# [TMC Housekeeping] Deprecate the Aera Vendor Vault & Avantgarde Treasury Vehicle
The Treasury Management RFP has concluded and the Avantgarde COMP strategy ($4.2M) was not selected. This housekeeping proposal deprecates it, together with the near-empty Aera Vendor Vault ($8K), by placing the Vendor Vault's ownership with the TMC's Treasury Timelock and severing Avantgarde's external operator access so the committee can wind both down and redeploy into the selected strategies, within the audited Escrow/Timelock architecture the DAO approved in Prop 580 (2-day delay; the DAO keeps its 60-day termination right).
For the Vendor Vault this finishes the transfer Prop 580 left half-done: Prop 580 set the Treasury Timelock as pendingOwner but the accept was never made, so the vault has sat in limbo. This proposal accepts it.
This proposal only transfers control already approved by governance and performs low-level, amount-independent cleanup. The actual liquidation and disbursement are executed by the TMC afterward as ordinary operations; no market/price-sensitive transfers are included here.
# Renewing the Compound Governance Working Group (CGWG) 2026
### Overview
Since its establishment in mid-2024, the Compound Governance Working Group (CGWG) has played an important role in shaping the evolution of Compound governance. Initially, CGWG concentrated on strengthening the protocol’s governance framework, with a focus on increasing both the quality and quantity of delegate participation. This early work aimed to make governance more robust, inclusive, and effective.
Over time, the CGWG has expanded its mandate beyond immediate governance improvements to also address the long-term sustainability of the Compound DAO. This now includes organizing Delegate Races 1 and 2 to delegate a voting power to trusted entities, stabilizing participation and quorum; safeguarding governance through work on the Community multisig, including signer rotations and extending the Proposal Guardian; and coordinating the delegation of idle COMP from sources like the Avantgarde Avatar Safe to ensure voting power is fully mobilized. The group also ran multiple RFP processes, for the Security Service Provider, Voting Service Provider, and OEV setup, bringing structure and neutrality to vendor selection. These programs have been conducted directly in coordination with the Compound Foundation, allowing for cost savings and increased revenue streams.
The CGWG also helps manage multisigs such as Immunefi Bug Bounty, Compound Blue Incentives, and the Scroll Airdrop safes, hosts bi-weekly community calls, moderates the forums, and provides research. Collectively, these contributions ensure both daily governance reliability and long-term protocol resilience.
### Further Information:
To see the full proposal scope of work and review deliverables from the previous engagement, please refer to the following form post: [https://www.comp.xyz/t/renewing-the-compound-governance-working-group-cgwg-2026/7566.](https://www.comp.xyz/t/renewing-the-compound-governance-working-group-cgwg-2026/7566.)
### Renewal Details
The CGWG will consist of PGov & Arana Digital going forward. We recently concluded our first full year of operations in December. Based on feedback from the Foundation, the CGWG has revised its compensation structure to reduce fixed costs while introducing explicit performance-based accountability.
Base Compensation:
* $19,000 USDC per month for 14 months
* Total base budget: $266,000 USDC
* Term: December 1, 2025 through February 1, 2027
This represents an 18.5% reduction from the prior base compensation level of approximately $23,300 per month, while sustaining increased operational scope and responsibilities outlined in this proposal. Funds for months without existing compensation will be transferred as a lump sum to the CGWG, with all remaining funds streamed over time through February 1, 2027.
Performance-Based Compensation (KPI Pool)
* $64,000 USDC total performance bonus pool
* Held in a shared multisig between the Compound Foundation and CGWG
The Foundation has requested a set of KPIs including maintaining quorum reliability such that at least 95% of standard on-chain proposals successfully reach quorum; ensuring sustained delegate engagement through bi-yearly Delegate Race rebalances, with recipients maintaining at least 80% weighted voting participation; meeting strict emergency governance service-level expectations, defined as zero missed response windows for time-sensitive governance events within a 4–6 hour window; and preserving governance security by ensuring that no malicious governance attempts are executed successfully. The performance-based compensation pool is contingent on the CGWG meeting this defined set of governance and operational KPIs over the term, coordinating closely with the Foundation to unlock this budget only if they are met. Funds will be held in a shared multisig with the Foundation and quarterly reviews will be conducted.
