0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#25,833,503·view on Etherscan
TL;DR: A well-constructed distribution of 24 idle treasury Nouns into an open gacha mechanism with an enforced minimum backing and treasury-hardcoded custody qualifies as mission spendin…
The proposal distributes treasury Nouns through FWA's random-draw mechanism where recipients are not named, no single participant can sweep the batch, and a contract-enforced minimum backing (1 ETH, listed at ~1.28 ETH) is stated and ratifiable — satisfying I.5's open, unsweepable acquisition and 'cheap is honest' tests; custody and recall are met by a pre-deployed, verified manager whose every exit path is hardcoded to the treasury and whose operator is replaceable by ordinary proposal, and the ~24-Noun escrow keeps drift within the 5% bound. Per I.5 this is judged as Article I mission spending, and combined book value plus the 30 ETH backing sits at or below the 100 ETH cap. Liveness is evidence, not a gate: the mechanism shows ~310 draws/day and ~25 ETH/day in fees across 6,400+ listings but volume is declining from peak — if that organic volume dies, listings become far easier to aim, so the human reviewer must weigh measured activity and its trend at vote time. One residual concern is that the prose does not explicitly confirm escrowed Nouns' voting weight is inert or directable only by passed proposal (I.5 'no capturable votes'), which the reviewer should verify against the deployed contract.
[ suggestions ]
- State explicitly and verify onchain that escrowed Nouns' voting weight is inert or directable only by passed proposal, never by the operator.
- Have the human reviewer confirm current FWA liveness and model the position if draw volume continues to decline toward zero.
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