@0xdcf3...7a19
Things are moving and I’m getting close to shipping a beta, with updates rolling out along the way. I’m treating this as an iterative rollout rather than a single launch moment, focusing on getting something usable out and letting it run in the wild first.
>
>
> any updates? it's January 2026, will the mini app launch this month?
>
If anyone has questions or ideas, they can always share them through the onchain topic I set up earlier.
steward-of-technical-exploration@0xae47...5Fed
Totally fair feedback, and I get why you’re asking for a stricter list. Ambiguity is usually how roles slowly turn into vibes-based authority, and I’m trying to avoid that outcome rather than create it.
The reason I didn’t enumerate a fixed list of systems is that the DAO’s stack and operational surfaces change over time. Any explicit checklist will go stale quickly, and then access ends up being arbitrarily blocked just because something new or migrated wasn’t named in the proposal. That tends to reintroduce ambiguity in practice, even if it looks precise on paper.
What I can do instead is tighten the language around **scope and exclusions** rather than naming every surface. That means defining access by category and purpose, and being very explicit about what this does not grant. No funds movement, no policy enforcement, no unilateral or irreversible actions, and no decision-making authority. Admins still control scope and duration, so access stays bounded without becoming brittle.
Also, appreciate the vouch. I’ve mostly tried to keep things running quietly and out of the way, and this proposal is really about making that kind of contribution legible without turning it into an obligation or an unofficial role with expectations attached.
>
>
> +1 for this prop but to Vote for I think it needs to explicitly list *exactly* the things you want/need access to (and what it does not grant you access to), so that there is zero ambiguity there.
>
> I like this as granting access to tech stack, can vouch for nekofar.eth as someone who just does useful "stuff" without asking (Lil Nouns functioned throughout 2025 thanks to this guy)
>
> "Doing nothing is explicitly allowed" 😸
>
@0xbE95...3E57
I think that concern is already addressed in the proposal, but maybe not in a single sentence that’s easy to spot.
The access scope is broad at the *definition* level on purpose, but it’s explicitly constrained at the *execution* level. Access is always granted under existing admin or maintainer privileges, scoped by them, time-bound if they choose, and revocable at any point. Nothing in the proposal creates standing access, permanent rights, or anything that bypasses admin judgment.
The key distinction I’m trying to make is that the proposal mandates **permission to request and receive access**, not permission to self-assign it. Admins retain full control over scope, duration, and revocation, and that discretion is explicitly preserved throughout the text. In other words, “minimum necessary scope” is already the default behavior, even if it’s not phrased as a single rule.
The intent is to remove ambiguity about whether access *can* be granted, not to weaken the caution around *how* it’s granted.
>
>
> Thoughtful open source aligned role, but access scope is unusually broad. Would support with clearer guardrails.
>
> I'd lean FOR with an inclusion along the lines of: "All access granted under this role should default to the minimum necessary scope and duration, and may be revoked at any time at admin discretion without cause"
>
Thanks for the feedback. Just to clarify, the proposal already assumes access is always scoped, granted under existing admin or maintainer privileges, and revocable at any time. The breadth is intentional at the definition level so it doesn’t go stale, but execution is constrained by admin judgment.
If that distinction is clear now, we’re probably aligned.
# Steward of Technical Exploration
---
## Summary of Intent, Purpose, and Terminology
**This proposal creates a voluntary, unpaid role so useful exploration can happen without responsibility being forced onto one person.** The intent is to formally recognize and support a kind of contribution that already exists, where someone explores systems, ideas, and tools to help the DAO understand options better, without becoming an operator, owner, or decision-maker.
**The core idea is simple: give access and initiative, but not obligation.** The role allows the steward to ask for access, look at how things work, try ideas, and build experimental tools when helpful. At the same time, it explicitly avoids creating expectations around delivery, maintenance, uptime, security, availability, or responsiveness.
**The word “Steward” is used with cultural awareness, not authority.** It is intentionally meme-adjacent and descriptive rather than formal. It does not grant power over people or systems. Everything that matters about the role is defined by this document, not by the title.
---
## Introduction and Background of the Proposed Role
**I am proposing to contribute under the title Steward of Technical Exploration.** This role is unpaid and voluntary by design. It exists to support curiosity-driven exploration and learning, not to manage others, enforce rules, or take responsibility for outcomes.
**My involvement in the Nounish ecosystem spans several years and multiple DAOs.** Most of my sustained work has been within Lil Nouns and open-source efforts, where the goal has been to build tools, explore ideas, and share understanding rather than to hold formal positions or receive compensation.
**That contribution has been flexible and informal, not role-based.** It has included building tools, writing and reviewing code, exploring how systems behave, and explaining technical trade-offs during discussions. Some work has been visible and shipped, while other work was exploratory and never intended to be permanent. This proposal does not change that behavior; it makes the boundaries clear so the DAO and the contributor are aligned.
---
## Open-Source, Public Goods, and How This Kind of Contribution Works
**Open-source communities work because people can contribute without being “on the hook.”** Someone can explore an idea, write code, or test a system without automatically becoming responsible for running it forever. This freedom is what keeps contributors engaged over long periods of time.
**Public goods improve when experimentation is allowed, even if nothing ships.** Many useful insights come from things that never become production systems. Learning what does not work is often as valuable as learning what does. This proposal explicitly protects that kind of contribution.
**This role is designed to follow those norms on purpose.** It enables access and exploration while clearly stating that no duty of care, liability, or accountability is created just because someone looked at or understood a system.
---
## What the Role Means in Plain Terms and Where It Stops
**The role exists to help the DAO understand possibilities, not to decide outcomes.** The steward may explore how systems work, what options exist, or what trade-offs might be involved, so that governance discussions are better informed.
**Contribution is entirely optional and interest-driven.** Work may include exploring ideas, building experimental tools, observing system behavior, or writing explanations that make complex topics easier to understand. There is no requirement to finish work, keep working, or prioritize DAO needs over other interests.
**Doing nothing is explicitly allowed.** Periods of inactivity are expected and acceptable. The role does not imply availability, commitment, or ongoing participation.
---
## How Experimental Work Differs from Production Work
**All work under this role is considered experimental unless clearly stated otherwise.** Experimental work exists to learn, test assumptions, or explore feasibility. It may be rough, incomplete, inefficient, or disposable, and that is expected.
**Production work only happens with explicit approval.** If something is ever proposed for long-term use, it must go through existing governance or maintainer review. Writing or contributing code does not mean owning it or being responsible for it afterward.
**Nothing silently becomes “your responsibility.”** Ideas, experiments, and even approved work do not create hidden obligations.
---
## Mandated Access to Infrastructure, Services, and Operational Interfaces Without Responsibility
**This proposal explicitly authorizes access when requested.** By approving it, the DAO instructs the admin to grant the Steward of Technical Exploration access, upon request, to infrastructure, services, and operational interfaces that are reasonably needed for exploration, experimentation, coordination, or understanding how the DAO functions in practice.
**Access is intentionally broader than just technical systems.** It may include any systems the DAO uses to operate, communicate, coordinate, or manage activity, whether those systems are technical, social, operational, or administrative. The purpose is understanding and contribution, not control.
**Access requests are valid by default.** They are authorized by this proposal and are not special favors. The admin may limit scope or duration, but granting access itself is expected when the request aligns with the role’s purpose.
**Access does not grant power.** Seeing or using systems does not create authority, moderation rights, ownership, or decision-making control.
---
## Why Access Still Does Not Create Responsibility
**Having access does not mean being responsible for what happens.** Requesting, holding, or using access does not create an obligation to act, respond, fix, moderate, or escalate issues.
**The steward has no duty of care.** There is no responsibility for system behavior, community behavior, security posture, uptime, correctness, or outcomes.
**This role never becomes a fallback role.** Even with broad access, the steward is not an operator, maintainer, administrator, moderator, or owner under any circumstances.
---
## Relationship to Governance and How Success Is Judged
**This role has no decision-making authority.** All final decisions remain with the DAO through existing governance processes.
**The steward may help make decisions clearer, not make them.** When topics are confusing or contested, the steward may help initiate token-based voting so decisions are explicit rather than assumed.
**The role is fully reversible.** Governance may change or remove it at any time. Approval does not create entitlement or dependency.
**Success means clarity, not output.** The role succeeds when discussions are better informed and ambiguity is reduced, even if nothing is built or deployed.
---
## Commitment, Compensation, and Closing Statement
**This is an unpaid, voluntary role with no minimum commitment.** There is no expectation of availability, responsiveness, or continued participation.
**Either side can end it at any time.** The steward may step away freely, and governance may redefine or revoke the role without cause.
**This proposal formalizes exploration without liability.** It allows the DAO to benefit from curiosity-driven contribution and broad access while keeping ownership, responsibility, and accountability exactly where they already are.
By approving this proposal, the DAO affirms that exploration, experimentation, and open-source style contribution are valuable public goods, and that they can be enabled safely without turning contributors into operators or decision-makers.steward-of-technical-exploration
NNS isn’t governing anymore and the LP is gone, so $NOGS has very limited value left. Using it now avoids sitting on a decaying asset and risking ending up with nothing.
wylin-for-reserve-admin-mizklrrf@0xc6a3...96E4
You keep repeating this story of heroic personal losses and selfless participation in the **forks**, but none of it addresses the **core problem** that was raised. The concern was about **influence gained afterward** and how that influence has been used. Pointing to old bidding losses does not erase what happened next or how it shaped **voting power** today. These are separate issues and should not be blended together.
About the forks, you and your benefactor were not exactly passive monks carrying historical artifacts. You participated voluntarily, yes, but you also **benefited from it after obligations were shifted back onto the DAO**. That part conveniently goes missing every time the conversation comes up.
On that note, I would appreciate if you could **name other members who also forked and then started accumulating more voting power using the extracted funds**. If this practice is as harmless and noble as you describe, transparency should not be a problem.
On the **501c3 topic**, you keep insisting decentralization and charitable status can co-exist. The law firms you mention might have given theoretical pathways, but here is the simple part. The one concrete attempt we had, through Endaoment, collapsed because the terms were not acceptable and because no one, including you, pushed for anything beyond **vague promises**. It is not fair to pretend the DAO rejected a perfect solution. **No real solution was ever presented**.
Also, during the DUNA discussions, the information you provided about charity law was incomplete at best. You presented yourself as well informed on nonprofit structures, yet you skipped the most important point. **United States charity law requires control and accountability structures that do not fit a decentralized, anonymous governance model**. That tension is not imaginary. It is legal reality.
If you have a complete protocol approved by law firms, great. **Share it**. Let the DAO see what tradeoffs exist. Until then, asking people to take it on faith does not work here. We value **transparent reasoning** more than hidden expert opinions.
Calling this a bitter character attack is a neat rhetorical trick to dodge substance. No one is attacking your personality. The issues raised are **structural and documented**. If some of the facts sting, that is on the facts, not on the person stating them.