# Compound Foundation Reimbursement
### Summary:
This proposal seeks authorization for the transfer of USDC from the Compound DAO Treasury to the Compound Foundation at 0x27944bC193AF572136b0f370Ca738514D52f7c80, reimbursing the Foundation for COMP that it fronted to enable the successful execution of governance proposal 504, and soon, proposal 510.
The reimbursement will be made in USDC rather than COMP due to the current unavailability of adequate COMP balances within DAO-controlled contracts, including the treasury and Comptroller.
### Proposal Details:
In order to ensure timely execution of proposals 504 and 510, the Compound Foundation temporarily provided/will provide 30.5k COMP from its budget. These COMP tokens were required to be sent to the Comptroller contract to satisfy onchain requirements for governance execution.
* 24,000 COMP has already been delivered to the Comptroller.
* 6,500 COMP remains to be transferred as part of the finalized workflow and will be completed before this present proposal’s voting period goes live.
* Total COMP fronted by the Foundation: 30,500 COMP.
The Foundation provided these tokens on a short-term basis with the understanding that the DAO would reimburse the value of the COMP. A timely reimbursement of the fronted assets is now required to ensure no disruptions in Foundation operations. Importantly, this transfer of funds does not provide the Foundation with additional funding. It is purely a reimbursement.
At present, DAO treasury and Comptroller balances do not contain sufficient COMP to reimburse in kind. So, the most appropriate reimbursement mechanism is a USDC transfer equal to the economic value of the COMP provided. The Foundation will then buy back COMP using the USDC.
**Below are the specific pricing details:**
* Proposal 504: 24,000 COMP valued at $31.91, totaling $765,840
* Proposal 510: 6,500 COMP valued at $35.54, totaling $231,010
Because the Foundation advanced these assets ahead of reimbursement and assumes financing risk, a 10% buffer is applied to the overall USDC reimbursement, equating to $99,685.
**Total reimbursement amount: $1,096,535 USDC**
### Cause for Reimbursement:
The Comptroller contract is responsible for distributing COMP rewards to users across Compound v2 markets. As users claim their accumulated rewards, whether individually or via automated claim processes, the Comptroller’s available COMP balance naturally declines over time.
Recently, a substantial amount of accumulated COMP rewards was claimed. Since the Comptroller contract is responsible for distributing COMP rewards, these claims reduced the amount of COMP held within the Comptroller. As a result, the Comptroller’s available COMP balance fell below the threshold required to support the execution of proposals 504 and 510, both of which involve COMP transfers as part of their onchain actions.
To ensure these governance proposals are processed without delay, the Compound Foundation temporarily provided/will provide the necessary COMP from its operational budget.
# Renew Proposal Guardian Role for the Community Multisig
## Description
This proposal aims to update the `ProposalGuardian` of the Compound Governor contract to the community multisig with an expiration of 12 months, extending until **September 12, 2026**.
The `ProposalGuardian` was last updated in [**Proposal 423**](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/compound/proposal/423?govId=eip155:1:0x309a862bbC1A00e45506cB8A802D1ff10004c8C0), where an expiration date was set for **September 11, 2025**. Since this expiration date has passed, this proposal is being submitted to renew the ProposalGuardian role for the community multisig and extend its validity for another 12 months.
## **Actions**
Call [`setProposalGuardian`](https://etherscan.io/address/0x309a862bbC1A00e45506cB8A802D1ff10004c8C0#writeProxyContract#F22) on the Compound Governor contract to set the [**community multisig**](https://etherscan.io/address/0xbbf3f1421D886E9b2c5D716B5192aC998af2012c) as the new `ProposalGuardian`, with an expiration timestamp of **1789229978 (Saturday, September 12, 2026).**
## **Tenderly Simulation Failure Explanation**
Although the proposal simulation linked in the Tally UI is failing, the proposal should execute successfully in production.
**Reasoning:**
* Proposals are first submitted to the Compound Governor via `propose()`.
* After the voting period ends and quorum is reached, the proposal is queued in the Governor, which then queues it in the Timelock.
* Once the Timelock delay passes, the proposal is executed in the Governor.
* The transaction calldata is first saved in the `_governanceCall` queue, and then the Timelock is called to execute the transaction.
