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# Proposal to Increase reUSD LP Market Supply Ceilings on FiRM Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/proposal-to-increase-reusd-lp-market-supply-ceilings-on-firm/683 **Summary** This proposal raises the aggregate supply ceiling for the two reUSD LP markets on FiRM from 2,000,000 DOLA to 3,000,000 DOLA. The full increase is directed to the Yearn strategy market, whose ceiling rises from 500,000 DOLA to 1,500,000 DOLA; the OnlyBoost strategy market ceiling is unchanged at 1,500,000 DOLA. Daily borrow limits are equalized at 250,000 DOLA per market, leaving the 500,000 DOLA aggregate daily limit unchanged. All other parameters are unchanged: collateral factor 85%, liquidation factor 100%, liquidation incentive 5%, and minimum debt 3,000 DOLA. This is a measured 50% aggregate step sized to what the underlying liquidity data has sustained, not to its most recent peak. **Background** The reUSD LP markets launched with deliberately conservative ceilings, consistent with the slow-launch posture set out in the [reUSD risk assessment (August 7, 2026)](https://github.com/InverseFinance/Risk-Assessments/blob/main/Resupply_reUSD/FiRM_Assessment_reUSD__Resupply.md). Just over a week after going live, both markets have already filled their combined 2,000,000 DOLA borrow capacity, and organic demand remains. The proposed increase directs the full 1,000,000 DOLA of new capacity to the Yearn strategy market, bringing the two market ceilings to parity at 1,500,000 DOLA each, and equalizes the daily borrow limits at 250,000 DOLA per market. The assessment committed any ceiling expansion to observed liquidity data rather than projection. This proposal is the first application of that commitment. **Data** Since the market launch the RWG has monitored Resupply's capacity through a daily on-chain series covering three indicators, benchmarked against an August 6 baseline: the TVL of the Curve pool underlying the price feed, total reUSD DEX liquidity across all four Curve pools, and aggregate withdrawable backing liquidity (the idle lender-side stablecoins a redeemer could realize across Resupply's lending markets). As of August 25, the price feed pool has grown from roughly $7.9M to $11.1M (+40%), total DEX liquidity from roughly $11.4M to $18.3M (+60%), and withdrawable backing liquidity from roughly $14.6M to $27.9M (+91%). The composite of the three indicators stands at +64% versus baseline and has held at or above +46% for eight consecutive days. Two honest qualifications shape the sizing. First, most of this growth arrived in the second half of August, so the trailing floor of the series over the full observation window sits near the baseline itself; the data demonstrates strong recent capacity, not yet a month of sustained capacity. Second, the largest single contributor to the backing liquidity improvement was a one-day lender deposit into a single Resupply market, which is liquidity that could exit as quickly as it arrived. The RWG tracks a redemption-realizable measure alongside the headline figure and it currently reads about $20M. **Rationale for the sizing** A point-in-time reading of the current data could justify a larger increase. We are deliberately not doing that. FiRM's fixed-rate structure means ceiling decisions are difficult to walk back: if liquidity trends down 50% next month, outstanding fixed-rate positions cannot simply be unwound by a parameter reversal. A 50% step to 3,000,000 DOLA keeps aggregate reUSD exposure well inside the capacity the data has actually sustained, and remains comfortably below the exposure FiRM extends to comparable collateral (the crvUSD market operates at an 87% collateral factor with a 5,000,000 DOLA ceiling, which we treat as the outer bound for reUSD until it accumulates comparable history). Further increases will follow the same discipline. From early September the daily series will span a full 30 days, and subsequent ceiling requests will be benchmarked against the rolling 30-day trailing low of the composite indicator rather than its current value, so growth must persist before FiRM prices it in. |Parameter | Current | Proposed| |--- | --- | ---| |Supply ceiling, Yearn strategy market | 500,000 DOLA | 1,500,000 DOLA| |Supply ceiling, OnlyBoost strategy market | 1,500,000 DOLA | unchanged| |Supply ceiling, aggregate | 2,000,000 DOLA | 3,000,000 DOLA| |Collateral factor | 85% | unchanged| |Liquidation factor | 100% | unchanged| |Liquidation incentive | 5% | unchanged| |Daily borrow limit, Yearn strategy market | 150,000 DOLA | 250,000 DOLA| |Daily borrow limit, OnlyBoost strategy market | 350,000 DOLA | 250,000 DOLA| |Minimum debt | 3,000 DOLA | unchanged| **On-chain actions** 1. Set the supply ceiling of the reUSD LP Yearn strategy market to 1,500,000 DOLA. 2. Set the daily borrow limit of the reUSD LP Yearn strategy market to 250,000 DOLA. 3. Set the daily borrow limit of the reUSD LP OnlyBoost strategy market to 250,000 DOLA.
# Contributor Bereavement Payment Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/contributor-bereavement-payment/682 ## **Summary** Following Tabboz's passing earlier this year and the operational offboarding completed in the weeks after, this proposal settles the DAO's remaining commitment to his family: a payment of **25,836 DOLA** from the DAO Treasury. ## **Background** Tabboz was a contributor to Inverse Finance and worked with the Product Working Group throughout his years here. He was part of this DAO for a long time, and he is missed by the people who worked with him every day. Following his passing earlier in 2026 (see the DAO's[ in-memoriam post](https://x.com/InverseFinance/status/2060325394944016662)), the operational offboarding, multisig signer transitions and infrastructure handover was handled at the time and is reflected in prior proposals. What remains is the payment to his family. The amount was determined by the core team in May 2026 in line with the DAO's Tier B contributor policy, following the precedent set by[ Proposal 322](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/322). ## **Recipient** The destination address 0x7ad367a6b712363ceeca0a8246ed621fc848b90b has been confirmed by Tabboz's family as their receiving address. ## **Proposed Action** Transfer **25,836 DOLA** from the DAO Treasury multisig to 0x7ad367a6b712363ceeca0a8246ed621fc848b90b.
# Add sDOLA/reUSD Yearn LP Market to FiRM # **Proposal to Add sDOLA/reUSD LP Market to FiRM** Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/add-sdola-reusd-lp-market-to-firm/680 ## **Summary** This proposal seeks to add the sDOLA/reUSD Curve LP, deposited via onlyBoost and Yearn, as a collateral market on FiRM. This market was originally proposed in May 2025 but was ultimately paused following DAO discussion. At the time, the primary concern was not the strategic case for the integration, but Resupply's limited operational history. The view was that the protocol should be given additional time to demonstrate its stability and behaviour before FiRM took on exposure. More than 15 months have now passed since that discussion, and Resupply has developed considerably. Alongside the additional protocol history, recent integrations between Inverse, Curve and Resupply have materially strengthened the business case for this market. We believe now is the appropriate time to revisit the integration. ## **Background** Resupply is a stablecoin and lending protocol built by contributors from the Convex and Yearn ecosystems. Users can deposit yield-bearing lending positions as collateral and borrow reUSD against them, allowing the underlying assets to continue earning yield while unlocking additional capital efficiency. Resupply launched in March 2025 and has now been live in production for approximately 17 months. The sDOLA/reUSD FiRM market was [first proposed shortly after Resupply's launch](https://forum.inverse.finance/t/add-sdola-reusd-convex-lp-market-to-firm/563). While the business case received support, the DAO ultimately preferred to allow the protocol more time to mature before proceeding. The proposal was therefore paused in May 2025 with the intention of revisiting it once Resupply had established a longer track record. Shortly afterwards, in June 2025, Resupply suffered an exploit involving a newly deployed lending market, resulting in approximately 10m reUSD of bad debt. The incident reinforced the value of the DAO's cautious approach at the time. Resupply subsequently completed its bad-debt recovery process and has now operated for more than a year since the incident. As a result, the DAO now has substantially more information and operational history on which to assess the protocol than was available during the original discussion. ## **Market Business Case** The business case for this integration has strengthened considerably following the launch of the new sDOLA/crvUSD LlamaLend V2 market. Resupply has integrated the crvUSD lending side of this market into its protocol, allowing users to deposit crvUSD into the sDOLA LlamaLend V2 market and use the resulting lending position as collateral to borrow reUSD. This creates a particularly strong alignment between Inverse, Resupply and Curve. The relationship can form a positive liquidity flywheel: 1. **FiRM enables leverage on the sDOLA/reUSD LP** Allowing the LP to be used as FiRM collateral gives depositors access to fixed-rate DOLA borrowing and enables leveraged LP strategies. This should increase demand for the LP and make the incentives directed towards it more capital efficient. 2. **Greater LP demand deepens reUSD liquidity** Additional sDOLA/reUSD liquidity provides reUSD with a deeper liquidity venue and improves its ability to maintain its peg. The Resupply and Convex ecosystems can further support this liquidity through incentives. 3. **Deeper reUSD liquidity enables Resupply to scale** Stronger reUSD liquidity allows Resupply to support additional borrowing and leverage across its own markets. 4. **Resupply can direct additional capital into the sDOLA LlamaLend V2 market** Resupply now accepts the crvUSD lending position from the sDOLA/crvUSD LlamaLend V2 market as collateral. Growth in Resupply therefore has the potential to drive additional crvUSD deposits into the market, increasing available liquidity for sDOLA borrowers and allowing the market to scale. 5. **A larger sDOLA market ultimately benefits Inverse** Greater capacity within the sDOLA LlamaLend market increases the usefulness and potential scale of sDOLA, creating additional demand for DOLA and strengthening sDOLA's position throughout the Curve ecosystem. The result is a highly synergistic structure where liquidity and borrowing activity can reinforce each other across FiRM, Resupply and LlamaLend. ## **Strategic Alignment** There is also significant strategic alignment between the teams involved. Inverse has longstanding relationships with contributors across Convex, Resupply and Yearn, with these teams having collaborated across liquidity, incentives, treasury management and product integrations for several years. Resupply has consistently demonstrated an interest in growing integrations involving sDOLA. More recently, Resupply's decision to support the new sDOLA LlamaLend V2 market further increases the direct economic alignment between the protocols. Adding the LP to FiRM provides another mechanism through which all parties can coordinate incentives and capital to grow the same underlying markets rather than competing for liquidity independently. ## **Market Parameters** Market parameters proposed in accordance with [risk assessment and recommendations from the RWG](https://forum.inverse.finance/t/add-sdola-reusd-lp-market-to-firm/680/2). * Collateral Factor: 85% * Liquidation Factor: 100% * Liquidation Incentive: 5% * Minimum debt: 3,000 DOLA For the onlyBoost Market: 0xf9287c29Cb888F4834B7D2757a833D509e7f9D9A * Supply Ceiling: 1,500,000 DOLA * Daily Borrow Limit: 350,000 DOLA For the Yearn market: 0x1fD4985cdd57bDb1eD646B10B7952fCD58946916 * Supply Ceiling: 500,000 DOLA * Daily Borrow Limit: 150,000 DOLA
# Migrate to ALE v5 # **Migrate to ALE v5** Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/migrate-to-ale-v5/681 ## **Summary** This proposal migrates FiRM from the current ALE v4 deployment to ALE v5 following the discovery of an approval-handling bug in ALE v4. ALE v4 relied on persistent approvals between ALE and FiRM markets. Certain inherited helper functions could overwrite these approvals and leave them at zero after use, causing subsequent ALE leverage transactions for the affected market to fail. ALE v5 fixes this by using ad-hoc approvals, approving the exact amount required immediately before each interaction rather than relying on persistent approvals. **ALE v5:** `0x43Fa5E63253b00D5e34f42e711D734A058142055` As with the previous ALE migration, a migration helper will be used to copy the existing market configurations from ALE v4 to ALE v5. The existing DbrHelper will continue to be used. ## **Exchange Routers** ALE v5 will approve both Enso and KyberSwap for swap routing, allowing the FiRM UI to offer both options to users. * **Enso:** `0xF75584eF6673aD213a685a1B58Cc0330B8eA22Cf` * **KyberSwap:** `0x6131B5fae19EA4f9D964eAc0408E4408b66337b5` Odos will not be approved following the shutdown of the protocol. ## **On-chain Actions** 1. Allow ALE v5 on the BorrowController: ``` borrowController.allow( 0x43Fa5E63253b00D5e34f42e711D734A058142055 ); ``` 2. Approve Enso and KyberSwap on ALE v5: ``` newALE.allowProxy( 0xF75584eF6673aD213a685a1B58Cc0330B8eA22Cf ); newALE.allowProxy( 0x6131B5fae19EA4f9D964eAc0408E4408b66337b5 ); ``` 3. Nominate the migration helper as pending governance of ALE v5 and DbrHelper: ``` newALE.setPendingGov(migrationHelper); dbrHelper.setPendingGov(migrationHelper); ``` 4. Execute the migration: ``` migrationHelper.migrate(); ``` This copies the existing FiRM market configurations from ALE v4 to ALE v5 and ensures the relevant markets are approved by DbrHelper. 5. Reclaim governance: ``` newALE.claimPendingGov(); dbrHelper.claimPendingGov(); ``` 6. Disable ALE v4 on the BorrowController: ``` borrowController.deny( 0x39D167Fe676EFC3be49bE874a37349A5D89f9058 ); ``` No user positions, collateral, debt, or FiRM market parameters are changed as part of this migration.
# Add sDOLA/reUSD onlyBoost LP Market to FiRM # **Proposal to Add sDOLA/reUSD LP Market to FiRM** Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/add-sdola-reusd-lp-market-to-firm/680 ## **Summary** This proposal seeks to add the sDOLA/reUSD Curve LP, deposited via onlyBoost and Yearn, as a collateral market on FiRM. This market was originally proposed in May 2025 but was ultimately paused following DAO discussion. At the time, the primary concern was not the strategic case for the integration, but Resupply's limited operational history. The view was that the protocol should be given additional time to demonstrate its stability and behaviour before FiRM took on exposure. More than 15 months have now passed since that discussion, and Resupply has developed considerably. Alongside the additional protocol history, recent integrations between Inverse, Curve and Resupply have materially strengthened the business case for this market. We believe now is the appropriate time to revisit the integration. ## **Background** Resupply is a stablecoin and lending protocol built by contributors from the Convex and Yearn ecosystems. Users can deposit yield-bearing lending positions as collateral and borrow reUSD against them, allowing the underlying assets to continue earning yield while unlocking additional capital efficiency. Resupply launched in March 2025 and has now been live in production for approximately 17 months. The sDOLA/reUSD FiRM market was [first proposed shortly after Resupply's launch](https://forum.inverse.finance/t/add-sdola-reusd-convex-lp-market-to-firm/563). While the business case received support, the DAO ultimately preferred to allow the protocol more time to mature before proceeding. The proposal was therefore paused in May 2025 with the intention of revisiting it once Resupply had established a longer track record. Shortly afterwards, in June 2025, Resupply suffered an exploit involving a newly deployed lending market, resulting in approximately 10m reUSD of bad debt. The incident reinforced the value of the DAO's cautious approach at the time. Resupply subsequently completed its bad-debt recovery process and has now operated for more than a year since the incident. As a result, the DAO now has substantially more information and operational history on which to assess the protocol than was available during the original discussion. ## **Market Business Case** The business case for this integration has strengthened considerably following the launch of the new sDOLA/crvUSD LlamaLend V2 market. Resupply has integrated the crvUSD lending side of this market into its protocol, allowing users to deposit crvUSD into the sDOLA LlamaLend V2 market and use the resulting lending position as collateral to borrow reUSD. This creates a particularly strong alignment between Inverse, Resupply and Curve. The relationship can form a positive liquidity flywheel: 1. **FiRM enables leverage on the sDOLA/reUSD LP** Allowing the LP to be used as FiRM collateral gives depositors access to fixed-rate DOLA borrowing and enables leveraged LP strategies. This should increase demand for the LP and make the incentives directed towards it more capital efficient. 2. **Greater LP demand deepens reUSD liquidity** Additional sDOLA/reUSD liquidity provides reUSD with a deeper liquidity venue and improves its ability to maintain its peg. The Resupply and Convex ecosystems can further support this liquidity through incentives. 3. **Deeper reUSD liquidity enables Resupply to scale** Stronger reUSD liquidity allows Resupply to support additional borrowing and leverage across its own markets. 4. **Resupply can direct additional capital into the sDOLA LlamaLend V2 market** Resupply now accepts the crvUSD lending position from the sDOLA/crvUSD LlamaLend V2 market as collateral. Growth in Resupply therefore has the potential to drive additional crvUSD deposits into the market, increasing available liquidity for sDOLA borrowers and allowing the market to scale. 5. **A larger sDOLA market ultimately benefits Inverse** Greater capacity within the sDOLA LlamaLend market increases the usefulness and potential scale of sDOLA, creating additional demand for DOLA and strengthening sDOLA's position throughout the Curve ecosystem. The result is a highly synergistic structure where liquidity and borrowing activity can reinforce each other across FiRM, Resupply and LlamaLend. ## **Strategic Alignment** There is also significant strategic alignment between the teams involved. Inverse has longstanding relationships with contributors across Convex, Resupply and Yearn, with these teams having collaborated across liquidity, incentives, treasury management and product integrations for several years. Resupply has consistently demonstrated an interest in growing integrations involving sDOLA. More recently, Resupply's decision to support the new sDOLA LlamaLend V2 market further increases the direct economic alignment between the protocols. Adding the LP to FiRM provides another mechanism through which all parties can coordinate incentives and capital to grow the same underlying markets rather than competing for liquidity independently. ## **Market Parameters** Market parameters proposed in accordance with [risk assessment and recommendations from the RWG](https://forum.inverse.finance/t/add-sdola-reusd-lp-market-to-firm/680/2). * Collateral Factor: 85% * Liquidation Factor: 100% * Liquidation Incentive: 5% * Minimum debt: 3,000 DOLA For the onlyBoost Market: 0xf9287c29Cb888F4834B7D2757a833D509e7f9D9A * Supply Ceiling: 1,500,000 DOLA * Daily Borrow Limit: 350,000 DOLA For the Yearn market: 0x1fD4985cdd57bDb1eD646B10B7952fCD58946916 * Supply Ceiling: 500,000 DOLA * Daily Borrow Limit: 150,000 DOLA
setRecipient(address,uint256,uint256)setRecipient(address,uint256,uint256)setRecipient(address,uint256,uint256)# Payroll Extension Proposal #2 Forum post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/payroll-extension-proposal-2/675 # Payroll Extension Proposal #2 ## Summary This proposal extends contributor compensation for a further 6 months, covering the period **July 1, 2026 through December 31, 2026**. It follows [Payroll Extension Proposal #1](https://forum.inverse.finance/t/payroll-extension-proposal-1/633) (executed on-chain as [Proposal #340](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/340) on December 8, 2025), whose INV vesting contracts ended on June 30, 2026 and whose DOLA payroll streams are currently authorized through September 30, 2026. A 6-month term follows the biannual extension cadence established in the Payroll Restructuring Proposal ([Mills #322](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/322)). The proposal: - Removes Nour from the DAO payroll. Following the [Inverse Finance Foundation Funding Proposal](https://forum.inverse.finance/t/inverse-finance-foundation-funding-proposal/664), Nour is transitioning to the Foundation's payroll as a contractor and will no longer receive DOLA payroll or INV vesting directly from the DAO - Grants the FoundationFunder contract an INV allowance of **6,000 INV per year, subject to a quarterly draw limit of 1,500 INV**, in addition to its existing DOLA allowance, to fund Foundation contractor compensation including its token component. As with the existing DOLA allowance, each draw requires a public on-chain justification - Extends DOLA payroll for the 5 remaining paid contributors from September 30, 2026 to **March 31, 2027**, at unchanged rates, covering the term through December 31, 2026 plus 3 months of potential severance pay in the case of no extension after December 31, 2026 - Deploys new 6-month INV vesting contracts for the 5 remaining contributors, running **retroactively from July 1, 2026** through December 31, 2026, at unchanged annual rates ## Background Payroll Extension Proposal #1 reduced annual payroll spend from 1,440,000 DOLA to 936,000 DOLA across 7 active contributors, extending DAO stablecoin runway from ~12 to ~18 months. Following the offboarding of Tabboz in [February 2026](https://forum.inverse.finance/t/offboarding-inverse-contributor/643) and Nour's transition to the Foundation payroll under this proposal, the DAO will have **5 contributors paid directly via DAO payroll**. The INV vesting contracts deployed under Proposal #340 ended on June 30, 2026. This proposal closes the resulting gap retroactively. ## Active Contributors (DAO Payroll) DOLA base compensation and INV compensation rates are unchanged from Payroll Extension Proposal #1. INV grants below cover the 184-day term (July 1 to December 31, 2026, 0.504 years): | Contributor | Role | Band | Annual DOLA | Annual INV | Term INV | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | MT | Solidity Engineer | A | 144,000 | 2,105 | 1,061 | | AlienDev | Frontend Engineer | A | 144,000 | 2,105 | 1,061 | | CryptoHarry | Head of Treasury | A | 144,000 | 2,105 | 1,061 | | Edo | Head of Risk Management | B | 120,000 | 1,741 | 878 | | Karm | Risk Manager | B | 120,000 | 1,741 | 878 | | **Total** | | | **672,000** | **9,797** | **4,939** | At an indicative INV price of ~$11, total compensation is approximately $167K/year (Band A) and $139K/year (Band B). Nour will be compensated by the Foundation, funded through the FoundationFunder's DOLA and INV allowances. His removal from DAO payroll is a voluntary transition and carries no severance. ## Budget Impact - **DOLA:** Extending the 5 payroll streams from September 30, 2026 to March 31, 2027 commits an incremental **336,000 DOLA** (6 months at 672,000 DOLA/year) beyond the currently authorized period. Of this, 168,000 DOLA covers the proposal term through December 31, 2026 and 168,000 DOLA covers the 3-month severance buffer, which is only paid out in the case of no extension. - **INV (vesting):** New vesting contracts total **4,939 INV** (3 × 1,061 Band A + 2 × 878 Band B), vesting linearly from July 1, 2026 to December 31, 2026. - **INV (Foundation):** The FoundationFunder INV allowance authorizes up to **6,000 INV per year (1,500 INV per quarter)**, drawn as needed with on-chain justifications rather than transferred upfront. - The current Treasury balance of ~8,054 INV covers the 4,939 INV vesters in full, leaving ~3,115 INV for Foundation draws (about two quarters). A Treasury INV top-up may be proposed later in the term as needed; no mint is required in this proposal. As with Proposal #1, severance is one-time, 3 months of pay streamed in DOLA, and contingent on successful off-boarding (handover of access, documentation, and transitional support). It applies in the case of no extension after December 31, 2026, or where a future extension does not include an existing contributor. ## On-Chain Actions 1. Remove Nour from the DOLA payroll contract 2. Update the DOLA payroll contract for the 5 remaining contributors listed above, extending stream end dates from September 30, 2026 to March 31, 2027 (epoch 1806537599) at unchanged annual rates (144,000 DOLA for Band A; 120,000 DOLA for Band B) 3. Set XinvVestorFactory INV allowance to 4,939 4. Deploy 5 INV vesting contracts via the XinvVestorFactory with start date July 1, 2026 (epoch 1782864000) and duration 15,897,600 seconds (184 days, ending EOD December 31, 2026, epoch 1798761599): 1,061 INV each for MT, AlienDev, and CryptoHarry; 878 INV each for Edo and Karm 5. Grant the FoundationFunder contract an INV allowance of 6,000 INV, subject to a quarterly draw limit of 1,500 INV
# Shut Down the sDOLA CCIP Bridge Lanes Forum: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/shut-down-the-sdola-ccip-bridge-lanes/670 ## Summary This proposal closes the idle sDOLA Chainlink CCIP integration. It removes every cross-chain lane, in both directions, across all five sDOLA token pools: the mainnet pool and the four L2 pools on Base, Optimism, Arbitrum, and Berachain. It also revokes each L2 pool's minter permission on its receipt token. The L2 changes are batched through `BridgeShutdownGovernor`, a purpose-built contract that fires all 8 cross-chain shutdown messages in a single `executeL2Shutdown()` call. The mainnet pool is closed by one direct action. The shutdown transfers no pool to a new owner. The mainnet pool stays owned by the timelock, and each L2 pool stays owned by its governance proxy. Only `GovernanceSender` ownership moves, to the governor and back to the timelock. `GovernanceSender` is delegated to the governor for the shutdown and handed back during execution. ## Rationale The sDOLA CCIP integration is not in use. Monitoring shows no live cross-chain activity and no deposits. While the integration sits idle, open bridge lanes are an unnecessary risk surface. The safe configuration when idle is to close every lane at both ends. Removing a lane on the source pool stops new transfers from starting. Removing it on the destination pool rejects any message that still arrives. Closing only one side would let a user lock funds into a lane whose far end can no longer deliver, stranding the transfer. Reopening a lane later requires a fresh governance proposal. There is no standing shortcut by design. ## The Shutdown Governor `BridgeShutdownGovernor` (`0x2A0FEC62992D2C0f1b0C598551c1627F18286F84`) sends every L2 shutdown message from a single `executeL2Shutdown()` entrypoint. It is `onlyOwner`, with the owner set to the DAO governance timelock, and it is `payable` so forwarded ETH can pay the CCIP message fees. It holds a hardcoded `L2_SHUTDOWN_MESSAGE_COUNT` of 8. The plan is fixed. The contract cannot choose destination chains, targets, or calldata. The whole batch is hardcoded and guarded by an internal assert that the message count equals 8. The shutdown removes lanes. It does not lower a rate limit. The 8 messages are four `applyChainUpdates` calls, one per L2 pool, that remove every remote chain from that pool, plus four `setMinter` calls that revoke each L2 pool's mint permission on its receipt token. The removal lists differ in length, four for Base and Arbitrum and three for Optimism and Berachain, because Optimism and Berachain do not connect to each other on-chain. Each list matches its pool's live `getSupportedChains` set exactly, so nothing reverts and no lane is left open. The governor can only act once it owns the sDOLA `GovernanceSender` (`0x4e521Fe7A9084067096d45A312B8FEeE39D5F1f3`), which is the allowlisted origin for the cross-chain messages. The proposal transfers the sender to the governor, calls `executeL2Shutdown()`, recovers unspent fees with `withdraw()` while the governor still owns the sender, then transfers the sender back to the timelock. The mainnet pool is a `LockReleaseTokenPool` and is not a minter of sDOLA, so it needs no minter revocation. Only its remote-chain connections are removed, and that runs as the direct mainnet action. ## Configuration Chain selectors: | Chain | Selector | |---|---| | Ethereum | `5009297550715157269` | | Base | `15971525489660198786` | | Optimism | `3734403246176062136` | | Arbitrum | `4949039107694359620` | | Berachain | `1294465214383781161` | Core contracts: | Contract | Address | |---|---| | BridgeShutdownGovernor | `0x2A0FEC62992D2C0f1b0C598551c1627F18286F84` | | GovernanceSender (sDOLA) | `0x4e521Fe7A9084067096d45A312B8FEeE39D5F1f3` | | DAO governance timelock (owner) | `0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B` | | Mainnet token pool (LockReleaseTokenPool) | `0x05eEe76f456C51Be0459EC1c0a78bf177B2c877C` | L2 token pools, receipt tokens, and governance proxies: | Chain | Token pool | Receipt token | Governance proxy | |---|---|---|---| | Base | `0xd84e1B7e1a7A8D49167884855c3985ef4bCa45aB` | `0xCa78ee4544ec5a33Af86F1E786EfC7d3652bf005` | `0x1C064265E053D23d120c518fDBB542e6537f82d1` | | Optimism | `0x8404024d8F74Ad2D20E82c184816B64D4184A018` | `0xfc63C9c8Ba44AE89C01265453Ed4F427C80cBd4E` | `0xaF956837AF704D825c1FCbE2651D5c3c37AD5289` | | Arbitrum | `0xbbc28DB61DF26B76D5F7D5Eed17eD4D6C278460e` | `0x7a1e123e41458aabaB8068BFed6010D8f9480898` | `0x607bCd974bB69C78eCdbf0B68748B791bBa24d94` | | Berachain | `0x8Bbd036d018657E454F679E7C4726F7a8ECE2773` | `0x02eaa69646183c069FC2B64F15923F27B9CF3b03` | `0x1992AF61FBf8ee38741bcc57d636CAA22A1a7702` | Action 3 carries the CCIP fee budget for the 8 messages. Fees are paid from the `GovernanceSender` balance, and unused ETH is recovered by action 4. Fund it by setting the value on action 3, or by sending ETH to the `GovernanceSender` before execution. ## On-Chain Actions Ownership moves through Chainlink's two-step `ConfirmedOwner` pattern. Action 4 recovers unspent CCIP fees and must run after `executeL2Shutdown()` and before the sender is transferred back, while the governor still owns the sender. | # | Target | Function | Value | Arguments | |---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | GovernanceSender `0x4e521Fe7A9084067096d45A312B8FEeE39D5F1f3` | `transferOwnership(address)` | 0 | governor `0x2A0FEC62992D2C0f1b0C598551c1627F18286F84` | | 2 | Governor `0x2A0FEC62992D2C0f1b0C598551c1627F18286F84` | `acceptGovernanceSenderOwnership()` | 0 | `0x` | | 3 | Governor `0x2A0FEC62992D2C0f1b0C598551c1627F18286F84` | `executeL2Shutdown()` | **CCIP fees** | `0x` *(fires 8 L2 messages)* | | 4 | Governor `0x2A0FEC62992D2C0f1b0C598551c1627F18286F84` | `withdraw(address)` | 0 | timelock `0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B` | | 5 | Governor `0x2A0FEC62992D2C0f1b0C598551c1627F18286F84` | `transferGovernanceSenderOwnership(address)` | 0 | timelock `0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B` | | 6 | GovernanceSender `0x4e521Fe7A9084067096d45A312B8FEeE39D5F1f3` | `acceptOwnership()` | 0 | `0x` | | 7 | Mainnet pool `0x05eEe76f456C51Be0459EC1c0a78bf177B2c877C` | `applyChainUpdates(uint64[],ChainUpdate[])` | 0 | remove `[15971525489660198786, 3734403246176062136, 4949039107694359620, 1294465214383781161]`; add `[]` |
# RWG Housekeeping: FiRM Market Deprecations Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/rwg-housekeeping-firm-market-deprecations/676 ### **Summary** This proposal executes the orderly wind-down of nine inactive or deprecated FiRM collateral markets. For each market, borrowing is paused and its Fed ceiling is set to zero, removing the market's capacity to issue new DOLA while leaving every existing borrower function (repayment, liquidation, collateral withdrawal) fully intact. ### **Motivation** These nine markets fall into three groups, each retired because it holds no active role in the current FiRM surface. The crvUSD-linked LP markets (DOLA-scrvUSD, sDOLA-scrvUSD, and crvUSD-DOLA in both their Convex and Yearn wrappings) are inactive deployments. The wstUSR LP markets (DOLA-wstUSR, Convex and Yearn) are retired in line with all Resolv collateral. The expired Pendle Principal Token markets (PT-sUSDE-27NOV2025 and PT-USDe-27NOV2025) are past maturity and carry no reason to remain open. Zeroing the ceiling through the FiRM Fed and pausing borrows is the standard sunset pattern, applied protocol-agnostically. ### **On-Chain Actions** Each market receives two calls: pauseBorrows(true) on the market contract, and changeMarketCeiling(market, 0) on the FiRM Fed (0x2b34548b865ad66a2b046cb82e59ee43f75b90fd). |# | Market | Address | Action| |--- | --- | --- | ---| |1 | Convex DOLA-scrvUSD | 0x2fed508aac87c0e6f0b647fe83164a7aa6eb2fc9 | pauseBorrows(true), changeMarketCeiling(0)| |2 | Yearn DOLA-scrvUSD | 0x5bb8f6aacff2971b42f9fe6945d24726a2541cf2 | pauseBorrows(true), changeMarketCeiling(0)| |3 | Convex sDOLA-scrvUSD | 0x63d27fc9d463ed727676367d3f818999962737e8 | pauseBorrows(true), changeMarketCeiling(0)| |4 | Yearn sDOLA-scrvUSD | 0xb8bc1e9c0a2d445bc39d2a745f47619e954dd565 | pauseBorrows(true), changeMarketCeiling(0)| |5 | PT-sUSDE-27NOV2025 | 0x223f21a27f290972cba4e25c8e351ef2937fbe68 | pauseBorrows(true), changeMarketCeiling(0)| |6 | PT-USDe-27NOV2025 | 0xf706289d0324a5e86c33ce54689a6f34cfd4b11f | pauseBorrows(true), changeMarketCeiling(0)| |7 | Convex DOLA-wstUSR | 0xe4d47ef77ac2c3fa4019cd169ac1dd9e27cb12e4 | pauseBorrows(true), changeMarketCeiling(0)| |8 | Yearn DOLA-wstUSR | 0x28684485369f7478f42aaa62660123ab5d573537 | pauseBorrows(true), changeMarketCeiling(0)| |9 | Convex crvUSD-DOLA | 0x6a522f3bd3fda15e74180953f203cf55aa6c631e | pauseBorrows(true), changeMarketCeiling(0)| Total: 18 on-chain actions. ### **Conclusion** Retiring these nine markets closes out deprecated and unused collateral capacity, keeps the FiRM surface clean, and preserves every existing borrower's ability to repay and withdraw.
