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0xd78c…9afb

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unknown sendersent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#15,529,724·0x4cdfac4d…c76acf
TIP_123: Deprecate Optimistic Governance and the Tribal Council This is a Tribal Council proposal that deprecates the Optimistic Governance and Tribal Council governance smart contracts. The optimistic governance upgrade was introduced in FIP-82 (https://tribe.fei.money/t/fip-82-governance-enhancements/3945) and in line with TIP-121 (https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-121-proposal-for-the-future-of-the-tribe-dao/4475) the tribal council would likely not be needed. Future governance proposals can be proposed and executed by the DAO. To deprecate, this proposal performs the following: 1. Revoke Tribe roles from the optimistic governance smart contracts. This prevents the optimistic governance and Tribal Council contracts from interacting with the Fei system. A small number of high level access roles can later be removed by the DAO. 2. Revoke all internal Tribal Council timelock EXECUTOR, PROPOSER, CANCELLER and TIMELOCK_ADMIN roles. This will render the Tribal Council timelock unusable by the Tribal Council Multisig. 3. Change the admin of deprecated timelocks from the TC timelock to the DAO timelock Critically, this proposal if passed can be undone at any time by the DAO to reintroduce the Tribal Council while the DAO retains any governance power. The Tribe DAO optimistic governance process is outlined here: https://docs.tribedao.xyz/docs/Governance/Overview
0x64c4bffb…9c5dsent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#15,529,724·0x4cdfac4d…c76acf
TIP_123: Deprecate Optimistic Governance and the Tribal Council This is a Tribal Council proposal that deprecates the Optimistic Governance and Tribal Council governance smart contracts. The optimistic governance upgrade was introduced in FIP-82 (https://tribe.fei.money/t/fip-82-governance-enhancements/3945) and in line with TIP-121 (https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-121-proposal-for-the-future-of-the-tribe-dao/4475) the tribal council would likely not be needed. Future governance proposals can be proposed and executed by the DAO. To deprecate, this proposal performs the following: 1. Revoke Tribe roles from the optimistic governance smart contracts. This prevents the optimistic governance and Tribal Council contracts from interacting with the Fei system. A small number of high level access roles can later be removed by the DAO. 2. Revoke all internal Tribal Council timelock EXECUTOR, PROPOSER, CANCELLER and TIMELOCK_ADMIN roles. This will render the Tribal Council timelock unusable by the Tribal Council Multisig. 3. Change the admin of deprecated timelocks from the TC timelock to the DAO timelock Critically, this proposal if passed can be undone at any time by the DAO to reintroduce the Tribal Council while the DAO retains any governance power. The Tribe DAO optimistic governance process is outlined here: https://docs.tribedao.xyz/docs/Governance/Overview
0x64c4bffb…9c5dsent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#15,418,702·0xb20233ee…c45ac8
TIP-122: End Rari team vesting and consolidate Tribal Council assets This proposal ends the vesting of the Rari Infrastructure team by clawing back their Fei and Tribe timelocks. It also consolidates the assets present on the Tribal Council timelock. End of Rari Team Vesting —-------------------------------- The Rari Infrastructure team has two timelocks in which funds are vesting. There is a FEI vesting timelock (https://etherscan.io/address/0x5d39721BA1c734b395C2CAdbdeeC178F688F6ec9) and a TRIBE vesting timelock (https://etherscan.io/address/0x20bC8FE104fadED2D0aD9634D745f1488f9991eF). There is ~2.8M FEI and ~2.8M TRIBE available to be clawed back from these timelocks. The funds will be returned to the Tribal Council timelock. An approval is granted to the DAO timelock to later allow the DAO to move the recovered FEI and TRIBE. Asset consolidation —------------------------- The Tribal Council timelock has various assets which are being consolidated and moved off the timelock: ~43M FEI is being burned ~1.1M LQTY is being sent to the DAO timelock ~15.3M FOX is being sent to the DAO timelock ~16k IDLE is being sent to the Tribal Council Safe, where it will then be sold The optimistic governance process used by the Tribe DAO and the role of the NopeDAO is documented here: https://docs.tribedao.xyz/docs/Governance/Overview