> @0x9e0e...57B1
>
> the accusation that the organization/ DAO member extracted value from the DAO in order to then purchase more votes is false. they lost $2M+ bidding up arbitragers + buying Nouns during the fork era, and then not forking them
>
> to the extent they did participate in the forks, (2 Nouns each in Forks 1 & 2,) they actually bear significant personal liability for those DAOs and the finances involved once the fork was created, not the DUNA. participating in them was an act of love to own a canonical piece of the DAO’s history and potentially upgrade the contract suite for new purposes in the future
>
> the accusation that 501c3 status + decentralization cannot co-exist is also false. Endaoment presented terms that were not acceptable to the DAO, and the issue was not pursued further by DAO members - yourself included - or the Admins.
>
> exploration of the legal intersection between 501c3 charitable status + DUNA style decentralization & anonymity and how to make it work in the context of a Nouns-style DAO has been one of the two primary focuses of my work this year, in coordination with two high-end law firms, one specializing in crypto law, the other in charity law
>
> we’ve designed a protocol that is arguably more decentralized than the existing Nouns protocol and also gets the green light from both law firms
>
> if the DAO so desires, 501c3 could still be explored further in our specific context and a solution could likely be found, though it may still require some compromise on the DAO’s end. some DAO members have signaled their interest in discussing this further with me, though there hasn’t been any follow up
>
> it’s unfortunate you feel mislead. perhaps consider doing the work necessary to operate with true information and present solutions, rather than bitter personal character attacks based on false information. it may deliver more of the results you’d like to see
>
> >
> >
> > I am increasingly worried that we are pretending the reserve admin role is necessary. There is **zero evidence** that this role was needed at any point in the past year, yet we somehow kept paying a premium for it; it feels like we have been **burning money on a function that never actually served a purpose**.
> >
> > My concerns grow when I look at the broader pattern. You are representing someone, or possibly an organization, who quietly extracted **the maximum possible value from the DAO during the forks**. With those same funds, they have **accumulated votes**, **built significant voting power**, and consistently **pushed DUNA forward**, a structure that conveniently shifts **their obligations from the forks back onto the DAO**. It is difficult not to notice how neatly all of this aligns in their favor.
> >
> > I am also concerned about the quality of information provided during the DUNA discussions. Some of it was **misleading**, especially around the topic of 501c3 status. You and your benefactor claimed a certain level of **experience and familiarity** with nonprofits and charities, yet the fact that **charity status and decentralization cannot legally coexist under US law** somehow never appeared in your explanations. That omission does not look accidental to anyone paying attention.
> >
> > Then there is the historical pattern of proposals that only passed because **the votes you represent** arrived exactly when needed. At this point it feels less like governance and more like watching a stage play where the same character walks in whenever the plot requires a convenient nudge.
> >
> > As a member who genuinely cares about the health of this DAO, I find these patterns troubling.
> >
>
>
>
>
I am always open to solutions. **Present them clearly**, without skipping the inconvenient parts. That would move us forward more than polished narratives about past sacrifices.
# Reconfiguring the Bidder Contract to Secure Our Fourth Noun
We currently hold **3 Nouns**, while the threshold for submitting or sponsoring proposals at Nouns DAO is **4**. This limitation affects our ability to participate meaningfully in governance, and reaching that fourth Noun is essential if we want to have a direct voice in shaping future initiatives. The challenge is to move toward that goal in a responsible and measured way, without committing more resources than necessary.
To do this, we will **update the Bidder contract parameters** to re-enter the auction environment with a clearer and more controlled strategy. The revised settings are as follows;
- **Minimum bid: 0.069 ETH**
- **Maximum bid: 0.69 ETH**
- **Bidding window: final hour of each auction**
This timing ensures the Bidder contract only becomes active when bids are most impactful, reducing unnecessary price escalation. All other parameters of the Bidder contract will remain unchanged to preserve existing stable logic.
Alongside these configuration changes, we will **send 0.5 ETH to the Bidder contract**. Combined with the existing **\~0.23 ETH** already available, the contract will have enough liquidity to participate consistently in upcoming auctions. The goal is not to win every auction but to maintain presence and act decisively when a favorable opportunity appears.
This approach keeps us involved in the Nouns auction ecosystem, sustains our visibility, and moves us incrementally toward acquiring a **fourth Noun**. Achieving this milestone restores our ability to **propose or co-sponsor governance actions** within Nouns DAO, expanding both our autonomy and impact.
If future DAO conditions demonstrate that this strategy is supported or incentivized, we can reassess and potentially **allocate additional funds** to strengthen the Bidder contract further. For now, the updated configuration and funding plan offer a balanced path between active participation and prudent treasury management.
# Reconfiguring the Bidder Contract to Secure Our Fourth Noun
We currently hold **3 Nouns**, while the threshold for submitting or sponsoring proposals at Nouns DAO is **4**. This limitation affects our ability to participate meaningfully in governance, and reaching that fourth Noun is essential if we want to have a direct voice in shaping future initiatives. The challenge is to move toward that goal in a responsible and measured way, without committing more resources than necessary.
To do this, we will **update the Bidder contract parameters** to re-enter the auction environment with a clearer and more controlled strategy. The revised settings are as follows;
- **Minimum bid: 0.069 ETH**
- **Maximum bid: 0.69 ETH**
- **Bidding window: final hour of each auction**
This timing ensures the Bidder contract only becomes active when bids are most impactful, reducing unnecessary price escalation. All other parameters of the Bidder contract will remain unchanged to preserve existing stable logic.
Alongside these configuration changes, we will **send 0.5 ETH to the Bidder contract**. Combined with the existing **\~0.23 ETH** already available, the contract will have enough liquidity to participate consistently in upcoming auctions. The goal is not to win every auction but to maintain presence and act decisively when a favorable opportunity appears.
This approach keeps us involved in the Nouns auction ecosystem, sustains our visibility, and moves us incrementally toward acquiring a **fourth Noun**. Achieving this milestone restores our ability to **propose or co-sponsor governance actions** within Nouns DAO, expanding both our autonomy and impact.
If future DAO conditions demonstrate that this strategy is supported or incentivized, we can reassess and potentially **allocate additional funds** to strengthen the Bidder contract further. For now, the updated configuration and funding plan offer a balanced path between active participation and prudent treasury management.reconfiguring-the-bidder-contract-to-secure-our-fourth-nounSolve some issues in markdown.
wylin-for-reserve-admin-mizklrrf
I am increasingly worried that we are pretending the reserve admin role is necessary. There is **zero evidence** that this role was needed at any point in the past year, yet we somehow kept paying a premium for it; it feels like we have been **burning money on a function that never actually served a purpose**.
My concerns grow when I look at the broader pattern. You are representing someone, or possibly an organization, who quietly extracted **the maximum possible value from the DAO during the forks**. With those same funds, they have **accumulated votes**, **built significant voting power**, and consistently **pushed DUNA forward**, a structure that conveniently shifts **their obligations from the forks back onto the DAO**. It is difficult not to notice how neatly all of this aligns in their favor.
I am also concerned about the quality of information provided during the DUNA discussions. Some of it was **misleading**, especially around the topic of 501c3 status. You and your benefactor claimed a certain level of **experience and familiarity** with nonprofits and charities, yet the fact that **charity status and decentralization cannot legally coexist under US law** somehow never appeared in your explanations. That omission does not look accidental to anyone paying attention.
Then there is the historical pattern of proposals that only passed because **the votes you represent** arrived exactly when needed. At this point it feels less like governance and more like watching a stage play where the same character walks in whenever the plot requires a convenient nudge.
As a member who genuinely cares about the health of this DAO, I find these patterns troubling.
extend-duna-administrators-for-4-months@0xc6a3...96E4
So the claim is that these admins somehow spent **over five thousand hours** in the past year doing repetitive middleman duties. Five thousand. As if they were tirelessly carrying the DAO on their backs while the rest of us just watched. Meanwhile, the actual evidence can barely scrape together **two hundred hours** of real activity. Quite an efficiency gap; almost artistic.
This isn’t a full time job. **Most of the tasks are repetitive**, and the admin only appears when something actually needs processing. Their entire responsibility is to review proposals for US legal compliance and collect basic tax information. And let’s be honest; even then **the admin is basically a human forward button**. The real work is handled by **the lawyers and the accountants**, who the DAO is already paying separately to do the actual thinking.
> @0x9e0e...57B1
>
> $100k per year is $48 per hour, assuming 40 hours per week? the math seems to be off by 10x, or the assumption is 4 working hours per week which seems unfair to the admins
>
> >
> >
> > i think we can all agree last year’s election was, politely speaking, rubbish. most of it happened off stage, like a performance where the cast never arrived, and this proposal seems determined to keep that tradition alive.
> >
> > first point, the payment only looks small if you avoid doing the math. it is 500 usd per person for two people, which averages out to 1000 usd per hour for a role with almost no real responsibility or workload. a premium rate for minimal effort, perfectly suited for a dao that claims to fund public goods while speedrunning corporate consulting culture instead. and this is a separated price paying for middle mans aside from taxes and the actual accountant and lawyer costs, which somehow makes it even more impressive. if public good was the priority, we are doing a fantastic job of proving the opposite.
> >
> > second point, this is still a noticeable slice of auction revenue drifting into something that feels more ceremonial than functional. and the best part is the implied workflow. so what? we pay this, then pause actual public good funding for the next three months so we can get scored again based on auction revenue. it is like putting public goods on hold to make sure the paperwork feels good about itself. the dao equivalent of closing a hospital so the admin team can enjoy better quarterly metrics.
> >
> > overall, if the intention was to make the community pause, squint, and question whether public goods were ever the real priority here, the proposal is performing beautifully.
> >
>
>
>
>
And then we get to the role itself. There’s **no reserve administrator position defined in DUNA**, and nothing in the documentation or history suggests such a role is needed. **No legal basis**, **no economic justification**, just another imaginary chair at an imaginary table.
# Reconfiguring the Bidder Contract to Secure Our Fourth Noun
We currently hold **3 Nouns**, while the threshold for submitting or sponsoring proposals at Nouns DAO is **4**. This limitation affects our ability to participate meaningfully in governance, and reaching that fourth Noun is essential if we want to have a direct voice in shaping future initiatives. The challenge is to move toward that goal in a responsible and measured way, without committing more resources than necessary.
To do this, we will **update the Bidder contract parameters** to re-enter the auction environment with a clearer and more controlled strategy. The revised settings are as follows;
– **Minimum bid: 0.069 ETH** – **Maximum bid: 0.69 ETH** – **Bidding window: final hour of each auction**
This timing ensures the Bidder contract only becomes active when bids are most impactful, reducing unnecessary price escalation. All other parameters of the Bidder contract will remain unchanged to preserve existing stable logic.
Alongside these configuration changes, we will **send 0.5 ETH to the Bidder contract**. Combined with the existing **\~0.23 ETH** already available, the contract will have enough liquidity to participate consistently in upcoming auctions. The goal is not to win every auction but to maintain presence and act decisively when a favorable opportunity appears.
This approach keeps us involved in the Nouns auction ecosystem, sustains our visibility, and moves us incrementally toward acquiring a **fourth Noun**. Achieving this milestone restores our ability to **propose or co-sponsor governance actions** within Nouns DAO, expanding both our autonomy and impact.
