0xec092c15…471asent to0xbeccb6bb…9bf6·#23,868,214·view on Etherscan
setReplenismentIncentiveBps(uint256)setReplenismentIncentiveBps(uint256)# Reduce the DBR Replenishment Incentive [2/2]
# Proposal to Reduce the Replenishment Incentive
Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/reduce-the-dbr-replenishment-incentive/625
## TL;DR
* Reduce `replenishmentIncentiveBps` on FiRM markets from 5000 → 1000 (50% → 10%).
* Borrowers still pay the same replenishment cost; we only change how it’s split between replenisher vs DAO.
* The DAO Treasury’s share of replenishment revenue goes from 50% → 90%.
## Background
When a user has a DBR deficit, anyone can call `forceReplenish` on the market:
* The user incurs a replenishment cost in DOLA (added to their debt).
* A share of that cost, controlled by `replenishmentIncentiveBps`, is paid to the caller as `replenisherReward`.
* The DAO Treasury effectively captures the rest via the market/lender setup.
In the Market contract, this is:
`uint replenisherReward = replenishmentCost * replenishmentIncentiveBps / 10000;`
FiRM launched with replenishmentIncentiveBps \= 5000 (50%) to bootstrap keepers and make sure deficits are cleared quickly.
## Motivation
1\. Keeper ecosystem is already competitive
After almost three years live, FiRM is fully integrated into multiple bots and keeper stacks:
* Replenishments are already highly competitive on larger positions.
* The original 50% incentive has done its job as a bootstrap parameter.
We no longer need to give away half the revenue to maintain healthy replenishment activity.
2\. Treasury is overpaying for the same outcome
The borrower always pays 100% of the replenishment cost as new DOLA debt. This proposal only changes the split:
* Before: 50% to caller, 50% to DAO
* After: 10% to caller, 90% to DAO
3\. 10% is still enough to keep things running
We don’t want to push incentives so low that:
* Small deficits remain unreplenished for a long time, or
* Gas economics no longer make sense for callers.
At 10%:
* Larger deficits still pay a meaningful absolute reward.
* Existing bots already monitor FiRM, so infra cost is largely sunk.
* If we ever observe persistent unreplenished deficits or degraded behavior, governance can revisit the parameter.
## On-Chain Actions
For all active FiRM markets (of which there are 28 currently, so this will be split into 2 on-chain proposals, of 14 markets each), defined as markets that:
* have `totalDebt > 100 DOLA`, or
* have `borrowPaused == false`,
perform:
* `setReplenismentIncentiveBps(1000)`
This sets `replenishmentIncentiveBps` to 10% on those markets, shifting replenishment revenue to 90% DAO / 10% caller without changing DBR pricing, liquidations, or user-facing mechanics.