subsequent policy update proposal will seek to disable the v1 module.
## Policy Visualisation in Terms of DeFi Kit Actions
The “show annotations” button, located at the top-right [here 1](https://roles.gnosisguild.org/eth:0xBd1099dFD3c11b65FB4BB19A350da2f5B61Efb0d/roles/ENS-MANAGER-V1/diff/rMNui3Yp9LlBScVLFjY9cWkk4QGYoIVkkYxURs16ys?annotations=false), provides a visualisation of the proposed permissions policy expressed through the DeFi Kit Protocol Actions. This feature offers a more abstract and simplified description of the policy, enhancing understanding and accessibility.
# [EP5.11] [Executable] Proposal: Fund the Meta-Governance Working Group (Term 5)
Funds the metagovernance working group with 374k USDC and 150k ENS
## Abstract
Meta-Governance is seeking funding to support DAO-wide operations, including Working Groups, treasury management, and governance initiatives. This request aligns with Rule 10.1.1 of the [Working Group Rules](https://docs.ens.domains/dao/wg/rules) and amendments introduced in [EP 4.8](https://docs.ens.domains/dao/proposals/4.8). This proposal will execute the funding specification according to [EP 5.9](https://snapshot.org/#/ens.eth/proposal/0x66d355555c24ed0d2fed0aee89e4fe009e2925c84144c4edc707d33e7c19e554), as amended by [EP 5.8](https://snapshot.org/#/ens.eth/proposal/0x1f328fd1fda5f3cabfdace3e521403def7ad41b0b0582e27334c135cd23c511d).
## Motivation
### [EP 5.9 — Funding Request: ENS Meta-Governance Working Group Term 5 ](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/4-4-2-social-funding-request-ens-meta-goverance-working-group/17994)
The Meta-Governance Working Group requests funding of **374,000 USDC and 150,000 ENS** from the ENS DAO treasury ([wallet.ensdao.eth](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFe89cc7aBB2C4183683ab71653C4cdc9B02D44b7)).
This funding will be used to support the governance processes of the ENS DAO and to manage and build infrastructure that supports the ENS DAO, its treasury, and its Working Groups.
## Specification
The following transfers are to be made:
- Transfer 374,000 USDC to [main.mg.wg.ens.eth](https://etherscan.io/address/0x91c32893216dE3eA0a55ABb9851f581d4503d39b).
- Transfer 150,000 ENS to [main.mg.wg.ens.eth](https://etherscan.io/address/0x91c32893216dE3eA0a55ABb9851f581d4503d39b).
Addresses for confirmation:
- 0x91c32893216de3ea0a55abb9851f581d4503d39b for main.mg.wg.ens.eth
# [EP5.2] [Executable] Commence Streams for Service Providers
This EP will initiate the Streams for Service Providers as selected on EP4.9
[Draft Discourse link](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/ep5-2-executable-commence-streams-for-service-providers-first-draft/18615?u=avsa)
## Abstract
EP 4.7 proposed the concept of Streams for service providers and set its budget at $3.6M per annum. EP4.9 selected the following Service providers and their annual budget:
|Service Provider Name| Annual Stream |
|---|---|
|ETH.LIMO|$500,000.00|
|NameHash Labs|$600,000.00|
|Resolverworks.eth|$700,000.00|
|Blockful|$300,000.00|
|Unruggable|$400,000.00|
|Wildcard Labs|$200,000.00|
|Ethereum Follow Protocol|$500,000.00|
|Namespace|$200,000.00|
|UNICORN.ETH|$200,000.00|
The Metagov Working Group has decided this will be implemented in the following manner:
1. Superfluid has been selected as the stream platform (details of which can be found on [this RFP](https://discuss.ens.domains/t/rfp-stream-platform-for-ens-service-providers/18448))
2. A new wallet, the "[Stream Management Pod](https://app.safe.global/settings/setup?safe=eth:0xB162Bf7A7fD64eF32b787719335d06B2780e31D1)" has been created as a Global.Safe (Gnosis Safe) wallet. It requires 3 out of 5 signatures to execute any transaction. Its members are the 3 Metagov Stewards, the secretary and the DAO Governor contract.
3. **This EP includes 5 Executable Transactions**, as follow😘*
1. **APPROVE** Superfluid contracts to wrap one month worth of USDC streaming (300,000 USDC);
2. **WRAP** one month worth of USDC streaming (300,000 USDC to USDCx);
3. **START A STREAM** to the Stream Management Pod of 0.114155251141552512 USDC per second [1];
1. **APPROVE** AutoWrap [2] contract to wrap an additional 5.1M USDC (this, added to the already wrapped 300k, should be enough to cover 18 months of the stream, after that a new EP will be required to keep the stream running);
1. **ENABLE AUTO-WRAP** to keep wrapping USDC to USDCx on a monthly basis (lower limit 200,000, upper limit 500,000).
4. Meanwhile the Stewards are reaching out to all representatives of the stream providers. Alex Urbelis, the general Counsel for ENS Labs, has drafted a service provider agreement and is acquiring the services of Urbelis to run a basic KYC and Sanctions protection. All Service Providers will be required to go through this process before receiving their first stream.
5. On February 1st Stream Management Pod will start creating individual streams to the Organizations who have completed the steps outlined in bullet #4. Because of Superfluid unique no-upfront-capital-lockup streams, it means that when all of 9 Service Providers Streams start, the Stream Management Pod will be forwarding 100% of the money it receives directly into the Service Providers. [3]
### Notes
[1]: USDC has a precision of 6 decimal places, but SuperUSDC has a precision of 18 decimals. The value of 0.114155251141552512 per second corresponds to approximately 9863.01 USDC per day and in 3,600,000.000000000018432 USDC per year in a non-leap year. In leap years (such as the current one) it will mean an extra $9.8K is paid in the 29th of February.