If future DAO conditions demonstrate that this strategy is supported or incentivized, we can reassess and potentially **allocate additional funds** to strengthen the Bidder contract further. For now, the updated configuration and funding plan offer a balanced path between active participation and prudent treasury management.reconfiguring-the-bidder-contract-to-secure-our-fourth-noun
extend-duna-administrators-for-4-months
i think we can all agree last year’s election was, politely speaking, rubbish. most of it happened off stage, like a performance where the cast never arrived, and this proposal seems determined to keep that tradition alive.
first point, the payment only looks small if you avoid doing the math. it is 500 usd per person for two people, which averages out to 1000 usd per hour for a role with almost no real responsibility or workload. a premium rate for minimal effort, perfectly suited for a dao that claims to fund public goods while speedrunning corporate consulting culture instead. and this is a separated price paying for middle mans aside from taxes and the actual accountant and lawyer costs, which somehow makes it even more impressive. if public good was the priority, we are doing a fantastic job of proving the opposite.
second point, this is still a noticeable slice of auction revenue drifting into something that feels more ceremonial than functional. and the best part is the implied workflow. so what? we pay this, then pause actual public good funding for the next three months so we can get scored again based on auction revenue. it is like putting public goods on hold to make sure the paperwork feels good about itself. the dao equivalent of closing a hospital so the admin team can enjoy better quarterly metrics.
overall, if the intention was to make the community pause, squint, and question whether public goods were ever the real priority here, the proposal is performing beautifully.
@0xc6a3...96E4
That take misses the mark. Sure, using GitHub and Vercel isn’t peak decentralization, but pretending that makes Nouns “the opposite of decentralized” is lazy reasoning.
Let’s be real, hosting a frontend on Vercel or keeping code on GitHub doesn’t centralize the protocol. The contracts live on Ethereum, and that’s where the logic, treasury, and governance sit. GitHub could nuke every repo tomorrow, and nothing onchain breaks. You could redeploy any frontend from scratch, point it to the same contracts, and it would work just fine.
Vercel? Yeah, it’s a private company. But it’s just serving static assets, not controlling funds. Anyone can mirror the same build to IPFS, Cloudflare, Arweave, or whatever else in a few minutes. The stack’s portable, and that’s what matters. Centralization at the hosting layer doesn’t equal centralization of power.
Saying “Ethereum security is pointless without decentralized frontends” is also a stretch. People interact with Nouns contracts through plenty of interfaces like Etherscan, CLI scripts, or wallets. The frontend is just a convenience, not the source of truth.
As for the “Nouns doesn’t even run validators” bit, yeah, it could, but that’s not its mission. Running validator nodes doesn’t suddenly make a DAO less “Web2.” It just makes it a worse sysadmin. Ethereum already handles consensus and uptime. Nouns doesn’t need to reinvent that part of the stack to stay legitimate.
And the “build our own cloud” thing sounds nice on paper until you realize you’re just moving trust from AWS to a few people with boxes in their basements. That’s not decentralization; that’s a single point of failure with better marketing.
If you really care about sovereignty, publish builds to IPFS, mirror repos on Radicle, or use decentralized RPC networks. That’s how you get resilience without cosplaying as an infrastructure company.
Decentralization isn’t an all-or-nothing religion. It’s a spectrum, and Nouns is already decentralized where it counts, in governance, treasury, and transparency. The rest is just convenience infrastructure, not ideology.
> Nouns web hosting is the opposite of decentralized
>
> Multiple clients with code hosted on Github, (which is owned by Microsoft,) the Dapps themselves hosted on Vercel, (private, centralized company famous for marking up and reselling Amazon server space. Whether it's .wtf, .camp, .game, Probe, .com, Berry, Nouns 95, they're all reliant on centralized web2 tech stacks. Anouns may be the single exception here, though I wonder how their edge functions are handled, (Fleek is better than Vercel, etc. but you're still putting trust in a venture-funded company without any real ownership, aka Web2)
>
> what good is the state-level security and uptime of Ethereum if we have no way to interact with the smart contract protocol we have on there?
>
> what hypocrites are we to experiment in self-sovereign systems of governance and capital allocation while building the least sovereign tooling possible to make the experiment move?Nouns DAO does not even host a single validator node to secure the network we claim to care about so much, despite having enough ETH In the treasury to setup 100 of them!
>
> Moosh is offering clear deliverables with a specific implementation timeline: several pieces of server hardware shipped directly to Nouners, a cloud we own and run for ourselves, with our frontends made into simple drag & drop to deploy templates
>
> with our own cloud, we can have our own RPC, our own validators, we can live true to the cypherpunk ethos of the technology we're building on top of, an actual self-sovereign tech stack
And to be fair, we’re talking about the tech layer here, while centralization in the social layer and voting dominance has always existed in Nouns and probably always will.
I see we already funded your art residency just a couple of months ago. I’d appreciate an update on what’s been done so far, and if designing these heads isn’t part of that residency, then it should be clarified. Also, even if it’s separate, you should probably be asking for ETH, not low-tier Nouns.
Haven’t seen you around Lil Nouns in ages. Did you retire from Lil Nouns or what? I’d be more encouraged to vote for it if you’d actually been around at least sometime in the past year. 😅
Just trying to understand better, what problem in Nouns DAO are you guys actually trying to solve with this? From what I read, it sounds like Moosh is getting its infra tested while Nouns gets a decentralized hosting setup, but the main issue we’ve faced with frontends isn’t really AWS going down. The problem has always been that when funding stops, the infrastructure behind those sites goes dark.
A Nouns frontend doesn’t just run on a web server. It depends on a bunch of external services like RPC endpoints to read and write to the blockchain, subgraphs to fetch indexed proposal and auction data, APIs for Farcaster or Discord integration, and sometimes even image or metadata hosting. Each of these services has its own cost, and when the DAO stops paying the bills or the developer maintaining it disappears, everything breaks. That’s why we’ve seen frontends vanish overnight before, not because AWS failed, but because the payments or maintenance stopped.
So I’m wondering, how does Moosh actually solve that? Does it decentralize the full stack, including RPCs and subgraphs, or only handle the hosting layer? Because even if we self-host the frontend, it still relies on paid endpoints for data. If those go unpaid, we end up in the same situation again.
Basically, if the goal is to make Nouns infra censorship resistant, that’s great, but it also needs to be financially sustainable. Otherwise, decentralizing the hosting is like putting a backup generator in a house that still depends on someone else’s water and gas lines, it might keep the lights on, but the rest still shuts down when the bills aren’t paid.
I don’t think gradually shutting down the client incentives program is the right way forward.
+1
> torn on this .. while i respect the hustle, building in public, taking community requests, etc... i go back to the client incentive board and see you just got your client ID like 3 months ago and already #7 on the board? I feel like with some more promotion you're on your way to the top.. and worry that this may push unfunded clients (even ones above you currently on the client incentive dash) to submit similar props. Would like to see more promoting the client on socials to boost use and increase your incentives (i just checked your x and fc and its been a while). good luck.
>
> +1
>
> > I still think the best way to fund clients is through the client incentives program.
> > It’s the only model that really works long term, it rewards active usage and filters
> > out clients that don’t bring value that can reach mass adoption. It also keeps
> > developers excited to keep improving and maintaining their projects, instead of just
> > building something for quick funding and letting it fade away.
> >
> > When incentives line up with real usage, everyone wins, users get better tools,
> > developers stay engaged, and the DAO doesn’t end up wasting funds on projects that
> > go quiet after a few months. That’s what healthy growth looks like.
> >
> > If client owners feel their current share or incentives from the DAO aren’t enough,
> > they can always put together a proposal to adjust the program parameters. The system
> > is already there to support them, it just needs to be used the right way.
+1
> I still think the best way to fund clients is through the client incentives program.
> It’s the only model that really works long term, it rewards active usage and filters
> out clients that don’t bring value that can reach mass adoption. It also keeps
> developers excited to keep improving and maintaining their projects, instead of just
> building something for quick funding and letting it fade away.
>
> When incentives line up with real usage, everyone wins, users get better tools,
> developers stay engaged, and the DAO doesn’t end up wasting funds on projects that
> go quiet after a few months. That’s what healthy growth looks like.
>
> If client owners feel their current share or incentives from the DAO aren’t enough,
> they can always put together a proposal to adjust the program parameters. The system
> is already there to support them, it just needs to be used the right way.
+1
> My concern is that this create another client building marathon.
>
> Nouns has burned around 2 million on more than 20 clients.
> The few popular ones still run today on incentive money.
>
> Building client-incentive mechanism alone likely cost the DAO over 500k. Judged on the products we actually use today, which Verbs built last year.
>
> I think incentives are a fair way to filter which clients are useful, even though the process is locked behind KYC.
>
> DAO voted against spending a few dollars on taxes over compliance for clients.
> So it feels strange to start another marathon of funding niche clients again by funding a new client over 100x of taxes that DAO might owe on client-incentives.
>
> If a client can gain enough traction, it can earn more.
> Clients should be built to provide value that others do not and then compete fairly on incentives.
+1
> Against funding redundant internal tooling.
>
> +1
>
> > I still think the best way to fund clients is through the client incentives program.
> > It’s the only model that really works long term, it rewards active usage and filters
> > out clients that don’t bring value that can reach mass adoption. It also keeps
> > developers excited to keep improving and maintaining their projects, instead of just
> > building something for quick funding and letting it fade away.
> >
> > When incentives line up with real usage, everyone wins, users get better tools,
> > developers stay engaged, and the DAO doesn’t end up wasting funds on projects that
> > go quiet after a few months. That’s what healthy growth looks like.
> >
> > If client owners feel their current share or incentives from the DAO aren’t enough,
> > they can always put together a proposal to adjust the program parameters. The system
> > is already there to support them, it just needs to be used the right way.
I appreciate the effort, but this feels more personal art exploration than something that adds real value or utility to Nouns. Revising a palette doesn’t meaningfully advance the ecosystem, and it’s unclear what lasting impact or contribution this update brings to the broader community.
I still think the best way to fund clients is through the client incentives program.
It’s the only model that really works long term, it rewards active usage and filters
out clients that don’t bring value that can reach mass adoption. It also keeps
developers excited to keep improving and maintaining their projects, instead of just
building something for quick funding and letting it fade away.
When incentives line up with real usage, everyone wins, users get better tools,
developers stay engaged, and the DAO doesn’t end up wasting funds on projects that
go quiet after a few months. That’s what healthy growth looks like.
If client owners feel their current share or incentives from the DAO aren’t enough,
they can always put together a proposal to adjust the program parameters. The system
is already there to support them, it just needs to be used the right way.
# Claim Your Lil Nouns ENS Name
You can claim your \`name.lilnouns.eth\` [here](https://ens.lilnouns.risheh.eth.limo/) if you missed it earlier. Just make sure you hold at least one Lil Noun and link your desired name to it. You’ll keep that name as long as you keep that Lil Noun, since it’s directly tied to it.