# RWG Housekeeping: Minter and Governance Cleanup Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/rwg-housekeeping-minter-and-governance-cleanup/677 ### **Summary** This proposal removes stale minting rights and governance permissions that are no longer in active use. It first migrates the stETH market to the live BorrowController so its residual position keeps replenishment coverage, then revokes DBR minting from three legacy BorrowControllers and two superseded jrDOLA deployments, revokes DOLA minting from the retired Gearbox Vault Fed, clears stale ALE allowlist entries on deprecated controllers, removes the sunsetting ODOS swap router from the live ALE v4, and removes one inactive address from the proposer whitelist. Every revocation target is confirmed idle or deprecated; the live BorrowController, the live jrDOLA vault, and all active Feds and integrations are untouched. ### **Motivation** Over the protocol's life, DBR and DOLA minting rights and ALE allowlist entries accumulated across successive contract versions. Governance replay of the full proposal history confirms twelve DBR minter grants with zero prior revocations, alongside the DOLA grant to the now-retired Gearbox Vault Fed and a set of ALE allowlist entries tied to superseded BorrowControllers. Leaving unused minter roles and allowlist entries live is an unnecessary standing risk surface. Retiring them narrows the set of contracts that can mint DBR or DOLA, or interact with FiRM, to only those in active service. The stETH market still points at the earliest BorrowController and carries a small residual position. Migrating it to the live BorrowController v4 preserves replenishment on that position, which is why the migration is ordered first, ahead of the revocations. Once the market no longer depends on the legacy controller, revoking that controller's minter role is clean. Per prior review, the minter role on the legacy BorrowControllers does not provide the replenishment-edge protection introduced in v4, so revoking it on the legacy controllers closes an unused path without affecting repayments or liquidations. The two jrDOLA deployments being revoked predate the live v2 vault. Naoufel's proposer-whitelist entry is inactive following the AWG wind-down. This proposal also removes the ODOS swap router from the ALE v4 proxy whitelist. ODOS has announced it is winding down its protocol effective July 30, 2026, so leaving its router enabled would keep an unsupported integration live on the Automated Leverage Engine. ### ### **On-Chain Actions** |# | Contract | Call | Target| |--- | --- | --- | ---| |1 | stETH Market | setBorrowController | BorrowController v4 (0x01eca33e20a4c379bd8a5361f896a7dd2bae4ce8)| |2 | DBR | removeMinter | BorrowController v1 (0x44b7895989bc7886423f06deaa844d413384b0d6)| |3 | DBR | removeMinter | BorrowController v2 (0x2dbad53a647a86b8988e007a33fe78bd55e9dd6f)| |4 | DBR | removeMinter | BorrowController v3 (0xeebea1ed06eeb120cbf72fad195683746b5a5245)| |5 | DBR | removeMinter | jrDOLA legacy (0x633821b8e003344e5223509277f2084ea809a452)| |6 | DBR | removeMinter | jrDOLA legacy (0xf4307a1354c0463812b3ce0f509c227f5cd1ccfd)| |7 | DOLA | removeMinter | Gearbox Vault Fed (0xe082eb109fad53ea8db9827ce6b8ef74882734fc)| |8 | BorrowController v1 | deny | ALE v2 (0x5233f4c2515ae21b540c438862abb5603506debc)| |9 | BorrowController v2 | deny | ALE v2 (0x5233f4c2515ae21b540c438862abb5603506debc)| |10 | BorrowController v3 | deny | ALE v2 (0x5233f4c2515ae21b540c438862abb5603506debc)| |11 | BorrowController v3 | deny | ALE v3 (0x4df2eaa1658a220fdb415b9966a9ae7c3d16e240)| |12 | ALE v4 | denyProxy | ODOS router (0xCf5540fFFCdC3d510B18bFcA6d2b9987b0772559)| |13 | GovernorMills | updateProposerWhitelist | Naoufel (0xFDa9365E2CDf21d72cb0dc4F5FF46F29e4aC59CE), false| Total: 13 on-chain actions. ### **Conclusion** This cleanup retires minting rights, allowlist entries, and governance permissions that are no longer in service, reducing the set of contracts that can mint DBR or DOLA or interact with FiRM to only those actively in use. It is a defense-in-depth hygiene measure with no effect on live user flows.
transferOwnership(address)# Shut Down the sINV CCIP Bridge Lanes Forum: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/shut-down-the-sinv-ccip-bridge-lanes/669 ## Summary This proposal closes the idle sINV Chainlink CCIP integration by de-allowlisting every cross-chain lane, in both directions, on all five sINV bridge contracts: the two mainnet `ProgrammableDataTokenTransfers` deployments (old and new) and the three L2 bridges on Base, Optimism, and Arbitrum. The L2-side lane removals are batched through `SINVBridgeShutdownGovernor`, a purpose-built contract that fires all 30 cross-chain shutdown messages in a single `executeL2Shutdown()` call. The mainnet-side lane removals are executed as direct proposal actions. Ownership of the sINV `GovernanceSender` and of every pool remains with the DAO governance timelock throughout, and is returned to it as the final step. ## Rationale The sINV CCIP integration is not currently in use. Monitoring shows no live cross-chain activity and no deposits. While idle, leaving the bridge lanes open is an unnecessary risk surface. The safe configuration when idle is to close every lane at both ends. Removing the outbound (destination-chain) allowlist on each contract prevents any new transfer from being initiated, and removing the inbound (source-chain) allowlist on each contract rejects any message that nonetheless arrives. Closing only one side would let a user initiate a transfer that then cannot be delivered, stranding funds mid-flight. ## The Shutdown Governor `SINVBridgeShutdownGovernor` (`0xb10D422b53789D570bAFE2f7145c1f6aeDF4a133`) dispatches every L2 shutdown message from a single `executeL2Shutdown()` entrypoint. It is `onlyOwner` (owner = the DAO governance timelock) and `payable`, with forwarded ETH paying the CCIP message fees, and it holds a hardcoded `L2_SHUTDOWN_MESSAGE_COUNT = 30`. The governor can only act once it owns the sINV `GovernanceSender` (`0xAeA8Ae87A34a0fAaEa0e6beD9f4627F576B524Fa`), the allowlisted origin for the cross-chain messages. The proposal therefore transfers the `GovernanceSender` to the governor, calls `executeL2Shutdown()`, recovers unspent fees, then transfers the `GovernanceSender` back to the timelock. The 30 messages break down as ten per L2 bridge: - `allowlistDestinationChain(remote, false)` for each of the other two L2s plus mainnet (3 messages) - `allowlistSourceChain(remote, false)` for each of the other two L2s plus mainnet (3 messages) - `allowlistSender(bridge, selector, false)` for both mainnet bridges plus the two other L2 bridges (4 messages) Ten messages across three L2 bridges gives thirty total, matching the hardcoded count. The mainnet pools are shut down separately, as direct actions, because the timelock owns them and no batching contract is needed. The governor's `withdraw(beneficiary)` recovers unspent CCIP fees and is executed while the governor still owns the `GovernanceSender`. ## Configuration Chain selectors: | Chain | Selector | |---|---| | Ethereum | `5009297550715157269` | | Base | `15971525489660198786` | | Optimism | `3734403246176062136` | | Arbitrum | `4949039107694359620` | Contract addresses: | Contract | Address | |---|---| | SINVBridgeShutdownGovernor | `0xb10D422b53789D570bAFE2f7145c1f6aeDF4a133` | | GovernanceSender (sINV) | `0xAeA8Ae87A34a0fAaEa0e6beD9f4627F576B524Fa` | | DAO governance timelock (owner) | `0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B` | sINV ProgrammableDataTokenTransfers contracts (the CCIP token pools, not the L2 sINV tokens): | Chain | Token Pool | |---|---| | Ethereum (new) | `0x70F3795c1EF726c58FfeA2e1A51526ac5707C066` | | Ethereum (old) | `0x7A43C13f7Fb3A0bF19cEB3fBC583A0CAda6D29a2` | | Base | `0x0173804066F7403E0815680F3DDa125a6cd10F7c` | | Optimism | `0xb5A998E90AdeD2C97f7ceDbb7c45Bbc27E82dfdD` | | Arbitrum | `0x1230bd56bf23Bf7adF95b9F861711301E3CCd6b3` | L2 governance proxies (CCIP message receivers; they receive each cross-chain message and forward to the explicit target): | Chain | sINV proxy | |---|---| | Base | `0x5D5392505ee69f9FE7a6a1c1AF14f17Db3B3e364` | | Optimism | `0xCbB162B761B83578b2a0226cbAf4C1adE0d60B2e` | | Arbitrum | `0x1230bd56bf23Bf7adF95b9F861711301E3CCd6b3` | ## On-Chain Actions Ownership of the `GovernanceSender` moves via Chainlink's two-step `ConfirmedOwner` pattern. The `GovernanceSender`'s leftover-fee sweep only succeeds while the governor still owns it, so the fee recovery (action 4) sits after `executeL2Shutdown()` and before ownership is handed back. | # | Target | Function | Value | Calldata (arguments) | |---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | GovernanceSender `0xAeA8Ae87A34a0fAaEa0e6beD9f4627F576B524Fa` | `transferOwnership(address)` | 0 | `0xb10D422b53789D570bAFE2f7145c1f6aeDF4a133` | | 2 | Governor `0xb10D422b53789D570bAFE2f7145c1f6aeDF4a133` | `acceptGovernanceSenderOwnership()` | 0 | `0x` | | 3 | Governor `0xb10D422b53789D570bAFE2f7145c1f6aeDF4a133` | `executeL2Shutdown()` | **CCIP fees** | `0x` *(fires 30 L2 messages)* | | 4 | Governor `0xb10D422b53789D570bAFE2f7145c1f6aeDF4a133` | `withdraw(address)` | 0 | `0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B` | | 5 | Governor `0xb10D422b53789D570bAFE2f7145c1f6aeDF4a133` | `transferGovernanceSenderOwnership(address)` | 0 | `0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B` | | 6 | GovernanceSender `0xAeA8Ae87A34a0fAaEa0e6beD9f4627F576B524Fa` | `acceptOwnership()` | 0 | `0x` | | 7 | OLD PDTT `0x7A43C13f7Fb3A0bF19cEB3fBC583A0CAda6D29a2` | `acceptOwnership()` | 0 | `0x` | | 8 | OLD PDTT `0x7A43C13f7Fb3A0bF19cEB3fBC583A0CAda6D29a2` | `allowlistDestinationChain(uint64, bool)` | 0 | `15971525489660198786, false` | | 9 | OLD PDTT `0x7A43C13f7Fb3A0bF19cEB3fBC583A0CAda6D29a2` | `allowlistDestinationChain(uint64, bool)` | 0 | `3734403246176062136, false` | | 10 | OLD PDTT `0x7A43C13f7Fb3A0bF19cEB3fBC583A0CAda6D29a2` | `allowlistDestinationChain(uint64, bool)` | 0 | `4949039107694359620, false` | | 11 | OLD PDTT `0x7A43C13f7Fb3A0bF19cEB3fBC583A0CAda6D29a2` | `allowlistSourceChain(uint64, bool)` | 0 | `15971525489660198786, false` | | 12 | OLD PDTT `0x7A43C13f7Fb3A0bF19cEB3fBC583A0CAda6D29a2` | `allowlistSourceChain(uint64, bool)` | 0 | `3734403246176062136, false` | | 13 | OLD PDTT `0x7A43C13f7Fb3A0bF19cEB3fBC583A0CAda6D29a2` | `allowlistSourceChain(uint64, bool)` | 0 | `4949039107694359620, false` | | 14 | NEW PDTT `0x70F3795c1EF726c58FfeA2e1A51526ac5707C066` | `allowlistDestinationChain(uint64, bool)` | 0 | `15971525489660198786, false` | | 15 | NEW PDTT `0x70F3795c1EF726c58FfeA2e1A51526ac5707C066` | `allowlistDestinationChain(uint64, bool)` | 0 | `3734403246176062136, false` | | 16 | NEW PDTT `0x70F3795c1EF726c58FfeA2e1A51526ac5707C066` | `allowlistDestinationChain(uint64, bool)` | 0 | `4949039107694359620, false` | | 17 | NEW PDTT `0x70F3795c1EF726c58FfeA2e1A51526ac5707C066` | `allowlistSourceChain(uint64, bool)` | 0 | `15971525489660198786, false` | | 18 | NEW PDTT `0x70F3795c1EF726c58FfeA2e1A51526ac5707C066` | `allowlistSourceChain(uint64, bool)` | 0 | `3734403246176062136, false` | | 19 | NEW PDTT `0x70F3795c1EF726c58FfeA2e1A51526ac5707C066` | `allowlistSourceChain(uint64, bool)` | 0 | `4949039107694359620, false` |
addMarket(address)# Re-Onboard sDOLA/scrvUSD LP as Collateral # **Proposal to Re-Onboard sDOLA/scrvUSD LP as Collateral** Forum Post: [https://forum.inverse.finance/t/re-onboard-sdola-scrvusd-lp-as-collateral/668](https://forum.inverse.finance/t/re-onboard-sdola-scrvusd-lp-as-collateral/668) ## **Summary** This proposal seeks community support to re-onboard the sDOLA/scrvUSD Curve LP token as collateral on FiRM. The market was previously offboarded due to heightened uncertainty around crvUSD following the launch and rapid growth of Yield Basis. At the time, this effectively reset part of crvUSD’s “lindy” and made it harder to assess the asset under the new operating model. Yield Basis has now been live for a meaningful period, and the original reason for keeping sDOLA/scrvUSD fully offboarded is less compelling. Given the strategic and business benefits of this collateral, it is appropriate to revisit onboarding. ## **Rationale** ### **1\. Strong expected borrow demand** sDOLA/scrvUSD is a high-yield LP, combining: * sDOLA yield * scrvUSD yield * boosted CRV incentives This creates clear looping demand when the net spread versus FiRM borrowing costs is attractive. FiRM benefits most from collateral that users actively want to lever, and sDOLA/scrvUSD fits that profile. ### **2\. Diversification for FiRM** FiRM debt has been falling and has become increasingly concentrated around DOLA/sUSDe. Re-onboarding sDOLA/scrvUSD would add a differentiated source of demand, diversify the collateral base, and help shift current momentum without needing to rely entirely on existing dominant markets. ### **3\. Strategic alignment with Curve** Inverse is deeply embedded in the Curve ecosystem. Curve remains one of the most important venues for DOLA liquidity, routing, and sDOLA growth. Supporting sDOLA/scrvUSD as FiRM collateral strengthens that relationship and reinforces Inverse’s commitment to Curve as a core ecosystem partner. ### **4\. More volume through DOLA** DOLA has historically benefited from being used as a routing and hop asset across Curve pools. In recent months, the number of active DOLA LPs has reduced, particularly with USR and deUSD pools going offline. As a result, DOLA has been doing less volume as a hop token. Re-onboarding sDOLA/scrvUSD would help address this by creating a new deep DOLA-adjacent LP against crvUSD, one of Curve’s highest-volume stable assets. This should support more routing through DOLA, improve DOLA’s role in Curve liquidity paths, and help maintain the volume profile needed for infrastructure such as the Chainlink DOLA price feed. ## **Stake DAO OnlyBoost Escrow** Unlike previous Curve LP markets on FiRM, this market would launch using Stake DAO’s new OnlyBoost escrow rather than the standard Convex escrow. OnlyBoost is a better fit for this market because it optimizes between Stake DAO and Convex boosts, rather than routing deposits exclusively through one venue. Benefits include: * Optimized balance between Stake DAO and Convex boosts * Improved reward capture for depositors * Instant reward crediting after harvest * Continued reward accrual while the LP is used as FiRM collateral * Fee-share benefits for the Inverse Treasury from Stake DAO revenue This makes the re-onboarding more valuable than simply restoring the previous market. It also upgrades the escrow model used for this collateral. ## **Deployment** * Market: [0xC45E9c231ab5D9Bd3F1131E7901B100D8D236C4d](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC45E9c231ab5D9Bd3F1131E7901B100D8D236C4d#readContract) * Escrow Implementation: [0x88df2a32C1130Ae8371Bf6B5d5C644a485FC650B](https://etherscan.io/address/0x88df2a32C1130Ae8371Bf6B5d5C644a485FC650B#code) ## **Parameters** As recommended by [RWG on the forum](https://forum.inverse.finance/t/re-onboard-sdola-scrvusd-lp-as-collateral/668/2): | Supply Ceiling | 5,000,000 | | :---- | :---- | | Daily Borrow Limit | 500,000 | | Collateral Factor | 87% | | Liquidation Factor | 100% | | Liquidation Incentive | 5% | | Minimum Debt Amount | 3,000 |
# Proposal to Enable FiRM Market Coverage for Latest jrDOLA Deployment Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/proposal-to-enable-firm-market-coverage-for-latest-jrdola-deployment/667 ### Summary This proposal authorizes the relaunched Junior Tranche (jrDOLA) system to provide bad debt coverage for FiRM lending markets. All eligible markets are added simultaneously to the FiRMSlashingModule, subject to the mandatory activation delay for security. The proposal is designed to execute in parallel with the jrDOLA Relaunch Proposal, ensuring the insurance mechanism becomes operational immediately upon both proposals passing. Consistent with the post-incident rollout strategy, coverage is limited to currently active markets and excludes paused, and deprecated markets. ### Background The jrDOLA Relaunch Proposal configures the core parameters and reward budget for the Junior Tranche system. That proposal intentionally excludes FiRM market additions to maintain a clean separation of concerns: • **Relaunch Proposal:** sets operational parameters, deploys infrastructure, allocates DBR budget • **This Proposal:** connects jrDOLA to the FiRM markets requiring bad debt protection ### Coverage Strategy Rationale for comprehensive coverage across eligible markets: 1\. **Simplicity:** depositors don’t need to evaluate which markets are or aren’t covered. Coverage is uniform across eligible FiRM markets, making the value proposition clear. 2\. **Fair treatment:** all FiRM markets benefit from DOLA liquidity, so all eligible markets should contribute to and benefit from bad debt insurance. 3\. **Administrative efficiency:** avoid the ongoing governance overhead of individual market evaluations. The activation delay and guardian cancellation provide sufficient safeguards. Each market added through this and any future proposal enters a 7-day timelock before jrDOLA begins covering its bad debt. While at this initiation stage it serves little immediate purpose, in general this delay: • Gives the guardian multisig time to cancel problematic additions if discovered • Prevents zero-day exploits where an attacker adds a market and immediately creates bad debt • Provides a buffer for depositors to exit if they disagree with market additions If and when a FiRM position in a covered market becomes insolvent: 1\. **Detection:** anyone observes a position where debt > collateral value (via oracles) 2\. **Eligibility check:** market is active in FiRMSlashingModule (activation delay passed); position collateral value < maxCollateralValue; position debt > minDebt 3\. **Execution:** permissionless call to slash(market, borrower) 4\. **Repayment:** jrDOLA vault repays bad debt to the FiRM market 5\. **Loss socialization:** all jrDOLA depositors absorb the loss pro-rata (share value decreases equally) ### Markets to be Added The following currently active FiRM markets, as of June 24th 2026, are proposed for jrDOLA coverage. |Market | Active Debt (DOLA)| |--- | ---| |sUSDe-DOLA | 34,817,172| |yv-sUSDe-DOLA | 5,435,566| |sUSDS-DOLA | 4,907,275| |wstETH | 621,939| |yv-sUSDS-DOLA | 371,962| |INV | 216,131| |wBTC | 209,338| |CVX | 135,086| |cvxCRV | 128,796| |st-yCRV | 113,367| |cbBTC | 92,899| |wETH | 16,359| |sUSDe | 0| |CRV | 0| ### On-Chain Actions One allowMarket call per covered market on the FiRMSlashingModule (**[0x316a01f878AA6d5A4C7ea2080D64D364F9538aa2](https://etherscan.io/address/0x316a01f878AA6d5A4C7ea2080D64D364F9538aa2)**), each subject to the 7-day activation delay. Mirrors the executed coverage proposal’s action format, retargeted to the relaunch slashing module and refreshed market set.