unknown sendersent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#15,238,561·0x7f8db4d7…c27d49
TIP-119: Collaterisation Oracle updates, Swap USDC, Perform FEI <> VOLT OTC This proposal is a technical maintenance and cleanup proposal which performs various updates to the Collaterisation Oracle so that it most accurately reflects the current PCV holdings. It also performs the FEI <> VOLT OTC swap, to allow the Volt team to repay their loan. Forum post for Volt repaying their loan: https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-xxx-accept-repayment-of-volt-launch-liquidity-backstop/4429 Specifically, it: - Registers the gOHM USD oracle on the Collaterisation Oracle - Adds the gOHM Holding PCV deposit to the Collaterisation Oracle. Will contribute ~$1.5M to PCV equity - Swaps the USDC held on the Tribal Council timelock for DAI, via the Maker PSM. Sends it to the Compound DAI PCV deposit. Will contribute ~$1M to PCV equity. - Fund the VOLT OTC escrow contract and swap 10M VOLT for 10.17M FEI. Burn the received FEI. (https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-xxx-accept-repayment-of-volt-launch-liquidity-backstop/4429) - Remove VOLT holding deposit from CR - Withdraws ~$50k ETH from Rari Fuse pool 146. Adding these assets into the accounting through this proposal, will have the net effect of increasing PCV equity by ~$2.5M.
0x64c4bffb…9c5dsent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#15,238,561·0x7f8db4d7…c27d49
TIP-119: Collaterisation Oracle updates, Swap USDC, Perform FEI <> VOLT OTC This proposal is a technical maintenance and cleanup proposal which performs various updates to the Collaterisation Oracle so that it most accurately reflects the current PCV holdings. It also performs the FEI <> VOLT OTC swap, to allow the Volt team to repay their loan. Forum post for Volt repaying their loan: https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-xxx-accept-repayment-of-volt-launch-liquidity-backstop/4429 Specifically, it: - Registers the gOHM USD oracle on the Collaterisation Oracle - Adds the gOHM Holding PCV deposit to the Collaterisation Oracle. Will contribute ~$1.5M to PCV equity - Swaps the USDC held on the Tribal Council timelock for DAI, via the Maker PSM. Sends it to the Compound DAI PCV deposit. Will contribute ~$1M to PCV equity. - Fund the VOLT OTC escrow contract and swap 10M VOLT for 10.17M FEI. Burn the received FEI. (https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-xxx-accept-repayment-of-volt-launch-liquidity-backstop/4429) - Remove VOLT holding deposit from CR - Withdraws ~$50k ETH from Rari Fuse pool 146. Adding these assets into the accounting through this proposal, will have the net effect of increasing PCV equity by ~$2.5M.
0x64c4bffb…9c5dsent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#15,018,045·0xd5e3777b…42d9d7
TIP-115: Collateralization and Operations Updates Executes a few actions related to collateralization and operations: Add a collateralization FEI lens to the FEI in the tribal council timelock and old rari timelocks. There are currently several million FEI that are protocol owned but not accounted as such. This fixes that. Accept beneficiary of the old rari timelocks to tribal council timelock. This is a cleanup item of TIP-113. Remove deprecated namedStaticPCVDeposit from collateralization oracle. This entry was manually accounting certain FEI and PCV deployments which can now be more accurately accounted automatically. Trigger new ETH LBP to convert 10k ETH to DAI. This will increase stable backing from 84% to over 90% per TIP-111. Grant tribal council safe the SWAP_ADMIN_ROLE to initiate LBPs after governance funds them. This proposal follows the Tribal Council process 1, and is currently queued in the Tribal Council Timelock beginning the 4 days veto window timelock. Proposal id= 0x70879c84c073206f4f5f5de29ff2715371aac9081e0148c47514a42e6f57098a Execution timestamp=27 June 22, 16:45 UTC
unknown sendersent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#15,018,027·0xbf191614…e39857