If you run into any issues or have feedback, feel free to ask. You can reach me on Farcaster or drop a comment here. Just a heads-up, if I’m not following you on Farcaster, your message might land in the Requests section. So if I don’t reply after a few days, try poking me another way, I probably just didn’t see it. 😅claim-your-lil-nouns-ens-name
# Lil Auction Issues & Improvements
I opened this topic to keep communication about Lil Auction issues simple and straightforward.
Last week I rolled out some performance improvements and a UI update, thanks to your feedback.
Your input really helps shape Lil Auction, so don’t hold back. Share your thoughts here or ping me on Farcaster if you spot issues or have ideas.lil-auction-issues-&-improvements
sunset-nouns-95
My concern is that this create another client building marathon.
Nouns has burned around 2 million on more than 20 clients.
The few popular ones still run today on incentive money.
Building client-incentive mechanism alone likely cost the DAO over 500k. Judged on the products we actually use today, which Verbs built last year.
I think incentives are a fair way to filter which clients are useful, even though the process is locked behind KYC.
DAO voted against spending a few dollars on taxes over compliance for clients.
So it feels strange to start another marathon of funding niche clients again by funding a new client over 100x of taxes that DAO might owe on client-incentives.
If a client can gain enough traction, it can earn more.
Clients should be built to provide value that others do not and then compete fairly on incentives.
# Lil Data Goes AI-Native
Following [proposal #332](https://lilnouns.camp/proposals/332); I’m working on making Lil Nouns data **AI-native** instead of leaving it scattered through proposals, Discord threads, shows, and repos. The plan is to structure governance, community, cultural, and dev data into proper pipelines, keep it off-chain for speed, anchor it on-chain for provenance, and make it usable by both AI systems and people.
Everyday community members will still be able to access this knowledge through the [Agent bot](https://farcaster.xyz/lilnouns) that’s already live. As part of this work it will get smarter, more accurate, and stop hallucinating random stuff. On the other side, developers and vibe coders get a solid data layer they can use to build new tools and ideas without having to dig through years of fractured history.
This is just the starting point. More interfaces are already being explored, but the foundation comes first by making Lil Nouns data structured, queryable, and portable.
I’m opening this thread to share details, hear feedback, and figure out what parts of the rollout the community wants prioritized, so don’t hold back.lil-data-goes-ai-native
Thanks to everyone who voted 🙏 The result is pretty much clear now, but every vote still matters and helps shape the discussion. I appreciate the participation, and whether this time or next, I’ll keep working on the idea.
# Onchain Topics in Lil Camp
Onchain topics are now live on Lil Camp. I’ve been toying with the idea of pushing Propdates, Candidates, and Topics over to L2, but crosschain is a rabbit hole I’m not eager to dive into. The moment you go down that path, things get messy fast, and complexity just means more hours of dev work and ongoing maintenance. And let’s be real, I don’t exactly have strong incentives to sink endless time into that.
For me, the priority is keeping Lil Camp useful without turning it into a beast that eats all my bandwidth. As long as new features stay simple (for me) to implement and maintain, I’ll keep rolling them out. I’d rather keep delivering practical stuff that the community can actually use than waste time wrestling with complexity that nobody asked for.
Contributions are welcome. If you have suggestions, you can actually build it yourself and send a pull request. But before jumping in, it’s better to open an issue on GitHub or reach out to me so we can discuss it first.onchain-topics-in-lil-camp
@0xdcf3...7a19
The proposal already sets aside 0.1 in budget lines for unseen costs, which directly aligns with what I’ve pointed out before. ETH price doesn’t matter much here since it’s always moving; right now support sits around 4200, resistance near 4600, and even year-end estimates hover around 4300. That buffer covers the volatility, so this proposal isn’t at risk from price swings.
Honestly, I can’t tell if you’re active in Lil Nouns or even Nouns. The MVP was part of the Nouns GG rounds, and we’ve had daily tweets about it; those even get mentioned on Lil Nouns calls and Nouncil calls. Expanding the bot is just a small piece of the proposal; the bigger picture is giving people without direct access to AI agents an easy first experience and lowering the onboarding barrier. The infra built here can plug into any AI-related setup later for professional use.
> @0x9e0e...57B1
>
> The proposal states that budgets are "tight but realistic" and "carefully scoped without padding", yet additional comments state there is a small buffer. On top of that, the price of ETH is down 14% since the original candidate was created, so this doesn't really add up. Regardless of the ask, I don't think anyone who is not on lilnouns.camp is aware that the lilnouns FC account is the bot. The only reason I was able to find it was because of your response to otterfodder's earlier question, and the only other reference to this fact was a comment on prop 298. As you mention, adoption is closely tied to visibility, and this has essentially none, so I find it hard to believe there has been much usage at all. I think it would be prudent to provide data to back up these claims.
>
> > @0x073f...2e63
> >
> > ETH has been in the 4100 to 4900 range for the past several weeks since the market started gaining. I do not base planning on the daily price, since volatility is always part of crypto. Instead, I look at short term forecasts and averages to keep things realistic. The budget also has a small buffer built in budget lines for exactly these kinds of swings, so the recent dip does not threaten delivery. From my side, the bigger risk is slowing down the work by waiting. ETH rarely gives us a “stable” moment, and if we pause for that, we might end up waiting forever. The proposal is still well covered, and if costs ever go slightly over later, I will adjust on my end rather than leave the DAO exposed. In practice, it makes more sense to move forward now while ETH is holding support and the plan is fully fundable.
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > This proposal has lost almost $3k in value since it was first proposed due to ETH's decline, will this amount still cover the costs? or should we wait until ETH stabilizes to re-propose?
> > >
> >
> >
> > @0x2ece...792F
> >
> > The previous version of this agent was an MVP. DAO engagement with it was modest, but it clearly showed potential, especially for onboarding and helping contributors navigate workflows. The people who used it found it valuable. Like many DAO tools, adoption is closely tied to visibility and timing, so we see this as something with room to grow.
> >
> > That said, expanding this agent is only about 10 percent of the current proposal. The main focus is to build AI-friendly infrastructure that positions us for the coming shift to AI-first tooling, which is already happening across the entire ecosystem.
> >
> > Every major platform is moving in this direction. Open Google and you see AI summaries instead of traditional search results. GitHub is adding AI capabilities daily. Etherscan has AI helpers on almost every page now. This is not a future trend, it’s the new default.
> >
> > From my own experience engaging with a lot of less active members over the past few years, one of the biggest barriers to long-term contribution is lack of context. If you’re not in the loop constantly, it's hard to stay engaged. People drop off not because of lack of interest, but because they can't afford to follow everything 24/7. AI can close that gap by helping newcomers and returning contributors quickly regain context and find their place in the conversation.
> >
> > It also helps builders. Accessing the right tools, documentation, or governance details can be a frustrating experience when scattered across platforms. AI can streamline all of that, reducing friction and making it easier to build and contribute.
> >
> > So while improving the agent is a relatively small part of this proposal, it's strategically important. It supports newcomers, improves contributor retention, and reinforces the larger goal: to build infrastructure that keeps us ahead in an AI-native future.
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > From your previous work on this agent, what was the level of engagement from the DAO? I think this would be pretty darn useful for newcomers but I am a little concerned about demand.
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
> All that being said, while I think having AI-native data might be interesting and potentially useful, I don't think anyone in the DAO would build on top of it at this point so I don't feel it's a useful spend for the DAO right now.
>
Everything you brought up has already been addressed in the comments and proposals. If you had actually read those, you’d already have your answers.
use-treasury-yield-to-sustainably-fund-nounish-irl-eventsYield-funded IRL events feel super Nounish. If it clicks, we’ve unlocked a sustainable way to fuel community events. If not, the lesson costs us little.
@0x073f...2e63
ETH has been in the 4100 to 4900 range for the past several weeks since the market started gaining. I do not base planning on the daily price, since volatility is always part of crypto. Instead, I look at short term forecasts and averages to keep things realistic. The budget also has a small buffer built in budget lines for exactly these kinds of swings, so the recent dip does not threaten delivery. From my side, the bigger risk is slowing down the work by waiting. ETH rarely gives us a “stable” moment, and if we pause for that, we might end up waiting forever. The proposal is still well covered, and if costs ever go slightly over later, I will adjust on my end rather than leave the DAO exposed. In practice, it makes more sense to move forward now while ETH is holding support and the plan is fully fundable.
>
>
> This proposal has lost almost $3k in value since it was first proposed due to ETH's decline, will this amount still cover the costs? or should we wait until ETH stabilizes to re-propose?
>
@0x2ece...792F
The previous version of this agent was an MVP. DAO engagement with it was modest, but it clearly showed potential, especially for onboarding and helping contributors navigate workflows. The people who used it found it valuable. Like many DAO tools, adoption is closely tied to visibility and timing, so we see this as something with room to grow.
That said, expanding this agent is only about 10 percent of the current proposal. The main focus is to build AI-friendly infrastructure that positions us for the coming shift to AI-first tooling, which is already happening across the entire ecosystem.
Every major platform is moving in this direction. Open Google and you see AI summaries instead of traditional search results. GitHub is adding AI capabilities daily. Etherscan has AI helpers on almost every page now. This is not a future trend, it’s the new default.
From my own experience engaging with a lot of less active members over the past few years, one of the biggest barriers to long-term contribution is lack of context. If you’re not in the loop constantly, it's hard to stay engaged. People drop off not because of lack of interest, but because they can't afford to follow everything 24/7. AI can close that gap by helping newcomers and returning contributors quickly regain context and find their place in the conversation.
It also helps builders. Accessing the right tools, documentation, or governance details can be a frustrating experience when scattered across platforms. AI can streamline all of that, reducing friction and making it easier to build and contribute.
So while improving the agent is a relatively small part of this proposal, it's strategically important. It supports newcomers, improves contributor retention, and reinforces the larger goal: to build infrastructure that keeps us ahead in an AI-native future.
>
>
> From your previous work on this agent, what was the level of engagement from the DAO? I think this would be pretty darn useful for newcomers but I am a little concerned about demand.
>
I’ve already gathered some feedback and addressed most of the questions that came up. Still, if anything’s unclear, drop your questions here or ping me on Farcaster.
Diversity in staking protocols always makes sense. If everything leans on one, Ethereum turns fragile and way too easy to control. More options spread the risk and keep it true to the idea of decentralization. The wider the staking landscape, the harder it is for anyone to grab power over the network. That’s how Ethereum stays tough.
# Making Lil Nouns Data AI-Native
Lil Nouns already has an AI Agent live inside Farcaster DMs. It works, but because it has no structured DAO data to draw from, replies often **hallucinate**.
This proposal is not just about fixing one bot. It is about building **AI-native data infrastructure**: governance, community, cultural, and developer data structured into pipelines, stored both **off-chain for scale and on-chain for provenance**, indexed for retrieval, and exposed through a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server. This eliminates hallucinations and makes Lil Nouns data portable across any AI workflow.
The infra will also **integrate with existing Lil Nouns tools and the current bot**, upgrading them to become more accurate, useful, and long-lived. Builders, developers, and vibe coders will be able to plug this data layer into their own apps and experiments.