During the Tenderly simulation, the Timelock is impersonated without `Governor.execute` being called, meaning `_governanceCall` is not populated. This causes the transaction to revert in the simulation, but in a real execution, it should succeed as expected.
# Finalize Security Service Provider Engagement (2025)
## Summary
This proposal enacts the outcome of the Compound DAO’s recent Security Service Provider (SSP) Request for Proposal (RFP) process. Following a multi-week evaluation by the Compound Foundation, the DAO has elected to appoint **ChainSecurity and Certora** as its joint security service providers for a 12-month term beginning August 18, 2025. In parallel, the DAO will also engage ZeroShadow to deliver incident response and monitoring services over the same period.
**The total authorized budget is $2,000,000 USD, allocated as follows:**
* ChainSecurity & Certora: $1,750,000
* ZeroShadow: $250,000
This RFP process has allowed the DAO to solicit a multitude of robust proposals, ensuring a smooth transition from the existing relationship with OpenZeppelin, while opening Compound to a near 50% reduction in security-based expenditure without a reduction in service provider quality.
## Background
In July 2025, the Compound Foundation, working alongside the Compound Governance Working Group (CGWG), [<u>initiated an RFP</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/request-for-proposal-rfp-compound-dao-security-service-provider-ssp/6955) to identify the DAO’s next security partner(s). The goal was to establish comprehensive protocol security coverage and improve cost efficiency, while ensuring continuous support for governance proposals, protocol upgrades, and any other developments that Compound engages in.
The RFP outlined a 12-month engagement covering smart contract audits, governance proposal review, deployment assessments, incident readiness, monitoring services, and vCISO appointment. Multiple leading security firms submitted proposals; all of their proposals can be viewed in [<u>this thread</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/request-for-proposal-rfp-compound-dao-security-service-provider-ssp/6955).
After thoroughly evaluating each submission, the Compound Foundation issued a [<u>formal recommendation</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compound-foundations-security-service-provider-recommendation/7047/1) to the DAO. Evaluation of all proposals was based on a six-point framework:
* Technical expertise in auditing, testing, and multi-chain support
* Audit methodology and deliverable quality
* vCISO & advisory capabilities, including personnel, experience, and availability
* Compound & DeFi familiarity based on past work and onboarding readiness
* Market reputation and engagement history
* Pricing & value, measured by overall scope, personnel commitment, and service clarity
Accordingly, the Foundation proposed appointing ChainSecurity and Certora as joint SSPs, along with engaging ZeroShadow for complementary incident response capabilities.
From July 28 to August 4, [<u>a Snapshot vote</u>](https://snapshot.box/#/s:comp-vote.eth/proposal/0x29f34f6cae855cb2605b81d490db7a13565be448a72b5f7a3d121db4b1a0cc49) was held to determine the DAO’s preferred SSP. The outcome was as follows:
* ChainSecurity & Certora: 425.3k votes (94.38%) — declared the winner
* Cyfrin: 25.3k votes (5.62%)
**This present onchain vote is the final step to enact the decision made via Snapshot, officially signing ChainSecurity and Certora as Compound DAO’s new SSP team.**
## Scope of Engagement
Under the terms of the RFP and the Foundation’s recommendation, responsibilities will be divided between two specialized engagements:
**1. ChainSecurity and Certora** 
Acting as the DAO’s SSPs, ChainSecurity and Certora will jointly:
* Lead technical assessments of protocol upgrades, governance proposals, and token onboarding efforts. They will provide actionable feedback, verify execution paths, and ensure proposed changes meet Compound’s security standards before being enacted. The review process will be tightly integrated with the governance lifecycle and include formal reporting. 
* Provide high-touch security advisory services, including a dedicated technical lead to act as Compound’s virtual CISO (vCISO). This CISO will help bridge audits with governance, align protocol improvements with security best practices, and ensure DAO contributors understand and can act on security findings. They will coordinate audit scheduling, delivery, and reporting timelines in alignment with governance proposal windows and DAO expectations. The Foundation will define prioritization when needed.
These security teams were recommended due to:
* Deep Compound experience: ChainSecurity has audited prior Compound V3 deployments and governance proposals, bringing firsthand knowledge of the protocol’s architecture and risk profile.