# Proposal to Relaunch jrDOLA with Initial DBR Reward Budget Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/proposal-to-relaunch-jrdola-with-initial-dbr-reward-budget/666 ### Summary This proposal authorizes the relaunch of the Junior Tranche system (jrDOLA) on an updated and freshly deployed contract suite. Following jrDOLA’s first live period and its absorption of a bad-debt event in a covered market, the system was paused while the design was reviewed. The relaunch carries forward the original architecture while introducing one substantive change: a bounded, governance-controlled withdrawal pause that allows the protocol to hold the insurance layer in place during an active stress event. The proposal sets initial operational parameters and allocates a DBR reward budget to rebuild liquidity through a measured, slow-churn approach. A follow-up proposal will enable FiRM market coverage, designed to execute in parallel, pending governance approval. ### Background jrDOLA introduces a market-driven insurance layer that addresses a fundamental limitation in Inverse Finance’s risk model. As FiRM continues to scale, the protocol absorbs all bad debt directly into DOLA backing, creating concentration risk that constrains growth potential. This model works adequately at current scale but becomes increasingly fragile as total debt exposure grows. jrDOLA solves this by creating a first-loss capital buffer where depositors voluntarily accept bad debt risk in exchange for increased yield. When FiRM positions become insolvent, the slashing mechanism draws from jrDOLA deposits to repay bad debt before it impacts DOLA backing. This protects DOLA solvency by establishing a dedicated absorption layer, enables protocol scaling with reduced systemic risk, provides DOLA holders with a new product that earns both sDOLA base yield and DBR rewards, and establishes permissionless bad debt resolution that requires no manual governance action during stress events. The initial live deployment validated the core mechanism in production: when a covered market sustained losses, jrDOLA absorbed the resulting bad debt exactly as designed, shielding DOLA backing. That episode also surfaced a structural gap. Depositors retained the ability to exit a distressed market before the relevant oracle had repriced and before slashing could be executed. A coordinated, rational exit during the window between a loss becoming likely and that loss becoming enforceable would let depositors escape the very risk they were paid to underwrite, leaving the remaining stakers and ultimately DOLA holders to absorb it. The relaunch closes this gap. The remedy mirrors the approach taken by Aave’s Umbrella safety system in its response to the rETH depeg event: governance gains the ability to temporarily freeze withdrawals so the insurance layer cannot drain ahead of a crystallizing loss. The capability is deliberately constrained. It can hold withdrawals for a maximum of ninety days, it requires continuous, affirmative governance support to persist rather than locking funds indefinitely, and governance can lift it at any time. It exists to preserve the integrity of the buffer during the narrow window where slashing is pending, not to trap depositor capital. The jrDOLA codebase underwent rigorous security scrutiny through a dual-audit process with Sherlock: a private audit with researchers Hash and Osidian focused on ERC-4626 vault mechanics, slashing logic, and withdrawal queue edge cases, followed by a public audit contest open to Sherlock’s broader researcher community. The final reports are posted [here](https://docs.inverse.finance/risk-working-group-digest/prevention/audits). The withdrawal-pause change introduced for the relaunch was implemented and reviewed separately, approved, and fork-tested across deposit, withdraw, and slash flows prior to redeployment. ### Technical Implementation **Deployed Contracts** The relaunch is built on a newly deployed contract suite on Ethereum mainnet. Addresses below supersede the original launch deployment: JuniorDola (jrDOLA) — **[0x6f80a22a57C7F0257094eA8D426AF3F747defbC7](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6f80a22a57C7F0257094eA8D426AF3F747defbC7)** The main ERC-4626 vault representing user deposits. All deposits are in sDOLA to provide a base yield layer. The contract integrates an xy=k auction mechanism that converts DBR rewards into DOLA-denominated yield, allowing depositors to earn returns without directly holding or managing DBR tokens. WithdrawalEscrow — **[0x8554d8a6Bcc5B6D6Eb7bEA2189e6a8F8d24c7e45](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8554d8a6Bcc5B6D6Eb7bEA2189e6a8F8d24c7e45)** Manages the delayed withdrawal queue. The per-withdrawal cooldown duration and exit window are still snapshotted and locked at the moment a withdrawal is queued and cannot be retroactively worsened for users already in the queue. The relaunch adds a bounded, governance-controlled pause over the queue (described under Governance Controls); outside of an active pause, behavior is unchanged. Users continue earning rewards during cooldown since their funds remain slashable. LinearInterpolationDelayModel — **[0x75FdA12cB3341CcCD41b77C2515F0DA716119B07](https://etherscan.io/address/0x75FdA12cB3341CcCD41b77C2515F0DA716119B07)** Calculates withdrawal delays based on queue utilization, interpolating linearly between the minimum delay (empty queue) and the maximum delay (at the governance-defined threshold). The contract is upgradeable by governance, but active withdrawals continue using the delay parameters from their queue time. FiRMSlashingModule — **[0x316a01f878AA6d5A4C7ea2080D64D364F9538aa2](https://etherscan.io/address/0x316a01f878AA6d5A4C7ea2080D64D364F9538aa2)** Implements the permissionless slashing mechanism for FiRM bad debt. Anyone can call the slashing function when a position becomes insolvent. Protective parameters include: ◦ **maxCollateralValue**: prevents slashing positions with significant collateral, forcing liquidators to handle those first. ◦ **minDebt**: prevents dust positions from spamming slashing events ◦ **activationDelay**: requires newly added markets to wait before becoming eligible for coverage A guardian multisig can cancel pending market additions during the delay window. Helper — **[0xcb1cf17F0e579e520458A3a3aa72ECA65eB8560C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xcb1cf17F0e579e520458A3a3aa72ECA65eB8560C)** Implements helper functions for interacting with the DBR auction in the JuniorDola contract. Two price feeds support integrations and downstream risk tooling: jrDOLA/DOLA feed — **[0x6B6e969ED13061058820BFcbaeAd5AB85411AFD6](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6B6e969ED13061058820BFcbaeAd5AB85411AFD6)** jrDOLA/USD feed — **[0x830A0be197F927ca1673355a85DB5E715F4Ce621](https://etherscan.io/address/0x830A0be197F927ca1673355a85DB5E715F4Ce621)** ### Initial Parameters **JuniorDola (auction parameters)** These four values seed and govern the xy=k DBR auction. They are the core economic levers of the relaunch and are carried forward from the original launch calibration as a starting point. • **dbrReserve:** \[200,000e18\] DBR — virtual reserves for the xy=k auction • **dolaReserve:** \[5,670e18\] sDOLA — virtual reserves for the xy=k auction (value used at original launch) • **yearlyRewardBudget:** \[500,000\] DBR — initial annual allocation (operator-controlled) • **maxYearlyRewardBudget:** 5,000,000 DBR — governance ceiling • **operator:** Treasury Working Group multisig The dbrReserve/dolaReserve ratio sets the auction’s opening DBR price. At the original launch the ratio implied ≈ 0.0285 sDOLA per DBR; current DBR trades around $0.0410 **WithdrawalEscrow** • **withdrawFee:** 5 bps — creates friction against cycling behavior; paid to remaining depositors • **exitWindow:** 2 days (48 hours) — time to claim a withdrawal after cooldown completes **LinearInterpolationDelayModel** • **minDelay:** 1 day — minimum withdrawal delay when the queue is empty • **maxDelay:** 10 days — applies when queue utilization reaches the threshold (aligned with Aave Umbrella) • **maxDelayThreshold:** 10,000 bps — delay scales linearly from min to max as the queue fills from 0% to 100% of supply **FiRMSlashingModule** • **maxCollateralValue:** $100 — positions above this must be liquidated normally • **minDebt:** $5 — minimum debt for slashing eligibility • **activationDelay:** 7 days — review window for new market additions • **guardian:** Policy Committee multisig ### Governance Controls The relaunch revises the control surface in exactly one respect: governance gains a bounded withdrawal pause. All other guarantees are preserved. **Governance CAN:** • Add or remove FiRM markets for coverage (new markets subject to the activation delay) • Increase the maxYearlyRewardBudget ceiling • Replace the LinearInterpolationDelayModel contract • Adjust FiRMSlashingModule parameters • Change the guardian address • **Pause withdrawals** — freeze both queued and new withdrawals for up to a maximum of ninety days during an active stress event. The pause requires continuous governance support to persist and can be lifted by governance at any time. **Governance CANNOT:** • Hold a pause beyond the ninety-day maximum without renewed, affirmative governance action • Worsen the cooldown or exit-window terms snapshotted for users already in the queue • Access deposited funds except through legitimate slashing • Bypass market activation delays **Operator (TWG multisig) CAN:** • Adjust yearlyRewardBudget within the governance-set ceiling **Operator CANNOT:** • Exceed the governance-approved ceiling • Access deposited funds • Modify withdrawal or slashing parameters **Guardian CAN:** • Remove markets from slashing protection before the activation period has elapsed **Guardian CANNOT:** • Interfere with operations of actively protected markets ### Operational Mechanics **For Depositors** Depositing into jrDOLA follows standard ERC-4626 vault interactions. Users approve sDOLA to the jrDOLA contract and call either deposit(amount, receiver) or mint(shares, receiver). Upon deposit, users receive jrDOLA shares representing their proportional claim on the vault and begin earning DBR rewards distributed through the xy=k auction, which automatically converts DBR into DOLA-denominated yield without requiring direct DBR interaction. Withdrawing follows a multi-step process designed to provide security during stress while maintaining a reasonable experience during normal operations. Users first call queueWithdrawal(shares) to enter the queue. At that moment the system snapshots their withdrawal parameters — cooldown duration and exit window — and applies the withdrawal fee, which is distributed to remaining depositors. Users then wait for the cooldown, which ranges from the minimum to the maximum delay based on current queue utilization. During cooldown, users continue earning rewards because their funds remain in the vault and continue to provide slashable coverage. After cooldown, users enter their exit window and claim by calling the claim function, receiving sDOLA equal to their original deposit plus accrued yield, minus any slashing events that occurred while deposited, minus the withdrawal fee. Users may also cancel during cooldown and return to the active pool. Should governance invoke the withdrawal pause during an active stress event, claims and new exits are held for the duration of the pause; queued positions retain their place and resume on lift. **For the Protocol** Bad debt coverage operates through a permissionless slashing process. When a FiRM position becomes insolvent such that debt value exceeds collateral value based on oracle pricing, anyone can call slash(market, borrower) on the FiRMSlashingModule. The module verifies insolvency by checking current debt and collateral values, then applies protective checks — collateral value below maxCollateralValue (so positions that should be liquidated normally are excluded) and debt above minDebt (so economically insignificant positions are ignored). If all checks pass, the module calculates the DOLA required to restore the position’s debt-to-collateral ratio to parity and triggers a pro-rata slash against the jrDOLA vault, where all depositors’ share values decrease proportionally to socialize the loss. The recovered DOLA repays the bad debt in the FiRM market, removing the insolvency and protecting DOLA backing before it reaches core reserves. Reward distribution operates through an ongoing auction integrated into the jrDOLA contract. The protocol allocates DBR according to the yearlyRewardBudget, within governance-set limits. These DBR enter an xy=k constant-product market maker with virtual DOLA reserves, creating a permissionless auction where anyone can swap sDOLA for DBR. This increases the vault’s total assets without changing share supply, raising the sDOLA-per-share exchange rate. Depositors thus earn DOLA-denominated yield without ever directly interacting with DBR, while the auction provides continuous price discovery and self-adjusting reward distribution based on DBR market dynamics. ### Budget Request The budget operates within a controlled structure. The maxYearlyRewardBudget of 5,000,000 DBR is a governance-enforced ceiling that can only be raised through a full governance proposal. Within that ceiling, the yearlyRewardBudget represents the initial active budget upon approval and is controlled by the operator (Treasury Working Group multisig), which can adjust it up to the ceiling without additional votes — enabling responsive calibration to market conditions while preserving ultimate governance control. Given that the relaunch deliberately rebuilds liquidity through a measured, slow-churn approach rather than an aggressive bootstrap, the initial yearlyRewardBudget should be calibrated to attract first-loss capital at a sustainable cost rather than to maximize early TVL. ### On-Chain Actions JuniorDola (setOperator, initialize, setSlashingModule, setMaxYearlyRewardBudget, setYearlyRewardBudget) · WithdrawalEscrow (initialize, setWithdrawFee, setExitWindow) · LinearInterpolationDelayModel (setMinDelay, setMaxDelay, setMaxDelayThresholdBps) · FiRMSlashingModule (setGuardian, setMaxCollateralValue, setMinDebt, setActivationDelay) · DBR (addMinter)
# Proposal to Pause Borrows on FiRM INV Market Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/proposal-to-pause-borrows-on-firm-inv-market/665 ### Summary This proposal pauses borrows on the FiRM INV market and redirects new borrowing demand against INV toward Monolith. The decision is strategic, not risk-driven. The market is not under stress today and existing borrowers are unaffected. Pausing borrows blocks new debt issuance against INV on FiRM while leaving open positions free to be managed, topped up, or repaid at borrower discretion. A secondary effect is to cap DOLA's exposure to INV, a reflexive collateral, by halting further issuance against the protocol's own governance token. ### Background The INV market on FiRM has operated since[ proposal #139](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/139), providing DOLA borrowing capacity against the Inverse governance token. INV is reflexive collateral: stress affecting the protocol can correlate with INV price, and DOLA debt backed by INV is partially backed by an equity claim on the entity issuing the DOLA. Monolith is Inverse Finance's stablecoin-as-a-service protocol. It’s [invusd](https://app.monolith.market/1/coin/0) market provides an alternative venue for borrowing against INV, separate from DOLA and FiRM’s collateralized lending model. Directing new INV-collateralized borrowing interest toward Monolith does two things at once: it builds Monolith adoption at a stage where flow concentration matters, and it lets FiRM reduce reflexive collateral exposure without requiring borrower action. As Monolith scales, the protocol benefits from concentrating new INV borrowing demand in the venue best positioned to absorb it. The only operation prevented is the creation of new debt against INV on FiRM. CF, LF, liquidation incentive, and supply ceiling are all unchanged. Open positions can still be managed, topped up, or repaid on existing terms. ### Looking Ahead This proposal does not pre-commit to further action on the INV market. If the RWG or Inverse governance later determines that additional INV-market wind-down steps are warranted, whether to deepen the reflexive-exposure reduction or for unrelated strategic reasons, those will be proposed separately. The RWG retains its standing mandate to escalate parameter changes on the INV market should risk conditions deteriorate, independent of this proposal. ### Actions **Action 1:** Pause borrows on FiRM INV Market **Action 2** Set FiRM INV Market Ceiling to 0
# Inverse Finance Foundation funding proposal Forum post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/inverse-finance-foundation-funding-proposal/664 ## Summary * Authorize the FoundationFunder contract to draw up to 150,000 DOLA per quarter from the DAO Treasury, subject to a total ERC20 allowance of 600,000 DOLA. * Approve the appointment of Scott Harrison as an additional director of the Inverse Finance Foundation. ## Inverse Finance Foundation background The Inverse Finance Foundation was established and initially capitalized following [a successful DAO governance proposal](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/318). The primary objective of the Foundation is to act as an accountable operating entity for Inverse DAO, enabling faster execution on product development, legal, operational, administrative, and commercial work using a capped discretionary budget approved by DAO governance. The Foundation’s Board of Directors has adopted bylaws and amended Memorandum and Articles of Association that grant the DAO substantial oversight. These documents are available for review [here](https://drive.google.com/drive/u/1/folders/1rqmDSle6h7eEV0jDTA2cjwCBcM0M_YJU). This proposal seeks to secure necessary operational funding for the Foundation and formalize the appointment of a new director. ## FoundationFunder contract allowance The FoundationFunder contract is a customized smart contract designed to facilitate a continuous funding allowance from the DAO Treasury to the Inverse Finance Foundation. This proposal configures the FoundationFunder contract to provide a maximum of 150,000 DOLA per quarter to the Foundation multisig. Rather than holding static deposits, the contract utilizes an ERC20 allowance to pull DOLA from the DAO Treasury on an as-needed basis. Actual disbursements may be lower than the maximum in any given quarter and will depend on the Foundation’s operating needs, subject at all times to the quarterly ceiling. The FoundationFunder enables the Foundation multisig to withdraw funds directly or delegate sub-allowances to authorized addresses. All aggregate expenditures via the FoundationFunder remain strictly bound by the 150,000 DOLA quarterly limit. The Foundation's multisig is a 3-of-5 Gnosis Safe currently controlled by the following signatories: 1. Scott Harrison (Cara Global) 2. Nour Haridy (Inverse Finance) 3. Harry (Inverse Finance) 4. Alien (Inverse Finance) 5. Hammad Tahir (Regen Financial) The multisig is deployed on the Ethereum network at the following address: 0xE15B0Ab2036d8Fc2d2aa537B748A34333Ffab963 The FoundationFunder requires each transfer to include a public on-chain justification. This creates a transaction-level record of the stated purpose for each disbursement, improving transparency for DAO reviewers. ## Appointment of Scott Harrison as foundation director The current director, Paul Hurn, is scheduled to transition to a new role at the end of May 2026 and will resign from the Inverse Finance Foundation Board of Directors at the end of May This proposal authorizes the appointment of Scott Harrison to the Board of Directors. Paul Hurn and Scott Harrison may serve as co-directors during the transition period, after which Scott Harrison will assume the role of sole director. ## Onchain actions * Approve a 600,000 DOLA total allowance for the [FoundationFunder](http://etherscan.io/address/0xADd84d9312Ed1961CE80A1CeB17446737f480993). * Set FoundationFunder quarterly limit to 150,000 DOLA
# sUSDe Market Consolidation and First Collateral Factor Reduction Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/susde-market-consolidation-and-first-collateral-factor-reduction/661 ### Summary This proposal is the first governance action flowing from the RWG's [Complete Risk Refresh Assessment of USDe/sUSDe Collaterals on FiRM](https://github.com/InverseFinance/Risk-Assessments/blob/main/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment.md). It seeks to execute the first stage of the RWG's phased sUSDe collateral transition proposed in the assessment. Three changes take effect simultaneously: the standalone sUSDe market is offboarded by reducing its supply ceiling to zero; the collateral factor on FiRM's two FeedSwitch-protected sUSDe LP markets (DOLA/sUSDe LP and yv-sUSDe/DOLA) is reduced from 92% to 91.75%; and market ceilings are brought in line with current borrow utilization — DOLA/sUSDe LP to $50.5M and yv-sUSDe/DOLA to $5M. The existing 100% liquidation factor and 4% liquidation incentive is preserved on both LP markets. ### Background FiRM currently operates three sUSDe-denominated markets. The two LP markets — DOLA/sUSDe LP and yv-sUSDe/DOLA — are protected by FeedSwitch V2, which prices sUSDe at USDT-equivalent in its default configuration. A standalone sUSDe market with a $5M ceiling and zero active borrowers operates outside FeedSwitch coverage, pricing directly against the live Chainlink sUSDe-USD DEX-state feed. The RWG's Complete Risk Refresh Assessment documents [five converging risk vectors](https://github.com/InverseFinance/Risk-Assessments/blob/main/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment.md#top-5-risk-vectors) across the sUSDe collateral stack. The structural finding central to this proposal is a 74% contraction in sUSDe DEX liquidity (ex-DOLA) since January 2026 — from $109M at FeedSwitch deployment to [$28.34M as of April 20, 2026](https://github.com/InverseFinance/Risk-Assessments/blob/main/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment.md#liquidity). This is the liquidity environment that underpins both the Chainlink sUSDe-USD feed and [every FiRM liquidation path for sUSDe collateral](https://github.com/InverseFinance/Risk-Assessments/blob/main/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment.md#contagion-mapping). The 92% CF and the current market ceilings were calibrated against the January environment. They no longer reflect the conditions under which the protocol is operating. The three changes in this proposal are addressed together because they belong together. The standalone market's offboarding is a consolidation step — it removes a surface with zero borrowers and no FeedSwitch protection, focusing the remaining plan on the two markets where the FeedSwitch actually operates. Ceiling alignment with current borrow utilization closes the gap between structural ceiling and actual exposure, removing headroom that serves no function during a managed transition window. The CF reduction is the substantive risk adjustment — the first of two steps that will bring the LP markets to 91% CF ahead of any feed configuration decision. ### Why Now The LP markets were parameterized at 92% CF against +$100M in independent exit liquidity. That pool depth is now roughly one-quarter of the environment the current parameterization was calibrated against. The Chainlink sUSDe-USD feed derives its price exclusively from on-chain DEX pools; feed behavior under stress is inseparable from the depth of the pools it sources from. Despite the recency of the October 2025 event, the current depth of $28M has [no stress-tested performance record](https://github.com/InverseFinance/Risk-Assessments/blob/main/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment.md#valuation-methodology), and a comparable event would hit an environment with roughly 4× less absorbing capacity. The [FeedSwitch](https://github.com/InverseFinance/Risk-Assessments/blob/main/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment.md#valuation-methodology) currently insulates LP market borrowers from real-time sUSDe price exposure. It was [deployed](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/344) as a temporary guardian-controlled buffer pending a trustless, PoR-driven automated fallback. That fallback has not materialized, and the current environment makes the interim posture progressively less defensible. Maintaining the FeedSwitch requires a named guardian to monitor, judge, and execute faster than a stress event deteriorates — a reactive model whose correctness is required exactly when the conditions for exercising judgment are most adverse. Even if exercised perfectly, guardian activation is still a reaction to an underlying problem already in motion and therefore cannot substitute for appropriate parameter sizing against the actual liquidity environment. Maintaining a 92% CF and ceilings unconstrained by utilization against a 74%-contracted liquidity picture is not consistent with the RWG's collateral framework. The RWG will conduct direct outreach to active sUSDe LP borrowers ahead of execution, consistent with prior parameter-change communications. ### Proposed Changes |Market|Parameter|Current|Proposed| | --- | --- | --- | --- | |Standalone sUSDe|Supply Ceiling|$5,000,000|$0| |DOLA/sUSDe LP|Collateral Factor|92%|91.75%| |DOLA/sUSDe LP|Supply Ceiling|$80,000,000|$50,500,000| |yv-sUSDe/DOLA|Collateral Factor|92%|91.75%| |yv-sUSDe/DOLA|Supply Ceiling|$20,000,000|$5,000,000| Liquidation incentive preserved at 4% on both LP markets. FeedSwitch configuration unchanged. No changes to LF or daily borrow limits. Combined sUSDe notional ceiling: $105M → $55.5M. Total ceiling reduction reflects consolidation to the two FeedSwitch-protected LP markets at utilization-appropriate levels. ### Looking Ahead If Stage 1 is approved via governance, [Stage 2](https://github.com/InverseFinance/Risk-Assessments/blob/main/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment.md#recommended-path) — a second CF reduction from 91.75% to 91% — is targeted approximately 30 days after this proposal executes, giving borrowers adequate time to adjust before the next step. During the Stage 1 observation window, the RWG continues structured data collection on Chainlink sUSDe-USD feed performance and sUSDe DEX TVL trajectory, and conducts engagement with Ethena on Season 6 status, sENA fee-switch activation timing, and forward guidance on the DEX-liquidity outlook. If deemed necessary, [Stage 3](https://github.com/InverseFinance/Risk-Assessments/blob/main/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment/sUSDe-Risk-Refresh-Assessment.md#recommended-path) — a data-driven ceiling reassessment and FeedSwitch configuration review — follows approximately 30 days after Stage 2, with a hard outer bound of June 26, 2026. It is a window, not a fixed execution date. The full rationale is set out in the Stage 3 proposal. The RWG pre-commits to timeline acceleration under either of two conditions: sUSDe DEX TVL (ex-DOLA) sustained at $10M or below over a continuous one-week window, or confirmed migration of Aave's sUSDe oracle across any of its Ethereum deployments from USDT-equivalent to live market pricing.
