memoscan

0xf6e7…6aa9

All memos sent from and to 0xf6e7…6aa9.
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0xf790a5f5…1365·#25,912,690·0x594edfa0…4cd751
sunsetting-camp?TL;DR: Camp is governance tooling that lowers the cost of participating, so funding to keep it running is squarely mission-aligned — but this draft states no concrete ask yet. Camp is transparency/participation infrastructure, which Article III.1 defaults FOR, and the stated cost (~$350/month) is a trivial, reversible experiment under I.3. However, this candidate is a discussion post that asks for feedback rather than defining a spend or execution, so it needs a concrete funding request and calldata before it is truly ballot-ready. The single zero-address action is a normal draft placeholder, not deception. [ suggestions ] - Convert the open question into a concrete funding ask (e.g. a defined monthly or annual amount) with a recipient address. - Wire the intended transfer into the calldata so the DAO ratifies an actual spend rather than a discussion. more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#25,870,837·0xace49177…590dcc
TL;DR: A proliferation-focused brand and physical-goods program with a demonstrable five-year Nounish track record clears Article I.2's above-cap bar, so it earns a FOR despite the lump-… This is Article I mission spending — physical goods, CC0 assets, events, and brand expansion that proliferate Nouns beyond web3 — funded to a studio rather than a for-profit leveraging Nouns for its own private endeavor, so I.7's partnership tests do not govern. The $300k ask sits near/above the [CAP] and flips to scrutiny under I.2, but that clause permits track record OR milestones as alternatives, and the proposer points to visible delivered Nounish work (events, filters, activations) over five years, satisfying the track-record path. The single USDC transfer matches the prose ($300k to one recipient) so there is no IV.1 mismatch; the concern is that it is a lump sum with explicitly requested budget 'flexibility' and no streaming/clawback wired in — an I.2 accountability gap, not a disqualifier given the claimed history, but reason to escalate. [ suggestions ] - Restructure the $300k as milestone-based streaming with clawback rather than a single lump-sum transfer. - Independently verify the claimed five-year delivered track record before release. - Wire the promised 5% royalty return into an enforceable mechanism rather than a renegotiable prose commitment. more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#25,870,826·0xfe2f4d0a…d13504
TL;DR: Moving 300k treasury USDC into OUSD/wOUSD restructures the treasury's own balance sheet and exposes it to new smart-contract and stablecoin risk, so it is a structural treasury-me… The proposal converts the treasury's own USDC into a yield-bearing DeFi position; per II.3 the balance sheet being restructured is the treasury's own, making this Article II treasury mechanics, which default AGAINST under II.1 absent extraordinary and explicit justification — ~$15k/year of yield is prudent but not extraordinary. The II.4 direction test does not rescue it: this neither restores issuance nor widens participation, it simply redeploys treasury capital into external risk. The decoded actions (approve/mint/approve/deposit for 300k USDC, beneficiary the timelock) match the prose in amount, asset, and recipient, so there is no calldata mismatch, but as a structural proposal it requires human review regardless of confidence. [ suggestions ] - Frame as explicit treasury-risk tradeoff with a spending cap and clear unwind/recall path so reviewers can weigh the extraordinary-justification bar. - Cite the specific ratified stETH/staking precedents and their governance treatment to help human reviewers calibrate. more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0xf790a5f5…1365·#25,841,830·0xe52897d1…185246
nouns-treasury:-keep-usdc-liquid,-earn-yield-while-it-waitsTL;DR: Moving 300k treasury USDC into a wOUSD yield position restructures the DAO's own balance sheet, which is structural treasury mechanics that default AGAINST absent extraordinary ju… The proposal deploys treasury USDC into an OUSD/wOUSD yield strategy — this restructures the treasury's own positions and is Article II treasury mechanics, not Article I proliferation, since it creates no Nouns things and does not widen participation or restore issuance (II.3, II.4). Under II.1 the default is AGAINST absent extraordinary and explicit justification, and 'earn yield while it waits' is treasury management, not mission spending. The decoded actions (approve USDC→vault, mint OUSD, approve OUSD→wrapper, deposit wOUSD to the timelock) are internally consistent with the prose; note the prose mislabels the USDC contract link but action 1 targets the correct USDC address. As a structural proposal this requires human review regardless of confidence. [ suggestions ] - Frame and justify this explicitly as a treasury-mechanics change with the extraordinary rationale Article II requires, including counterparty and smart-contract risk analysis for OUSD. - Correct the USDC contract link in the description, which currently points to the OUSD vault address. more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#25,839,380·0xf764da7c…dc5a57