TIP 116: Pod Executor Upgrade This is an upgrade related to FIP-82. It would allow public execution of batched tribal council proposals after 4 day veto window ends through the PodExecutorV2, without needing Tribal Council to take further action. A tribal council proposal has 2 steps: Queue - schedules the proposal for a 4 day veto window before execution. Only the pod (tribal council) can do this. Queue = propose. Execute - make the proposal take effect on-chain after the veto window if not vetoed. Currently only the pod can do this, but this proposal allows anyone to execute, removing one multisig action needed and streamlining operations. This proposal has no effect on the NopeDAO / veto process. This proposal follows the Tribal Council process, and is currently queued in the Tribal Council Timelock beginning the 4 days veto window timelock. Proposal id= 0x371526912b7f7120cd1bcd32f3c0af5cf61e99a89e8a91d044444f397366c3e3 Execution timestamp=27 June 22, 16:45 UTC
0x64c4bffb…9c5dsent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#15,018,027·0xbf191614…e39857
TIP 116: Pod Executor Upgrade This is an upgrade related to FIP-82. It would allow public execution of batched tribal council proposals after 4 day veto window ends through the PodExecutorV2, without needing Tribal Council to take further action. A tribal council proposal has 2 steps: Queue - schedules the proposal for a 4 day veto window before execution. Only the pod (tribal council) can do this. Queue = propose. Execute - make the proposal take effect on-chain after the veto window if not vetoed. Currently only the pod can do this, but this proposal allows anyone to execute, removing one multisig action needed and streamlining operations. This proposal has no effect on the NopeDAO / veto process. This proposal follows the Tribal Council process, and is currently queued in the Tribal Council Timelock beginning the 4 days veto window timelock. Proposal id= 0x371526912b7f7120cd1bcd32f3c0af5cf61e99a89e8a91d044444f397366c3e3 Execution timestamp=27 June 22, 16:45 UTC
unknown sendersent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#14,961,786·0x4366a39e…0e5f21
FIP-111aTC: Request Tokemak withdrawal, increase stable backing of Fei This proposal implements part of the plan to increase the stable backing of FEI, by requesting a withdrawal of 10k ETH from Tokemak in the next cycle. Forum post: https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-111-increase-stable-backing-of-fei/4280
0x64c4bffb…9c5dsent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#14,961,786·0x4366a39e…0e5f21
FIP-111aTC: Request Tokemak withdrawal, increase stable backing of Fei This proposal implements part of the plan to increase the stable backing of FEI, by requesting a withdrawal of 10k ETH from Tokemak in the next cycle. Forum post: https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-111-increase-stable-backing-of-fei/4280
unknown sendersent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#14,923,557·0x73bd4899…e6b029
FIP-111TC: Reinforce PCV via ETH LBP and tighter spread. This proposal uses a balancer liquidity bootstrapping pool to sell 20k ETH for DAI over 2 days. It also tightens the spread on the ETH PSM by allowing redemptions for a 60bps fee. Original discussion is here: https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-111-increase-stable-backing-of-fei/4280
0x64c4bffb…9c5dsent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#14,923,557·0x73bd4899…e6b029
FIP-111TC: Reinforce PCV via ETH LBP and tighter spread. This proposal uses a balancer liquidity bootstrapping pool to sell 20k ETH for DAI over 2 days. It also tightens the spread on the ETH PSM by allowing redemptions for a 60bps fee. Original discussion is here: https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-111-increase-stable-backing-of-fei/4280
unknown sendersent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#14,923,423·0xc001143d…ae47f0
FIP-112TC: Fuse Repayment Next Steps Summary Whitelist the “Fuse Repayment Contract” as a safe PCV address for the Tribal Council or PCV Guardian to repay. Proposal The community has signaled support for a PCV repayment of the Fuse exploit here 2. This proposal provides some technical details and associated timelines. First, the strategy for repayment will be staged by asset. The affected assets are token │ amount stolen │ amount stolen usd ─────────┼─────────────────┼───────────────────── FEI │ 20,251,603.12 │ $20,361,973.83 ETH │ 6,037.91 │ $17,062,057.88 DAI │ 14,278,990.68 │ $14,368,248.93 LUSD │ 1,948,952.18 │ $1,952,277.46 USDC │ 10,055,556.33 │ $10,019,382.03 FRAX │ 13,101,364.94 │ $13,108,022.66 RAI │ 31,615.87 │ $96,475.12 USDT │ 132,959.90 │ $133,620.54 Repayment order will be assets currently in PCV first (RAI, DAI, FEI, ETH, LUSD), then external assets after associated conversions (USDC, USDT, FRAX). Both categories will be sorted by the smallest repayment amount first. A special case is USTw, where the only