0x3fb19771…4c8asent to0x309a862b…c8c0·#22,132,463·view on Etherscan
# Renew Proposal Guardian Role for the Community Multisig
## Description
This proposal aims to update the `ProposalGuardian` of the Compound Governor contract to the community multisig with an expiration of six months, extending until **September 11, 2025**.
The `ProposalGuardian` was last updated in [**Proposal 304**](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/compound/proposal/304?govId=eip155:1:0xc0Da02939E1441F497fd74F78cE7Decb17B66529), where an expiration date was set for **February 17, 2025**. Since this expiration date has passed, this proposal is being submitted to renew the ProposalGuardian role for the community multisig and extend its validity for another six months.
## **Actions**
Call [`setProposalGuardian`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x309a862bbC1A00e45506cB8A802D1ff10004c8C0#writeProxyContract#F22) on the Compound Governor contract to set the [**community multisig**](https://etherscan.io/address/0xbbf3f1421D886E9b2c5D716B5192aC998af2012c) as the new `ProposalGuardian`, with an expiration timestamp of **1757566800 (Thu, Sep 11, 2025)**.
## **Tenderly Simulation Failure Explanation**
Although the proposal simulation linked in the Tally UI is failing, the proposal should execute successfully in production.
**Reasoning:**
* Proposals are first submitted to the Compound Governor via `propose()`.
* After the voting period ends and quorum is reached, the proposal is queued in the Governor, which then queues it in the Timelock.
* Once the Timelock delay passes, the proposal is executed in the Governor.
* The transaction calldata is first saved in the `_governanceCall` queue, and then the Timelock is called to execute the transaction.
During the Tenderly simulation, the Timelock is impersonated without `Governor.execute` being called, meaning `_governanceCall` is not populated. This causes the transaction to revert in the simulation, but in a real execution, it should succeed as expected.