The budget is **5 ETH** for a **five-month build (Sep 2025 - Jan 2026)** followed by **operations, maintenance, and upgrades through the end of 2026**. The roadmap is structured, but **steps and focus areas may be adjusted based on DAO priorities at the time**, ensuring the project aligns with the community’s evolving needs.
---
## Problem
The Lil Nouns AI Agent shows promise, but it hallucinates. The issue is not the model, it is missing context. DAO knowledge is scattered across proposals, Discord threads, shows, and repos. Without structured data, AI will always guess.
The deeper problem is that **Lil Nouns data is not AI-native**. For communities and DAOs, being legible to AI is no longer optional. Governance, culture, and dev resources must be structured, queryable, and portable, secured with the right mix of off-chain efficiency and on-chain verifiability.
---
## Solution
This project builds **AI-native data infrastructure** for Lil Nouns and integrates it with tools already in use.
- **Governance data**: proposals, votes, treasury flows, auctions, secured with on-chain storage for provenance.
- **Community data**: Discord, Farcaster, Mirror/Paragraph pipelines with anonymization, primarily stored off-chain for scale.
- **Cultural and media data**: ingestion of video and audio content such as the Pirate Show and selectively the Lil Nouns Show. These are examples only. The infra will be built to handle **any similar media source** including podcasts, Twitter/X Spaces, community calls, recorded workshops, and future shows. Stored off-chain for practicality, with important metadata anchored on-chain.
- **Developer data**: ABIs, repos, upgrade histories structured for builders, with schema references stored on-chain.
- **MCP server**: makes Lil Nouns data portable across AI systems.
- **Existing bots and tools integration**: upgrading the current AI Agent and DAO-facing bots to use the same infra, eliminating hallucinations and extending their capabilities.
### Technical Approach
- **Ingestion pipelines** normalize raw inputs into structured and semantic formats.
- **Vector databases with retrieval-augmented generation (RAG)** ground answers.
- **Hybrid storage**: off-chain for media, embeddings, and scale; on-chain for governance, schema, and metadata.
- **Tiered access controls** give holders advanced features while keeping core public access.
- **Monitoring and feedback loops** detect hallucinations and improve reliability.
- **Integration hooks** ensure existing bots and future tools all share the same data backbone.
- **Maintenance** ensures pipelines, storage, and AI retrieval remain reliable across the lifecycle, not just during initial build.
---
## Budget
The ask is **5 ETH** for a five-month build and operations with maintenance through **end of 2026**. This includes development effort, AI usage, infrastructure, monitoring, and maintenance.
### Breakdown
- **Infra and hosting (1.8 ETH)**: off-chain databases (structured and vector), storage for transcripts and media, compute for ingestion and inference, plus on-chain costs for governance and metadata anchoring. Covers scaling and monitoring through 2026.
- **Governance pipelines (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, indexing, and on-chain storage of proposals, votes, treasury, and auctions.
- **Discord integration (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, anonymization, semantic indexing, stored off-chain with metadata anchors.
- **Social media ingestion (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, connectors for Farcaster, Mirror/Paragraph, limited Twitter.
- **Media ingestion (0.4 ETH)**: development, maintenance, and handling of audio and video sources such as Pirate Show, Lil Nouns Show, podcasts, Twitter/X Spaces, community calls, and future DAO media. Stored off-chain with key references on-chain.
- **Developer data structuring (0.4 ETH)**: development and maintenance of ABIs, repos, upgrades structured for dev queries, schemas anchored on-chain.
- **Farcaster Mini App (0.3 ETH)**: development, maintenance, and lightweight interface with tiered access.
- **MCP server (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, and infra for portable access.
- **Integration with existing bots and tools (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, and upgrades of the current AI Agent and DAO bots to use shared infra.
- **Flex and innovations (0.1 ETH)**: buffer for unforeseen costs or pipeline extensions.
### Budget Philosophy
I always design budgets to be **tight but realistic**. The amounts listed are carefully scoped to cover actual development and infra needs without padding. My track record is that I deliver what I promise, and this project will be no exception.
**Open-source note:** All software from this project will be released as open-source under a permissive license (Apache 2.0). This ensures transparency, long-term accessibility, and the freedom for other builders to extend or repurpose the work without lock-in.
---
## Timeline
- **Month 1 (Sep 2025):** Infra expansion, Discord and social ingestion, begin integration with existing Agent.
- **Month 2 (Oct 2025):** Governance pipelines with on-chain anchoring, developer data structuring.
- **Month 3 (Nov 2025):** Media ingestion pipelines (Pirate Show, Lil Nouns Show, podcasts, Spaces, community calls), tiered access implementation.
- **Month 4 (Dec 2025):** MCP server development and testing, continue DAO bot and tool integration.
- **Month 5 (Jan 2026):** Farcaster Mini App launch, full MCP server deployment, system stabilization.
- **Months 6–16 (Feb – Dec 2026):** Operations, monitoring, maintenance, integration upgrades, hallucination reduction, incremental improvements.
**Flexibility note:** While this is the planned sequence, development steps may be reprioritized in collaboration with the DAO to reflect community needs at the time.
---
## Outcome
By early 2026:
- The current AI Agent and DAO bots are upgraded to use grounded data, with **no more hallucinations**.
- Governance, community, cultural, and developer data are structured and queryable.
- Media content including shows, podcasts, Spaces, and calls are preserved and searchable.
- Lil Nouns gains a **living, portable memory** of its history and culture.
- Hybrid storage ensures scalability and permanence: bulk data off-chain for efficiency, critical metadata and governance on-chain for trust and provenance.
- MCP server ensures Lil data is not locked in one app but queryable by any AI system.
- Developers and vibe coders can build apps, bots, and cultural projects directly on Lil Nouns.
- All software released openly under Apache 2.0 ensures the infra remains usable, forkable, and auditable by anyone.
The **real outcome**: Lil Nouns becomes **AI-native**. Its knowledge is not fragmented, but structured, queryable, portable, and actively maintained. The infra does not just provide tools for the present, it preserves DAO culture as an **AI-native archive**, ensuring Lil Nouns history and creativity are accessible for years to come.
For **5 ETH**, the DAO secures five months of build and nearly a year of operations with active maintenance, upgrading Lil Nouns from an experimental demo to **DAO-grade AI infrastructure**: reliable, extensible, open-source, and future-proof through 2026, with flexibility to follow DAO priorities.
# Making Lil Nouns Data AI-Native
Lil Nouns already has an AI Agent live inside Farcaster DMs. It works, but because it has no structured DAO data to draw from, replies often **hallucinate**.
This proposal is not just about fixing one bot. It is about building **AI-native data infrastructure**: governance, community, cultural, and developer data structured into pipelines, stored both **off-chain for scale and on-chain for provenance**, indexed for retrieval, and exposed through a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server. This eliminates hallucinations and makes Lil Nouns data portable across any AI workflow.
The infra will also **integrate with existing Lil Nouns tools and the current bot**, upgrading them to become more accurate, useful, and long-lived. Builders, developers, and vibe coders will be able to plug this data layer into their own apps and experiments.
The budget is **5 ETH** for a **five-month build (Sep 2025 - Jan 2026)** followed by **operations, maintenance, and upgrades through the end of 2026**. The roadmap is structured, but **steps and focus areas may be adjusted based on DAO priorities at the time**, ensuring the project aligns with the community’s evolving needs.
---
## Problem
The Lil Nouns AI Agent shows promise, but it hallucinates. The issue is not the model, it is missing context. DAO knowledge is scattered across proposals, Discord threads, shows, and repos. Without structured data, AI will always guess.
The deeper problem is that **Lil Nouns data is not AI-native**. For communities and DAOs, being legible to AI is no longer optional. Governance, culture, and dev resources must be structured, queryable, and portable, secured with the right mix of off-chain efficiency and on-chain verifiability.
---
## Solution
This project builds **AI-native data infrastructure** for Lil Nouns and integrates it with tools already in use.
- **Governance data**: proposals, votes, treasury flows, auctions, secured with on-chain storage for provenance.
- **Community data**: Discord, Farcaster, Mirror/Paragraph pipelines with anonymization, primarily stored off-chain for scale.
- **Cultural and media data**: ingestion of video and audio content such as the Pirate Show and selectively the Lil Nouns Show. These are examples only. The infra will be built to handle **any similar media source** including podcasts, Twitter/X Spaces, community calls, recorded workshops, and future shows. Stored off-chain for practicality, with important metadata anchored on-chain.
- **Developer data**: ABIs, repos, upgrade histories structured for builders, with schema references stored on-chain.
- **MCP server**: makes Lil Nouns data portable across AI systems.
- **Existing bots and tools integration**: upgrading the current AI Agent and DAO-facing bots to use the same infra, eliminating hallucinations and extending their capabilities.
### Technical Approach
- **Ingestion pipelines** normalize raw inputs into structured and semantic formats.
- **Vector databases with retrieval-augmented generation (RAG)** ground answers.
- **Hybrid storage**: off-chain for media, embeddings, and scale; on-chain for governance, schema, and metadata.
- **Tiered access controls** give holders advanced features while keeping core public access.
- **Monitoring and feedback loops** detect hallucinations and improve reliability.
- **Integration hooks** ensure existing bots and future tools all share the same data backbone.
- **Maintenance** ensures pipelines, storage, and AI retrieval remain reliable across the lifecycle, not just during initial build.
---
## Budget
The ask is **5 ETH** for a five-month build and operations with maintenance through **end of 2026**. This includes development effort, AI usage, infrastructure, monitoring, and maintenance.
### Breakdown
- **Infra and hosting (1.8 ETH)**: off-chain databases (structured and vector), storage for transcripts and media, compute for ingestion and inference, plus on-chain costs for governance and metadata anchoring. Covers scaling and monitoring through 2026.
- **Governance pipelines (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, indexing, and on-chain storage of proposals, votes, treasury, and auctions.
- **Discord integration (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, anonymization, semantic indexing, stored off-chain with metadata anchors.
- **Social media ingestion (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, connectors for Farcaster, Mirror/Paragraph, limited Twitter.
- **Media ingestion (0.4 ETH)**: development, maintenance, and handling of audio and video sources such as Pirate Show, Lil Nouns Show, podcasts, Twitter/X Spaces, community calls, and future DAO media. Stored off-chain with key references on-chain.
- **Developer data structuring (0.4 ETH)**: development and maintenance of ABIs, repos, upgrades structured for dev queries, schemas anchored on-chain.
- **Farcaster Mini App (0.3 ETH)**: development, maintenance, and lightweight interface with tiered access.
- **MCP server (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, and infra for portable access.
- **Integration with existing bots and tools (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, and upgrades of the current AI Agent and DAO bots to use shared infra.
- **Flex and innovations (0.1 ETH)**: buffer for unforeseen costs or pipeline extensions.
### Budget Philosophy
I always design budgets to be **tight but realistic**. The amounts listed are carefully scoped to cover actual development and infra needs without padding. My track record is that I deliver what I promise, and this project will be no exception.