# Adopt the SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement for Monolith Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/adopt-the-seal-safe-harbor-agreement-for-monolith/663 ## Summary This proposal adopts the SEAL Safe Harbor for Whitehats framework on behalf of the Monolith protocol, extending the same on-chain safe harbor protections that Inverse Finance itself has operated under since the execution of [Proposal 273](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/273). The proposal contains two on-chain actions, both routed through the INV Treasury, which is the owner of the Monolith Safe Harbor Agreement contract: 1. Set the per-incident bounty cap on the Monolith Agreement to $1,000,000. 2. Register the Monolith Agreement in the SEAL Safe Harbor Registry, formally adopting the framework for Monolith. ## Background The SEAL Safe Harbor for Whitehats, developed by the Security Alliance (SEAL), provides whitehat security researchers with a defined on-chain safe harbor when intervening to prevent or mitigate active exploits against participating DeFi protocols. Adoption is a two-step on-chain process: a per-protocol Agreement contract describing in-scope assets, bounty terms, and security contacts is deployed, and that Agreement is then registered in the canonical SEAL Safe Harbor Registry. Inverse Finance has been subscribed to SEAL Safe Harbor since the execution of[ Proposal 273](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/273). This proposal extends equivalent on-chain protections to Monolith, whose asset recovery flows are controlled by the INV Treasury. The Monolith Safe Harbor Agreement has already been deployed at[ 0x7fb1970F81aCAa1A39f55c92609CE729b0D6f1C0](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7fb1970F81aCAa1A39f55c92609CE729b0D6f1C0) by SEAL, and ownership has been transferred to the INV Treasury at[ 0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B](https://etherscan.io/address/0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B). ## Rationale Bringing Monolith under SEAL Safe Harbor extends a clear, on-chain incentive framework for whitehats to assist in mitigating active exploits against the protocol, complementing Monolith's existing security posture and aligning Monolith with the broader set of DeFi protocols already covered by the framework — including Inverse Finance itself. On-chain registration is the binding step of the adoption process. Until the Agreement is recorded in the Registry, Monolith is not formally adopted and the safe harbor protections are not in effect. ## Adoption Details The following terms reflect the Monolith Safe Harbor configuration that will be in effect once this proposal executes. Predetermined rewards for successful whitehats that recover protocol funds. |Field|Value| | --- | --- | |Percentage|10%| |Cap (per incident)|1,000,000 DOLA| |Aggregate Cap|None| |Retainable|Yes — whitehats may retain their bounty directly from recovered funds, streamlining the payout process for both the whitehat and the protocol| |Identity|Pseudonymous — whitehats must identify themselves to the protocol but are not required to provide a real name or any formal identification| |Diligence Requirements|None| ### Asset Recovery Addresses Addresses controlled by the protocol to which recovered funds will be returned by the whitehat. |Chain|Address| | --- | --- | |Mainnet|0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B (INV Treasury)| ### In-Scope Accounts On-chain assets owned by the protocol that are protected under Safe Harbor. |Chain|Name|Address|Child Contract Scope| | --- | --- | --- | --- | |Mainnet|Factory|0x6D961c9DCF1AD73566822BA4B087892e3839B849|None| |Mainnet|InterestRateModel|0x5B679dDD0edDce323f74AEc38E3849d70d57C113|None| Child Contract Scope = None is intentional for the Factory: only the listed addresses are in scope. Child markets deployed via the Factory are explicitly excluded so that coverage cannot extend to wrongfully configured Monolith markets. ## On-Chain Actions Both actions are executed by the Treasury Timelock. Action 1 raises the per-incident bounty cap on the previously deployed Agreement from its initial value of $200,000 to $1,000,000; all other bounty parameters remain unchanged from their currently configured values. Action 2 records the Agreement in the SEAL Safe Harbor Registry, completing formal adoption. ### Action 1 — Update bounty cap on the Monolith Safe Harbor Agreement |Field|Value| | --- | --- | |Target|0x7fb1970F81aCAa1A39f55c92609CE729b0D6f1C0| |Value|0| |Signature|setBountyTerms((uint256,uint256,bool,uint8,string,uint256))| Decoded parameters: |Field|Current|New| | --- | --- | --- | |bountyPercentage|10|10| |bountyCapUSD|200000|1000000| |retainable|true|true| |identity (enum)|1 (Pseudonymous)|1 (Pseudonymous)| |diligenceRequirements|"None"|"None"| |aggregateBountyCapUSD|0|0| ### Action 2 — Adopt the Agreement into the SEAL Safe Harbor Registry |Field|Value| | --- | --- | |Target|0x326733493E143b8904716E7A64A9f4fb6A185a2c| |Value|0| |Signature|adoptSafeHarbor(address)| |Param agreementAddress|0x7fb1970F81aCAa1A39f55c92609CE729b0D6f1C0| ## References * SEAL Safe Harbor framework: https://github.com/security-alliance/safe-harbor * Monolith Safe Harbor Agreement: https://etherscan.io/address/0x7fb1970F81aCAa1A39f55c92609CE729b0D6f1C0 * SEAL Safe Harbor Registry: https://etherscan.io/address/0x326733493E143b8904716E7A64A9f4fb6A185a2c * Prior Inverse Finance Safe Harbor adoption: [Proposal 273](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/273)
# Pass Through yETH Recovery Assets to Affected FiRM Users # Pass Through yETH Recovery Assets to Affected FiRM Users Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/pass-through-yeth-recovery-assets-to-affected-firm-users/657 ## Summary This proposal seeks to claim Inverse Finance’s allocation from the [Yearn yETH optimistic recovery plan](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-90-yeth-optimistic-recovery-plan/14573/27), and distribute 100% of the received [ysWETH](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe5387cd454dcc542421c069c009d915ab9efaafd) shares to the 4 affected FiRM users pro rata based on their yETH balances at the time of the exploit. Under the Yearn recovery plan, integrator-held balances are claimable by the integrator, with the expectation that the integrator distributes the recovered value onward to the underlying users. Inverse had 4 affected FiRM users with yETH exposure, and these users have since fully repaid their debts. As such, the recovered assets should be passed through to them in full. ## Background The Yearn yETH exploit resulted in a loss of underlying ETH backing yETH. Yearn has since recovered a meaningful portion of these assets and launched an [optimistic recovery plan](https://gov.yearn.fi/t/yip-90-yeth-optimistic-recovery-plan/14573/27) to distribute the recovered value back to affected holders. Recovery eligibility is based on balances at snapshot block `23914085`, and for integrator-held balances the integrator is treated as the claimant. The downstream distribution is then handled by the integrator according to its own governance process. Inverse had 4 users on FiRM with yETH exposure at the time of the exploit. These users are included in the Yearn recovery plan. Since all 4 users have now fully repaid their debts, there is no remaining protocol debt to offset, and the recovered assets should therefore be returned to the affected users directly. The [Yearn recovery claim contract](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9564850c7090B13794e6d1164B0826C0aEFf3143) allows claimants to call `claim(false)`, which mints [ysWETH](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe5387cd454dcc542421c069c009d915ab9efaafd) recovery vault shares to the claimant address. The number of ysWETH shares received cannot be known in advance, because the amount of shares minted depends on the recovery vault share price at execution time, and DAO governance execution is not instantaneous. To handle this cleanly, a simple helper contract has been deployed at [0xFeB4763867Ce21506bE8037eF4f10737E12fDF2e](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFeB4763867Ce21506bE8037eF4f10737E12fDF2e). The helper can only be called by the [Inverse Treasury](https://etherscan.io/address/0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B), reads the Treasury’s full ysWETH balance at execution time, and distributes 100% of that balance pro rata to the 4 affected users. It does not custody funds itself, instead using `transferFrom(Treasury, user, amount)`, and is single-use. This avoids the need to predict the amount of ysWETH in advance and ensures the full recovered balance is distributed in one execution flow. ## Distribution The distribution will be based on each user’s yETH balance at the time of the exploit. | User | yETH balance | Share | |---|---:|---:| | `0xC95f235896F5a82486Ab645596fC29b76e52900c` | 196.178283039425670085 | 52.572498% | | `0x3C9F71Ae57FEA4a2E38C9d413705Ed1FDcD9e3Da` | 121.518520195354211134 | 32.564930% | | `0xaE79f0562C2128cC12d0ac068aC288856Fe0e1AB` | 0.966854089014142159 | 0.259101% | | `0xc989Df5B623fa84E57e99eC9006283510Ea8C2eC` | 54.493967510951575023 | 14.603472% | Total yETH balance: `373.157624834745598401` ## Contracts - [yETH recovery claim contract](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9564850c7090B13794e6d1164B0826C0aEFf3143): `0x9564850c7090B13794e6d1164B0826C0aEFf3143` - [ysWETH](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe5387cd454dcc542421c069c009d915ab9efaafd): `0xe5387cd454dcc542421c069c009d915ab9efaafd` - [distributor helper](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFeB4763867Ce21506bE8037eF4f10737E12fDF2e): `0xFeB4763867Ce21506bE8037eF4f10737E12fDF2e` - [Inverse Treasury](https://etherscan.io/address/0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B): `0x926dF14a23BE491164dCF93f4c468A50ef659D5B` ## On-Chain Actions - call `claim(false)` on the [Yearn yETH recovery claim contract](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9564850c7090B13794e6d1164B0826C0aEFf3143) from the Treasury - approve the [distributor helper](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFeB4763867Ce21506bE8037eF4f10737E12fDF2e) to spend [ysWETH](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe5387cd454dcc542421c069c009d915ab9efaafd) from the Treasury - call `execute()` on the [distributor helper](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFeB4763867Ce21506bE8037eF4f10737E12fDF2e), distributing 100% of the Treasury’s ysWETH balance to the 4 affected users pro rata - reset the helper’s ysWETH allowance back to `0`
# Grant TWG Allowance for Treasury Yearn Vault Positions # Proposal to Grant TWG Allowance for Treasury Yearn Vault Positions Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/grant-twg-allowance-for-treasury-yearn-vault-positions/656 ## Summary This proposal requests that the DAO grant the TWG onchain allowances for the Treasury’s holdings of Yearn vault positions. The purpose of these allowances is to allow the TWG to actively manage these Treasury assets, primarily by unwinding them into DOLA where appropriate in order to derisk the balance sheet, increase Treasury flexibility, and support broader Treasury management operations. ## Background The Treasury currently holds a number of Yearn vault positions that have accumulated as part of Inverse’s partnership and integrations with Yearn. These positions are strategically important to the DAO. Back in Q1 2025, the TWG negotiated a 65% fee share with Yearn for Yearn vaults integrated onto FiRM, and as a result a large portion of the Treasury’s balance in these assets has come from that arrangement. Over the past year, this has brought in an additional \~$80k of revenue for the DAO. However, these positions should not remain operationally stranded in the Treasury. Market conditions change, partner risk changes, peg risk changes, and the DAO’s liquidity needs change. The TWG should be able to manage these assets directly and efficiently when prudent. The main use case for this allowance is simple: to unwind Yearn vault positions into DOLA when appropriate, whether to derisk, simplify the Treasury balance sheet, improve stablecoin reserves, or respond more quickly to changing market conditions. ## Proposal Grant the TWG onchain allowance for the Treasury’s current Yearn vault holdings. These allowances would allow the TWG to: * unwind Yearn vault positions into DOLA * reduce exposure to positions where the risk/reward is no longer attractive * respond faster to protocol, partner, or market risk * manage Treasury assets without needing a full governance cycle for each routine operational action These approvals do not give the TWG arbitrary spending authority. They simply allow the TWG to pull the relevant vault tokens from the Treasury as needed to manage and unwind them appropriately. ## On-Chain Actions Grant the following allowances to the TWG: * 3,454 of yvCurve-deUSD/DOLA-f * 1,805 of yvCurve-dola-save-f * 100,000 of yvCurve-DOLA-sUSDe-f * 50,000 of yvCurve-DOLA-sUSDS-f * 18,382 of yvCurve-DOLA/USR-f * 5,000 yvCurve-reusdsdola-f * 5,000 of yvCurve-savedola-f * 4,695 of yvCurve-DOLAwstUSR-f * 199,290 of ysUSDS
# Increase sUSDe LP Daily Borrow Limits and Reduce wstUSR LP Market Ceilings on FiRM Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/increase-susde-lp-daily-borrow-limits-and-reduce-wstusr-lp-market-ceilings-on-firm/652 ## Summary This proposal seeks to adjust parameters across four FiRM markets to better align DOLA issuance capacity with the current risk picture. For the sUSDe LP markets (DOLA/sUSDe and yv-DOLA/sUSDe), daily borrow limits are raised from 2M to 5M DOLA each, reflecting sustained high demand and the improved risk posture established by January's [FeedSwitch v2 deployment](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/344). For the wstUSR LP markets (DOLA/wstUSR and yv-DOLA/wstUSR), supply ceilings are reduced from 40M to 25M DOLA and from 10M to 5M DOLA respectively, and the daily borrow limit on the primary market is reduced from 5M to 2M DOLA, reflecting the RWG's monitoring-only conclusion on USR following an extended reassessment. These changes collectively represent a risk-adjusted reallocation of DOLA issuance capacity; expanding where the evidence supports it, and right-sizing where caution is warranted. ## Background and Rationale ### sUSDe LP Markets The DOLA/sUSDe and yv-DOLA/sUSDe markets have consistently been among FiRM's highest-utilization markets. In January 2026, the community approved a comprehensive sUSDe LP parameter update that raised the collateral factor to 92%, reduced the liquidation incentive to 4%, set a minimum debt floor of 5,000 DOLA, and activated FeedSwitch v2 across both markets. That update meaningfully strengthened the risk architecture of these markets. FeedSwitch v2 introduced oracle fallback logic tied to observable, objective Ethena health indicators, providing borrowers a layer of protection during market anomalies and stress scenarios. Since that proposal passed, borrower demand has continued to grow. The current daily borrow limit of 2M DOLA per market constrains legitimate borrowing activity without providing meaningful additional risk protection given the collateral's fundamentals. Raising the daily borrow limit to 5M DOLA per market gives these markets room to accommodate growth while the per-market supply ceiling and the inherent liquidity depth of the underlying collateral continue to act as the binding risk constraints. ### wstUSR LP Markets The wstUSR LP markets have been under active monitoring since launch. The RWG has been conducting ongoing due diligence on the Resolv ecosystem; tracking USR's collateral composition, collateralization ratio, redemption infrastructure, and liquidity depth through the weekly Risk Observer Checklist and a dedicated FiRM x USR Risk Dashboard. That body of work, now spanning well over a year of continuous data, has led to a monitoring-only conclusion for new USR exposure. The wstUSR LP parameter adjustments in this proposal reflect that conclusion and bring existing governance caps into alignment with what our risk framework actually supports. Reducing the DOLA/wstUSR supply ceiling from 40M to 25M DOLA and the yv-DOLA/wstUSR ceiling from 10M to 5M DOLA brings total combined ceiling capacity to 30M DOLA; comfortably within the stress model ceiling. Reducing the daily borrow limit on the primary market from 5M to 2M DOLA aligns with the same posture and reduces the rate at which new DOLA exposure can accumulate. Total current DOLA debt across both wstUSR LP markets is approximately $13.1M, well below both the existing and proposed ceilings and no active borrowers are affected by this change. These adjustments are a governance hygiene measure that corrects a parameter overhang relative to the RWG's actual risk assessment, without disrupting any live positions. ## Actions 1. Set Daily Borrow Limit to 5,000,000 DOLA for the DOLA/sUSDe market 2. Set Daily Borrow Limit to 5,000,000 DOLA for the yv-DOLA/sUSDe market 3. Set Supply Ceiling to 25,000,000 DOLA for the DOLA/wstUSR market 4. Set Daily Borrow Limit to 2,000,000 DOLA for the DOLA/wstUSR market 5. Set Supply Ceiling to 5,000,000 DOLA for the yv-DOLA/wstUSR market
# wBTC Market Oracle Update & Unpause Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/wbtc-market-oracle-update-unpause/644 ## Summary This proposal corrects the wBTC FiRM market oracle feed configuration and resumes market operations. ## Background A configuration error was identified in the wBTC price feed deployment. The `_bridgeAssetDenominator` constructor argument was incorrectly set, which would have caused incorrect price derivation during a significant WBTC/BTC dislocation event. The market was paused as a precaution upon discovery. A corrected feed has been deployed and tested: - New feed: `0xd66b3f73bd85dfb52d01e5ef56db29b75730b3dc` No user funds were affected. The misconfiguration would only have posed risk in the event of a substantial WBTC/BTC depeg, which did not occur. ## Proposed Actions 1. Set wBTC market oracle to corrected feed 2. Unpause wBTC market ## Impact Borrowers may observe slight health factor adjustments reflecting current WBTC/BTC pricing. No user action required. ## On-Chain Actions - Set wBTC market feed with correct decimals - Unpause market borrows
# wBTC Market Oracle Update & Unpause Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/wbtc-market-oracle-update-unpause/644 ## Summary This proposal corrects the wBTC FiRM market oracle feed configuration and resumes market operations. ## Background A configuration error was identified in the wBTC price feed deployment. The `_bridgeAssetDenominator` constructor argument was incorrectly set, which would have caused incorrect price derivation during a significant WBTC/BTC dislocation event. The market was paused as a precaution upon discovery. A corrected feed has been deployed and tested: - New feed: `0xd66b3f73bd85dfb52d01e5ef56db29b75730b3dc` No user funds were affected. The misconfiguration would only have posed risk in the event of a substantial WBTC/BTC depeg, which did not occur. ## Proposed Actions 1. Set wBTC market oracle to corrected feed 2. Unpause wBTC market ## Impact Borrowers may observe slight health factor adjustments reflecting current WBTC/BTC pricing. No user action required. ## On-Chain Actions - Set wBTC market feed with correct decimals - Unpause market borrows
# Offboarding Inverse Contributor Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/offboarding-inverse-contributor/643 It is with deep sadness that we share that the Inverse Finance team has recently received confirmation of the passing of a valued contributor. This news has been verified in communication with the contributor’s family. Tabboz was a thoughtful and dedicated builder whose work contributed meaningfully to the Inverse ecosystem. Beyond his technical contributions, he was a kind and collaborative presence within the team, and he will be deeply missed by everyone who had the privilege of working alongside him. Our thoughts and heartfelt condolences are with his family and loved ones during this incredibly difficult time. In light of these circumstances, this proposal seeks to carry out the necessary operational updates to ensure DAO payroll and vesting systems are properly maintained. This proposal is strictly administrative in nature and does not preclude separate discussions regarding additional gestures of support or recognition from the DAO toward the contributor’s family. ### On-Chain Actions * Remove Tabboz from active payroll streams
# Proposal to Sunset crvUSD-LP FiRM Markets Pending Demonstrated crvUSD Stability Under Yield Basis Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/proposal-to-sunset-crvusd-lp-firm-markets-pending-demonstrated-crvusd-stability-under-yield-basis/641 ## Summary This proposal initiates a phased collateral factor reduction and liquidation incentive increase across crvUSD-LP FiRM markets along with setting market ceilings to 0 in order to facilitate complete market wind-down and strengthen protocol resilience against ongoing crvUSD volatility and emerging infrastructure concerns. Until there is clear definition of credit line limits and demonstrated crvUSD stability under the new Yield Basis-dominated operational model, this adjustment represents a measured risk mitigation while preserving market functionality for existing borrowers. ## Motivation Recent market volatility has exposed structural pressures on crvUSD's peg stability mechanism, driven primarily by Yield Basis's rapid scaling and associated deleveraging dynamics. Concurrent observations of infrastructure stress during peak volatility periods have reinforced the need for proactive risk management measures to protect DOLA holders from potential contagion effects. This proposal revisits the strategic direction initially proposed in [Proposal 324](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/324) and subsequently remediated through [Proposal 328](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/328), now with additional urgency warranted by material changes in the crvUSD risk landscape since those governance actions. ## Background & Rationale In October 2025, the Risk Working Group identified emerging systemic risks associated with crvUSD's integration with Yield Basis and proposed market deprecation through [Proposal 324](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/324). That proposal sought to pause new borrows and wind down exposure across crvUSD-LP markets. When Proposal 324 did not pass governance, the TWG implemented a remediation strategy through [Proposal 328](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/328), which maintained market operations while deploying a hedge position to offset FiRM's crvUSD collateral exposure. The hedge strategy involved establishing a levered short position against crvUSD on Curve Lend, creating a mechanism to profit from crvUSD depreciation events. While this hedge has performed as designed during recent volatility, it does not constitute a complete risk transfer and leaves the protocol exposed to certain failure modes, particularly those involving oracle infrastructure or rapid price movements. ### Current Risk Environment Since the implementation of [Proposal 328](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/328), several developments have materially elevated the risk profile of crvUSD exposure: * **PegKeeper Ammo**: Curve's PegKeeper system - the automated liquidity provision mechanism designed to defend crvUSD's peg during stress events - became completely depleted and remains at zero capacity. PegKeepers operate identically to Inverse's Fed mechanism: they expand liquidity into AMM pools during normal conditions and contract during depeg events to restore parity. The depletion of this primary defense layer represents a fundamental shift in crvUSD's stability profile. * **Outstanding crvUSD Borrows**: With PegKeepers exhausted, crvUSD's peg defense now relies entirely on the secondary mechanism: borrowers repaying crvUSD debt against hard-coded $1.00 valuations. When crvUSD depegs, borrowers can profitably purchase discounted crvUSD from the market and repay their loans, removing supply and supporting the peg. The system incentivizes this behavior by raising variable borrow rates. During last week's volatility, crvUSD variable rates spiked to 300% while crvUSD traded at $0.965, creating obvious arbitrage profits for borrowers. Borrows declined from 74M to 30M (a 60% reduction). This 25M represents the final defensive capacity available. Once exhausted through liquidations or repayments, no systematic peg defense mechanism remains operational. * **Oracle Reliability**: During the February 6th market stress event, we observed block inclusion anomalies in the crvUSD-USD price feed consistent with conditions we have documented in past high-stress liquidation environments. Low liquidity coupled with high gas costs strains the liquidation route and opens the door to price feed update block inclusion issues, which in past instances have resulted in bundled negative price movements that exceeded our liquidation incentive buffer and resulted in protocol losses. Another market drawdown of equal or greater magnitude, particularly in an environment where PegKeeper capacity is depleted and crvUSD liquidity is fragmented across pools, creates conditions where these same dynamics could manifest more severely at precisely the moment when liquidation reliability is most critical. * **Yield Basis Credit Line Expansion**: Yield Basis's crvUSD credit line has expanded from an initial 60M proposal to the current 1B allocation, with the founder [proposing](https://forum.yieldbasis.com/t/how-to-scale-yield-basis-and-crvusd-at-the-same-time/27) a further 10x increase alongside a complete liquidity migration to optimize pool mechanics under new Curve code. This open-ended expansion trajectory prevents reliable risk assessment. Each credit line increase or migration represents a structural modification to crvUSD's operational dynamics and stress behavior. Until Yield Basis demonstrates it can maintain stability under sustained market-wide volatility at its current scale, and until clear maximum credit line limits are established through governance, we cannot predict how crvUSD will behave during future stress events or establish appropriate risk parameters for our markets. The fundamental issue is that crvUSD has transitioned from a stablecoin with understood peg defense mechanisms and predictable behavior to one whose stability depends on the experimental scaling of Yield Basis infrastructure. Given our protocol's commitment to DOLA health as the paramount objective, the RWG has determined that collateral factor reductions represent a prudent risk management action at this juncture. ## On-Chain Actions The following adjustments are proposed across the two crvUSD-LP FiRM markets: * CF from 90% to 87.5% * LI from 5% to 6.5% * Market Ceiling to 0 DOLA
# Proposal to Enable FiRM Market Coverage for jrDOLA Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/proposal-to-enable-firm-market-coverage-for-jrdola/639 ## Summary This proposal authorizes the Junior Tranche (jrDOLA) system to provide bad debt coverage for existing FiRM lending markets. All markets will be added simultaneously to the FiRMSlashingModule, subject to the mandatory activation delay period for security. This proposal is designed to execute in parallel with the jrDOLA Launch Proposal, ensuring the insurance mechanism becomes operational immediately upon both proposals passing. ## Background The jrDOLA Launch Proposal configures the core parameters and reward budget for the Junior Tranche system. However, that proposal intentionally excludes FiRM market additions to maintain clean separation of concerns: * Launch Proposal: Sets operational parameters, deploys infrastructure, allocates DBR budget * This Proposal: Connects jrDOLA to actual FiRM markets requiring bad debt protection As of this proposal, FiRM operates 20 active lending markets across diverse collateral types. Each market represents potential bad debt exposure that currently impacts DOLA backing directly. jrDOLA creates a buffer layer, absorbing losses before they affect core protocol reserves. ## Coverage Strategy Rationale for comprehensive coverage: 1. Simplicity: Depositors don't need to evaluate which markets are/aren't covered. Coverage is uniform across FiRM, making the value proposition clear. 2. Fair treatment: All FiRM markets benefit from DOLA liquidity. All markets should contribute to (and benefit from) bad debt insurance. 