0x2e0c4839…74adsent to0xa1207f3b…e587·#24,729,601·view on Etherscan
Thanks for sharing this ,i think it’s a fair concern and honestly expected given how things might look from the outside.
I understand why it could seem like this proposal is aimed at protecting my position as the top holder. But in reality, my accumulation wasn’t driven by competition , it was largely a response to earlier activity from wallet **0xf2be0cd090b3ab2d98b6b18ebc7ca25a6c18c85a**, where there were attempts to push proposals that could have resulted in treasury funds being moved in ways that didn’t feel safe for the DAO.
For anyone interested in reviewing that context, you can look at **Props 10, 12, and 19**, which informed a lot of my decisions at the time.
My priority here is less about ownership position and more about **reducing potential risk to the treasury and governance process**.
The suggestion to pause auctions isn’t meant as a permanent solution, but as a short window for the DAO to step back and align on a few things:
* Whether the current base bid still reflects the perceived value of the NFTs
* How to better manage bidding dynamics so participation doesn’t become discouraged
* What safeguards we can introduce to reduce risks like sybil behaviour or malicious proposals
From my perspective, some options worth discussing could be:
* A temporary pause on auctions
* Adjusting the base bid to reflect current demand
* Slightly increasing the voting threshold (e.g., +5%)
* Reviewing additional protections around proposal execution
That said, I’m not trying to push a fixed solution here, just creating space for the community to think through this collectively.
Also agree with your point on security. Questions around sybil resistance, proposal review standards, and even clarity on veto activity are important, and this could be a good opportunity to address them more directly as a DAO.
Appreciate you raising this, would be great to hear more thoughts from others as well.