[2]: [Autowrapper](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1D65c6d3AD39d454Ea8F682c49aE7744706eA96d#code) is a [series](https://etherscan.io/address/0x30aE282CF477E2eF28B14d0125aCEAd57Fe1d7a1#code) of [contracts](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1D65c6d3AD39d454Ea8F682c49aE7744706eA96d#code) developed by superfluid. When pinged (and anyone would be able to ping it), if the amount of tokens that the DAO has wrapped is below the lower limit, it will automatically wrap new tokens in order to keep the stream running. The goal is to reduce smart contract risk. If Superfluid is somehow hacked, ENS will not lose more than the upper limit set here (about 50 days worth of funds). If both Superfluid AND the autowrapper are hacked at the same time, ENS cannot lose more than the maximun USDC allowance (18 months worth of funds).
[3]: Any capital that remains in the pod (due to the difference between the day this EP is executed and the day the last Service Provider stream is active) will be still considered under the DAO's ownership and will be used only as a buffer (if autowrapper fails, we will have some weeks to resolve it without interrupting payments) and to solve any logistical issues with service providers. It will NOT count towards Metagov's budget nor it will it be used to any other purpose than the service provider management.
## Specification
We will now details the transactions to be executed on this EP:
| Operation | Target | Decoded Calldata | Raw Calldata |
|---|---|---|--|
| approve USDCx SuperToken contract to transfer 300k USDC | 0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48 (USDC) |``function approve(address 0x1BA8603DA702602A8657980e825A6DAa03Dee93a, uint256 300000000000)`` | 0x095ea7b30000000000000000000000001ba8603da702602a8657980e825a6daa03dee93a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000045d964b800 |
| wrap 300k USDC to USDCX | 0x1BA8603DA702602A8657980e825A6DAa03Dee93a (Super-USDC) | `function upgrade(uint256 300000000000000000000000)` | 0x45977d03000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003f870857a3e0e3800000 |
| start flow to Safe with the flowrate of 0.1141... per second | 0xcfA132E353cB4E398080B9700609bb008eceB125 (Superfluid) |``function setFlowrate(address 0x1BA8603DA702602A8657980e825A6DAa03Dee93a, address 0xB162Bf7A7fD64eF32b787719335d06B2780e31D1, int96 114155251141552512) `` | 0x57e6aa360000000000000000000000001ba8603da702602a8657980e825a6daa03dee93a000000000000000000000000b162bf7a7fd64ef32b787719335d06b2780e31d100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001958f989989a980 |
| approve auto-wrap for 5.1M | 0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48 (USDC) | ``function approve(address 0x1D65c6d3AD39d454Ea8F682c49aE7744706eA96d, uint256 5100000000000`` |``0x095ea7b30000000000000000000000001d65c6d3ad39d454ea8f682c49ae7744706ea96d000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004a36fb03800`` |
| create auto-wrap schedule | 0x30aE282CF477E2eF28B14d0125aCEAd57Fe1d7a1 (Autowrapper) | `function createWrapSchedule (address 0x1BA8603DA702602A8657980e825A6DAa03Dee93a, address 0x1D65c6d3AD39d454Ea8F682c49aE7744706eA96d, address 0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48, uint64 3000000000, uint64 1814400, uint64 4320000` | `0x5626f9e60000000000000000000000001ba8603da702602a8657980e825a6daa03dee93a0000000000000000000000001d65c6d3ad39d454ea8f682c49ae7744706ea96d000000000000000000000000a0b86991c6218b36c1d19d4a2e9eb0ce3606eb4800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b2d05e0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001baf80000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000041eb00` |
All contracts have verifiable code. You can use tools such as the [Calldata decoder](https://tools.deth.net/calldata-decoder) to verify the correctness of the calldata and etherscan to look deeper into them. You can also *simulate the transactions yourself* using [this repo](https://github.com/d10r/ens-streams).
The terms for the createWrapSchedule are the address of the superToken (super-usdc), the address of the Strategy contract, the address of the base token (USDC), the expiry (set to the far future), lowerLimit and upperLimit. These last two are set in seconds and mean that if, when the autowrapper is pinged, the stream has less than 21 days in it's runway, then it will automatically wrap 50 days worth of funds.
Alex Van de SandePreventing human-machines conflicts since 2014. Ethereum Foundation Alumni (2014-2018), co-founder of ENS (2017), currently director of ENS foundation.https://mirror.xyz/avsa.eth
I am in favor of airdropping both for the edge cases and the locked ens due to accidental send–although I previously voted against the second case because I thought it should be done in a separate transaction at a later time.
Address: unable to send value, r`ecipient may have revertedAddress: insufficient balanceNot enough balanceRecipient already withdrewYou can't push the same block on`address not set or set to burnOverflow detected!
Hi Alex, followed you for a while on Twitter but you have your DM's closed.
Whenever I see someone with an ENS name I can't help but look them up on Etherscan and have browse.
I noticed that you have some unclaimed Tornado Cash governance tokens, ($vTORN).
They might be worth redeeming as you've got a few thousand dollars you might not know about.
Will Dappcon 2020 happen as planned, in september in Berlin?␟"Yes","No–it will be remote","No–it will be postponed to later in the year","Other outcome"␟Cryptocurrency␟en_US