supplier was Terraform Labs and the strategy will await further clarity from them. For assets currently in PCV, the capital will be sourced from the most liquid deposit of that type, for example ETH would come from the Aave ETH deposit given it holds the most ETH. The proposal simply whitelists the repayment contract as a safe address for new PCV to be transferred in by the Tribal council or PCV Guardian to repay. If any tokens remain in the contract after repayment, they can be withdrawn back into PCV. In terms of timelines, it would take 1-2 days to repay assets in PCV, and up to a week to source the non PCV assets from proposal execution. This proposal follows the Tribal Council process 2, and is currently staged for signing in the Tribal Council Timelock. Once proposed by Tribal Council, the code will then have a 4 day timelock where it is subject to veto by the Nope DAO. Learn more about the Nope DAO here. Veto Details Proposal id = 0xe1d6d214480d4b634e445682b1278e7649c0cb7f9b9d6d4a121c25d8bcbd8f21 Execution timestamp = Jun-07-2022 09:21:53 PM +UTC
0x64c4bffb…9c5dsent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#14,923,423·0xc001143d…ae47f0
FIP-112TC: Fuse Repayment Next Steps Summary Whitelist the “Fuse Repayment Contract” as a safe PCV address for the Tribal Council or PCV Guardian to repay. Proposal The community has signaled support for a PCV repayment of the Fuse exploit here 2. This proposal provides some technical details and associated timelines. First, the strategy for repayment will be staged by asset. The affected assets are token │ amount stolen │ amount stolen usd ─────────┼─────────────────┼───────────────────── FEI │ 20,251,603.12 │ $20,361,973.83 ETH │ 6,037.91 │ $17,062,057.88 DAI │ 14,278,990.68 │ $14,368,248.93 LUSD │ 1,948,952.18 │ $1,952,277.46 USDC │ 10,055,556.33 │ $10,019,382.03 FRAX │ 13,101,364.94 │ $13,108,022.66 RAI │ 31,615.87 │ $96,475.12 USDT │ 132,959.90 │ $133,620.54 Repayment order will be assets currently in PCV first (RAI, DAI, FEI, ETH, LUSD), then external assets after associated conversions (USDC, USDT, FRAX). Both categories will be sorted by the smallest repayment amount first. A special case is USTw, where the only supplier was Terraform Labs and the strategy will await further clarity from them. For assets currently in PCV, the capital will be sourced from the most liquid deposit of that type, for example ETH would come from the Aave ETH deposit given it holds the most ETH. The proposal simply whitelists the repayment contract as a safe address for new PCV to be transferred in by the Tribal council or PCV Guardian to repay. If any tokens remain in the contract after repayment, they can be withdrawn back into PCV. In terms of timelines, it would take 1-2 days to repay assets in PCV, and up to a week to source the non PCV assets from proposal execution. This proposal follows the Tribal Council process 2, and is currently staged for signing in the Tribal Council Timelock. Once proposed by Tribal Council, the code will then have a 4 day timelock where it is subject to veto by the Nope DAO. Learn more about the Nope DAO here. Veto Details Proposal id = 0xe1d6d214480d4b634e445682b1278e7649c0cb7f9b9d6d4a121c25d8bcbd8f21 Execution timestamp = Jun-07-2022 09:21:53 PM +UTC
unknown sendersent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#14,920,465·0xa3143038…04c22d
FIP-109TC: Set TRIBE incentives to 0 across all deposits. Proposal As mentioned in FIP-104 11, the Tribe DAO should be cutting costs where possible and preserving equity. By setting TRIBE incentives to zero, the DAO would recover this primary cost going forward. Currently, TRIBE incentives fall into 3 categories: Single-sided TRIBE Stableswap liquidity Bribes For single sided TRIBE staking, this is largely unnecessary as it does not secure the protocol in any way. That TRIBE would do better to remain in the treasury. These incentives were pointed to Fuse pool 8, but has increased smart contract risk and reduced optionality for users. For stableswap liquidity, the protocol could market-make AMMs using PCV without the need for high cost incentives. There are currently 10M FEI incentivized in Uniswap v3 at over a 20% APR of TRIBE incentives. There are 25M FEI on Curve at a 12% APR. We can also use our veBAL to incentivize FEI liquidity without spending TRIBE. Lastly, Bribes on Convex are no longer profitable as yields have collapsed, so this cost should be cut as well. If approved, the Guardian would be used to deprecate incentives upon snapshot result.