**Open-source note:** All software from this project will be released as open-source under a permissive license (Apache 2.0). This ensures transparency, long-term accessibility, and the freedom for other builders to extend or repurpose the work without lock-in.
---
## Timeline
- **Month 1 (Sep 2025):** Infra expansion, Discord and social ingestion, begin integration with existing Agent.
- **Month 2 (Oct 2025):** Governance pipelines with on-chain anchoring, developer data structuring.
- **Month 3 (Nov 2025):** Media ingestion pipelines (Pirate Show, Lil Nouns Show, podcasts, Spaces, community calls), tiered access implementation.
- **Month 4 (Dec 2025):** MCP server development and testing, continue DAO bot and tool integration.
- **Month 5 (Jan 2026):** Farcaster Mini App launch, full MCP server deployment, system stabilization.
- **Months 6–16 (Feb – Dec 2026):** Operations, monitoring, maintenance, integration upgrades, hallucination reduction, incremental improvements.
**Flexibility note:** While this is the planned sequence, development steps may be reprioritized in collaboration with the DAO to reflect community needs at the time.
---
## Outcome
By early 2026:
- The current AI Agent and DAO bots are upgraded to use grounded data, with **no more hallucinations**.
- Governance, community, cultural, and developer data are structured and queryable.
- Media content including shows, podcasts, Spaces, and calls are preserved and searchable.
- Lil Nouns gains a **living, portable memory** of its history and culture.
- Hybrid storage ensures scalability and permanence: bulk data off-chain for efficiency, critical metadata and governance on-chain for trust and provenance.
- MCP server ensures Lil data is not locked in one app but queryable by any AI system.
- Developers and vibe coders can build apps, bots, and cultural projects directly on Lil Nouns.
- All software released openly under Apache 2.0 ensures the infra remains usable, forkable, and auditable by anyone.
The **real outcome**: Lil Nouns becomes **AI-native**. Its knowledge is not fragmented, but structured, queryable, portable, and actively maintained. The infra does not just provide tools for the present, it preserves DAO culture as an **AI-native archive**, ensuring Lil Nouns history and creativity are accessible for years to come.
For **5 ETH**, the DAO secures five months of build and nearly a year of operations with active maintenance, upgrading Lil Nouns from an experimental demo to **DAO-grade AI infrastructure**: reliable, extensible, open-source, and future-proof through 2026, with flexibility to follow DAO priorities.scaling-lil-nouns-ai-agentUpdated to clarify everything will be open-source under a permissive license (Apache 2.0). Keeps it transparent, usable, and forkable.
scaling-lil-nouns-ai-agent@0xae47...5Fed
The on-chain storage component puts the full datasets into a permanent blockchain layer that provides immutability, replication, and integrity. At the same time, the main chain only holds the hashes and metadata anchors, so active data stays fast and cost-efficient off-chain while the archival side guarantees long-term availability without bloating the primary chain.
>
>
> what is the onchain storage component of this?
>
Got questions or feedback on this proposal? Drop them in, and I’ll answer onchain so it’s easy for everyone to follow along.
# Making Lil Nouns Data AI-Native
Lil Nouns already has an AI Agent live inside Farcaster DMs. It works, but because it has no structured DAO data to draw from, replies often **hallucinate**.
This proposal is not just about fixing one bot. It is about building **AI-native data infrastructure**: governance, community, cultural, and developer data structured into pipelines, stored both **off-chain for scale and on-chain for provenance**, indexed for retrieval, and exposed through a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server. This eliminates hallucinations and makes Lil Nouns data portable across any AI workflow.
The infra will also **integrate with existing Lil Nouns tools and the current bot**, upgrading them to become more accurate, useful, and long-lived. Builders, developers, and vibe coders will be able to plug this data layer into their own apps and experiments.
The budget is **5 ETH** for a **five-month build (Sep 2025 - Jan 2026)** followed by **operations, maintenance, and upgrades through the end of 2026**. The roadmap is structured, but **steps and focus areas may be adjusted based on DAO priorities at the time**, ensuring the project aligns with the community’s evolving needs.
---
## Problem
The Lil Nouns AI Agent shows promise, but it hallucinates. The issue is not the model, it is missing context. DAO knowledge is scattered across proposals, Discord threads, shows, and repos. Without structured data, AI will always guess.
The deeper problem is that **Lil Nouns data is not AI-native**. For communities and DAOs, being legible to AI is no longer optional. Governance, culture, and dev resources must be structured, queryable, and portable, secured with the right mix of off-chain efficiency and on-chain verifiability.
---
## Solution
This project builds **AI-native data infrastructure** for Lil Nouns and integrates it with tools already in use.
- **Governance data**: proposals, votes, treasury flows, auctions, secured with on-chain storage for provenance.
- **Community data**: Discord, Farcaster, Mirror/Paragraph pipelines with anonymization, primarily stored off-chain for scale.
- **Cultural and media data**: ingestion of video and audio content such as the Pirate Show and selectively the Lil Nouns Show. These are examples only. The infra will be built to handle **any similar media source** including podcasts, Twitter/X Spaces, community calls, recorded workshops, and future shows. Stored off-chain for practicality, with important metadata anchored on-chain.
- **Developer data**: ABIs, repos, upgrade histories structured for builders, with schema references stored on-chain.
- **MCP server**: makes Lil Nouns data portable across AI systems.
- **Existing bots and tools integration**: upgrading the current AI Agent and DAO-facing bots to use the same infra, eliminating hallucinations and extending their capabilities.
### Technical Approach
- **Ingestion pipelines** normalize raw inputs into structured and semantic formats.
- **Vector databases with retrieval-augmented generation (RAG)** ground answers.
- **Hybrid storage**: off-chain for media, embeddings, and scale; on-chain for governance, schema, and metadata.
- **Tiered access controls** give holders advanced features while keeping core public access.
- **Monitoring and feedback loops** detect hallucinations and improve reliability.
- **Integration hooks** ensure existing bots and future tools all share the same data backbone.
- **Maintenance** ensures pipelines, storage, and AI retrieval remain reliable across the lifecycle, not just during initial build.
---
## Budget
The ask is **5 ETH** for a five-month build and operations with maintenance through **end of 2026**. This includes development effort, AI usage, infrastructure, monitoring, and maintenance.
### Breakdown
- **Infra and hosting (1.8 ETH)**: off-chain databases (structured and vector), storage for transcripts and media, compute for ingestion and inference, plus on-chain costs for governance and metadata anchoring. Covers scaling and monitoring through 2026.
- **Governance pipelines (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, indexing, and on-chain storage of proposals, votes, treasury, and auctions.
- **Discord integration (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, anonymization, semantic indexing, stored off-chain with metadata anchors.
- **Social media ingestion (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, connectors for Farcaster, Mirror/Paragraph, limited Twitter.
- **Media ingestion (0.4 ETH)**: development, maintenance, and handling of audio and video sources such as Pirate Show, Lil Nouns Show, podcasts, Twitter/X Spaces, community calls, and future DAO media. Stored off-chain with key references on-chain.
- **Developer data structuring (0.4 ETH)**: development and maintenance of ABIs, repos, upgrades structured for dev queries, schemas anchored on-chain.
- **Farcaster Mini App (0.3 ETH)**: development, maintenance, and lightweight interface with tiered access.
- **MCP server (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, and infra for portable access.
- **Integration with existing bots and tools (0.6 ETH)**: development, maintenance, and upgrades of the current AI Agent and DAO bots to use shared infra.
- **Flex and innovations (0.1 ETH)**: buffer for unforeseen costs or pipeline extensions.
### Budget Philosophy
I always design budgets to be **tight but realistic**. The amounts listed are carefully scoped to cover actual development and infra needs without padding. My track record is that I deliver what I promise, and this project will be no exception.
---
## Timeline
- **Month 1 (Sep 2025):** Infra expansion, Discord and social ingestion, begin integration with existing Agent.
- **Month 2 (Oct 2025):** Governance pipelines with on-chain anchoring, developer data structuring.
- **Month 3 (Nov 2025):** Media ingestion pipelines (Pirate Show, Lil Nouns Show, podcasts, Spaces, community calls), tiered access implementation.
- **Month 4 (Dec 2025):** MCP server development and testing, continue DAO bot and tool integration.
- **Month 5 (Jan 2026):** Farcaster Mini App launch, full MCP server deployment, system stabilization.
- **Months 6–16 (Feb – Dec 2026):** Operations, monitoring, maintenance, integration upgrades, hallucination reduction, incremental improvements.
**Flexibility note:** While this is the planned sequence, development steps may be reprioritized in collaboration with the DAO to reflect community needs at the time.
---
## Outcome
By early 2026:
- The current AI Agent and DAO bots are upgraded to use grounded data, with **no more hallucinations**.
- Governance, community, cultural, and developer data are structured and queryable.
- Media content including shows, podcasts, Spaces, and calls are preserved and searchable.
- Lil Nouns gains a **living, portable memory** of its history and culture.
- Hybrid storage ensures scalability and permanence: bulk data off-chain for efficiency, critical metadata and governance on-chain for trust and provenance.
- MCP server ensures Lil data is not locked in one app but queryable by any AI system.
- Developers and vibe coders can build apps, bots, and cultural projects directly on Lil Nouns.
The **real outcome**: Lil Nouns becomes **AI-native**. Its knowledge is not fragmented, but structured, queryable, portable, and actively maintained. The infra does not just provide tools for the present, it preserves DAO culture as an **AI-native archive**, ensuring Lil Nouns history and creativity are accessible for years to come.
For **5 ETH**, the DAO secures five months of build and nearly a year of operations with active maintenance, upgrading Lil Nouns from an experimental demo to **DAO-grade AI infrastructure**: reliable, extensible, and future-proof through 2026, with flexibility to follow DAO priorities.scaling-lil-nouns-ai-agentI’ve updated the proposal to go beyond just fixing hallucinations. Now it covers off-chain + on-chain storage, wider media ingestion (shows, podcasts, Spaces, calls), and integration with the bots I already built. Added maintenance next to development for stability, kept the budget tight but realistic, stretched the timeline through 2026, and framed the whole thing as building an AI-native archive for Lil Nouns.
I want to see if there’s any dev in the Nouns ecosystem who actually ever contributed some lines of code to Nouns in any way, and got introduced to Nouns from one of these IRL events. Pretty curious to know that before casting my vote.
Pretty much against funding or involving Nouns in any project without a clearly stated license and real open source. If the license is vague or missing, it is a legal landmine. If the code is closed, we cannot audit it, fork it, fix it, or keep it alive when the team vanishes. That kills community ownership, invites vendor lock in, and turns onchain governance into a trust exercise. We build public goods, not black boxes with a Noun slapped on top.
Minimum bar looks simple. Repo public. License explicit and permissive. Clear contribution guide and ownership of IP spelled out. Reproducible builds and basic security hygiene with reviews and tests. Permissive licenses like Apache 2.0, MIT, or BSD are fine here, they keep things simple, avoid copyleft traps, and allow the community to build without friction. Anything less reads like trust me bro code, which is cute until it hits prod and the bill arrives. And I don’t see any of it on the proposal.
stacking-treasury-yield-with-oeth-3.0---step-1/2Variety in your crypto basket makes sense. Better not to put everything into one protocol, it’s healthier for Ethereum’s growth and future too. And since we’re already counting pennies and nickels these days, might be worth a shot.