* Formal verification leadership: Certora is a pioneer in formal verification tooling, offering advanced techniques for proving correctness of complex smart contract systems.
* vCISO support and technical strength: The engagement is led by ChainSecurity’s senior leadership, with multiple engineers available full-time to support audits, governance reviews, and real-time advisory.
* Trusted by top protocols: Both firms have secured protocols like Aave, Uniswap, Maker, and Ethereum Foundation, and are widely respected for their focus on correctness and systematic risk reduction.
* Long-term alignment: Both teams have demonstrated consistent DAO engagement and the ability to grow with protocols as complexity scales.
**2. ZeroShadow (Monitoring and Incident Response)** 
ZeroShadow will deliver continuous operational security coverage by:
* Setting up a monitoring solution and tuning detection logic to reduce alert noise, utilizing the latest methodologies including AI
* Triaging alerts in real time and coordinating incident response
* Responding to governance attacks, smart contract exploits, phishing attempts, and multisig compromise
* Running tabletop exercises and improving preparedness of the protocol to proactively respond and resolve security incidents in coordination with the Community Multisig
After ZeroShadow was named as a vendor in two separate SSP proposals, the Foundation included the team as a complement to the above two SSPs. Carving out this incidence response engagement allows Compound to benefit from 24/7/365 coverage with a virtual Security Operations Center (vSOC).
## Onchain Vote Execution Details
If passed, this proposal will authorize the creation of two COMP token streams via the Compound Streamer:
**Total Budget**: $2,000,000
* $1,750,000 for ChainSecurity & Certora
* $250,000 for ZeroShadow
Both of the above will have their own dedicated stream.
**Duration**: 12 months starting **August 18, 2025**
* \_streamDuration = 31,536,000 seconds (365 days)
**Payment Mechanism:** Funds will be streamed in COMP tokens through the[ <u>Compound Streamer</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compound-streamer-universal-asset-streaming-infrastructure/6861). The amount of COMP streamed will be USD-adjusted using Chainlink price feeds to ensure the vendors receive the agreed $2M USD equivalent over the 12-month term. Upon submission of the onchain vote, a 10% buffer will be applied to each stream, meaning a total of ~$2,200,000 of COMP will enter the Streamers upon proposal execution. This is meant to accommodate for COMP volatility. At the time of onchain vote submission, 45,000 COMP approximates the $2.2M total, of which, 39,375 will be deposited in the ChainSecurity & Certora stream, and 5,625 will be allocated to the ZeroShadow stream.
**Stream Recipient (\_recipient)**:
* ChainSecurity & Certora reception address: 0xa1fa21665daA59f27046110CC2f58218b6343A2B
* Stream address: [<u>0x334791289a906Ac8f96ac0f90E7A91Bf4AaE4A60</u>](https://etherscan.io/address/0x334791289a906ac8f96ac0f90e7a91bf4aae4a60)
* ZeroShadow reception address: 0x9FAEaBCeD4C29F030d40A83F1a7822624d67f904
* Stream address: [<u>0xAF9CEE006AE377e88f3BBd668e3d67807F546Bd8</u>](https://etherscan.io/address/0xaf9cee006ae377e88f3bbd668e3d67807f546bd8)
**Slippage Amount (\_slippage)**: 1%
* Slippage ensures that every time the vendors claim, the Streamer converts the accrued USD amount into COMP using the current Chainlink price feed, with up to a 1% buffer to handle small price fluctuations and keep payments fair.
**Claim Cooldown (\_claimCooldown)**: 604,800 seconds (7 days)
* This is the minimum time between claims. Once the vendors claim accrued COMP tokens, they can’t claim again for 7 days.
**Stream Cancellation Rights:**
* The DAO retains the authority to cancel the stream if SLAs are not met and/or KPIs materially deviate from the agreed terms.
* Any cancellation request must be explicated on the forums by the Compound Foundation, giving the service providers a 60-day notice for pausing the stream (\_minimumNoticePeriod = 5,184,000 seconds). An onchain proposal must call the terminateStream() function in order for cancellation to occur.