0x64c4bffb…9c5dsent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#14,920,465·0xa3143038…04c22d
FIP-109TC: Set TRIBE incentives to 0 across all deposits. Proposal As mentioned in FIP-104 11, the Tribe DAO should be cutting costs where possible and preserving equity. By setting TRIBE incentives to zero, the DAO would recover this primary cost going forward. Currently, TRIBE incentives fall into 3 categories: Single-sided TRIBE Stableswap liquidity Bribes For single sided TRIBE staking, this is largely unnecessary as it does not secure the protocol in any way. That TRIBE would do better to remain in the treasury. These incentives were pointed to Fuse pool 8, but has increased smart contract risk and reduced optionality for users. For stableswap liquidity, the protocol could market-make AMMs using PCV without the need for high cost incentives. There are currently 10M FEI incentivized in Uniswap v3 at over a 20% APR of TRIBE incentives. There are 25M FEI on Curve at a 12% APR. We can also use our veBAL to incentivize FEI liquidity without spending TRIBE. Lastly, Bribes on Convex are no longer profitable as yields have collapsed, so this cost should be cut as well. If approved, the Guardian would be used to deprecate incentives upon snapshot result.
unknown sendersent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#14,917,005·0x859871d1…a70a65
FIP-104: Set TRIBE incentives to 0 across all deposits. Proposal As mentioned in FIP-104 11, the Tribe DAO should be cutting costs where possible and preserving equity. By setting TRIBE incentives to zero, the DAO would recover this primary cost going forward. Currently, TRIBE incentives fall into 3 categories: Single-sided TRIBE Stableswap liquidity Bribes For single sided TRIBE staking, this is largely unnecessary as it does not secure the protocol in any way. That TRIBE would do better to remain in the treasury. These incentives were pointed to Fuse pool 8, but has increased smart contract risk and reduced optionality for users. For stableswap liquidity, the protocol could market-make AMMs using PCV without the need for high cost incentives. There are currently 10M FEI incentivized in Uniswap v3 at over a 20% APR of TRIBE incentives. There are 25M FEI on Curve at a 12% APR. We can also use our veBAL to incentivize FEI liquidity without spending TRIBE. Lastly, Bribes on Convex are no longer profitable as yields have collapsed, so this cost should be cut as well. If approved, the Guardian would be used to deprecate incentives upon snapshot result.
0x64c4bffb…9c5dsent to0xd78cd3aa…9afb·#14,917,005·0x859871d1…a70a65
FIP-104: Set TRIBE incentives to 0 across all deposits. Proposal As mentioned in FIP-104 11, the Tribe DAO should be cutting costs where possible and preserving equity. By setting TRIBE incentives to zero, the DAO would recover this primary cost going forward. Currently, TRIBE incentives fall into 3 categories: Single-sided TRIBE Stableswap liquidity Bribes For single sided TRIBE staking, this is largely unnecessary as it does not secure the protocol in any way. That TRIBE would do better to remain in the treasury. These incentives were pointed to Fuse pool 8, but has increased smart contract risk and reduced optionality for users. For stableswap liquidity, the protocol could market-make AMMs using PCV without the need for high cost incentives. There are currently 10M FEI incentivized in Uniswap v3 at over a 20% APR of TRIBE incentives. There are 25M FEI on Curve at a 12% APR. We can also use our veBAL to incentivize FEI liquidity without spending TRIBE. Lastly, Bribes on Convex are no longer profitable as yields have collapsed, so this cost should be cut as well. If approved, the Guardian would be used to deprecate incentives upon snapshot result.