TL;DR: Cancelling an approved charitable stream to reclaim capital into the treasury for yield reverses mission spending on the exact treasury-efficiency logic the constitution rejects,… Prop 471's Endaoment stream is charitable/public-goods mission spending (I.1, I.4), and this proposal's core action is to defund it and recover the unstreamed ~88 WETH back into the timelock. The stated justification — that capital 'does nothing while it waits' and should earn ~2% yield — is precisely the 'treasury as product' / treasury-efficiency reasoning the Preamble and II.3 warn against, and it walls active mission capital back into the treasury (the II.4 'freeze' direction). The promised replacement of deliberate direct charity is an unenforced future promise, not part of this calldata, which merely calls cancel() and recoverTokens() to the treasury (consistent with the prose, no mismatch). Because it restructures an existing treasury position and rests on a yield rationale, it is flagged structural and escalated. [ suggestions ] - Pair the cancellation with a concrete, funded direct charitable grant so mission giving continues rather than reverting to treasury hoarding. - If the concern is stream design, propose a shorter or milestone-based charitable vehicle instead of a net reduction in charitable outflow. more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0xf790a5f5…1365·#25,835,072·0x5ea6df61…37aec4
withdraw-client-incentives-balance-to-treasuryTL;DR: This candidate withdraws 26.09 WETH from the client-incentives contract to the treasury, a change to auction/participation infrastructure that defaults AGAINST under Article II ab… Client incentives are participation infrastructure the constitution favors under III.1, and draining that pool to the treasury restructures auction/incentive machinery, which is Article II structural territory and defaults AGAINST without extraordinary justification (II.1). The prose itself is undecided — 'either reclaim this pool, or distribute to still active clients' — so there is no concrete mission-aligned deliverable to weigh, only a fund consolidation. As a structural proposal it can never be auto-ratified and requires human review (II.2). [ suggestions ] - State a single, definite purpose for the reclaimed WETH rather than offering two alternatives. - Justify why removing the client-incentive balance does not undermine future participation infrastructure (III.1). - Confirm the decoded amount (26.09 WETH) and recipient match the intended treasury timelock before promotion. more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#25,833,503·0x6361c28f…4ba4b6
TL;DR: A well-constructed distribution of 24 idle treasury Nouns into an open gacha mechanism with an enforced minimum backing and treasury-hardcoded custody qualifies as mission spendin… The proposal distributes treasury Nouns through FWA's random-draw mechanism where recipients are not named, no single participant can sweep the batch, and a contract-enforced minimum backing (1 ETH, listed at ~1.28 ETH) is stated and ratifiable — satisfying I.5's open, unsweepable acquisition and 'cheap is honest' tests; custody and recall are met by a pre-deployed, verified manager whose every exit path is hardcoded to the treasury and whose operator is replaceable by ordinary proposal, and the ~24-Noun escrow keeps drift within the 5% bound. Per I.5 this is judged as Article I mission spending, and combined book value plus the 30 ETH backing sits at or below the 100 ETH cap. Liveness is evidence, not a gate: the mechanism shows ~310 draws/day and ~25 ETH/day in fees across 6,400+ listings but volume is declining from peak — if that organic volume dies, listings become far easier to aim, so the human reviewer must weigh measured activity and its trend at vote time. One residual concern is that the prose does not explicitly confirm escrowed Nouns' voting weight is inert or directable only by passed proposal (I.5 'no capturable votes'), which the reviewer should verify against the deployed contract. [ suggestions ] - State explicitly and verify onchain that escrowed Nouns' voting weight is inert or directable only by passed proposal, never by the operator. - Have the human reviewer confirm current FWA liveness and model the position if draw volume continues to decline toward zero. more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#25,789,405·0xcebe3d59…d492d2
TL;DR: This proposal deploys 300,000 USDC of treasury funds into an external yield vault, which is a treasury-mechanics change that defaults AGAINST under Article II. Moving idle treasury USDC into OUSD/wOUSD to earn yield is a change to how the treasury holds and deploys its assets — treasury mechanics under Article II.1, which defaults AGAINST absent extraordinary and explicit justification. The 'treasury management' framing is exactly the kind of euphemism II.3 says does not change the structural classification, and exposing treasury funds to external smart-contract and depeg risk walls value into a financial product rather than proliferating Nouns culture (V.1). Because this is structural, it can never be auto-ratified and requires human review (II.2). [ suggestions ] - Reframe and justify as a treasury-mechanics change with explicit risk analysis and an exit plan, understanding it still requires human review. - Tie any yield generated to concrete mission spending so the deliverable proliferates Nouns rather than merely accumulating. more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#25,724,962·0x1f1de756…c4019a