Demo of the miniapp is live [here](https://lilnouns.github.io/lilnouns-ens/) for the Sepolia contract. You can test it and drop feedback, but keep in mind it only works on Sepolia for now, at least until this proposal passes.
# Delegating ENS Control to New Lil Nouns Mapper
This proposal follows proposal [#312](https://lilnouns.camp/proposals/312) to deliver and delegate a new ENS Mapper contract. By passing this, the new smart contract will be recognized as ENS manager and will generate subnames linked directly to tokens.
A note on Name Wrapper: in proposal #312 I mentioned using ENS’s modern Name Wrapper approach. Unfortunately, since our treasury doesn’t support safe transfer of NFTs (a requirement for Name Wrapper), we can’t use that method right now. This doesn’t affect functionality. The contract is upgradeable, so if the treasury ever migrates to a version that supports safe transfers, we can extend it in the future.
## Contract Overview
The new [ENS Mapper](https://github.com/lilnouns/lilnouns-ens/blob/master/packages/contracts/src/LilNounsEnsMapperV2.sol) is an upgradeable smart contract that provides ENS subname mapping for Lil Nouns NFTs. It lets NFT owners claim and manage a human-readable ENS name (e.g., \`mynoun.lilnouns.eth\`) that stays programmatically linked to their token.
The contract serves as both ENS controller (managing subnames) and resolver (providing data tied to those names).
## Core Features
- **Subname Claiming** \`claimSubname()\` lets an NFT owner register a unique subname for their tokenId. Ownership is verified and no duplicate labels are allowed.
- **ENS Resolution**
- **IAddrResolver**: \`addr()\` resolves the ENS name to the current NFT owner, updating automatically on transfers.
- **ITextResolver**: Supports text records, including a built-in “avatar” record pointing to the NFT’s EIP-155 URI.
- **INameResolver**: Returns the full ENS name tied to a given node.
- **Upgradeability** Uses UUPS upgradeable proxy. Logic can be upgraded without breaking existing names or requiring re-registration.
- **Legacy Migration** Includes functions to migrate or release names from the V1 system.
- **Ownership and Control** Controlled by \`OwnableUpgradeable\`. DAO retains administrative rights; NFT owners retain subname-level control.
---
If passed, the DAO will officially delegate ENS manager rights to the new contract, enabling subname generation for Lil Nouns NFTs. This builds on the foundation from proposal #312 and provides the community with a functional, upgradeable ENS mapping system.
# Delegating ENS Control to New Lil Nouns Mapper
This proposal follows proposal [#312](https://lilnouns.camp/proposals/312) to deliver and delegate a new ENS Mapper contract. By passing this, the new smart contract will be recognized as ENS manager and will generate subnames linked directly to tokens.
A note on Name Wrapper: in proposal #312 I mentioned using ENS’s modern Name Wrapper approach. Unfortunately, since our treasury doesn’t support safe transfer of NFTs (a requirement for Name Wrapper), we can’t use that method right now. This doesn’t affect functionality. The contract is upgradeable, so if the treasury ever migrates to a version that supports safe transfers, we can extend it in the future.
## Contract Overview
The new [ENS Mapper](https://github.com/lilnouns/lilnouns-ens/blob/master/packages/contracts/src/LilNounsEnsMapperV2.sol) is an upgradeable smart contract that provides ENS subname mapping for Lil Nouns NFTs. It lets NFT owners claim and manage a human-readable ENS name (e.g., \`mynoun.lilnouns.eth\`) that stays programmatically linked to their token.
The contract serves as both ENS controller (managing subnames) and resolver (providing data tied to those names).
## Core Features
- **Subname Claiming** \`claimSubname()\` lets an NFT owner register a unique subname for their tokenId. Ownership is verified and no duplicate labels are allowed.
- **ENS Resolution**
- **IAddrResolver**: \`addr()\` resolves the ENS name to the current NFT owner, updating automatically on transfers.
- **ITextResolver**: Supports text records, including a built-in “avatar” record pointing to the NFT’s EIP-155 URI.
- **INameResolver**: Returns the full ENS name tied to a given node.
- **Upgradeability** Uses UUPS upgradeable proxy. Logic can be upgraded without breaking existing names or requiring re-registration.
- **Legacy Migration** Includes functions to migrate or release names from the V1 system.
- **Ownership and Control** Controlled by \`OwnableUpgradeable\`. DAO retains administrative rights; NFT owners retain subname-level control.
---
If passed, the DAO will officially delegate ENS manager rights to the new contract, enabling subname generation for Lil Nouns NFTs. This builds on the foundation from proposal #312 and provides the community with a functional, upgradeable ENS mapping system.delegating-ens-control-to-new-lil-nouns-mapperDecided in the last review it’s safer and cleaner to stick with single-step ownership; two-step didn’t seem needed here. Now it’s just one transaction, delegating the ENS manager role straight to the ENS Mapper contract.
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\aWa&aW[Pa%}` a%Sa%N`zV[_a%;V[P=a&nV[aV[_a#vV[P=a'WV[aeip155:1/erc721:V[a/Ha)8V[Pa/]a/X`aN$V[a5uaN9V[a5}aN_V[a3V[a8zV[a;[V[a<߅_aB~WaBRW[aAGV[aBqzV[_aBMV[P=aB_V[acV[_aC"V[P=aCKV[aaF>W[aF"WV[_cp>F0123456789abcdefWaKFaKAaK<aK,aKQV[V[aNAaN/V[V[aNKaSV[aNSaNUV[V[aN]aTQV[V[aNgaNCV[V[V[aT2aT4V[V[aTOaT?aN
# Delegating ENS Control to New Lil Nouns Mapper
This proposal follows proposal [#312](https://lilnouns.camp/proposals/312) to deliver and delegate a new ENS Mapper contract. By passing this, the new smart contract will be recognized as ENS manager and will generate subnames linked directly to tokens.
A note on Name Wrapper: in proposal #312 I mentioned using ENS’s modern Name Wrapper approach. Unfortunately, since our treasury doesn’t support safe transfer of NFTs (a requirement for Name Wrapper), we can’t use that method right now. This doesn’t affect functionality. The contract is upgradeable, so if the treasury ever migrates to a version that supports safe transfers, we can extend it in the future.
## Contract Overview
The new [ENS Mapper](https://github.com/lilnouns/lilnouns-ens/blob/master/packages/contracts/src/LilNounsEnsMapperV2.sol) is an upgradeable smart contract that provides ENS subname mapping for Lil Nouns NFTs. It lets NFT owners claim and manage a human-readable ENS name (e.g., \`mynoun.lilnouns.eth\`) that stays programmatically linked to their token.
The contract serves as both ENS controller (managing subnames) and resolver (providing data tied to those names).
## Core Features
- **Subname Claiming** \`claimSubname()\` lets an NFT owner register a unique subname for their tokenId. Ownership is verified and no duplicate labels are allowed.
- **ENS Resolution**
- **IAddrResolver**: \`addr()\` resolves the ENS name to the current NFT owner, updating automatically on transfers.
- **ITextResolver**: Supports text records, including a built-in “avatar” record pointing to the NFT’s EIP-155 URI.
- **INameResolver**: Returns the full ENS name tied to a given node.
- **Upgradeability** Uses UUPS upgradeable proxy. Logic can be upgraded without breaking existing names or requiring re-registration.
- **Legacy Migration** Includes functions to migrate or release names from the V1 system.
- **Ownership and Control** Controlled by \`Ownable2StepUpgradeable\`. DAO retains administrative rights; NFT owners retain subname-level control.
---
If passed, the DAO will officially delegate ENS manager rights to the new contract, enabling subname generation for Lil Nouns NFTs. This builds on the foundation from proposal #312 and provides the community with a functional, upgradeable ENS mapping system.delegating-ens-control-to-new-lil-nouns-mapperUpdated the transactions, first one hands over ownership of the ENS Mapper contract to the DAO, second one sets the ENS Mapper as the manager of ENS.
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+6`eip155:1/erc721:Pa+\a+5a+/a+*a+%`aOXV[a6NaOmV[a6VaOa!yV[_a8KV[P=a8bV[aV[V[a?Za7fV[Pa?m_a?gaOa"?V[aE\aEVaEQaE#V[aaGvW[aGZWV[_cp>F0123456789abcdefaMMWaL~aLyaLtaLdaLaOFaUJV[aOMV[V[aOVaO:V[V[aOkaUJV[V[aOuaOcV[V[aOV[aP%a7fV[PaP@_aP:aP5a)uV[aV&V[_aVWaVRa)uV[aV&V[tV[PaW,_aW&aO/V[
If the cost of simplifying is pushing people out for valuing their privacy, then what we are really doing is narrowing the definition of who counts as a member. That is not simplification; it is gatekeeping. And if we are fine with that, then we should stop pretending decentralization is our pillar at all, because at that point it is just marketing.
+1
> The main pillar of a DAO is decentralization, and having multiple frontends with different approaches and experiences is one of the clearest ways to keep that pillar strong. When users have the freedom to choose how they interact with the DAO, it prevents single points of control, and that’s what decentralization is supposed to mean in practice.
>
> In the past, the DAO chose to adopt DUNA as its structural base. That decision wasn’t free; it came with costs, both financially and philosophically. Choosing a single structure always does. And while it might have seemed like a practical choice at the time, it locked us into a path that now raises serious questions about whether the trade-offs are worth it.
>
> So here’s what I want to put to the members. Does the cost–benefit in this proposal really make sense? Is the cost mentioned here something you would consider reasonable when the outcome is essentially bowing down to censorship? Because that’s the crux of it. When we decide to exclude known contributors simply because they prioritize their privacy, we’re not just saving money or simplifying operations; we’re giving up on one of the main values that the crypto ecosystem was built on.
>
> Let’s not forget why this entire movement exists. It was designed to protect individual privacy, to grant financial freedom, to create a system where people could participate without being forced to compromise on their principles. If we start making decisions that punish members for choosing privacy, then what exactly are we standing for? At that point, we’re not only contradicting the idea of decentralization, we’re actively undermining the ethos that makes this ecosystem different from the old world we were trying to improve on.
>
> The cost here is more than just a line item on a proposal; it’s the cost of legitimizing censorship. It’s the cost of saying some people can’t contribute unless they give up what matters most to them. If we’re willing to pay that price, then we’re admitting that decentralization is negotiable, and that privacy is only important until it gets inconvenient.
>
> So I’ll put it bluntly: do you think the cost–benefit here actually aligns with the pillars of this DAO? Or are we letting short-term convenience pull us away from the principles we claim to uphold? As members, you have the power to decide that with every single vote. Proposals can change the direction block by block, but only if we pay attention to what’s really at stake. This is one of those moments where the choice isn’t just about money; it’s about whether we keep holding up the very pillars that define what a DAO is supposed to be.
update-approved-client-list
The main pillar of a DAO is decentralization, and having multiple frontends with different approaches and experiences is one of the clearest ways to keep that pillar strong. When users have the freedom to choose how they interact with the DAO, it prevents single points of control, and that’s what decentralization is supposed to mean in practice.
