0xbc3ed6b5…72c4sent to0x6f3e6272…223d·#18,313,345·view on Etherscan
Appreciate the thoughtful discussion here so far and look forward to more in the coming weeks.
One way or another, the DAO is currently setup to "burn" money. Currently this burn is to arbitragers. I'm not sure if anyone has run the total on what was arbed out in the last for but I'd guess > $2M.
Something has to change.
There are several proposals. The alternatives I am aware of--things like capped exit, timelocking funds--have significant downsides.
Timelocking hurts honest actors: imagine honest forkers trying to leave have their funds cut by a DAO voting to lock the funds away.
Capped exit arbitrarily disadvantages certain nouners owners solely based on the price their noun was sold for at auction. It would warp the secondary market: nouns bought at a higher auction price are worth more. And why? Why does a secondary buyer of a Noun auctioned for a high price deserve more in a fork? Why is an honest actor who bought at a low price and wants to fork capped in how much they can take away?
Moreover the energy of these proposals is hyper focused on eliminating the arbitrage, which I fund uncharismatic. No one want to join a DAO that is primarily focused on not getting arbed.
With the burn, I think we have a chance to fix the arb, while actually being primarily focused on more exciting things. I would support the burn even if the arb was not an issue. Already I see the burn forcing healthy conversation on things that were already issues, like, "What if it just amounts to a new round of funding to past proposers?" If the DAO is captured by past proposers, I'd like to know sooner than later! And the burn is creating efforts to break out to new proposer audiences.
The assumption of the opposition is that having more time leads to better outcomes. Sometimes! Generally not in young organizations. Things tend to happen quickly or not at all. Slow often = dead. Nouns is not a hedge fund with a salaried staff. There is more at play. We need attention from the voters to do well. We need attention from proposers. Slow often means less attention. People stop caring. "Nothing is happening over there."
What's the downside of the burn? It's pretty capped in my opinion. The DAO can vote to remove it. The DAO can mitigate via rapidly distributing the treasury Nouns. There are lots of options.
But I think in the best case we get to test a theory: that Nouns spending more aggressively will lead to better outcomes. And not *just* trying haphazardly to spend more aggressively, but doing so in a legible context: voters and proposers alike know the DAO is highly incentivized to spend X by a certain date. This is super helpful for organizing in a decentralized context.
That's my thinking, eager to hear yours. Let's find the best path, together 🫡
*sent from voter.wtf*