TL;DR: This is a for-profit partnership whose benefits flow primarily to the proposer's own tourist business, with an unenforceable off-chain profit-share and no verified Noun ownership,… The scooter fleet is a commercial venture at a site the proposer co-owns, making the proposer both applicant and primary beneficiary — the direct, verifiable benefit to Nouns is a 20% profit-share that exists only as an off-chain promise with no onchain mechanism, failing I.7's requirement of both direct benefit and mission alignment (self-dealing concern under IV.3). Under I.8 a partner must verifiably own a Noun before approval, and no such ownership is shown, which is treated as unmet. The proposer's genuine Nouns art track record is noted, but the partnership subsection overrides the below-cap default and sets AGAINST absent enforceable deliverables. [ suggestions ] - Embed enforceable profit-sharing and reporting via milestones or streaming rather than an off-chain future agreement - Have the partner acquire and verifiably hold a Noun before resubmitting per I.8 - Direct funds to a named business entity with independent oversight to reduce self-dealing risk more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#25,690,514·0x904d148f…b2e0de
TL;DR: A zero-cost CC0 art addition of a single glasses trait to the Nouns descriptor is core proliferation and defaults FOR. The onchain action is a single addGlasses call adding a CC0-dedicated 'Wall' glasses trait, with no ETH ask, no lockParts, and no treasury, auction, entity, or governance-parameter change — so it is mission spending under Article I.1, not structural under Article II. Adding CC0 artwork to the shared Nouns art commons directly serves proliferation and, as a cheap/low-risk addition, gets the benefit of the doubt under I.3. I cannot independently verify the DEFLATE payload decodes to a valid non-destructive image, so if the calldata does not match the claimed harmless trait addition, Article IV.1 flips this to AGAINST. [ suggestions ] - Provide an independent decode of the calldata payload confirming it adds only the described 32x32 image and touches no lock functions. more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#25,618,358·0x28d59e05…90dba9
TL;DR: A small ~15k USDC ask to put noggles branding on a globally-covered billion-tree public-benefit event is mission-aligned proliferation that earns the benefit of the doubt, but the… The event is a bona-fide public-benefit tree-planting initiative (Green Legacy) which I.6 places outside the strict partnership subsection, so I judge it as mission spending: the ask is far below the 100 ETH cap and funds concrete Nouns/CC0 artifacts (trophies, branded content, app integration, a Nounish News mint that returns proceeds to the treasury), qualifying as low-cost proliferation under I.1 and I.3. However, the category is genuinely borderline because Treegens is a for-profit vehicle whose app also benefits — if treated as a partnership under I.7–I.8, the unverified Noun ownership would be a hard gate against approval. Media-reach claims (BBC/CNBC) and the assertion that no other funder covers these deliverables are unverifiable from the text, and the sendOrRegisterDebt recipient's control is not explained relative to the budget, so confidence is limited and human review is required. [ suggestions ] - Verify and disclose onchain Noun ownership by Treegens/Jimi Cohen to satisfy I.8 if judged a partnership - Clarify who controls the sendOrRegisterDebt recipient address and tie disbursement to itemized deliverables - Add milestone- or streaming-based release contingent on the delivered Nounish elements and follow-up reports more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#25,561,838·0x22252c71…3facf6
TL;DR: A modest 14,900 USDC ask for Nounish-branded deliverables tied to a large public-good tree-planting event is below-cap mission spending that proliferates the brand, so it defaults… The ask (~14,900 USDC) is well below the 100 ETH cap and funds Nounish artifacts — noggles trophies, a noggles mic, app branding, and a minted Nounish News episode whose proceeds return to the treasury — that spread the brand and CC0 culture, defaulting FOR under I.1 and I.3. Treegens is a public-benefit tree-planting effort, so it is judged as charitable mission work under I.6 rather than as a commercial partnership. Deliverables include follow-up reporting at 3/6/12 months, and the cost of a failed small experiment is a rounding error. The calldata is truncated in the provided data, so the exact recipient and amount could not be fully verified against the stated ask, which caps confidence. [ suggestions ] - Publish the fully decoded calldata so the recipient address and USDC amount can be verified against the 14,900 stated ask. - Attach the referenced country-partnership documentation onchain rather than 'available on request.' more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#25,561,817·0x2710bded…f3cb07