In the past, the DAO chose to adopt DUNA as its structural base. That decision wasn’t free; it came with costs, both financially and philosophically. Choosing a single structure always does. And while it might have seemed like a practical choice at the time, it locked us into a path that now raises serious questions about whether the trade-offs are worth it.
So here’s what I want to put to the members. Does the cost–benefit in this proposal really make sense? Is the cost mentioned here something you would consider reasonable when the outcome is essentially bowing down to censorship? Because that’s the crux of it. When we decide to exclude known contributors simply because they prioritize their privacy, we’re not just saving money or simplifying operations; we’re giving up on one of the main values that the crypto ecosystem was built on.
Let’s not forget why this entire movement exists. It was designed to protect individual privacy, to grant financial freedom, to create a system where people could participate without being forced to compromise on their principles. If we start making decisions that punish members for choosing privacy, then what exactly are we standing for? At that point, we’re not only contradicting the idea of decentralization, we’re actively undermining the ethos that makes this ecosystem different from the old world we were trying to improve on.
The cost here is more than just a line item on a proposal; it’s the cost of legitimizing censorship. It’s the cost of saying some people can’t contribute unless they give up what matters most to them. If we’re willing to pay that price, then we’re admitting that decentralization is negotiable, and that privacy is only important until it gets inconvenient.
So I’ll put it bluntly: do you think the cost–benefit here actually aligns with the pillars of this DAO? Or are we letting short-term convenience pull us away from the principles we claim to uphold? As members, you have the power to decide that with every single vote. Proposals can change the direction block by block, but only if we pay attention to what’s really at stake. This is one of those moments where the choice isn’t just about money; it’s about whether we keep holding up the very pillars that define what a DAO is supposed to be.
dissolve-the-dunaAt this point it is hard to deny that the foundation steered us into DUNA by building an illusion rather than presenting a fair choice. What looked like a set of promises was less about concrete commitments and more about constructing a mirage that made one path appear inevitable. The push toward that direction was not about giving the DAO time and space to weigh alternatives, it was about rushing us before we could evaluate other viable structures. That kind of maneuver strips a DAO of its purpose, which is collective deliberation based on truth, not staged appearances.
The DAO deserves clarity on every feasible path forward. If the decision is to remain under the current structure, then the costs of past rugs, including those orchestrated through the foundation, must be accounted for and transparently addressed. If the community wants to move away from this setup, then exploring changes to the entity itself or even dissolving the structure entirely must be put on the table. Without these discussions, members are left reacting to illusions rather than making informed decisions grounded in reality.
Each option carries implications. Staying with the current framework could mean continuing under the shadow of manipulated narratives, but it also offers a path to repair by holding the foundation accountable. Shifting to a new entity opens the door for fresh governance design and a chance to rebuild trust, though it comes with legal and organizational challenges. Dissolving the structure entirely may sound extreme, but in some cases dismantling what no longer works can be more sustainable than forcing it forward under false pretenses.
The key is not which option is chosen, but whether the DAO is truly given the freedom to evaluate them without illusions clouding the process. A decentralized organization cannot function if its members are constantly fed curated stories that disguise control as choice. What we need now is an open, comprehensive look at the real options, the real costs, and the real risks, so that decisions are made with eyes wide open rather than under the spell of carefully crafted appearances.
nouns-duna-admin-elections@0x05A1...011c
Not really a fan of this setup, and I don’t think it’s in the best interest of the DAO. Roles like this should not be treated as permanent fixtures. In fact, I think shorter reelection cycles than a year would make more sense, because the health of a DAO depends on flexibility and accountability. If admins or even regular members start to feel like their position is guaranteed, then the whole point of a decentralized structure begins to erode. DAOs evolve block by block, and without predefined plans and periodic reevaluations, it becomes easy to drift into complacency or unchecked power. We have already seen what happens when structures like foundations go unchallenged, turning into stagnant entities that serve themselves more than the community.
Another issue is the financial justification. From the numbers presented during space calls, we are being asked to spend hundreds of thousands to manage what amounts to tens of thousands. That mismatch is hard to justify, and I’m not convinced that the workload is anywhere near what would require full-time salaries. Without hard evidence of actual demand or output to match these costs, this looks like treasury inefficiency. It risks creating the perception that roles are padded with oversized compensation rather than tied directly to the value delivered.
I plan to put forward a proposal in the upcoming days to remove one of these admin positions and reduce the overall number by half. This isn’t about punishing individuals; it’s about making sure the DAO remains lean, adaptable, and responsible with its treasury. We cannot afford to drift into the same traps that traditional organizations fall into, where budgets balloon and accountability shrinks. If we allow that to happen, then we are building the very structures that DAOs were supposed to challenge.
Keeping roles limited in duration, salaries proportionate to actual work, and governance under constant review is the only way to maintain trust and sustainability. Anything less risks turning the DAO into just another centralized body with a thin coat of decentralization painted on top.
> appreciate Bix getting this convo started ahead of time 🙏
>
> def agree that if the community intends to replace DUNA admins, we should figure out a clear process for doing this smoothly and equitably.
>
> my only concern is that we could spend a ton of time and energy doing elections only to end up with the same result.
>
> personally, I think the DUNA admins have been doing a great job. If they are interested in continuing with their roles, I not only personally don't see any need to replace them, but I think it's likely that they would win the election anyway.
>
> that said, I understand the argument that we should hold annual elections regardless of the current admin's "approval rating". perhaps there are better candidates out there that are interested in the role, they could win an election, and the cost of switching admins is worth the benefits. it's one of those things that you can never know until you try.
>
> all things considered, I'd like to propose a couple first steps in this process:
>
> 1. Confirm the current admins' interest in continuing in their roles for another year unless the community wishes to replace them (I assume the answer to this is yes and don't have any reason to believe otherwise, but still worth confirming)
> 2. Once confirmed, put up a prop where FOR = renew the existing DUNA admins and AGAINST = move forward with an election (ideally include the details nekofar mentioned above in this prop)
>
> passing any prop is hard these days and requires significant support, so I think there's a good chance it would fail, which would lend credence to the importance of holding an election. however, if it passes, that would be a strong signal that an election is not necessary and would not be the best use of the community's time and energy. further, if anyone ever feels that an admin is not performing their duties, they can still put up a prop to remove or replace them any time (right? please correct me if I'm wrong about this).
>
> Some context:
> Ever since the formation of ShapeShift DAO, we've had the concept of Workstreams and Workstream Leaders (it's actually a structure I designed and am pretty proud of 🤓 (see https://forum.shapeshift.com/t/shapeshift-organizational-structure/58 or https://cointelegraph.com/innovation-circle/dispelling-the-flat-dao-myth). While Workstream Leaders don't have tenure for life and need to seek re-approval from the community, we decided early on to not periodically hold elections for replacements. Nonetheless, when Workstream Leaders have needed to be replaced, either because they want to step down or the community wants them to step down, the DAO has been able to effectively replace them. It's easy for me to imagine that if the DAO instead operated with annual elections (which would actually be longer than the typical workstream approval period of 6 months), this would have resulted in significant time and energy, potentially no difference in results, and certainly lots of frustration from both workstream leaders, governance participants, and candidates that exhausted time and energy running.
>
> I do think it's essential for there to be an open and decentralized process for any kind of DAO "Leader" to be removed or replaced, but I would argue that we have one already: governance. I also appreciate and support the effort to get consensus on a more standardized process for this, and really just want to recommend that this process begin with the first steps outlined above so we can potentially avoid wasting time and energy if the community is already in support of the existing admins.
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> If we move forward with this plan and the prop does not pass, I think nekofar's action items sound like great next steps while the plan for an election is solidified (happy to assist with that too if/when we get to that point). Even better, if the admins are able and willing, these details would be great to include in the prop too.
kyc-requirements-for-nouns-client-rewards@0x9e0e...57B1
I ask my questions exactly where they need to be asked. It has to be completely clear to the DAO that admins are not the ones steering decisions; their responsibility is limited to informing members of the situation. The DAO itself holds the full authority to decide block by block, and it can overturn or revise past decisions whenever it chooses. Claiming that the DAO has already decided on KYC is misleading, because that implies the decision is permanent or binding in a way that limits future governance. The truth is, the DAO is designed to function proposal by proposal, where every new submission can redefine or even reject what was decided before.
In this structure, admins are advisors, not enforcers. They can give input, share context, and provide recommendations, but they cannot dictate outcomes. And when providing information, admins are obligated to deliver the whole picture, not a preferred or selective version of it. Their obligation is to the DAO, not to a specific narrative. There is no "should" or "must" when it comes to DAO governance; the DAO always retains the freedom to decide whatever it wants, regardless of prior expectations or admin preferences.
If the DAO decides that the Nouncil client ID should be approved without requiring KYC, that is within its absolute right. If, on the other hand, the DAO decides that older client IDs should or should not be approved regardless of prior guidance, that too is entirely its prerogative. These choices rest solely with the voting body of the DAO.
The important point is transparency. Every voter needs to understand that admins are in an advisory role only. Their responsibility is to deliver information so the DAO can make informed choices, but they cannot override or substitute the DAO’s will. Decisions, whether consistent with admin recommendations or directly opposed to them, belong to the DAO and the DAO alone. This distinction has to be clear, otherwise the boundaries between advisory input and governance authority get blurred, which undermines the very principles of decentralized decision-making.
> The numbers matter. As you yourself said, you are obligated to inform the DAO about the situation, because at the end of the day it is the DAO’s will that decides whether to proceed with something or not. When I bring up numbers, it is not for decoration, it is because the DAO needs to see clearly what is on the table. Are we talking about something so small it is nickels and pennies, where we spend more time and resources debating than the issue is even worth, or are we talking about something substantial enough that the DAO can consciously decide whether it wants to take on that obligation or not?
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> This clarity is critical. The DAO cannot make informed decisions without understanding the scale. A single penny and millions are not in the same universe, yet both can sit in the same conversation if the numbers are left vague. That is why, just as the DAO should have full numbers on the obligations DUNA pushed onto us from the foundation, costs and responsibilities that did not vanish but instead became ours, it should also be told whether current debates are about trivial sums or meaningful commitments.
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> If we claim to be protecting the DAO by arguing over pennies, while at the same time being silently burdened with millions elsewhere, we are not really protecting the DAO at all. We are distracting it. The question is not only about whether to say yes or no to a particular matter, but whether we are equipping the DAO with the right scale of information so that its will can be exercised rationally. Otherwise, the DAO risks making decisions in the dark, treating small change like mountains and ignoring mountains like small change.
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> The numbers do not just matter, they define the very context in which decisions are made. Without them, talk of obligations and protection is empty. With them, the DAO can actually see whether its time and treasury are being spent wisely, or if it is being played into fighting over pennies while carrying the weight of millions elsewhere.