## RFP Process References
* **RFP Template and Applications Thread:**[ <u>Request for Proposal: Compound DAO Security Service Provider (SSP)</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/request-for-proposal-rfp-compound-dao-security-service-provider-ssp/6955)
* **ChainSecurity Proposal:** [<u>Part 1</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/request-for-proposal-rfp-compound-dao-security-service-provider-ssp/6955/3), [<u>Part 2</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/request-for-proposal-rfp-compound-dao-security-service-provider-ssp/6955/4)
* **ZeroShadow Overview:** [<u>link</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/request-for-proposal-rfp-compound-dao-security-service-provider-ssp/6955/33)
* **Foundation Recommendation:**[ <u>link</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compound-foundations-security-service-provider-recommendation/7047)
* **Snapshot Results:** [<u>forum post</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compound-foundations-security-service-provider-recommendation/7047/6), [<u>vote</u>](https://snapshot.box/#/s:comp-vote.eth/proposal/0x29f34f6cae855cb2605b81d490db7a13565be448a72b5f7a3d121db4b1a0cc49)
# Voting Service Provider RFP: Finalize Tally Enterprise Agreement (2025)
### Following the successful completion of the VSP RFP and Snapshot vote, **this on-chain proposal authorizes the formal engagement of Tally Enterprise as Compound DAO’s VSP for the next year-long term. Execution of this proposal finalizes this agreement based on the terms substantiated in** [**Tally's RFP submission**](https://www.comp.xyz/t/request-for-proposal-rfp-compound-dao-voting-service-provider-vsp/6845/16)**.**
## RFP Results:
* Winning Vendor: Tally Enterprise
* Snapshot Support: 71.11% (552.9k votes)
* Reference Links: [<u>Original RFP</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/request-for-proposal-rfp-compound-dao-voting-service-provider-vsp/6845) |[ <u>Final Review</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/voting-service-provider-rfp-final-review/6942) |[ <u>Snapshot Results</u>](https://snapshot.box/#/s:comp-vote.eth/proposal/0x1d596409a8d530f17c8c7dd9d963873d02fb06cd43612cb987935666fa4bc045)
## Funding Terms:
**Total Budget:** $150,000
**Duration:** 12 months starting August 1, 2025
**Total Budget:** $150,000
**Duration:** 12 months starting August 1, 2025
* *\_streamDuration* = 31,536,000 seconds (365 days)
**Payment Mechanism:** Funds will be streamed in COMP tokens through the [<u>Compound Streamer</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compound-streamer-universal-asset-streaming-infrastructure/6861). The amount of COMP streamed will be USD-adjusted using Chainlink price feeds to ensure Tally receives the agreed $150,000 USD equivalent over the 12-month term. Upon submission of the onchain vote, a 10% buffer will be applied to the stream deposit, meaning ~$165,000 of COMP will enter the Streamer upon proposal execution. This is meant to accommodate for COMP volatility. At the time of onchain vote submission, 3000 COMP approximates the $150k total, warranting a 3300 COMP deposit into the streamer after accounting for the buffer.
**Stream Address:** [0x36a0eB84154797DAdCEaCFD046785dB31094C308](https://etherscan.io/address/0x36a0eB84154797DAdCEaCFD046785dB31094C308)
**Stream Recipient (*\_recipient*):** 0x7E90E03654732ABedF89Faf87f05BcD03ACEeFdC (Tally’s address)
**Slippage Amount (*\_slippage*):** 1%
* Slippage ensures that every time Tally claims, the Streamer converts the accrued USD amount into COMP using the current Chainlink price feed, with up to a 1% buffer to handle small price fluctuations and keep payments fair.
**Claim Cooldown (*\_claimCooldown):*** 604,800 seconds (7 days)—this is the minimum time between claims. Once Tally claims accrued COMP tokens, they can’t claim again for 7 days.
**Milestone-Based Disbursement:**
* Funding is streamed proportionally over 12 months but is tied to the following deliverables and service level agreements (further outlined below in “KPIs and Oversight”):
* Monthly Uptime & Support Guarantees
* Quarterly Reporting
* Feature Delivery Deadlines
**Stream Cancellation Rights:**
* The DAO retains the authority to cancel the stream if milestones are not met or KPIs materially deviate from the agreed terms.
* Any cancellation request must be explicated on the forums by the CGWG and Compound Foundation, giving the service provider a 30-day notice for pausing the stream (*\_minimumNoticePeriod* = 2,592,000 seconds). An onchain proposal must call the *terminateStream()* function in order for cancellation to occur.