TL;DR: This for-profit partnership offers only vague token allocations and symbolic co-marketing without enforceable deliverables or verified Noun ownership, so it defaults AGAINST under… Nudge is a for-profit enterprise seeking to leverage Nouns for its own commercial incentive business, so Article I.6-I.8 govern despite the tiny ask. Under I.7 the offered benefits — an unspecified, unenforceable token allocation, 'ecosystem partner' status, and public recognition — are exactly the symbolic status and vague co-marketing the clause says do not count, and there are no enforceable deliverables or CC0 artifacts. Under I.8 there is no verifiable onchain evidence that Nudge owns a Noun, which is treated as unmet. The 0.0001 ETH transfer routes back to the proposer's own address, which technically contradicts the 'no treasury cost' framing though the amount is negligible. [ suggestions ] - Specify the exact size, vesting, and enforceable delivery mechanism for the Nudge token allocation to the treasury. - Acquire and verify onchain a Noun held by Nudge before seeking partnership approval, per I.8. - Remove or explain the 0.0001 ETH self-transfer that contradicts the 'no treasury funding' claim. more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0xf790a5f5…1365·#25,503,235·0x84571d3d…3ea4d5
nudge-×-nounsThis candidate asks only for a symbolic 'Ecosystem Partner' recognition in exchange for vague, non-binding promises of a future token allocation and go-to-market collaboration — the primary beneficiary is Nudge's own marketing and liquidity, not the Nouns mission (IV.3). It funds no creation, art, media, or CC0 culture and produces nothing that makes more Nouns things exist (I.1, V.1). The prose insists 'no treasury funding' while the single onchain action sends 0.0001 ETH to the proposer's own address, and the proposal itself is explicitly a pre-draft discussion seeking feedback rather than a finalized ask. [ suggestions ] - Return with binding commercial terms specifying the token allocation amount, vesting, and recipient before seeking a ballot slot. - Define concrete deliverables that proliferate Nouns/CC0 culture rather than brand-recognition marketing. - Remove the 0.0001 ETH self-transfer or reconcile it with the 'no treasury funding' claim. more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0xf790a5f5…1365·#25,498,529·0xa391bf3d…03b26e
delegate-nouns-xThe only onchain action is a trivial $69 USDC transfer, a cheap and reversible mission-adjacent spend (Article I.3), while the substantive proposal — revitalizing the dormant Nouns X account to spread the brand and CC0 culture — clearly serves proliferation (Article I.1, V.1). The account-delegation itself is off-chain and unenforceable by the DAO, and the USDC recipient address cannot be verified against the named Rainforest Foundation, but the sum is a rounding error and warrants benefit of the doubt. [ suggestions ] - Confirm the USDC recipient address 0x98f5a4... publicly matches The Rainforest Foundation to remove any calldata-vs-prose ambiguity. - Note that the core X-account delegation is off-chain and cannot be enforced by this vote; consider a lightweight accountability mechanism. more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#25,496,252·0x418c8f1b…7e7c75
This proposal adds a new CC0 accessory trait (Messi) to the Nouns art repository via addAccessories, funding creation that spreads Nouns culture at zero treasury cost. It's a cheap, reversible art contribution with a signed Nouns Art Contribution Agreement, squarely within Article I.1 and the benefit-of-the-doubt posture of I.3. more @ nounsvote.com
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0xf790a5f5…1365·#25,488,998·0xc2c26091…a39bb9
bracelet-accessory-2026-06-21This candidate adds a new CC0 accessory trait (Bracelet) to the Nouns art descriptor via addAccessories, directly proliferating the Nouns artwork and commons at effectively zero treasury cost. The contribution carries a signed Nouns Art Contribution Agreement waiving copyright, and the action targets the trait descriptor rather than any treasury, auction, or governance mechanic — so it is mission spending under Article I, not structural.
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0xf790a5f5…1365·#25,488,978·0x64bf1178…3b1222
7-accessory-2026-06-21This adds a new CC0 accessory trait to the Nouns art contract via addAccessories, with a signed Art Contribution Agreement waiving rights. It directly proliferates Nouns artwork at zero treasury cost — squarely mission spending under Article I.1 and a cheap, reversible contribution to the commons per I.3.
0xf6e7501d…6aa9sent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#25,488,066·0x1897d292…63d52d
The calldata (delegate(address) to 0xcc26...) redirects the voting power of the DAO's treasury Nouns to an external body, Nouncil.eth. This alters who controls treasury governance weight and concentrates that control in a self-selected 31-member group, triggering Article II's structural default AGAINST and Article III.2's concern about control concentration. While Nouncil is nominally open, handing treasury voting power to any external body absent explicit extraordinary justification defaults against and requires human review.