3. Administrative efficiency: Avoid ongoing governance overhead of individual market evaluations. The activation delay and guardian cancellation provide sufficient safeguards. Each market added through this and any future proposal enters a 7-day timelock period before jrDOLA begins covering its bad debt. While in this initiation stage this serves little purpose, in general this delay is designed to: * Gives guardian multisig time to cancel problematic additions if discovered * Prevents zero-day exploits where attacker adds market and immediately creates bad debt * Provides buffer for depositors to exit if they disagree with market additions If and when a FiRM position in a covered market becomes insolvent: 1. Detection: Anyone observes position where debt > collateral value (via oracles) 2. Eligibility check: * Market is active in FiRMSlashingModule (activation delay passed) * Position collateral value < maxCollateralValue (prevents oracle manipulation) * Position debt > minDebt (prevents dust spam) 3. Execution: Permissionless call to slash(market, borrower) 4. Repayment: jrDOLA vault repays bad debt to FiRM market 5. Loss socialization: All jrDOLA depositors absorb loss pro-rata (share value decreases equally) ## Markets to be Added The following FiRM markets will be added to jrDOLA coverage upon execution of this proposal: |Market|Current Borrows (MM) (as of Jan 25th)| | --- | --- | |[sUSDe-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb427fC22561f3963B04202F9bb5BCEbd76c14A99)|71.79| |[wstUSR-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe4D47Ef77AC2C3FA4019Cd169Ac1Dd9E27cb12E4)|32.21| |[yv-sUSDe-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4E264618dC015219CD83dbc53B31251D73c2db1a)|11.14| |[sUSDS-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD68d3a44d46dd50BFeBa8Cca544717B76e7C4b29)|5.65| |[sUSDe](https://etherscan.io/address/0x79eF6d28C41e47A588E2F2ffB4140Eb6d952AEc4)|2.39| |[yv-wstUSR-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x28684485369f7478f42aAA62660123AB5D573537)|1.95| |[scrvUSD-sDOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x63D27fC9d463Ed727676367D3F818999962737E8)|1.39| |[cvxCRV](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3474ad0e3a9775c9F68B415A7a9880B0CAB9397a)|1.22| |[wstETH](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3FD3daBB9F9480621C8A111603D3Ba70F17550BC)|0.58| |[INV](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb516247596Ca36bf32876199FBdCaD6B3322330B)|0.49| |[yv-sUSDS-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4A33baFA8a31E4ec9649f65646022cAD1957808b)|0.39| |[wBTC](https://etherscan.io/address/0x48BA574Edf0bc4E2E40B529863aaA6a67c264E7C)|0.28| |[st-yCRV](https://etherscan.io/address/0x27b6c301Fd441f3345d61B7a4245E1F823c3F9c4)|0.16| |[CVX](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdc2265cBD15beD67b5F2c0B82e23FcE4a07ddF6b)|0.13| |[cbBTC](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2A256306D8ba899E33B01e495982656884Ac77FF)|0.07| |[yv-scrvUSD-sDOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb8bc1E9c0a2d445bc39d2A745F47619E954dD565)|0.03| |[wETH](https://etherscan.io/address/0x63Df5e23Db45a2066508318f172bA45B9CD37035)|0.01| |[yv-USR-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC0086Ff652c67f43F00F0F9C69Ef6c33640C8cCF)|0| |[CRV](https://etherscan.io/address/0x63fAd99705a255fE2D500e498dbb3A9aE5AA1Ee8)|0| |[USR-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3Ac5CEbC7A417DB619B85660E4f284f5643DFd5e)|0| ## On-Chain Actions - Call allowedMarkets for all 20 markets in the FiRM Slashing Module contract
# Proposal to Launch jrDOLA with Initial DBR Reward Budget Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/proposal-to-launch-jrdola-with-initial-dbr-reward-budget/637 ## Summary This proposal authorizes the launch of the Junior Tranche system (jrDOLA) following successful completion of two comprehensive security audits. The proposal sets initial operational parameters and allocates a DBR reward budget to bootstrap liquidity through an initial measured approach. A follow up proposal will set out to enable FiRM market coverage, pending governance approval. ## Background jrDOLA introduces a market-driven insurance layer that addresses a fundamental limitation in Inverse Finance's current risk model. As FiRM continues to scale, the protocol absorbs all bad debt directly into DOLA backing, creating concentration risk that constrains growth potential. This model works adequately at current scale but becomes increasingly fragile as total debt exposure grows. jrDOLA solves this by creating a first-loss capital buffer where depositors voluntarily accept bad debt risk in exchange for yield. If and when FiRM positions become insolvent, the slashing mechanism automatically draws from jrDOLA deposits to repay bad debt before it impacts DOLA backing. This achieves several strategic objectives. First, it protects DOLA solvency by establishing a dedicated bad debt absorption layer. Second, it enables protocol scaling with reduced systemic risk exposure. Third, it provides DOLA holders with a new yield-generating product that earns both sDOLA base yield and DBR rewards. Finally, it establishes automated, permissionless bad debt resolution that requires no manual governance action during stress events. The system is designed for composability and future expansion. While this initial launch intends to cover FiRM markets, the modular architecture allows governance to add coverage for additional markets and protocols such as the PSM or future Fed deployments without requiring contract redeployment or migration. The jrDOLA codebase has undergone rigorous security scrutiny through a dual-audit process with Sherlock. The first phase consisted of a private audit conducted with specialized security researchers Hash and Osidian, who focused on ERC-4626 vault mechanics, slashing logic, and withdrawal queue edge cases. All identified issues were addressed prior to the second phase, a public audit contest open to Sherlock's broader security researcher community. The final reports for both are posted for public viewing [here](https://docs.inverse.finance/risk-working-group-digest/prevention/audits). Additionally, Sherlock Shield provides 200,000 USDC in exploit insurance coverage for the first month post-deployment, offering an additional layer of financial protection during the critical early launch period. ## Technical Implementation ### Deployed Contracts The jrDOLA system consists of four core contracts deployed to Ethereum mainnet: JuniorDola (jrDOLA) — [0x633821b8e003344e5223509277f2084ea809a452](https://etherscan.io/address/0x633821b8e003344e5223509277f2084ea809a452) The main ERC-4626 vault representing user deposits. All deposits are in sDOLA to provide a base yield layer. The contract integrates an xy=k auction mechanism that converts DBR rewards into DOLA-denominated yield, allowing depositors to earn returns without directly holding or managing DBR tokens. WithdrawalEscrow — [0x3912365Cc44309c99743597F9d18c6CB946Ab5f0](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3912365Cc44309c99743597F9d18c6CB946Ab5f0) Manages the delayed withdrawal queue. This contract is intentionally immutable to protect user interests. Once a withdrawal is queued, the cooldown duration and exit window parameters are locked and cannot be altered by governance. Users continue earning rewards during cooldown since their funds remain slashable. LinearInterpolationDelayModel — [0x3b1E443aB423c9A7B1B2EA7b3cB7c0be012a4FbF](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3b1E443aB423c9A7B1B2EA7b3cB7c0be012a4FbF) Calculates withdrawal delays based on queue utilization. Uses linear interpolation between minimum delay (when queue is empty) and maximum delay (at governance-defined threshold). The contract is upgradeable by governance, but active withdrawals continue using the delay parameters from their queue time. FiRMSlashingModule — [0x9c0e166052d69d6f46422525e1f75d4a8f295423](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9c0e166052d69d6f46422525e1f75d4a8f295423) Implements the permissionless slashing mechanism for FiRM bad debt. Anyone can call the slashing function when a position becomes insolvent. Protective parameters include: * maxCollateralValue: Prevents slashing positions with significant collateral, forcing liquidators to handle those first * minDebt: Prevents dust positions from spamming slashing events * activationDelay: Requires newly added markets to wait before becoming eligible for coverage A guardian multisig can cancel pending market additions during the delay window. Helper — [0xe0db3f30c96e272c5ef7dfe3d30272bd2ae3d3cf](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe0db3f30c96e272c5ef7dfe3d30272bd2ae3d3cf) Implements helper functions for interacting with the DBR auction in the JuniorDola contract. ### Initial Parameters JuniorDola: * dbrReserve: [1,000,000e18] DBR — virtual reserves for xy=k auction * dolaReserve: [37,930e18] sDOLA — virtual reserves for xy=k auction * yearlyRewardBudget: [500,000] DBR — initial annual allocation (operator-controlled) * maxYearlyRewardBudget: [10,000,000] DBR — governance ceiling * operator: Treasury Working Group multisig WithdrawalEscrow: * withdrawFee: [5] bps — creates friction against cycling behavior; paid to remaining depositors * exitWindow: [48] hours — time to claim withdrawal after cooldown completes LinearInterpolationDelayModel: * minDelay: [1] day — minimum withdrawal delay when queue is empty * maxDelay: [7] days — applies when queue utilization reaches threshold * maxDelayThreshold: [10000] bps — e.g., 5,000 bps (50%) means delay scales linearly from min to max as queue fills from 0% to 50% FiRMSlashingModule: * maxCollateralValue: [$100] — positions above this must be liquidated normally * minDebt: [$5] — minimum debt for slashing eligibility * activationDelay: [7] days — review window for new market additions * guardian: Policy Committee multisig These parameters are calibrated for initial launch with conservative assumptions about deposit behavior and queue dynamics. Once TVL scales and usage patterns stabilize, a follow-up proposal intends to transition toward more capital-efficient settings including lower utilization thresholds for delay activation and extended maximum delay periods. ### Governance Controls Governance CAN: * Add or remove FiRM markets for coverage (new markets subject to activation delay) * Increase the maxYearlyRewardBudget ceiling * Replace the LinearInterpolationDelayModel contract * Adjust FiRMSlashingModule parameters * Change the guardian address Governance CANNOT: * Pause withdrawals or interfere with the active withdrawal queue * Change withdrawal terms for users already in queue * Access deposited funds except through legitimate slashing * Bypass market activation delays Operator (TWG multisig) CAN: * Adjust yearlyRewardBudget within the governance-set ceiling Operator CANNOT: * Exceed the governance-approved ceiling * Access deposited funds * Modify withdrawal or slashing parameters Guardian CAN: * Remove markets from slashing protection before the activation period has elapsed. Guardian CANNOT: * Interfere with operations of actively protected markets. ### Operational Mechanics #### For Depositors Depositing into jrDOLA follows standard ERC-4626 vault interactions. Users approve sDOLA to the jrDOLA contract and call either deposit(amount, receiver) or mint(shares, receiver) depending on whether they prefer to specify deposit amount or desired shares. Upon deposit, users receive jrDOLA shares representing their proportional claim on the vault. Additionally, depositors begin earning DBR rewards distributed through the xy=k auction mechanism, which automatically converts DBR into DOLA-denominated yield without requiring direct DBR interaction. Withdrawing requires a multi-step process designed to provide security during periods of stress while maintaining reasonable user experience during normal operations. Users first call queueWithdrawal(shares) to enter the withdrawal queue. At this moment, the system snapshots their withdrawal parameters including cooldown duration and exit window timing, and applies the withdrawal fee, which is distributed to remaining depositors. Users then wait for the cooldown period, which ranges from the minimum delay to maximum delay based on current queue utilization as calculated by the LinearInterpolationDelayModel. During this cooldown, users continue earning rewards since their funds remain in the vault and continue to provide slashable insurance coverage. After the cooldown completes, users enter their exit window during which they can claim their withdrawal by calling the claim function. Users receive sDOLA representing their original deposit plus all accrued yield, minus any slashing events that occurred while they were deposited, minus the withdrawal fee. Users can also cancel their withdrawal during the cooldown period and return to the active depositor pool. #### For the Protocol Reward distribution operates through an ongoing auction mechanism integrated into the jrDOLA contract. The protocol allocates DBR to the jrDOLA contract according to the yearlyRewardBudget parameter controlled by the operator within governance-set limits. These DBR tokens enter an xy=k constant product market maker with virtual DOLA reserves, creating a permissionless auction where anyone can swap sDOLA for DBR. This increases the vault's total assets without changing the share supply, causing the sDOLA-per-share exchange rate to increase. Depositors thus earn DOLA-denominated yield without ever directly interacting with DBR tokens. The auction mechanism provides continuous price discovery and automatically adjusts reward distribution based on DBR market dynamics. The bad debt coverage mechanism operates through a permissionless slashing process. When a FiRM position becomes insolvent such that the debt value exceeds collateral value based on oracle pricing, anyone can call slash(market, borrower) on the FiRMSlashingModule contract. The module first verifies that the position is legitimately insolvent by checking current debt and collateral values. It then applies protective checks, ensuring the position's collateral value is below maxCollateralValue to prevent slashing positions that should be liquidated through normal mechanisms, and ensuring debt exceeds minDebt to avoid processing economically insignificant positions. If all checks pass, the module calculates the required DOLA amount needed to bring the position's debt-to-collateral ratio back to parity. It then triggers a pro-rata slash against the jrDOLA vault, where all depositors' share values decrease proportionally to socialize the loss. The recovered DOLA is used to repay the bad debt in the FiRM market, removing the insolvency. This protects DOLA backing by absorbing bad debt into jrDOLA before it impacts core protocol reserves. ## Budget Request The budget operates within a controlled structure. The maxYearlyRewardBudget parameter of 10,000,000 DBR represents a governance-enforced ceiling that can only be increased through full governance proposals. Within this ceiling, the yearlyRewardBudget parameter of 500,000 DBR represents the initial active budget upon approval of this proposal. This amount is controlled by the operator (Treasury Working Group multisig) and can be adjusted up to the governance ceiling without requiring additional votes, enabling responsive adjustment to market conditions while maintaining ultimate governance control. The initial budget request was calibrated through analysis of comparable insurance mechanisms in DeFi, modeling of depositor yield requirements given FiRM's historical bad debt frequency and severity, and assessment of total DBR availability relative to competing uses across the protocol ecosystem. ## On-Chain Actions - jrDOLA (setOperator, initialize, setSlashingModule, setYearlyRewardBudget, setMaxYearlyRewardBudget) - WithdrawalEscrow (initialize, withdrawFee, exitWindow) - LinearInterpolationDelayModel (setMinDelay, setMaxDelay, setMaxDelayThresholdBps) - FiRMSlashingModule (setGuardian, setMaxCollateralValue, setMinDebt, setActivationDelay) - DBR (addMinter)
# Proposal to Enable FiRM Market Coverage for jrDOLA Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/proposal-to-enable-firm-market-coverage-for-jrdola/639 ## Summary This proposal authorizes the Junior Tranche (jrDOLA) system to provide bad debt coverage for existing FiRM lending markets. All markets will be added simultaneously to the FiRMSlashingModule, subject to the mandatory activation delay period for security. This proposal is designed to execute in parallel with the jrDOLA Launch Proposal, ensuring the insurance mechanism becomes operational immediately upon both proposals passing. ## Background The jrDOLA Launch Proposal configures the core parameters and reward budget for the Junior Tranche system. However, that proposal intentionally excludes FiRM market additions to maintain clean separation of concerns: * Launch Proposal: Sets operational parameters, deploys infrastructure, allocates DBR budget * This Proposal: Connects jrDOLA to actual FiRM markets requiring bad debt protection As of this proposal, FiRM operates 20 active lending markets across diverse collateral types. Each market represents potential bad debt exposure that currently impacts DOLA backing directly. jrDOLA creates a buffer layer, absorbing losses before they affect core protocol reserves. ## Coverage Strategy Rationale for comprehensive coverage: 1. Simplicity: Depositors don't need to evaluate which markets are/aren't covered. Coverage is uniform across FiRM, making the value proposition clear. 2. Fair treatment: All FiRM markets benefit from DOLA liquidity. All markets should contribute to (and benefit from) bad debt insurance. 3. Administrative efficiency: Avoid ongoing governance overhead of individual market evaluations. The activation delay and guardian cancellation provide sufficient safeguards. Each market added through this and any future proposal enters a 7-day timelock period before jrDOLA begins covering its bad debt. While in this initiation stage this serves little purpose, in general this delay is designed to: * Gives guardian multisig time to cancel problematic additions if discovered * Prevents zero-day exploits where attacker adds market and immediately creates bad debt * Provides buffer for depositors to exit if they disagree with market additions If and when a FiRM position in a covered market becomes insolvent: 1. Detection: Anyone observes position where debt > collateral value (via oracles) 2. Eligibility check: * Market is active in FiRMSlashingModule (activation delay passed) * Position collateral value < maxCollateralValue (prevents oracle manipulation) * Position debt > minDebt (prevents dust spam) 3. Execution: Permissionless call to slash(market, borrower) 4. Repayment: jrDOLA vault repays bad debt to FiRM market 5. Loss socialization: All jrDOLA depositors absorb loss pro-rata (share value decreases equally) ## Markets to be Added The following FiRM markets will be added to jrDOLA coverage upon execution of this proposal: |Market|Current Borrows (MM) (as of Jan 25th)| | --- | --- | |[sUSDe-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb427fC22561f3963B04202F9bb5BCEbd76c14A99)|71.79| |[wstUSR-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe4D47Ef77AC2C3FA4019Cd169Ac1Dd9E27cb12E4)|32.21| |[yv-sUSDe-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4E264618dC015219CD83dbc53B31251D73c2db1a)|11.14| |[sUSDS-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD68d3a44d46dd50BFeBa8Cca544717B76e7C4b29)|5.65| |[sUSDe](https://etherscan.io/address/0x79eF6d28C41e47A588E2F2ffB4140Eb6d952AEc4)|2.39| |[yv-wstUSR-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x28684485369f7478f42aAA62660123AB5D573537)|1.95| |[scrvUSD-sDOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x63D27fC9d463Ed727676367D3F818999962737E8)|1.39| |[cvxCRV](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3474ad0e3a9775c9F68B415A7a9880B0CAB9397a)|1.22| |[wstETH](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3FD3daBB9F9480621C8A111603D3Ba70F17550BC)|0.58| |[INV](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb516247596Ca36bf32876199FBdCaD6B3322330B)|0.49| |[yv-sUSDS-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4A33baFA8a31E4ec9649f65646022cAD1957808b)|0.39| |[wBTC](https://etherscan.io/address/0x48BA574Edf0bc4E2E40B529863aaA6a67c264E7C)|0.28| |[st-yCRV](https://etherscan.io/address/0x27b6c301Fd441f3345d61B7a4245E1F823c3F9c4)|0.16| |[CVX](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdc2265cBD15beD67b5F2c0B82e23FcE4a07ddF6b)|0.13| |[cbBTC](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2A256306D8ba899E33B01e495982656884Ac77FF)|0.07| |[yv-scrvUSD-sDOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb8bc1E9c0a2d445bc39d2A745F47619E954dD565)|0.03| |[wETH](https://etherscan.io/address/0x63Df5e23Db45a2066508318f172bA45B9CD37035)|0.01| |[yv-USR-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC0086Ff652c67f43F00F0F9C69Ef6c33640C8cCF)|0| |[CRV](https://etherscan.io/address/0x63fAd99705a255fE2D500e498dbb3A9aE5AA1Ee8)|0| |[USR-DOLA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3Ac5CEbC7A417DB619B85660E4f284f5643DFd5e)|0| ## On-Chain Actions - Call allowedMarkets for all 20 markets in the FiRM Slashing Module contract
# Proposal to Launch jrDOLA with Initial DBR Reward Budget Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/proposal-to-launch-jrdola-with-initial-dbr-reward-budget/637 ## Summary This proposal authorizes the launch of the Junior Tranche system (jrDOLA) following successful completion of two comprehensive security audits. The proposal sets initial operational parameters and allocates a DBR reward budget to bootstrap liquidity through an initial measured approach. A follow up proposal will set out to enable FiRM market coverage, pending governance approval. ## Background jrDOLA introduces a market-driven insurance layer that addresses a fundamental limitation in Inverse Finance's current risk model. As FiRM continues to scale, the protocol absorbs all bad debt directly into DOLA backing, creating concentration risk that constrains growth potential. This model works adequately at current scale but becomes increasingly fragile as total debt exposure grows. jrDOLA solves this by creating a first-loss capital buffer where depositors voluntarily accept bad debt risk in exchange for yield. If and when FiRM positions become insolvent, the slashing mechanism automatically draws from jrDOLA deposits to repay bad debt before it impacts DOLA backing. This achieves several strategic objectives. First, it protects DOLA solvency by establishing a dedicated bad debt absorption layer. Second, it enables protocol scaling with reduced systemic risk exposure. Third, it provides DOLA holders with a new yield-generating product that earns both sDOLA base yield and DBR rewards. Finally, it establishes automated, permissionless bad debt resolution that requires no manual governance action during stress events. The system is designed for composability and future expansion. While this initial launch intends to cover FiRM markets, the modular architecture allows governance to add coverage for additional markets and protocols such as the PSM or future Fed deployments without requiring contract redeployment or migration. The jrDOLA codebase has undergone rigorous security scrutiny through a dual-audit process with Sherlock. The first phase consisted of a private audit conducted with specialized security researchers Hash and Osidian, who focused on ERC-4626 vault mechanics, slashing logic, and withdrawal queue edge cases. All identified issues were addressed prior to the second phase, a public audit contest open to Sherlock's broader security researcher community. The final reports for both are posted for public viewing [here](https://docs.inverse.finance/risk-working-group-digest/prevention/audits). Additionally, Sherlock Shield provides 200,000 USDC in exploit insurance coverage for the first month post-deployment, offering an additional layer of financial protection during the critical early launch period. ## Technical Implementation ### Deployed Contracts The jrDOLA system consists of four core contracts deployed to Ethereum mainnet: JuniorDola (jrDOLA) — [0xf4307a1354c0463812b3ce0f509c227f5cd1ccfd](https://etherscan.io/address/0xf4307a1354c0463812b3ce0f509c227f5cd1ccfd) The main ERC-4626 vault representing user deposits. All deposits are in sDOLA to provide a base yield layer. The contract integrates an xy=k auction mechanism that converts DBR rewards into DOLA-denominated yield, allowing depositors to earn returns without directly holding or managing DBR tokens. WithdrawalEscrow — [0x3912365cc44309c99743597f9d18c6cb946ab5f0](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3912365cc44309c99743597f9d18c6cb946ab5f0) Manages the delayed withdrawal queue. This contract is intentionally immutable to protect user interests. Once a withdrawal is queued, the cooldown duration and exit window parameters are locked and cannot be altered by governance. Users continue earning rewards during cooldown since their funds remain slashable. LinearInterpolationDelayModel — [0x3b1e443ab423c9a7b1b2ea7b3cb7c0be012a4fbf](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3b1e443ab423c9a7b1b2ea7b3cb7c0be012a4fbf) Calculates withdrawal delays based on queue utilization. Uses linear interpolation between minimum delay (when queue is empty) and maximum delay (at governance-defined threshold). The contract is upgradeable by governance, but active withdrawals continue using the delay parameters from their queue time. FiRMSlashingModule — [0x6d27dd57a7dbf5b27a3fcabd75c916ac765a346c](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6d27dd57a7dbf5b27a3fcabd75c916ac765a346c) Implements the permissionless slashing mechanism for FiRM bad debt. Anyone can call the slashing function when a position becomes insolvent. Protective parameters include: * maxCollateralValue: Prevents slashing positions with significant collateral, forcing liquidators to handle those first * minDebt: Prevents dust positions from spamming slashing events * activationDelay: Requires newly added markets to wait before becoming eligible for coverage A guardian multisig can cancel pending market additions during the delay window. Helper — [0x93c0610b258e42c43544e74cfc1efec8c1f5459b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x93c0610b258e42c43544e74cfc1efec8c1f5459b) Implements helper functions for interacting with the DBR auction in the JuniorDola contract. ### Initial Parameters JuniorDola: * dbrReserve: [1,000,000e18] DBR — virtual reserves for xy=k auction * dolaReserve: [37,930e18] sDOLA — virtual reserves for xy=k auction * yearlyRewardBudget: [500,000] DBR — initial annual allocation (operator-controlled) * maxYearlyRewardBudget: [10,000,000] DBR — governance ceiling * operator: Treasury Working Group multisig WithdrawalEscrow: * withdrawFee: [5] bps — creates friction against cycling behavior; paid to remaining depositors * exitWindow: [48] hours — time to claim withdrawal after cooldown completes LinearInterpolationDelayModel: * minDelay: [1] day — minimum withdrawal delay when queue is empty * maxDelay: [7] days — applies when queue utilization reaches threshold * maxDelayThreshold: [10000] bps — e.g., 5,000 bps (50%) means delay scales linearly from min to max as queue fills from 0% to 50% FiRMSlashingModule: * maxCollateralValue: [$100] — positions above this must be liquidated normally * minDebt: [$5] — minimum debt for slashing eligibility * activationDelay: [7] days — review window for new market additions * guardian: Policy Committee multisig These parameters are calibrated for initial launch with conservative assumptions about deposit behavior and queue dynamics. Once TVL scales and usage patterns stabilize, a follow-up proposal intends to transition toward more capital-efficient settings including lower utilization thresholds for delay activation and extended maximum delay periods. ### Governance Controls Governance CAN: * Add or remove FiRM markets for coverage (new markets subject to activation delay) * Increase the maxYearlyRewardBudget ceiling * Replace the LinearInterpolationDelayModel contract * Adjust FiRMSlashingModule parameters * Change the guardian address Governance CANNOT: * Pause withdrawals or interfere with the active withdrawal queue * Change withdrawal terms for users already in queue * Access deposited funds except through legitimate slashing * Bypass market activation delays Operator (TWG multisig) CAN: * Adjust yearlyRewardBudget within the governance-set ceiling Operator CANNOT: * Exceed the governance-approved ceiling * Access deposited funds * Modify withdrawal or slashing parameters Guardian CAN: * Remove markets from slashing protection before the activation period has elapsed. Guardian CANNOT: * Interfere with operations of actively protected markets. ### Operational Mechanics #### For Depositors Depositing into jrDOLA follows standard ERC-4626 vault interactions. Users approve sDOLA to the jrDOLA contract and call either deposit(amount, receiver) or mint(shares, receiver) depending on whether they prefer to specify deposit amount or desired shares. Upon deposit, users receive jrDOLA shares representing their proportional claim on the vault. Additionally, depositors begin earning DBR rewards distributed through the xy=k auction mechanism, which automatically converts DBR into DOLA-denominated yield without requiring direct DBR interaction. Withdrawing requires a multi-step process designed to provide security during periods of stress while maintaining reasonable user experience during normal operations. Users first call queueWithdrawal(shares) to enter the withdrawal queue. At this moment, the system snapshots their withdrawal parameters including cooldown duration and exit window timing, and applies the withdrawal fee, which is distributed to remaining depositors. Users then wait for the cooldown period, which ranges from the minimum delay to maximum delay based on current queue utilization as calculated by the LinearInterpolationDelayModel. During this cooldown, users continue earning rewards since their funds remain in the vault and continue to provide slashable insurance coverage. After the cooldown completes, users enter their exit window during which they can claim their withdrawal by calling the claim function. Users receive sDOLA representing their original deposit plus all accrued yield, minus any slashing events that occurred while they were deposited, minus the withdrawal fee. Users can also cancel their withdrawal during the cooldown period and return to the active depositor pool. #### For the Protocol Reward distribution operates through an ongoing auction mechanism integrated into the jrDOLA contract. The protocol allocates DBR to the jrDOLA contract according to the yearlyRewardBudget parameter controlled by the operator within governance-set limits. These DBR tokens enter an xy=k constant product market maker with virtual DOLA reserves, creating a permissionless auction where anyone can swap sDOLA for DBR. This increases the vault's total assets without changing the share supply, causing the sDOLA-per-share exchange rate to increase. Depositors thus earn DOLA-denominated yield without ever directly interacting with DBR tokens. The auction mechanism provides continuous price discovery and automatically adjusts reward distribution based on DBR market dynamics. The bad debt coverage mechanism operates through a permissionless slashing process. When a FiRM position becomes insolvent such that the debt value exceeds collateral value based on oracle pricing, anyone can call slash(market, borrower) on the FiRMSlashingModule contract. The module first verifies that the position is legitimately insolvent by checking current debt and collateral values. It then applies protective checks, ensuring the position's collateral value is below maxCollateralValue to prevent slashing positions that should be liquidated through normal mechanisms, and ensuring debt exceeds minDebt to avoid processing economically insignificant positions. If all checks pass, the module calculates the required DOLA amount needed to bring the position's debt-to-collateral ratio back to parity. It then triggers a pro-rata slash against the jrDOLA vault, where all depositors' share values decrease proportionally to socialize the loss. The recovered DOLA is used to repay the bad debt in the FiRM market, removing the insolvency. This protects DOLA backing by absorbing bad debt into jrDOLA before it impacts core protocol reserves. ## Budget Request The budget operates within a controlled structure. The maxYearlyRewardBudget parameter of 10,000,000 DBR represents a governance-enforced ceiling that can only be increased through full governance proposals. Within this ceiling, the yearlyRewardBudget parameter of 500,000 DBR represents the initial active budget upon approval of this proposal. This amount is controlled by the operator (Treasury Working Group multisig) and can be adjusted up to the governance ceiling without requiring additional votes, enabling responsive adjustment to market conditions while maintaining ultimate governance control. The initial budget request was calibrated through analysis of comparable insurance mechanisms in DeFi, modeling of depositor yield requirements given FiRM's historical bad debt frequency and severity, and assessment of total DBR availability relative to competing uses across the protocol ecosystem. ## On-Chain Actions - jrDOLA (setOperator, initialize, setSlashingModule, setYearlyRewardBudget, setMaxYearlyRewardBudget) - WithdrawalEscrow (initialize, withdrawFee, exitWindow) - LinearInterpolationDelayModel (setMinDelay, setMaxDelay, setMaxDelayThresholdBps) - FiRMSlashingModule (setGuardian, setMaxCollateralValue, setMinDebt, setActivationDelay) - DBR (addMinter)
# Reduce the Virtual Auction Minimum Bad Debt Repayment and Begin Treasury INV Buybacks # Reduce the Virtual Auction Minimum Bad Debt Repayment and Begin Treasury INV Buybacks Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/reduce-the-virtual-auction-minimum-bad-debt-repayment-and-begin-treasury-inv-buybacks/640 ## Summary This proposal seeks to reduce the `minRepayBps` of the Virtual Auction to 0% from 20%, and to start a new auction that sells DBR for INV, accumulating INV in the Treasury via rate-limited DBR issuance. This is in response to the current state of the crypto markets, which are both squeezing margins in the core lending business and leading to significant price declines in many volatile assets, including the INV governance token. ## Background * The virtual auction [launched in early 2024](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/164), with 100% of proceeds initially being directed to DOLA bad debt repayment * In January 2025, the [SaleHandler was updated](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/263) to introduce a governance-controlled `minRepayBps` and a live `repayBps` adjustable by the TWG beneficiary between `minRepayBps` and 100% * DBR Auction v2 infrastructure allows for governance to create new DBR for assets without needing new customized code ## Motivation ### Virtual Auction The current 20% minimum repayment requirement makes the core lending business unsustainable during poor market periods, requiring incentives to be subsidized by other revenue sources (such as veNFTs). Reducing the minimum to 0%, gives the TWG flexibility to dynamically adjust the level of repayment used, based on current margins and market conditions. This ensures a more sustainable business at all times, thereby protecting the DAO’s runway during weaker market periods. ### INV Buybacks With current market conditions pushing the INV governance token to its all-time low in USD at the time of writing, it represents a good opportunity for the DAO to begin price-sensitive DCA buybacks using the DBR Auction v2 infrastructure. The INV bought will be stored in the DAO Treasury and can be utilized by governance in the future. ## INV Auction Parameters The proposed operator is the Treasury Working Group multisig, which will manage the DBR rate allocated to the auction, in conjunction with DBR issuance budget elsewhere, and also INVs USD price. * Starting DBR Reserve \= 500,000 * Starting INV Reserve \= 1,250 * Min DBR rate per year \= 0 * Max DBR rate per year \= 50,000,000 (note: this is the ceiling, the expected initial rate will be lower) ## On-Chain Actions * Set `minRepayBps` on VA Sales Handler to 0 * Grant DBR minting rights to INV Auction * Set the max DBR rate per year to 50,000,000
# sUSDe LP FiRM Markets Feed Switch Implementation & Parameter Updates Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/susde-lp-firm-markets-feed-switch-implementation-parameter-updates/636 ## Summary This proposal implements four coordinated actions for the DOLA/sUSDe LP markets on FiRM: 1. Feed Switch Implementation: Transition from the current Chainlink sUSDe-USD derived pricing to FeedSwitch V2 - an audited oracle architecture that defaults to stable pricing ($1 via USDT Chainlink feed) with guardian-controlled fallback to market pricing when conditions warrant. 