## KPIs and Oversight:
As outlined in the Tally Enterprise submission, their team has committed to uphold stated SLAs, along with a workstream of various deliverables due throughout the course of the engagement. The specific deliverable timelines are to be published by Tally in quarterly reports and will be guided by the Foundation/CGWG to best allocate resources to the most needed efforts first.
### Support & Uptime SLA:
* 99.9% uptime for frontend and API services on a monthly basis.
* Critical support requests handled within 4 business hours, resolved/escalated within 24 hours.
* Quarterly Incident & Uptime Report: Includes response time, resolution details, mitigation steps.
* Change Notifications: Major platform changes communicated to the DAO at least 7 days in advance.
* Bug Resolution: Non-critical bugs fixed within 5 business days; critical bugs within 1 business day.
### Workstream of Deliverables:
* The below projects are intended for completion during the first quarter of Tally’s Enterprise engagement:
* Advanced simulations for Compound contracts
* Seatbelt integration
* Gasless voting
* Custom domain
* Karma integration
* Tally Zero
* Homepage for Compound Safes
* Below are additional workstreams that may be coordinated for completion throughout the course of the engagement based on priorities set by the Foundation/CGWG:
* Alternative governance track interface (MarketAdmin proposals)
* Cross-chain governance support (execution automation & tracking)
* DAO analytics dashboard (“Tally-litics”)
* Treasury & runway analytics
* Governance Emergency Rollback system UI
* Governance notifications and forum bot
* Custom proposal actions for Compound contracts and proposal scripts
*- Etc.*
# Delegate Compensation Program Pilot
# **Delegate Compensation Program Pilot**
**Authors: AranaDigital, PGov, StableLab**
## Summary
This proposal introduces a Delegate Compensation Program to incentivize active participation, enhance accountability, and support sustainable governance. Delegates are essential to Compound’s governance, but the lack of compensation impacts participation and retention. We propose a structured program to ensure fairness, transparency, and high-quality contributions, run over the course of the coming 6 months. If this proposal passes, the Compound Governance Working Group (CGWG) will immediately begin administering this program as per the below specifications (see “Detailed Specification”). Selection of this initial cohort of delegates will follow a [<u>delegate score</u>](https://dune.com/dm_compound/delegator-analytics#delegate-score) that aggregates delegate participation data over the past 6 months, incorporating voting %, vote timing, and impact on new collateral TVL growth.
* Overall Budget: $288k
* Duration of Pilot Program: 6 Months
* Total Delegates Selected: 16 (divided into 2 tiers, with 8 per tier)
Final forum post can be found [here](https://www.comp.xyz/t/delegate-compensation-program-pilot-final/6383).
The initial discourse if linked [here](https://www.comp.xyz/t/rfc-delegate-compensation-program-for-compound/6198).
## Background
Governance in Compound has been live since 2020, and the protocol has grown considerably over the past couple of years, now reaching a TVL of over $4B. There have been 375 proposals so far, and as the protocol grows, there are more proposals per month than before.
However, the number of voters has been decreasing, despite their importance, likely due to the absence of a financial incentive.
### Compensation Philosophy
Effective governance within a DAO demands engaged, well-informed delegates who diligently track ecosystem developments, analyze proposals, and participate in governance decisions with both expertise and integrity. However, the absence of compensation places a significant financial and operational burden on delegates, forcing them to limit their engagement, resulting in uninformed or sporadic participation. A significant consequence of such complacency is governance attacks, such as the one faced by Compound in Q3 2024.
To address these challenges, this compensation program is designed to align delegate incentives with Compound’s overarching goals, ensuring that their contributions directly advance the protocol’s long-term success. By rewarding behaviors such as thorough proposal evaluation, consistent voting participation, and meaningful engagement with the community, the program fosters a culture of diligence, responsibility, and strategic decision-making.
Community feedback will play a central role in shaping and refining these incentives to ensure they remain aligned with the DAO’s evolving priorities and values. By running a pilot, this program not only provides immediate benefits in enhancing governance participation but also establishes a scalable framework that can evolve alongside Compound’s governance needs. Data collected after the end of the 6 month period will be important for amending and refining future compensation cycles.
