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Memo 0x21100a41…799446 on Ethereum

nouns-duna-admin-elections@0x05A1...011c Not really a fan of this setup, and I don’t think it’s in the best interest of the DAO. Roles like this should not be treated as permanent fixtures. In fact, I think shorter reelection cycles than a year would make more sense, because the health of a DAO depends on flexibility and accountability. If admins or even regular members start to feel like their position is guaranteed, then the whole point of a decentralized structure begins to erode. DAOs evolve block by block, and without predefined plans and periodic reevaluations, it becomes easy to drift into complacency or unchecked power. We have already seen what happens when structures like foundations go unchallenged, turning into stagnant entities that serve themselves more than the community. Another issue is the financial justification. From the numbers presented during space calls, we are being asked to spend hundreds of thousands to manage what amounts to tens of thousands. That mismatch is hard to justify, and I’m not convinced that the workload is anywhere near what would require full-time salaries. Without hard evidence of actual demand or output to match these costs, this looks like treasury inefficiency. It risks creating the perception that roles are padded with oversized compensation rather than tied directly to the value delivered. I plan to put forward a proposal in the upcoming days to remove one of these admin positions and reduce the overall number by half. This isn’t about punishing individuals; it’s about making sure the DAO remains lean, adaptable, and responsible with its treasury. We cannot afford to drift into the same traps that traditional organizations fall into, where budgets balloon and accountability shrinks. If we allow that to happen, then we are building the very structures that DAOs were supposed to challenge. Keeping roles limited in duration, salaries proportionate to actual work, and governance under constant review is the only way to maintain trust and sustainability. Anything less risks turning the DAO into just another centralized body with a thin coat of decentralization painted on top. > appreciate Bix getting this convo started ahead of time 🙏 > > def agree that if the community intends to replace DUNA admins, we should figure out a clear process for doing this smoothly and equitably. > > my only concern is that we could spend a ton of time and energy doing elections only to end up with the same result. > > personally, I think the DUNA admins have been doing a great job. If they are interested in continuing with their roles, I not only personally don't see any need to replace them, but I think it's likely that they would win the election anyway. > > that said, I understand the argument that we should hold annual elections regardless of the current admin's "approval rating". perhaps there are better candidates out there that are interested in the role, they could win an election, and the cost of switching admins is worth the benefits. it's one of those things that you can never know until you try. > > all things considered, I'd like to propose a couple first steps in this process: > > 1. Confirm the current admins' interest in continuing in their roles for another year unless the community wishes to replace them (I assume the answer to this is yes and don't have any reason to believe otherwise, but still worth confirming) > 2. Once confirmed, put up a prop where FOR = renew the existing DUNA admins and AGAINST = move forward with an election (ideally include the details nekofar mentioned above in this prop) > > passing any prop is hard these days and requires significant support, so I think there's a good chance it would fail, which would lend credence to the importance of holding an election. however, if it passes, that would be a strong signal that an election is not necessary and would not be the best use of the community's time and energy. further, if anyone ever feels that an admin is not performing their duties, they can still put up a prop to remove or replace them any time (right? please correct me if I'm wrong about this). > > Some context: > Ever since the formation of ShapeShift DAO, we've had the concept of Workstreams and Workstream Leaders (it's actually a structure I designed and am pretty proud of 🤓 (see https://forum.shapeshift.com/t/shapeshift-organizational-structure/58 or https://cointelegraph.com/innovation-circle/dispelling-the-flat-dao-myth). While Workstream Leaders don't have tenure for life and need to seek re-approval from the community, we decided early on to not periodically hold elections for replacements. Nonetheless, when Workstream Leaders have needed to be replaced, either because they want to step down or the community wants them to step down, the DAO has been able to effectively replace them. It's easy for me to imagine that if the DAO instead operated with annual elections (which would actually be longer than the typical workstream approval period of 6 months), this would have resulted in significant time and energy, potentially no difference in results, and certainly lots of frustration from both workstream leaders, governance participants, and candidates that exhausted time and energy running. > > I do think it's essential for there to be an open and decentralized process for any kind of DAO "Leader" to be removed or replaced, but I would argue that we have one already: governance. I also appreciate and support the effort to get consensus on a more standardized process for this, and really just want to recommend that this process begin with the first steps outlined above so we can potentially avoid wasting time and energy if the community is already in support of the existing admins. > > If we move forward with this plan and the prop does not pass, I think nekofar's action items sound like great next steps while the plan for an election is solidified (happy to assist with that too if/when we get to that point). Even better, if the admins are able and willing, these details would be great to include in the prop too.