2. Collateral Factor Increase: Raise the collateral factor from 90% to 92%, enabled by the improved feed stability. 3. Liquidation Incentive Reduction: Lower the liquidation incentive from 5% to 4%, justified by larger FiRM position sizes and reliable, measured liquidator support. 4. Minimum Debt Increase: Raise the minimum debt from $3k to $5k to align with the reduced incentive and keep the market oriented toward larger position sizes. These actions are interdependent: the feed switch provides the foundation that justifies the market parameter changes. ## Background The DOLA/sUSDe LP markets have demonstrated strong product-market fit, with approximately $86.5M in outstanding debt (split 77.75M in the Convex implementation and 7.7M in the Yearn vault) representing over half of FiRM's total borrowing activity. User demand continues to grow, supported by competitive yields and efficient looping strategies. Important to note that DOLA’s (via FiRM) total exposure to USDe represents a small fraction of USDe’s circulating supply and redemption capacity. The price oracle for the markets derives sUSDe LP token pricing through a multi-step process: 1. Pull Chainlink sUSDe-USD feed, normalized by the sUSDe:USDe exchange rate 2. Apply pessimistic pricing: take the lower of DOLA ($1 fixed) and the derived sUSDe value 3. Multiply by the Curve pool's virtual price to determine LP token value This methodology directly reflects on-chain market conditions, and is the current pricing solution in place for all existing LP FiRM markets. However, market pricing introduces unnecessary volatility that may not always reflect fundamental value. The RWG has, as of late, conducted extensive analysis of oracle behavior for redemption-backed stablecoins across FiRM markets. This research, spanning price feed mechanics, collateral factor sensitivity, and stress scenario modeling, has informed a two-track approach to address the above: Immediate: Deploy FeedSwitch V2 as an interim solution providing stable pricing with guardian-controlled market fallback. Ongoing: Continue development of an advanced proof-of-reserves hybrid architecture that programmatically ties pricing to verified backing levels. This longer-term solution will further reduce tail risk while minimizing trust assumptions. The feed switch represents a pragmatic first step that can be deployed using audited, battle-tested code while the more sophisticated solution is developed. Automation of the switch itself remains the preferred end-state. ## FeedSwitch V2 Overview ### Architecture FeedSwitch V2 is an evolution of the oracle switch mechanism successfully deployed for PT markets on FiRM. The implementation has been adapted for LP feeds with the following capabilities: **Feedswitch V2 Contract: [0x3326a10A83B77fAae29aedBB8AAEB18E5872624D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3326a10A83B77fAae29aedBB8AAEB18E5872624D#code)** |Feature|Specification| | --- | --- | |Primary Feed|Stable pricing via USDT Chainlink feed (USDe = USDT assumption)| |Fallback Feed|Current market-derived pricing (Chainlink sUSDe-USD methodology)| |Guardian|RWG Multisig| |Timelock|Configurable by governance; initially set to 0 (immediate switching)| The RWG will communicate any feed switch via Inverse channels when practicable; however, because the timelock is 0 and switching is discretionary, borrowers must treat market-derived sUSDe pricing as an always-possible operating state. Normal Conditions: The feed returns stable LP token pricing based on the USDT reference, insulating users from short-term market volatility that doesn't reflect redemption value. Stress Conditions: If market conditions warrant (per alert severity framework below), the RWG guardian triggers a switch to market-derived pricing, enabling liquidations to proceed based on actual market conditions. ### Alert Severity Framework Inverse Finance RWG will continuously monitor a set of non-exhaustive indicators to assess whether FiRM’s sUSDe markets should rely on stable reference pricing or switch to market-derived pricing. These indicators are provided for general transparency only; Inverse Finance reserves the right to switch the feed at its discretion, based on these signals and/or any other relevant information. ### Key indicators we generally observe * Mint/Redeem Readiness: signs of impaired redemption functionality or degraded operational throughput (e.g., buffer stress, throttling constraints, backlog/processing issues). * Reserve Fund Monitoring: material changes in availability or usage that indicate persistent negative funding or reduced capacity to stabilize adverse conditions. * Collateral Integrity/Transparency Drift: sustained changes in collateralization, liquid stable reserves, or other reported backing integrity metrics that may indicate elevated impairment risk. * Broader Exchange/Contagion Events: major exchange failures or systemic market disruptions that could impair settlement, hedging, or convertibility paths, even absent confirmed direct exposure. The framework is an internal monitoring process used to guide operational readiness and inform FeedSwitch decisions. The indicators referenced in this proposal are intentionally non-exhaustive. These indicators are operationalized into internal reports (including automated alerting components), but no single metric is intended to serve as a hard trigger; Inverse Finance reserves the right to switch feeds at its discretion, based on these factors and/or any other relevant information. ## Rationale The transition to FeedSwitch V2 addresses a specific dynamic in successful looping markets: as more liquidity concentrates in FiRM-associated pools, external liquidity sources thin, and market-derived pricing becomes an increasingly imperfect proxy for fundamental value. For sUSDe specifically: * Redemption value is backed by Ethena's delta-neutral strategy * The 7-day unlock creates temporary price dislocations that don't reflect underlying value * Market volatility can trigger liquidations that are punitive to users without corresponding protocol risk FeedSwitch V2 introduces a controlled trust mechanism, preserving free-market pricing as the ultimate backstop, while defaulting to stable reference pricing during normal conditions where market dislocations do not reflect redemption value. ### Operational Risk Alignment: USDT Reference While the mint/redeem contract buffer policy supports both USDT and USDC, Ethena’s critical operating path is meaningfully tied to USDT liquidity, both through the RFQ mint/redeem rails (supported pairs include USDT/USDe and USDC/USDe) and through the stablecoin settlement flows that are most likely to be relied on during stressed conditions. In practice, this matters because if Ethena needs to facilitate redemptions under volatility, it may need to rebalance and refill the mint/redeem contract using the most liquid and operationally available stablecoin path. Separately, Ethena documents that its delta-neutral hedge stack uses linear perpetuals denominated in USDT, which makes the system positionally long USDT (margin and PnL are in USDT). As a result, a severe USDT idiosyncratic event (e.g., depeg or impaired convertibility) can translate into backing degradation and weaken collateralization dynamics even if the underlying directional hedges are intact. Ethena explicitly frames this as a monitored risk. Accordingly, referencing USDT rather than hardcoding $1.00 better matches the real settlement and risk surface during stress. It aligns pricing with the asset used in primary redemption/arbitrage flows and avoids overreacting to short-lived venue distortions, while preserving the ability to fall back to market-derived pricing during broader dislocations. ### Policy Actions Validate Feed Design Assumptions Recent Ethena risk-governance actions reinforce the distinction between fundamental backing risk and venue/market-structure dislocations, which is especially relevant for sUSDe given its 7-day cooldown to USDe. [In November 2025](https://gov.ethenafoundation.com/t/proposal-usde-redeem-for-dislocations-on-secondary-markets/712), Ethena approved a last-resort discount buyback + burn tool that can be used only below a strict threshold (e.g., $0.99), funded from a capped portion of backing assets, with acquired USDe burned after settlement. Ethena has also communicated an ad-hoc proof-of-reserves update within 24 hours if emergency mechanics are used. This matters because sUSDe discounts can arise from two distinct drivers: USDe-level stress (where anchor support and transparency measures are directly relevant) and sUSDe-specific time-to-liquidity pricing from the cooldown (where a spread can persist even if redemption value remains intact). The proposal’s oracle controls are designed around that reality - stable pricing as the default, with a market-based fallback during acute exchange disruption or broader contagion, without assuming temporary dislocations imply true backing impairment. ## On-Chain Actions ### Collateral Factor Increase (→ 92%) The current 90% CF was set conservatively given market-derived pricing volatility. With stable pricing as the default: * Reduced liquidation risk from transient price movements means users can maintain positions through short-term volatility * 92% is an appropriate figure relative to the underlying collateral quality. This will increase capital efficiency and competitive positioning vs. alternative venues Additionally, Ethena’s recent enhancements to USDe stress tooling and transparency provide incremental support that severe, venue-specific dislocations are less likely to persist as fundamental impairment, complementing our oracle controls rather than replacing them. ### Liquidation Incentive Decrease (→ 4%) In the sUSDe-DOLA and yv-sUSDe-DOLA FiRM markets, we’ve observed successful liquidations at meaningful scale (4 liquidation events spanning Dec 2024–Nov 2025), including a large single liquidation with ~336.7k repaid debt and ~462.1k total repaid. Liquidations were executed across four distinct liquidators, suggesting liquidation capacity is not reliant on a single actor and has been effective even for larger position sizes. This observed liquidation performance supports reducing the liquidation incentive from 5% to 4%, particularly given these markets skew toward larger, more liquidatable positions. ### Minimum Debt Increase (→ 5000 DOLA) We propose increasing the minimum borrow size from 3,000 DOLA to 5,000 DOLA to preserve liquidation efficiency alongside the reduction in liquidation incentive from 5% to 4%. Liquidations carry a relatively fixed execution cost that becomes materially more punitive during stressed markets. In a scenario that drives persistent USDe/sUSDe dislocation or peg impairment, we would also expect a sharp increase in on-chain activity (risk-off flows, arbitrage, liquidations), which typically elevates gas costs and further compresses liquidator margins. A higher minimum debt improves the likelihood that each liquidation remains economically viable and therefore reliably executed by third-party liquidators, even under congestion. This adjustment is also consistent with observed usage in the sUSDe–DOLA and yv-sUSDe–DOLA markets, where borrower positions are predominantly larger. Raising the minimum debt primarily reduces the long-tail of small borrows that are least attractive to liquidate under elevated gas and a reduced incentive, while having minimal impact on the typical borrower profile in these markets. As a result, this change improves expected liquidation completeness during adverse conditions by avoiding the lowest-notional positions that are most likely to become uneconomic to clear. ### Set Oracle Price Feeds 1. sUSDe-DOLA CLP feed : [0xe741c804Ca2e26a0aa5511a6018119CD6991Aaa5](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe741c804Ca2e26a0aa5511a6018119CD6991Aaa5) 2. sUSDe-DOLA Yearn feed: [0x2dc3ceb337a7b62831f4f27688aacfbb9b4c0afa](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2dc3ceb337a7b62831f4f27688aacfbb9b4c0afa)
# Redeploy DOLA Peg Stability Module Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/redeploy-dola-peg-stability-module/634 ## Summary This proposal redeploys the DOLA PSM for USDS with added Expansion and Contraction events, grants minting rights to the new PSMFed, and deprecates the original PSMFed deployment. The PSM functionality and parameters remain unchanged from the [original activation proposal](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/311). ## Background The PSM was originally deployed in August 2025 but lacked standard Expansion and Contraction events present in other Fed contracts. Since the PSM has seen minimal usage to date, redeployment with these events adds no operational risk while improving monitoring and transparency. ## Specification The redeployed contracts maintain identical parameters to the original deployment: * Buy Fee: 0 bps (1 USDS = 1 DOLA) * Sell Fee: 20 bps (1 DOLA = 0.998 USDS) * Minimum Total Supply: 100,000 shares to mitigate inflation-style attacks * Supply Cap: 10,000,000 DOLA New Contracts: * PSM: 0x1d02f2841afa3cc20435a8c804c24deac5f30dfa * PSMFed: 0x67fc21332d24fc5250a3b7fc988191ad7f38f9cc * Controller (unchanged): 0xe3475728673eabaec90a37aa3ae2ced9f0db5ff2 ## On-Chain Actions * PSM.setBuyFeeBps = 0 * PSM.setSellFeeBps = 20 * PSM.setMinTotalSupply = 100k * PSMFed.setSupplyCap = 10M * Add PSM as DOLA Minter * Remove old PSM contract as DOLA Minter
# Redeploy DOLA Peg Stability Module Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/redeploy-dola-peg-stability-module/634 ## Summary This proposal redeploys the DOLA PSM for USDS with added Expansion and Contraction events, grants minting rights to the new PSMFed, and deprecates the original PSMFed deployment. The PSM functionality and parameters remain unchanged from the [original activation proposal](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/311). ## Background The PSM was originally deployed in August 2025 but lacked standard Expansion and Contraction events present in other Fed contracts. Since the PSM has seen minimal usage to date, redeployment with these events adds no operational risk while improving monitoring and transparency. ## Specification The redeployed contracts maintain identical parameters to the original deployment: * Buy Fee: 0 bps (1 USDS = 1 DOLA) * Sell Fee: 20 bps (1 DOLA = 0.998 USDS) * Minimum Total Supply: 100,000 shares to mitigate inflation-style attacks * Supply Cap: 10,000,000 DOLA New Contracts: * PSM: 0x1d02f2841afa3cc20435a8c804c24deac5f30dfa * PSMFed: 0x67fc21332d24fc5250a3b7fc988191ad7f38f9cc * Controller (unchanged): 0xe3475728673eabaec90a37aa3ae2ced9f0db5ff2 ## On-Chain Actions * PSM.setBuyFeeBps = 0 * PSM.setSellFeeBps = 20 * PSM.setMinTotalSupply = 100k * PSMFed.setSupplyCap = 10M * Add PSM as DOLA Minter * Remove old PSM contract as DOLA Minter
mint(address,uint256)# Payroll extension proposal #1 (2/2) Forum post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/payroll-extension-proposal-1/633 (This proposal is divided into two votes due to the large number of on-chain actions) # Summary This is the first Payroll extension proposal following the recent approval of the Payroll restructuring proposal. With the DAO’s stablecoin runway being ~12 months, this proposal cuts yearly spending on Payroll from 1,440,000 DOLA down to 936,000 per year, increasing runway to ~18 months. INV compensation spending is reduced from 16,617 to 13,643 INV per year. This is done by reducing the stablecoin pay of all paid contributors as well as by reducing the team size. # Changes to Payroll bands Base DOLA compensation of both A and B contributor bands will be reduced. This will result in the reduction of base compensation of all contributors. |Band|Previous comp|New comp|% change| | --- | --- | --- | --- | |A|174,000|144,000|-17.2%| |B|144,000|120,000|-16.6%| Despite the base compensation cuts, the total comp for all contributors will range between $186K and $224K based on an INV price of $38. More on INV compensation further below. # Extended contributors Unfortunately, Pat B and Naoufel will be departing from the team. The total team size will be reduced to 7 paid contributors. The contributors listed below will have their DOLA pay extended until September 30, 2026. This includes three months of potential severance pay in the case of no extension after June 30, 2026. More details can be found in the [Payroll Restructuring Proposal (Mills#322)](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/322). |Name|Role|Band|DOLA/year| | --- | --- | --- | --- | |Nour|General Coordinator & Solidity|A|144,000| |MT|Solidity Engineer|A|144,000| |AlienDev|Frontend Engineer|A|144,000| |CryptoHarry|Head of Treasury|A|144,000| |Tabboz|Solidity Engineer|B|120,000| |Edo|Head of Risk Management|B|120,000| |Karm|Risk Manager|B|120,000| |Total|||936,000| # INV compensation restart This proposal restarts INV compensation for active contributors after it was not restarted due to the end of working group seasonal proposals. Below are the rates for each contributor: |Name|Band|INV/year|% of INV supply (719K)| | --- | --- | --- | --- | |Nour|A|2,105|0.29%| |MT|A|2,105|0.29%| |AlienDev|A|2,105|0.29%| |CryptoHarry|A|2,105|0.29%| |Tabboz|B|1,741|0.24%| |Edo|B|1,741|0.24%| |Karm|B|1,741|0.24%| |Total||13,643|1.90%| This proposal both restarts INV compensation going forward and provides retroactive compensation for the period from May 1st, 2025, through the present. The grants for active contributors will last until EOD June 30, 2025 (covering both retroactive and forward-looking INV). This means contributors will be granted INV covering 426 days (1.167 years): |Band|INV/year|Period (years)|Total INV| | --- | --- | --- | --- | |A|2,105|1.167|2,457| |B|1,741|1.167|2,032| # Benefits for departing contributors To support departing contributors as they transition to new roles, the proposal provides: * Severance is one-time, 3 months of pay streamed in DOLA, and contingent on successful off-boarding (handover of access, documentation, and transitional support). * Retroactive INV: The INV compensation that was paused for the last working group season vested over three months. Retroactive INV Calculation: 1st May to 7th December, 220 days (0.603 years) * Transition support: Assistance from the DAO when possible to help them secure new roles, including through our network of partners. Below are the departing contributors and their benefits: |Name|Total DOLA severance|Total vested INV| | --- | --- | --- | |Pat B|36,000|0.603*2,105=1,269| |Naoufel|30,000|0.603*1,741=1,050| |Total|66,000|2,319| # To the departing contributors I say this on behalf of everyone in the DAO: We’re grateful for your work, grit and dedication through the toughest chapter of the DAO’s history. You spent years rebuilding this organization from scratch. The DAO will continue to reap the benefits of your work for many more years. Pat and Naoufel, thank you for your service to the protocol, its holders and its users. # On-Chain Actions New INV Vesters to be deployed: |Contributor|INV Amount|Start Date|End Date| | --- | --- | --- | --- | |Nour|2,457|07/12/2025|30/06/2026| |MT|2,457|07/12/2025|30/06/2026| |AlienDev|2,457|07/12/2025|30/06/2026| |CryptoHarry|2,457|07/12/2025|30/06/2026| |Tabboz|2,032|07/12/2025|30/06/2026| |Edo|2,032|07/12/2025|30/06/2026| |Karm|2,032|07/12/2025|30/06/2026| |Pat B|1,269|07/12/2025|07/03/2026| |Naoufel|1,050|07/12/2025|07/03/2026| |Total|18,243||| New DOLA Payroll to be added: |Contributor|Yearly Amount|End Date| | --- | --- | --- | |Nour|144,000|30/09/2026| |MT|144,000|30/09/2026| |AlienDev|144,000|30/09/2026| |CryptoHarry|144,000|30/09/2026| |Tabboz|120,000|30/09/2026| |Edo|120,000|30/09/2026| |Karm|120,000|30/09/2026| |Pat B|144,000|07/03/2026 (3 months)| |Naoufel|120,000|07/03/2026 (3 months)| The on-chain actions will be: * Remove the 9 contributors from the old payroll contract * Set DOLA allowance of old payroll contract to 0 * Add 9 contributors to the new DOLA payroll contract * Mint 8,000 INV to the Treasury * Set the INV allowance of XinvVestorFactory to 18,243 * Deploy cancellable vestors for the 9 contributors
# Payroll extension proposal #1 (1/2) Forum post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/payroll-extension-proposal-1/633 (This proposal is divided into two votes due to the large number of on-chain actions) # Summary This is the first Payroll extension proposal following the recent approval of the Payroll restructuring proposal. With the DAO’s stablecoin runway being ~12 months, this proposal cuts yearly spending on Payroll from 1,440,000 DOLA down to 936,000 per year, increasing runway to ~18 months. INV compensation spending is reduced from 16,617 to 13,643 INV per year. This is done by reducing the stablecoin pay of all paid contributors as well as by reducing the team size. # Changes to Payroll bands Base DOLA compensation of both A and B contributor bands will be reduced. This will result in the reduction of base compensation of all contributors. |Band|Previous comp|New comp|% change| | --- | --- | --- | --- | |A|174,000|144,000|-17.2%| |B|144,000|120,000|-16.6%| Despite the base compensation cuts, the total comp for all contributors will range between $186K and $224K based on an INV price of $38. More on INV compensation further below. # Extended contributors Unfortunately, Pat B and Naoufel will be departing from the team. The total team size will be reduced to 7 paid contributors. The contributors listed below will have their DOLA pay extended until September 30, 2026. This includes three months of potential severance pay in the case of no extension after June 30, 2026. More details can be found in the [Payroll Restructuring Proposal (Mills#322)](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/322). |Name|Role|Band|DOLA/year| | --- | --- | --- | --- | |Nour|General Coordinator & Solidity|A|144,000| |MT|Solidity Engineer|A|144,000| |AlienDev|Frontend Engineer|A|144,000| |CryptoHarry|Head of Treasury|A|144,000| |Tabboz|Solidity Engineer|B|120,000| |Edo|Head of Risk Management|B|120,000| |Karm|Risk Manager|B|120,000| |Total|||936,000| # INV compensation restart This proposal restarts INV compensation for active contributors after it was not restarted due to the end of working group seasonal proposals. Below are the rates for each contributor: |Name|Band|INV/year|% of INV supply (719K)| | --- | --- | --- | --- | |Nour|A|2,105|0.29%| |MT|A|2,105|0.29%| |AlienDev|A|2,105|0.29%| |CryptoHarry|A|2,105|0.29%| |Tabboz|B|1,741|0.24%| |Edo|B|1,741|0.24%| |Karm|B|1,741|0.24%| |Total||13,643|1.90%| This proposal both restarts INV compensation going forward and provides retroactive compensation for the period from May 1st, 2025, through the present. The grants for active contributors will last until EOD June 30, 2025 (covering both retroactive and forward-looking INV). This means contributors will be granted INV covering 426 days (1.167 years): |Band|INV/year|Period (years)|Total INV| | --- | --- | --- | --- | |A|2,105|1.167|2,457| |B|1,741|1.167|2,032| # Benefits for departing contributors To support departing contributors as they transition to new roles, the proposal provides: * Severance is one-time, 3 months of pay streamed in DOLA, and contingent on successful off-boarding (handover of access, documentation, and transitional support). * Retroactive INV: The INV compensation that was paused for the last working group season vested over three months. Retroactive INV Calculation: 1st May to 7th December, 220 days (0.603 years) * Transition support: Assistance from the DAO when possible to help them secure new roles, including through our network of partners. Below are the departing contributors and their benefits: |Name|Total DOLA severance|Total vested INV| | --- | --- | --- | |Pat B|36,000|0.603*2,105=1,269| |Naoufel|30,000|0.603*1,741=1,050| |Total|66,000|2,319| # To the departing contributors I say this on behalf of everyone in the DAO: We’re grateful for your work, grit and dedication through the toughest chapter of the DAO’s history. You spent years rebuilding this organization from scratch. The DAO will continue to reap the benefits of your work for many more years. Pat and Naoufel, thank you for your service to the protocol, its holders and its users. # On-Chain Actions New INV Vesters to be deployed: |Contributor|INV Amount|Start Date|End Date| | --- | --- | --- | --- | |Nour|2,457|07/12/2025|30/06/2026| |MT|2,457|07/12/2025|30/06/2026| |AlienDev|2,457|07/12/2025|30/06/2026| |CryptoHarry|2,457|07/12/2025|30/06/2026| |Tabboz|2,032|07/12/2025|30/06/2026| |Edo|2,032|07/12/2025|30/06/2026| |Karm|2,032|07/12/2025|30/06/2026| |Pat B|1,269|07/12/2025|07/03/2026| |Naoufel|1,050|07/12/2025|07/03/2026| |Total|18,243||| New DOLA Payroll to be added: |Contributor|Yearly Amount|End Date| | --- | --- | --- | |Nour|144,000|30/09/2026| |MT|144,000|30/09/2026| |AlienDev|144,000|30/09/2026| |CryptoHarry|144,000|30/09/2026| |Tabboz|120,000|30/09/2026| |Edo|120,000|30/09/2026| |Karm|120,000|30/09/2026| |Pat B|144,000|07/03/2026 (3 months)| |Naoufel|120,000|07/03/2026 (3 months)| The on-chain actions will be: * Remove the 9 contributors from the old payroll contract * Set DOLA allowance of old payroll contract to 0 * Add 9 contributors to the new DOLA payroll contract * Mint 8,000 INV to the Treasury * Set the INV allowance of XinvVestorFactory to 18,243 * Deploy cancellable vestors for the 9 contributors
# FiRM Liquidation Factor Adjustment for Select Volatile Collateral Markets Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/firm-liquidation-factor-adjustment-for-select-volatile-collateral-markets/631 ## Summary Following analysis performed on the October 10th, 2025 liquidation cascade - the largest in cryptocurrency history - the Risk Working Group (RWG) proposes systematic liquidation factor (LF) increases across five volatile collateral markets to align FiRM's safety parameters with empirical evidence from extreme market stress. Throughout this event, Chainlink oracles operated correctly by design, but network congestion created on-chain publication delays that produced step-wise repricing, compressing multiple minutes of price movement into single oracle updates and overwhelming liquidation execution in markets with lower LF settings. Proposed Changes: |Market|Current LF|Proposed LF|Change| | --- | --- | --- | --- | |wstETH|60%|75%|+15%| |wBTC|60%|75%|+15%| |wETH|40%|75%|+35%| |cbBTC|50%|75%|+25%| |CRV|60%|100%|+40%| |No Change|Current|Proposed|| |INV|50%|50%|Maintain| |st-yETH|100%|100%|Maintain| |CVX|100%|100%|Maintain| |cvxCRV|100%|100%|Maintain| |st-yCRV|100%|100%|Maintain| These adjustments strengthen FiRM's resilience to oracle latency during extreme market conditions while RWG collaborates with Chainlink to individually backtest each volatile asset's oracle performance against October 10th data, verifying that fine-tuned OCR (Off-Chain Reporting) configurations produce validated improvements that would successfully pass the stress test conditions observed during the event. To clarify, no user action is required at this time. By securing existing markets, RWG establishes the foundation to confidently pivot toward growth-facing initiatives. ## Background On October 10, 2025, crypto markets experienced an unprecedented liquidation cascade. Within hours, over $19.2 billion in leveraged positions were liquidated across DeFi and CeFi platforms. Altcoins were significantly impacted, many losing 50-60% of value within 10-minute intervals. FiRM processed 79 liquidations across three markets (CVX: 72, CRV: 5, cvxCRV: 2), clearing approximately $717,000 DOLA - one of the largest 24-hour liquidation periods in protocol history. CVX dropped 71% in 27 minutes (from $2.94 to $0.85), resulting in $110,310 in bad debt, since repaid through a generous contribution from CVX co-founders C2tp and Winthorpe. RWG published a [comprehensive analysis](https://www.inverse.finance/blog/posts/en-US/october-10th-stress-test-firm-performance-analysis) of the CVX/USD Chainlink oracle performance during the event, which led to [governance action](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/331) increasing CVX LF from 60% to 100% to secure the market. Markets with 100% LF (cvxCRV, st-yCRV) experienced zero bad debt despite exposure to similar volatility. FiRM remains free of bad debt and fully operational. The October 10th liquidation cascade - an isolated, unprecedented market shock - occurred against the backdrop of broader Q4 2025 market deterioration. Throughout October and November, DeFi has experienced a series of high-profile protocol exploits (Moonwell, Balancer) and stablecoin depegs (Elixir, Stream, Yala), with on-chain indicators revealing defensive positioning across DeFi ecosystems. The combination of an isolated extreme volatility event layered on top of already fragile market conditions amplified systemic stress, justifying heightened risk management across longtail volatile collateral. ### The Role of Oracle Latency RWG is conducting comprehensive analysis of Chainlink oracle performance across volatile and stable assets listed on FiRM to understand the relationship between oracle latency and liquidation outcomes during the October 10th event. Chainlink oracles maintained full data integrity throughout the event with no gaps or invalid rounds, demonstrating that the issue was feed provider latency-driven rather than FiRM failure-driven, and responsiveness normalized as volatility subsided. RWG is now working with Chainlink to conduct similar detailed analysis across all other collateral markets to understand oracle behavior patterns and validate whether current LF and CF methodologies provide appropriate safety margins for each asset's specific oracle configuration and latency profile. ## Proposed Parameter Changes While 100% LF across all FiRM volatile markets is the most protective configuration for protocol safety, borrower experience and loss scaling represent critical trade-offs that must be balanced against risk minimization. In FiRM's model, the liquidation incentive (10-12% for volatile assets) applies to whatever portion of debt gets liquidated - when LF is 100%, that penalty applies to the entire position, amplifying user loss and typically ending borrower retention altogether. Partial liquidations, by contrast, give borrowers the opportunity to re-collateralize or repay without losing their entire position, maintaining borrower relationships even during market stress. The broader DeFi ecosystem has been moving toward more borrower-friendly unwind mechanisms. Aave v3 and Spark implement dynamic close factors that liquidate only 50% of positions when health factor exceeds 0.95, escalating to 100% only in deep distress. Llamalend by Curve pioneered soft liquidations that typically unwind just 1-5% of debt to restore solvency, with these designs showing clear improvements in user retention and becoming major competitive selling points. FiRM currently has room to improve user experience through dynamic or tiered LF logic that scales with health factor or asset-specific liquidity profiles, though such enhancements would require FiRM v2 architecture with new market contract implementations. ### CRV ( → 100% LF) The proposed max increase to the CRV market’s LF parameter represents continuation of FiRM's longtail asset risk mitigation strategy that began with CVX's post-October 10th correction to 100% LF. The CRV market on FiRM is rich with operational history and battle-tested solvency across multiple stress events; justifying its continuation. [AAVE moved CRV to non-borrowable status](https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-deprecation-of-low-demand-volatile-assets-on-aave-v3-instances/23261) following the event, setting borrow caps to 1 and LTV to 0%, citing demonstrated oracle risks and low market efficiency. RWG's analysis and industry findings support maximum protective parameters. ### wETH, wBTC, wstETH, cbBTC ( → 75% LF) These four markets represent FiRM's highest-quality volatile collateral. Despite varying oracle feed complexity - from wETH's direct ETH/USD feed (0.5% deviation, 1-hour heartbeat) to wstETH's triple-feed architecture (stETH/ETH, stETH/USD, ETH/USD) and bridge asset risk considerations with cbBTC and wBTC's; these assets share a critical characteristic that distinguishes them from longtail collateral: low volatility relative to high liquidity depth. This fundamental property makes them significantly less vulnerable to the granular price latency issues that overwhelmed liquidation execution in longtail markets during October 10th, as their deep order books and slower price movements provide greater time windows for liquidators to execute before positions become underwater. The proposed 75% LF sits on the higher end of industry standards, but FiRM's architectural differentiators provide borrower-focused safety features that enable competitive market positioning despite conservative liquidation parameters. ### No Changes: Validated Parameters * INV market maintains 50% LF as appropriate for its unique risk profile as Inverse Finance’s governance token. The current setting recognizes that partial liquidations reduce market impact for a thin-orderbook, protecting against cascading liquidations in negative feedback loops. Currently, the largest position in the market represents ~81.5% of outstanding debt and maintains heavy overcollateralization, making 50% LF safe for the dominant exposure. * CVX market maintains 100% LF following its [post-October 10th correction](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/331). * st-yETH market is being offboarded through separate [governance action](https://forum.inverse.finance/t/offboard-the-st-yeth-market-on-firm/626) due to sustained deterioration of its liquid value and operational integrity. * cvxCRV and st-yCRV markets were proactively [upgraded to 100% LF in July 2025](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/304) following RWG's identification of liquidity decline. Both assets lack CEX presence and rely on thinning on-chain Curve pools with deteriorating pegs (cvxCRV at 41%, st-yCRV 52%). During October 10th, both markets experienced zero bad debt despite exposure to volatility, validating the preemptive risk management. ## Comparison to Industry Response AAVE implemented aggressive risk-off measures following October 10th, documented in their governance proposal "[ARFC: Deprecation of Low Demand Volatile Assets](https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-deprecation-of-low-demand-volatile-assets-on-aave-v3-instances/23261)" authored by Chaos Labs. The DAO voted on setting borrow caps to 1 (effectively non-borrowable) for 14 assets including CRV, UNI, ENS, ARB, BAL, LDO, and 1INCH, while simultaneously setting LTV to 0% (no collateral value) for the same assets. Their rationale centered on oracle deviations of 15-50% during October 10th combined with low market efficiency creating arbitrage exploitation risk. Chaos Labs' recent analysis cited CRV experiencing sustained 58% price dislocation during the October 10th window, with [Chainlink SVR](https://blog.chain.link/chainlink-smart-value-recapture-svr/) (Smart Value Recapture) oracle updates lagging by a constant 5 blocks (approximately 60 seconds) throughout the crash period. Their technical framework focused on oracle-DEX price divergence: when Chainlink pricing diverged from on-chain DEX reality, the dislocation enabled arbitrage exploitation. They documented approximately $200K deficit from this mispricing mechanism, where market participants could supply high-LT collateral, borrow CRV at oracle's understated price, and immediately sell on DEX venues at higher market prices. This arbitrage could be repeated until either prices converged or protocol liquidity was exhausted. The oracle-DEX divergence is particularly material for protocols like AAVE and Moonwell (as detailed in a[ report by Anthias Labs](https://forum.moonwell.fi/t/anthias-labs-report-on-the-events-of-october-10th-2025/1983)) because CRV and other volatiles were previously borrowable on their platform, creating direct arbitrage vulnerability. When oracle pricing lags behind on-chain reality during volatility, borrowers can extract value from the protocol through the price differential. This exploitation mechanism drove AAVE's decision to make these select volatiles non-borrowable rather than simply adjusting liquidation parameters. RWG’s analysis approached the same October 10th event from a different angle, focusing on oracle update latency rather than oracle-DEX divergence. The distinction between RWG and Chaos Labs' analyses reflects different protocol architectures and resulting vulnerabilities. Both studies identify oracle responsiveness issues during extreme volatility but from complementary perspectives - one focused on price divergence exploitation, the other on liquidation execution timing. Chaos Labs' observation that SVR oracle lag "could have been insufficient to support timely liquidations, thereby publishing the price updates with a consistent maximum allowed lag" aligns with RWG’s analysis of oracle latency overwhelming FiRM liquidation execution. The convergence of findings from independent analyses examining the same event strengthens confidence that oracle responsiveness during extreme network congestion is a systemic concern across DeFi lending protocols, regardless of specific architecture differences. ## Future Considerations This proposal represents immediate market securing via Liquidation Factor optimization based on October 10th empirical evidence. RWG's near-term focus following this proposal will be comprehensive collateral factor analysis, particularly for stablecoin LP markets, as previewed in the CVX post-event analysis. Oracle latency during extreme volatility affects not only liquidation execution but also the appropriate collateral factor settings that determine borrowing capacity. The same October 10th oracle performance data being gathered for liquidation factor validation will inform systematic review of collateral factors across FiRM markets, with stablecoin LPs receiving priority assessment given their 97% concentration of DOLA backing. Longer-term improvements would require FiRM v2 architecture with new market contract implementations. Dynamic liquidation mechanisms would eliminate the tradeoff between safety and user experience inherent in static LF settings, with soft liquidations enabling gradual position reduction and sliding scale factors adjusting automatically based on real-time volatility. Hybrid oracle systems incorporating pull-based pricing from sources like Pyth or Redstone alongside Chainlink push-based feeds would provide redundancy during network congestion. Multi-oracle validation with automated health monitoring could enable real-time parameter adjustments based on oracle performance degradation. Chainlink is providing detailed oracle performance data for all volatile collateral markets during the October 10th event and historical patterns, which will be incorporated into ongoing risk assessment. This quantitative evidence will enable data-driven validation of proposed parameters and inform future OCR configuration optimizations that RWG is coordinating with Chainlink to pass October 10th stress test conditions. Completing this liquidation factor optimization during Q4 market deterioration positions FiRM strategically for future growth. By ironing out parameter vulnerabilities and validating oracle feed integrity across stressed conditions now, RWG can confidently reallocate focus from defensive market securing toward growth-oriented initiatives once analysis concludes and markets stabilize. The comprehensive oracle performance data being gathered establishes quantitative frameworks for evaluating collateral factor increases where appropriate and assessing new collateral candidates with validated risk assessment methodologies. This measured approach - securing existing markets first, then expanding thoughtfully from a position of strength - ensures FiRM scales responsibly without compromising the protocol stability that has differentiated FiRM throughout industry-wide stress events. ## On-Chain Actions * Set Liquidation Factor for wETH market to 75% * Set Liquidation Factor for wstETH market to 75% * Set Liquidation Factor for wBTC market to 75% * Set Liquidation Factor for cbBTC market to 75% * Set Liquidation Factor for CRV market to 100%
# Enable Swap Proxies on ALEV4 # Proposal to Enable Swap Proxies on ALEV4 Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/enable-swap-proxies-on-alev4/630 ## TL;DR * The recent **“[Migrate DBR Helpers to New TriDBR Poo](https://forum.inverse.finance/t/migrate-dbr-helpers-to-new-tridbr-pool/627)l”** proposal deployed and enabled the new ALE contract ALEV4 ([0x39D167Fe676EFC3be49bE874a37349A5D89f9058](https://etherscan.io/address/0x39D167Fe676EFC3be49bE874a37349A5D89f9058#code)). * ALEV4 uses an allowlist (`isExchangeProxy`) for swap routers used in leverage/deleverage flows. * We identified that the two swap proxies used by the FiRM frontend were not included in the whitelist: * Odos router: [`0xCf5540fFFCdC3d510B18bFcA6d2b9987b0772559`](https://etherscan.io/address/0xcf5540fffcdc3d510b18bfca6d2b9987b0772559) * 1inch Aggregation Router: [`0x111111125421cA6dc452d289314280a0f8842A65`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x111111125421cA6dc452d289314280a0f8842A65) * This proposal simply calls `allowProxy` for both addresses on ALEV4 so that existing leverage/deleverage flows can route via Odos/1inch as intended. * No changes to FiRM markets, risk parameters, or DBR logic. --- ## Background In the DBR Helpers → new TriDBR pool migration, we: * Deployed new helper contracts (ALEV4, PendlePTHelper, DbrHelper), * Migrated configuration from the legacy ALE, * Disabled the old helpers. ALEV4 introduces a safety improvement around swap routing: * Each market can be configured to use an `exchangeProxy`. * At execution time, ALEV4 checks `markets[_market].useProxy` and `isExchangeProxy[_proxy]`. * Only addresses explicitly allowed via `allowProxy()` can be used as swap routers. This pattern is already in use (e.g. prior 0x → 1inch switch), but when we migrated to ALEV4 we did not include the `allowProxy` calls in the on-chain steps, so both Odos and 1inch are currently *not* enabled on the new ALE. The result is that any leverage/deleverage flow that passes these routers as `exchangeProxy` will revert with `InvalidProxyAddress()`. --- ## Objective Formally authorize the two swap routers used by FiRM as valid exchange proxies on ALEV2 so that: * Frontends and power-users can use Odos and 1inch for DOLA / collateral routing in leverage and deleverage flows. * Behaviour matches the previous ALE setup, with improved routing via the new TriDBR pool and the same aggregator stack. No other changes are in scope. --- ## Rationale * **Restores intended functionality** The original migration assumed Odos and 1inch would remain usable as swap backends for ALE flows. Without whitelisting, those routes simply revert. * **Minimal, well-scoped change** We are only setting two booleans in `isExchangeProxy`. No state related to user escrows, market debt, or DBR accounting is modified. * **Battle-tested routers** Both addresses correspond to heavily-used, audited swap routers (Odos router v2 and 1inch Aggregation Router v6), already integrated in the Inverse stack and widely used across DeFi. * **Improved UX and execution** Allowing these aggregators lets users source the best routes across DEXs while still keeping ALE’s flash-mint-based leverage/deleverage UX. --- ## Specification / On-Chain Actions On ALEV4: 0x39D167Fe676EFC3be49bE874a37349A5D89f9058 1. Enable Odos router as an exchange proxy ``` ALEV4.allowProxy(0xCf5540fFFCdC3d510B18bFcA6d2b9987b0772559); ``` 2. Enable 1inch Aggregation Router as an exchange proxy ``` ALEV4.allowProxy(0x111111125421cA6dc452d289314280a0f8842A65); ```
setReplenismentIncentiveBps(uint256)setReplenismentIncentiveBps(uint256)# Reduce the DBR Replenishment Incentive [2/2] # Proposal to Reduce the Replenishment Incentive Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/reduce-the-dbr-replenishment-incentive/625 ## TL;DR * Reduce `replenishmentIncentiveBps` on FiRM markets from 5000 → 1000 (50% → 10%). * Borrowers still pay the same replenishment cost; we only change how it’s split between replenisher vs DAO. * The DAO Treasury’s share of replenishment revenue goes from 50% → 90%. ## Background When a user has a DBR deficit, anyone can call `forceReplenish` on the market: * The user incurs a replenishment cost in DOLA (added to their debt). * A share of that cost, controlled by `replenishmentIncentiveBps`, is paid to the caller as `replenisherReward`. * The DAO Treasury effectively captures the rest via the market/lender setup. In the Market contract, this is: `uint replenisherReward = replenishmentCost * replenishmentIncentiveBps / 10000;` FiRM launched with replenishmentIncentiveBps \= 5000 (50%) to bootstrap keepers and make sure deficits are cleared quickly. ## Motivation 1\. Keeper ecosystem is already competitive After almost three years live, FiRM is fully integrated into multiple bots and keeper stacks: * Replenishments are already highly competitive on larger positions. * The original 50% incentive has done its job as a bootstrap parameter. We no longer need to give away half the revenue to maintain healthy replenishment activity. 2\. Treasury is overpaying for the same outcome The borrower always pays 100% of the replenishment cost as new DOLA debt. This proposal only changes the split: * Before: 50% to caller, 50% to DAO * After: 10% to caller, 90% to DAO 3\. 10% is still enough to keep things running We don’t want to push incentives so low that: * Small deficits remain unreplenished for a long time, or * Gas economics no longer make sense for callers. At 10%: * Larger deficits still pay a meaningful absolute reward. * Existing bots already monitor FiRM, so infra cost is largely sunk. * If we ever observe persistent unreplenished deficits or degraded behavior, governance can revisit the parameter. ## On-Chain Actions For all active FiRM markets (of which there are 28 currently, so this will be split into 2 on-chain proposals, of 14 markets each), defined as markets that: * have `totalDebt > 100 DOLA`, or * have `borrowPaused == false`, perform: * `setReplenismentIncentiveBps(1000)` This sets `replenishmentIncentiveBps` to 10% on those markets, shifting replenishment revenue to 90% DAO / 10% caller without changing DBR pricing, liquidations, or user-facing mechanics.
setReplenismentIncentiveBps(uint256)setReplenismentIncentiveBps(uint256)# Reduce the DBR Replenishment Incentive [1/2] # Proposal to Reduce the Replenishment Incentive Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/reduce-the-dbr-replenishment-incentive/625 ## TL;DR * Reduce `replenishmentIncentiveBps` on FiRM markets from 5000 → 1000 (50% → 10%). * Borrowers still pay the same replenishment cost; we only change how it’s split between replenisher vs DAO. * The DAO Treasury’s share of replenishment revenue goes from 50% → 90%. ## Background When a user has a DBR deficit, anyone can call `forceReplenish` on the market: * The user incurs a replenishment cost in DOLA (added to their debt). * A share of that cost, controlled by `replenishmentIncentiveBps`, is paid to the caller as `replenisherReward`. * The DAO Treasury effectively captures the rest via the market/lender setup. In the Market contract, this is: `uint replenisherReward = replenishmentCost * replenishmentIncentiveBps / 10000;` FiRM launched with replenishmentIncentiveBps \= 5000 (50%) to bootstrap keepers and make sure deficits are cleared quickly. ## Motivation 1\. Keeper ecosystem is already competitive After almost three years live, FiRM is fully integrated into multiple bots and keeper stacks: * Replenishments are already highly competitive on larger positions. * The original 50% incentive has done its job as a bootstrap parameter. We no longer need to give away half the revenue to maintain healthy replenishment activity. 2\. Treasury is overpaying for the same outcome The borrower always pays 100% of the replenishment cost as new DOLA debt. This proposal only changes the split: * Before: 50% to caller, 50% to DAO * After: 10% to caller, 90% to DAO 3\. 10% is still enough to keep things running We don’t want to push incentives so low that: * Small deficits remain unreplenished for a long time, or * Gas economics no longer make sense for callers. At 10%: * Larger deficits still pay a meaningful absolute reward. * Existing bots already monitor FiRM, so infra cost is largely sunk. * If we ever observe persistent unreplenished deficits or degraded behavior, governance can revisit the parameter. ## On-Chain Actions For all active FiRM markets (of which there are 28 currently, so this will be split into 2 on-chain proposals, of 14 markets each), defined as markets that: * have `totalDebt > 100 DOLA`, or * have `borrowPaused == false`, perform: * `setReplenismentIncentiveBps(1000)` This sets `replenishmentIncentiveBps` to 10% on those markets, shifting replenishment revenue to 90% DAO / 10% caller without changing DBR pricing, liquidations, or user-facing mechanics.
# Offboard the st-yETH Market on FiRM Forum Thread: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/offboard-the-st-yeth-market-on-firm/626 ## Summary This proposal initiates the orderly offboarding of the st-yETH FiRM market due to a sustained deterioration of its liquid value, operational integrity, and redeemability of the largest component of its backing, apxETH, which no longer has sufficient on-chain liquidation routing. These structural changes materially impair the true liquidatable value of st-yETH when used as collateral on FiRM. To mitigate this risk, the proposal reduces the st-yETH market Collateral Factor to 50%, sets the Liquidation Factor to 100%, sets the Market Ceiling to 0, and pauses the market to prevent new borrowing. Existing borrowers should close their positions and fully repay any outstanding debt on this market. A follow-up proposal will be introduced if necessary to fully offboard any remaining market debt after the actions of this proposal are executed. ## Background yETH has been available on FiRM as a liquid staking derivative vault token intended to provide diversified ETH staking exposure through Yearn’s basket of LSTs. Its value relies on frictionless redemptions of its underlying components, making the integrity of each constituent asset critical to its suitability as collateral. A recent and significant degradation in yETH’s collateral profile stems from apxETH, which has undergone major structural changes following Dinero’s recent dissolution and product [acquisition by Plume](https://plume.org/blog/plume-to-acquire-dinero-accelerating-institutional-eth-sol-btc-expansion). This acquisition has resulted in the removal of all product and governance token incentives (e.g. pxETH, pxSOL, sDINERO), eliminating the fast-withdraw mechanisms that previously supported pxETH’s immediate liquidity and redemption reliability. Under the new model, pxETH withdrawals require Ethereum’s standard 32 ETH validator queue minimums, causing sub-32 pxETH redemptions to commonly sit in multi-week queues awaiting fulfillment. Dinero’s user interface currently estimates delays of roughly 50 days for smaller pxETH withdrawal requests and the [Ethereum validator queue](https://www.validatorqueue.com/) is 32 days for large withdraws / Yearn rebalancing. It’s unclear at this time if Plume will resume supporting pxETH functionality such as fast-withdraw liquidity incentivization or if Dinero will continue maintaining UI/UX post acquisition. ## Motivation Although pxETH maintains a theoretical 1:1 economic guarantee with ETH, its realizable liquidity is no longer compatible with FiRM’s need for predictable, on-chain unwindability. These constraints create a structural mismatch where redemptions are delayed and impaired in practice. More critically, this materially impacts the true value of yETH on FiRM because roughly 30% of its composition (apxETH) no longer has sufficient on-chain liquidation routing. In effect, a large portion of yETH’s backing cannot be unwound in a manner that preserves collateral value for FiRM during liquidation events. On-chain DEX liquidity conditions illustrate this deterioration, documented in the [RWG’s observer checklist](https://forum.inverse.finance/t/behind-the-scenes-risk-observer-checklist/379). The yETH/ETH Curve pool currently stands at approximately $2.2M, a ~37% decline from October averages, and continues to trend downward. pxETH liquidity has thinned as well, with the pxETH/WETH Curve pool sitting around $1.88M TVL and poor pairing depth, leaving it incapable of absorbing meaningful redemptions. Simulating an unwind of yETH’s apxETH exposure (894 pxETH) shows ~85% slippage, yielding only ~125 ETH (~$380,000). This level of impairment demonstrates that yETH’s pxETH-backed portion cannot be liquidated through on-chain DEX’s without catastrophic loss, even in benign conditions. This issue is compounded by yETH’s governance woes. Despite Dinero’s dissolution, Yearn governance has yet to adjust exposure to pxETH. The lack of corrective action suggests governance stagnation and reduces confidence that the vault will address this or any future problematic concentration in the foreseeable future. ## Offboarding Rationale Taken together, pxETH’s degraded redemption mechanics, the persistent apxETH overweight within yETH, declining AMM liquidity across both assets, and inactive upstream governance all point to a sustained and compounding deterioration in yETH’s liquid collateral value. These conditions render the asset unsuitable for continued use as FiRM collateral and justify initiating its orderly offboarding. Fully removing the market also eliminates the need for RWG to continue overseeing an upstream asset mix that we neither control nor that appears to be actively maintained. ## On-Chain Actions 1.) Set st-yETH Collateral Factor to 50% * A follow-up proposal will be introduced if necessary, further reducing collateral factor until all remaining market debt is repaid. 2.) Set st-yETH Liquidation Factor to 100% 3.) Set st-yETH Market Ceiling to 0 4.) Pause st-yETH market borrows
# Update the INV Price Feed - 2 # Update INV Price Feed to Dynamic-Fee INV/WETH Curve Oracle Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/update-the-inv-price-feed-2/628 ## Summary This proposal updates the INV/USD price feed used by FiRM and Frontier to: 1. Migrate from the current [INV/WETH](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6bd88c57523bf138a19b263e8ebc8661c836b171) Curve pool to the new higher-fee [INV/WETH](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdcd90d866ff9636e5a04768825d05d27b3fb19ec) Curve pool; and 2. Replace the existing `ChainlinkCurve2CoinsFeed` with a new `DynamicFeeCurveFeed` that explicitly accounts for the Curve pool’s trading fee. The goal is for FiRM and Frontier to use a price that reflects INV’s net-of-fee executable value in our main liquidity pool. ## Background * INV is currently priced via a Chainlink \+ Curve oracle: * Chainlink WETH/USD price, combined with * Curve INV/WETH twocrypto-ng EMA (`price_oracle()`). * The DAO is migrating INV liquidity and routing to a new INV/WETH Curve pool configured with a higher trading fee. * With the higher fee, the mid-price from the pool (EMA) overstates the value a liquidator can actually realize after paying fees. To keep the oracle aligned with where INV trades and make pricing slightly more conservative, we introduce a dynamic-fee-aware variant. ## DynamicFeeCurveFeed Overview The new oracle contract, `DynamicFeeCurveFeed`, keeps the same basic structure: * Uses `IChainlinkBasePriceFeed` for WETH → USD (18 decimals). * Uses the new INV/WETH Curve pool for: * `price_oracle()` (EMA of the INV/WETH rate), and * `fee()` (dynamic pool fee, 1e10 precision). * Returns INV/USD with 18 decimals and description INV / USD. Price calculation (simplified): * Get `pairedTokenToUsdPrice` (WETH/USD) from Chainlink. * Get `crvOraclePrice` from `curvePool.price_oracle()`, which is WETH/INV * Compute INV/USD * Fetch `fee = curvePool.fee()`, clamp it to `maxFee` (initially 2%, equal to the pools maximum fee). * Apply the discount: `usdPrice = usdPrice * (1 - fee)`. This makes the oracle reflect a post-fee price, bounded by a governance-controlled maxFee (0–100%). The contract also includes a simple gov / pendingGov pattern and a setMaxFee(int \_maxFee) function restricted to gov. ## Rationale * We are already relying on the INV/WETH Curve pool as the main liquidity venue for INV. * With the new pool’s higher fee, using a pure mid-price (price\_oracle()) overestimates the value available to liquidators and arbitrageurs. * Applying the Curve fee in the oracle: * Keeps assumptions closer to real execution, and * Introduces a small, bounded conservative bias that improves risk management for FiRM and Frontier. ## On-Chain Actions * Update FiRM INV Feed * Update Frontier INV Feed * Update sINV price feed
# Migrate DBR Helpers to New TriDBR Pool # Proposal to Migrate DBR Helpers to New TriDBR Pool Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/migrate-dbr-helpers-to-new-tridbr-pool/627 ## TL;DR * FiRM helper contracts (ALE, PendlePTHelper, DbrHelper) currently route via the old TriDBR pool. * Liquidity is migrating to the new TriDBR pool, so we’re upgrading helpers to use it. * This proposal: * Enables the new helper contracts, * Executes a one-shot migrator to copy configuration from the old ALE, * Then disables the legacy helpers. * No changes to market parameters or user positions, this is purely a routing / infra upgrade. ## Background To improve the FiRM UX, we use several helper contracts that abstract common flows such as: * Buying/selling DBR * Leveraging and deleveraging positions (ALE) * Interacting with Pendle PT markets Today, these helpers have hard-coded routing that assumes DBR–DOLA–INV liquidity is in the [old TriDBR](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc7de47b9ca2fc753d6a2f167d8b3e19c6d18b19a) Curve pool. As liquidity is being migrated to the [new TriDBR](https://etherscan.io/address/0x66da369fc5dbba0774da70546bd20f2b242cd34d) pool, the existing helpers would increasingly route through a shallow / deprecated pool, degrading execution and UX. To avoid this, we deploy updated helpers that integrate with the new pool: ## Objective Update FiRM infra so that: * All helper flows (ALE, DBR selling, Pendle PT helper flows) use the new TriDBR pool. * Governance retains ownership/control of the new helper contracts. * Legacy helpers are cleanly disabled to avoid confusion or mis-routing. This proposal only: 1. Enables the new ALE contract on the borrow controller, 2. Executes a migration contract that: * Claims pending gov on the new helpers, * Copies ALE market configuration from the old ALE, * Re-approves FiRM markets on the new DbrHelper, 3. Transfers governance back to DAO gov, 4. Disallows the old helpers. No FiRM market parameters, user escrows, or DBR logic are changed. ## New Contracts: * ALE: [0x39D167Fe676EFC3be49bE874a37349A5D89f9058](https://etherscan.io/address/0x39d167fe676efc3be49be874a37349a5d89f9058#code) * PendlePTHelper: [0x719C47071bea36fD2b2287bBe6efa872A594Fb78](https://etherscan.io/address/0x719c47071bea36fd2b2287bbe6efa872a594fb78#code) * DbrHelper: [0x3363Ad5780316Fd5180Bb9F34297B533fb9cB335](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3363ad5780316fd5180bb9f34297b533fb9cb335#code) * Migration Contract: [0x043646A09FA89a1d8f48788008E70299BB269855](https://etherscan.io/address/0x043646a09fa89a1d8f48788008e70299bb269855#code) The Migration contract: * Reads the current ALE market configuration from the legacy ALE, * Sets the equivalent markets on the new ALE, * Calls approveMarket on the new DbrHelper for the same set of markets, * Handles pending gov for both new ALE and new DbrHelper. ## On-Chain Actions The governance proposal will perform the following actions: 1. Enable new helpers on the borrow controller * Allow the new ALE contract to borrow / operate as helpers on FiRM (same permissions as the legacy helpers). 2. Execute the migrator * Call `migrate()` on the migration contract * This: * Claims pending gov on the new ALE and DbrHelper, * Copies ALE markets from the old ALE to the new ALE, * Calls `approveMarket` for all relevant FiRM markets on the new DbrHelper, * Sets pending gov of both contracts back to DAO governance. 3. Accept governance on new helpers * Governance (GOV) accepts ownership / gov role on: * ALEV2 * DbrHelper 4. Disable legacy helpers * Remove / disallow the following legacy helper contracts from the borrow controller: * Old ALE * Old Curve Helper
# Deprecate the FiRM Fed Global Ceiling # Proposal to Deprecate the FiRM Fed Global Ceiling Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/deprecate-the-firm-fed-global-ceiling/623 ## TL;DR * What: Raise the FiRM Fed’s global supply ceiling to a practically non-binding level so it no longer constrains operations. * Why: The global ceiling adds little risk control beyond per-market ceilings, but it does create operational friction (hard caps on idle liquidity). ## Background The [FiRM Fed](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2b34548b865ad66a2b046cb82e59ee43f75b90fd#code) mints/burns DOLA into approved FiRM markets. In `expansion()`, two checks gate supply: * Global: `globalSupply + amount <= supplyCeiling` * Per-market: `supplies[market] + amount <= ceilings[market]` Other relevant guardrails: * Only the chair can call expansion/contraction; only gov can change ceilings/chair. * Expansion is blocked if a market is paused (`borrowPaused()` check). * Only whitelisted markets (`dbr.markets(address(market))`) can be targeted. Note: Raising the global ceiling does not mint DOLA. It only relaxes the aggregate cap. All per-market ceilings remain fully binding. ## Motivation The global ceiling has become an operational constraint without adding material risk control: * It prevents leaving healthy idle DOLA in lower-utilization markets (e.g., ETH-collateral markets) even when per-market ceilings are conservative. That can deter new borrowers who want to see available liquidity before opening positions. * Risk is already budgeted at the market level via `ceilings[market]`. Those limits are what actually shape exposure and are the knobs we tune as collateral, liquidity, and oracle conditions evolve. * The global ceiling introduces a “sum of all markets” choke point that we repeatedly trip on, not for risk reasons (e.g., juggling liquidity between markets). By setting the global ceiling to a very high value, we effectively deprecate it while keeping all per-market ceilings and existing checks intact. This high value is proposed to be 100 billion DOLA. ## What Changes vs. What Stays the Same * Stays: Per-market ceilings (primary risk limit), borrow-pause check, chair-only control, and ability to contract supply at any time. * Changes: The global ceiling no longer binds day-to-day operations; the Fed Chair can pre-fund markets up to their individual ceilings without tripping an aggregate cap. ## On-Chain Action * Set FiRM Fed’s global ceiling to 100,000,000,000 DOLA
# Adjust CVX Market Parameters on FiRM Forum: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/adjust-cvx-market-parameters-on-firm/621 ## Summary This proposal reduces the Collateral Factor for the CVX Market on FiRM from 70% to 65% and increases the Liquidation Factor from 60% to 100%. Following the October 10th market event, Chainlink has re-tuned Off-Chain Reporting (OCR) timing parameters for the CVX/USD feed to improve transaction inclusion latency under network congestion. These updated risk settings work in conjunction with the oracle improvements to secure the CVX FiRM market and enable safe resumption of lending activity. ## Background The most critical period on October 10th occurred during the crash epicenter between 21:17-21:25 UTC (8 minutes), when CVX/USD fell from approximately $2.30 to $0.98, a 58% decline compressed into five consecutive oracle rounds. Each of these updates exceeded 5-25% deviation, with the largest single-round move at -25.1%. As these delayed updates posted, previously healthy positions were suddenly pushed below liquidation thresholds, creating a multi-block liquidation cascade confirmed in FiRM liquidation traces. Because only 60% of each position could be liquidated at a time, several accounts required multiple transactions to close, amplifying network congestion and realized slippage. Read the full technical analysis: October 10th Stress Test: FiRM Performance Analysis. ### Coordination with Chainlink Members of the RWG and TWG have been coordinating since with Chainlink’s data team to review the CVX/USD feed and discuss mitigation strategies. The Chainlink team confirmed that OCR timing parameters have been re-tuned to improve transaction inclusion reliability during high-congestion periods, following RWG’s request. These optimizations are expected to significantly reduce, but not fully eliminate block-inclusion latency under stress conditions. Until the release of new latency performance metrics (p95/p99), RWG’s risk posture will maintain a conservative collateral configuration to ensure resilience against remaining timing gaps. ## Rationale Lowering the Collateral Factor to 65% provides a safety margin against price-update latency and compressed volatility shocks, while increasing the Liquidation Factor to 100% ensures each liquidation fully clears borrower debt in one step. This configuration directly addresses the October 10th cascade pattern, preventing recursive partial liquidations and strengthening FiRM’s stability during extreme events. ## Next Steps Chainlink will review OCR latency and transaction-inclusion metrics for CVX and related feeds (USR/USD, crvUSD/USD, sUSDe/USD, cbBTC/USD, DAI/USD, and CRV/USD) to assess whether tail-latency or deviation-threshold tuning could further enhance responsiveness. These feeds represent FiRM’s highest-leverage and correlation-sensitive markets, and Chainlink’s guidance will inform whether any configuration adjustments are advisable. There are currently three healthy open positions in the CVX Market with combined outstanding debt of 23,000 DOLA. Inverse Finance’s governance process will provide ample time for borrowers to re-manage their positions prior to enforcement of the new parameters. Until the update is live, new borrowing activity will be limited as a precautionary measure. ## On-Chain Actions * Set CVX Market Collateral Factor 65% * Set CVX Market Liquidation Factor 100%
# Proposal to Fund Global Junior Tranche Audit Contest Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/proposal-to-fund-global-junior-tranche-audit-contest/619/1 ## 1. Proposal Summary This proposal requests an increase of 76,000 DOLA to the BBP multisig allowance to fund a public audit contest for the Junior Tranche product on Sherlock. The contest will provide additional security review following the initial private audit, with a split bounty structure that incentivizes thorough examination of the codebase. ## 2. Background The Junior Tranche codebase recently completed a private audit with Sherlock, which identified several findings requiring code fixes. The findings from this initial audit warrant an additional security review to ensure comprehensive coverage before deployment. A public audit contest allows multiple auditors to examine the codebase simultaneously, increasing the likelihood of identifying any remaining edge cases or vulnerabilities. This approach provides broader security coverage compared to a single private audit team. ## 3. Project Details * Junior Tranche Audit Contest - 76,000 DOLA * Base pool: 26,000 DOLA * Critical findings pool: 50,000 DOLA * Duration: 4 days * Start date: November 10, 2025 * Platform: Sherlock The split bounty structure appropriately incentivizes thorough review while managing budget efficiently. If no critical vulnerabilities are found, only the base pool of 26,000 DOLA will be paid out, and the critical findings pool of 50,000 DOLA will remain unspent. **Any unspent allowance will be burnt/revoked.** ## 4. On-Chain Actions * Remaining allowance: 119,060 DOLA (reserved for Monolith security audits, granted [here](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/280)) * New request: 76,000 DOLA (for Junior Tranche audit contest) * Total approval: 195,060 DOLA Set BBP multisig DOLA allowance to 195,060 DOLA
# Re-allocate the FiRM Market Ceilings for USR LP Markets # Proposal to Re-allocate the FiRM Market Ceilings for USR LPs Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/re-allocate-the-firm-market-ceilings-for-usr-lp-markets/620 ## Summary Rebalance the existing $50 million FiRM debt ceiling for the USR-backed LPs by shifting capacity full from DOLA/USR to DOLA/wstUSR. | Variant | Current Ceiling | Proposed Ceiling | Change | | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | | yv-DOLA/USR | $5m | 0 | \-$5m | | DOLA/USR | $20m | 0 | \-$20m | | yv-DOLA/wstUSR | $5m | $10m | \+$5m | | DOLA/wstUSR | $20m | $40m | \+$20m | | Total | $50m | $50m | 0 | The overall risk exposure stays constant; only its distribution changes. ## Background * **Collateral listing**: DOLA/USR LP ([Convex](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/274) & [Yearn](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/275)) was enabled in March 2025; DOLA/wstUSR ([Convex](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/321) & [Yearn](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/320)) was enabled in October 2025 * **Performance**: the USR-backed market has consistently been the top-performing (or one of the top-performing) markets on FiRM ## Motivation * **Better Performance:** The wstUSR variant LP has performed better, despite a lower RESOLV point multiplier (20x compared with 30x on DOLA/USR) * **Long-term sustainability**: Switching to the yield-bearing variant is more sustainable in the long run because the yield will always be available, whereas the value of point incentives is likely to decrease over time. * **Unchanged risk profile**: Total debt, LTV parameters, and oracle sources remain exactly as already approved. ## On-Chain Actions * Set the market ceiling of Yearn DOLA/USR FiRM Market to 0 DOLA * Set the market ceiling of Convex DOLA/USR FiRM Market to 0 DOLA * Set the market ceiling of Yearn DOLA/wstUSR FiRM Market to 10m DOLA * Set the market ceiling of Convex DOLA/wstUSR FiRM Market to 40m DOLA
# Authorize Limited Leverage for use by the TWG # **Authorize the TWG to use limited leverage and hedging in stablecoin portfolio management** Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/authorize-limited-leverage-for-use-by-the-twg/618 ## **TL;DR** * **What:** Permit TWG to deploy low-risk, USD-stablecoin-only leverage and hedges to improve risk-adjusted returns and reduce protocol balance-sheet risk. * **Why:** Increase sustainable yield, hedge protocol exposures (e.g., collateral/borrow side risk), and harvest DOLA volatility in a peg-supportive way. * **How:** Strict guardrails on exposure, LTV, liquidation buffers, per-asset/protocol limits, transparent reporting, and an emergency pause. * **Scope:** On-chain only; FiRM, Curve Lend, Aave v3, Morpho Blue, FraxLend, Fluid and Pendle primitives to start. Start with conservative caps; broaden only via DAO ratification. --- ## **Background** The TWG has managed Inverse’s treasury and liquidity for \~4 years, growing assets from just under \~$2m (INV-heavy) to \>$17m with significantly more diversified holdings. To date, stablecoin reserves have been deployed conservatively (seeding liquidity, earning modest yield). This proposal expands the toolkit to include measured leverage and hedging exclusively within USD-stable markets to enhance returns and reduce risk on the DAO’s balance sheet. --- ## **Objectives (in order of priority)** 1. **Principal safety & peg stability** (DOLA first, everything else second). 2. **Balance-sheet risk reduction** (hedge material protocol exposures). 3. **Stable, defensible yield** (net of borrow costs, fees, and slippage). 4. **Transparency & repeatability** (clear playbooks, controls, and reporting). --- ## **Scope of Strategies** All strategies are **USD-stable oriented** (collateral, debt, and instruments): * Leveraged carry / basis: borrow one stable to long a yield-bearing stable, stable LP, or Pendle PTs to lock in net positive carry. * Hedging: short specific stables where the DAO is long (e.g., collateral on FiRM or treasury assets) to reduce tail risk without forced user unwinds. * DOLA volatility harvesting (peg-supportive): buy DOLA below band and (optionally) borrow-and-sell small sizes near/above band, with strict limits and circuit breakers (details below). **Allowed venues (initial):** * **Debt/credit:** FiRM, Curve Lend, Aave v3, FraxLend, Fluid, Morpho Blue (stable-vs-stable markets). * **Yield legs:** yield-bearing stables, stable LPs (Curve), Pendle PTs (fixed-income style). * **Execution:** on-chain DEXes and routers. Any additions require DAO ratification. **Explicit exclusions (initial):** perps/centralized margin, non-USD assets, under-audited new primitives. --- ## **Risk Guardrails & Definitions** **Portfolio sizing** * Max Net Exposure in leveraged strategies: ≤ 20% of Stable Reserve NAV. **Concentration** * Per-protocol cap: ≤ 10% of Stable Reserve NAV (except FiRM) * Per-asset (unhedged long) cap: ≤ 10% of Stable Reserve NAV (except DOLA, which can be longed without a cap). **Borrow-side risk** * Min liquidation buffer: ≥ 4% to liquidation price when a market-based price oracle is used. * Min liquidation buffer: ≥ 1% to liquidation price when a hard-coded price feed is used (such as PTs on FiRM). **Ops & controls** * **On-chain custody:** TWG controlled multisig only (no CEX custody). * **Emergency pause:** any TWG signer \+ RWG may pause new position entries for a protocol/asset and start an unwind of existing position with rationale shared within 24 hours --- ## **DOLA Policy: Peg-Supportive Volatility Harvest** **Intent:** Allow the DAO to capture some of the volatility that traders currently capture without harming the peg. **Definitions** * **Longs:** When DOLA is below target peg, long sDOLA by using it as collateral, borrowing other stables, and using to buy more sDOLA collateral * **Shorts:** Use FiRM to borrow DOLA, and sell or add to liquidity (if using a DOLA LP collateral), effectively creating a short position **Constraints** * No new net shorting while FiRM incidents are active **Rationale:** This policy is counter-cyclical on dips (supports the peg) and light-touch, opportunistic near peg (never large enough to create sell pressure). It lets the DAO internalize some spread PnL while remaining peg-positive. --- ## **Hedging Example (crvUSD)** * The DAO currently has material crvUSD exposure via FiRM debt and treasury. On yield-basis launch (new code), RWG requested temporary exposure reduction. * Action pattern: open a crvUSD short via long sDOLA funded with crvUSD debt (Curve Lend) or equivalent stable-vs-stable venue. * Payoff: if crvUSD wobbles (or suffers an incident) while FiRM takes losses, the short profits help offset protocol-side losses. If crvUSD is fine, carry cost is bounded and the hedge can be scaled down. * Should the TWG realize profit from a short position while experiencing losses elsewhere, said profit shall be allocated to cover losses in the following prioritized order: Treasury losses, DOLA backing losses, and junior tranche losses. Any remaining profit thereafter will be deposited into the treasury. --- ## **Reporting & Transparency** * **Isolated Multsig:** In order to make tracking positions easier to follow and account for, an isolated multisig will be used for levered positions, at the address: [0x6dB248100cF4908429AB671F33D105311ED7fEF8](https://app.safe.global/home?safe=eth:0x6dB248100cF4908429AB671F33D105311ED7fEF8) * **Quarterly report:** PnL will be included in the stable reserve line item of the soon-to-be-live quarterly DAO financial reports produced by the TWG * **PnL treatment:** * Realized yield net of borrow, fees, and incentives. * Unrealized mark-to-market by pricing providers (UIs, oracles, Coingecko, debank). * Points/airdrops: valued at 0 until liquid; disclosed separately. * **Incidents:** immediate post-mortem. --- **On-Chain Actions** The TWG multisig requires higher token allowances to the DAO Treasury to execute routine capital allocations (deposits/withdrawals) efficiently. These approvals do not authorize discretionary spending; they simply permit repeated transfers of the same token without resetting allowances. For example, moving 250,000 DOLA out and back four times requires a 1,000,000 allowance. The current TWG DOLA allowance is 739,090; this proposal increases it to 2,000,000 to support ongoing treasury management, such as what has been discussed in the above proposal.
# Re-allocate the FiRM Market Ceilings for DOLA/sUSDe LP # Proposal to Re-allocate the FiRM Market Ceilings for DOLA/sUSDe LP Forum Post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/re-allocate-the-firm-market-ceilings-for-dola-susde-lp/612 ## Summary Rebalance the existing $100 million FiRM debt ceiling for the DOLA / sUSDe collateral by shifting capacity from the Yearn vault to the Convex vault: | Variant | Current Ceiling | Proposed Ceiling | Change | | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | | Yearn | $50m | $20m | \-$30m | | Convex | $50m | $80m | \+$30m | | Total | $100m | $100m | 0 | The overall risk exposure stays constant; only its distribution changes. ## Background * **Collateral listing**: DOLA/sUSDe LP ([Convex](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/241) & [Yearn](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/240)) was enabled in November 2024\. * **Ceiling increase**: In December 2024 the [DAO raised each vault’s ceiling](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/253) from $10m to $50m (total $100m). * **Performance**: the DOLA/sUSDe market has consistently been the top-performing (or one of the top-performing) markets on FiRM * **Ethena Sats**: on 22nd October 2025, the Ethena points multiplier to LPs on FiRM was doubled from 15x to 30x, making it far more attractive for users ## Motivation * **Ethena Partnership Milestone**: The Ethena points multiplier for DOLA/sUSDe LPs on FiRM has recently doubled from 15× → 30×, making FiRM’s markets one of the highest-yielding Ethena partner opportunities currently available. This upgrade highlights the strength of Inverse’s collaboration with Ethena and cements DOLA/sUSDe LPs as one of the most attractive points-earning venues in the ecosystem, given the ability to lever it. * **Utilization Disparity:** Despite equal 50M ceilings, the Convex LP is near full utilization (\~40M borrowed) while the Yearn LP remains lightly used (\~10M). Without reallocation, new inflows risk being blocked despite strong borrower demand. * **Unchanged risk profile**: Total debt, LTV parameters, and oracle sources remain exactly as already approved. ## On-Chain Actions * Set the market ceiling of Yearn DOLA/sUSDe FiRM Market to 20m DOLA * Set the market ceiling of Convex DOLA/sUSDe FiRM Market to 80m DOLA
# 3 - Extend the DOLA Payroll Allowance Forum post: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/3-extend-dola-payroll-allowance/613 ## Summary Authorize an additional 271,000 DOLA allowance for the contributor-payroll contract so that all active contributors can continue to receive compensation for the next 60 days while the DAO restructuring is finalized. This follows on from the two previous 30-day and 60-day extensions. ## Context and Problem * Seasonal payroll model – The DAO traditionally funds contributor payments in fixed “seasons” (e.g., S3 → S4). * Pause directive – At my request, working-group heads paused the transition to Season 4 pending a broader restructuring plan. * Result – The dedicated DOLA allowance on the payroll contract has now depleted, halting payouts entirely. Contributors deliver ongoing work that underpins core protocol operations, risk management, and development. It is crucial to continue compensation as it otherwise risks talent loss and operational disruption. ## Extension Calculation * Unclaimed payroll (expected at time of proposal execution) = 30,000 DOLA * Monthly Payroll = 120,500 * Allowance required = 120,500*2 + 30,000 = 271,000 DOLA ## On-Chain Actions * Set DOLA allowance of the payroll contract to 271,000 DOLA
# Proposal to Enable Chainlink CCIP Cross-chain Transfers of sDOLA Forum: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/proposal-to-enable-chainlink-ccip-cross-chain-transfers-of-sdola/611 ## Background This proposal seeks to enable cross-chain functionality for sDOLA tokens using Chainlink's Cross-Chain Interoperability Protocol (CCIP). sDOLA is issued as an ERC-4626 vault token, making it both flexible and portable across different DeFi protocols and applications. The implementation of CCIP cross-chain functionality for sDOLA represents a significant step forward in Inverse Finance's multi-chain strategy. Chainlink CCIP offers a decentralized, secure, and scalable solution for cross-chain communication and asset transfers. This integration will allow sDOLA token holders to transfer their assets seamlessly across Arbitrum, Base, Ethereum, Optimism, and other chains while maintaining exposure to the underlying yield mechanisms. By leveraging Chainlink's proven infrastructure, we can provide users with seamless access to protocol benefits across multiple networks while maintaining the security and decentralization principles core to the Inverse ecosystem. ## Motivation The expansion of sDOLA to multiple chains through CCIP will deliver several key benefits, namely: Enhanced liquidity by enabling seamless token transfers between Ethereum mainnet and L2s, facilitating efficient capital allocation for users and protocols. Improved user experience by providing a unified experience for sDOLA holders regardless of their preferred chain and reduced transaction costs for those operating on L2s Enhanced DOLA stability through fluid cross-chain arbitrage that can quickly correct price discrepancies, compared to native bridging solutions that could leave the peg vulnerable for up to 7 days during periods of imbalance. Expanded protocol integration opportunities with L2-native protocols including DEX’s like Aerodrome, lending markets like Morpho, yield splitting protocols like Pendle, and more. The technical infrastructure will leverage Chainlink's proven security model and decentralized oracle network, implementing a hub-and-spoke architecture with Ethereum as the primary hub while enabling automated exchange rate updates across all supported chains. Implementation Architecture Overview The sDOLA cross-chain integration is built on Chainlink CCIP to provide secure and programmable transfers between Ethereum and supported L2 networks. On Ethereum, tokens are deposited into the canonical LockReleaseTokenPool, where they are locked before a corresponding amount is minted on the destination chain. When sDOLA moves back to Ethereum, the process reverses: tokens on the L2 are burned and the locked amount is released from the pool. Exchange Rate Synchronization Exchange rate synchronization ensures that when sDOLA moves across chains via CCIP, the token’s yield-bearing value remains consistent. The CCIP transfer includes updated exchange rate data, so receipt tokens minted on destination chains accurately reflect the same underlying value as mainnet sDOLA. This prevents drift between chains and preserves parity for users. ## Governance and Security Governance of sDOLA’s CCIP integration is centered on the canonical sDOLA contract on Ethereum and its LockReleaseTokenPool, which locks tokens before issuing cross-chain receipts. Control of the TokenAdminRegistry is delegated to the Inverse Finance governance timelock, ensuring all configuration changes remain under DAO authority. Security is reinforced by Chainlink CCIP’s defense-in-depth architecture, where decentralized oracle networks manage execution, verification, and risk oversight to keep transfers resilient and tamper-proof. ## Technical Specifications This specific proposal will activate deployed code across Ethereum Mainnet, Base, Optimism, Berachain and Arbitrum. The code has already been deployed, but is waiting for governance to take ownership of the govSender contract which controls L2 deployments, as well as CCIP token administration rights, token pool ownership, exchange rate updater ownership and setting the token pool for sDOLA. Once the token pool has been set for sDOLA tokens, CCIP token transfers will be enabled to Base, Arbitrum, Berachain and Optimism. L2s will be using mint/burn token pools with mainnet using a lock/release token pool. To govern contracts on the L2s, governance proxy contracts have been deployed to each respective network, which allow L1 inverse token governance to send messages originating from governance proposals. These messages in turn govern functionality of the smart contracts under its control, similar to how token governance functions on mainnet. ### Deployed Contracts **Ethereum:** - governanceSender: 0x4e521Fe7A9084067096d45A312B8FEeE39D5F1f3 - tokenPool: 0x05eEe76f456C51Be0459EC1c0a78bf177B2c877C - exchangeRateUpdater: 0xd5A3416f7863f306Ca7CD9B12f067FFFd5D57a61 **Base:** - governanceProxy: 0x1C064265E053D23d120c518fDBB542e6537f82d1 - tokenPool: 0xd84e1B7e1a7A8D49167884855c3985ef4bCa45aB - token: 0xCa78ee4544ec5a33Af86F1E786EfC7d3652bf005 - exchangeRateUpdater: 0x7a1e123e41458aabaB8068BFed6010D8f9480898 **Optimism:** - governanceProxy: 0xaF956837AF704D825c1FCbE2651D5c3c37AD5289 - tokenPool: 0x8404024d8F74Ad2D20E82c184816B64D4184A018 - token: 0xfc63C9c8Ba44AE89C01265453Ed4F427C80cBd4E - exchangeRateUpdater: 0xCa78ee4544ec5a33Af86F1E786EfC7d3652bf005 **Arbitrum:** - governanceProxy: 0x607bCd974bB69C78eCdbf0B68748B791bBa24d94 - tokenPool: 0xbbc28DB61DF26B76D5F7D5Eed17eD4D6C278460e - token: 0x7a1e123e41458aabaB8068BFed6010D8f9480898 - exchangeRateUpdater: 0x93685185666c8D34ad4c574B3DBF41231bbfB31b **Berachain:** - governanceProxy: 0x1992AF61FBf8ee38741bcc57d636CAA22A1a7702 - tokenPool: 0x8Bbd036d018657E454F679E7C4726F7a8ECE2773 - token: 0x02eaa69646183c069FC2B64F15923F27B9CF3b03 - exchangeRateUpdater: 0xDE1697A5da5d06904C9755E3FC287D215579Daf0 ## On-chain actions **Action 1:** Accept ownership of sDOLA token in CCIP Token Admin Registry(0xb22764f98dD05c789929716D677382Df22C05Cb6) by calling acceptAdminRole with sDOLA address. **Action 2:** Accept ownership of sDOLA tokenPool by calling acceptOwnership() on tokenPool address(0x05eEe76f456C51Be0459EC1c0a78bf177B2c877C); **Action 3:** Set tokenPool for sDOLA by calling setPool(sDOLA, tokenPool) on tokenAdminRegistry **Action 4:** Accept ownership of govSender(0x4e521Fe7A9084067096d45A312B8FEeE39D5F1f3) on mainnet **Action 5:** Accept ownership of ExchangeRateUpdater(0x4e521Fe7A9084067096d45A312B8FEeE39D5F1f3) on mainnet.
# Pause crvUSD LP Markets on FiRM During Observation Period Forum Link: https://forum.inverse.finance/t/pause-crvusd-lp-markets-on-firm-during-observation-period/609 ### Summary This proposal recommends formally sunsetting four FiRM markets by setting their market ceilings to zero and pausing new borrows. The markets targeted for deprecation include: scrvUSD-sDOLA, yv-scrvUSD-sDOLA, scrvUSD-DOLA, and yv-scrvUSD-DOLA. These actions are part of ongoing operational cleanup initiatives to streamline FiRM’s collateral roster, reduce unnecessary risk exposure, and improve protocol efficiency. ### Motivation As FiRM matures, periodic reviews of its supported collateral markets are essential to maintaining a healthy, efficient lending protocol. The recent passing of Curve DAO governance proposal #1206, which authorized a credit line of up to 60M crvUSD to bootstrap the Yield Basis protocol, represents a fundamental restructuring that warrants immediate risk reassessment. Sunsetting these markets serves multiple objectives. It removes operational overhead from the RWG, reduces the monitoring burden for tracking new protocol dependencies, and minimizes governance surface area around parameters that no longer align with our risk tolerance. From a security perspective, deprecating these markets narrows the protocol’s exposure to tail risks during Yield Basis’s initial operational phase and allows the RWG to focus resources on higher-impact opportunities. ### Background & Rationale The crvUSD LP markets require reassessment following Curve DAO’s approval of a 60M crvUSD pre-mint (~55% of current supply) to bootstrap Yield Basis, a newly deployed leveraged yield farming protocol. Since the initial 60M crvUSD authorization, a new Curve governance proposal has been published seeking to increase crvUSD caps for Yield Basis pools to 300M crvUSD—a figure representing over 2x current total crvUSD supply. This signals the intention for continued aggressive expansion of crvUSD backing into Yield Basis. This structural change introduces new dependencies where crvUSD stability relies on Yield Basis performance, which itself depends on Curve pool mechanics and BTC price action. The magnitude of this change triggers our FiRM Collateral Screening Framework requirement for a hard minimum of 6 months operational history before accepting modified collateral structures. The new backing mechanism moves crvUSD away from its established infrastructure. While Yield Basis has undergone comprehensive security review, the protocol has zero operational history, and the resource allocation required to monitor this experimental phase does not justify the remaining market opportunity. This decision reflects adherence to our collateral screening framework rather than any assessment of Yield Basis’s security or audit quality. The RWG is entering a formal 6-month observation period to assess Yield Basis operational performance through our weekly Risk Observer Checklist. Reassessment criteria for potential future reintroduction include successful operational history with no critical incidents, demonstrated stability under market stress, and material reduction in monitoring overhead requirements aligned with our collateral screening standards. ### On-Chain Actions For each market listed: scrvUSD-sDOLA: pauseBorrows = true, setMarketCeiling = 0 DOLA yv-scrvUSD-sDOLA: pauseBorrows = true, setMarketCeiling = 0 DOLA scrvUSD-DOLA: pauseBorrows = true, setMarketCeiling = 0 DOLA yv-scrvUSD-DOLA: pauseBorrows = true, setMarketCeiling = 0 DOLA
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