Ultimately, in an increasingly adversarial landscape, where well-capitalized entities can exploit governance vulnerabilities—often due to delegate complacency and voter apathy—underfunded governance participation poses a significant risk. Without proper compensation, DAOs become susceptible to governance attacks, inefficient decision-making, and weakened resilience against extractive proposals.
### Delegate Compensation Programs Across DAOs
The program we are proposing aligns Compound with high-performing DAOs while allowing the CGWG to adapt incentives to meet the protocol’s unique needs. A key feature incorporated in this pilot program is the delegate score, which aggregates various factors, including TVL-based impact as a result of a delegate's voting decision.
## Detailed Specification
The compensation program will run over the six months. With a budget at $288k, the pilot will be allocating $48k/month, which will allow Compound DAO to evaluate key metrics, including delegate engagement, governance outcomes, and community feedback. These insights will be critical in assessing the program’s effectiveness and identifying areas for improvement.
The CGWG will oversee program implementation and rewards distribution. Funds from the passing of this onchain vote will be sent to the working group’s multisig (0xfd947c72f09703210eeCbcab9c9206fE5e1Bb6e2). All distributions will be paid to program participants in the form of COMP tokens after the conclusion of each month.
Two different groups of criteria will determine how a delegate may be admitted to the pilot program vs the compensation attained while partaking in the program.
### Part A: Selection Criteria
For admittance into the pilot program, the below delegate score over the trailing 6-month period will be utilized:
You may view the up-to-date delegate rankings [here](https://dune.com/dm_compound/delegator-analytics#delegate-score).
One of the predominant pieces of feedback we received when designing this initiative was to not heavily bias the score towards delegates with large amounts of voting power. This can act as a double-edged sword, where large delegates in theory should be rewarded for their proportional contribution to meeting quorum and thereby prompting the further increase of protocol TVL, for example. To address this concern, the voting impact score, which is a function of a delegate’s voting power, remains capped at 20% of the total delegate score.
We also decided to keep the voting impact score present in the calculation since tangible influence on protocol metrics like collateral TVL was an additional concern posed by delegates, where voters should be rewarded for increasing protocol growth in a more objective manner. For the pilot program, we will solely use [delegates’ impact on TVL for new markets/collaterals](https://dune.com/dm_compound/delegator-analytics#compound-new-proposals-growth) as the primary metric—this may change in future iterations of the program. Impact-weighted scores are scarcely used by DAOs today for paying delegates, and they inherently contain a bias towards those with more voting power since more VP means higher impact on the passing of a proposal. KPI-driven compensation is something that DAOs should start trending towards, at least to a degree, hence why we are including this metric.
In accordance with compensation programs instituted by other DAOs, we’ve kept the primary weight on the delegate’s participation score—retaining that at 60% of the total score. We strongly believe that this weight should account for at least 50% of any compensation program since high rates of participation directly dictate how well a governance system is working.
Delegates for this pilot will be selected solely based on their delegate score and will be divided into two tiers. The top 8 entities with the highest score—that apply to the program—will fall under Tier 1, and the following 8 will fall under Tier 2. Relative to other protocol DAOs, this program is indexing on not only rewarding larger, active delegates but also attracting a new cohort of voters.
If the proposal to pursue this program passes, we will be releasing a forum post that’ll act as the venue to submit your application. Just because a delegate has a high score does not mean they will be automatically inducted into the program; everyone must apply. A 7-day period will be granted for everyone to submit their applications, which will ask for basic details about the applicant and prompt them to set up a delegate communication page to articulate their voting rationales. To reiterate, admittance into the compensation program will be solely based on your delegate score, and the top 16 applicants will be eligible for this program.
### Part B: Compensation Breakdown
Monthly compensation will be divided into two payment types: base and bonus rate. Base rate is the amount a delegate admitted into the program will receive for voting on onchain votes. The bonus rate is the amount a delegate will receive for posting rationales regarding their voting decision on their respective delegate platform.
Tier 1
* Monthly Base Rate: $3000 in $COMP
* Monthly Bonus Rate: $1500 in $COMP
TOTAL = $4.5k\*8 delegates = $36k/month
Tier 2
* Monthly Base Rate: $1000 in $COMP
* Monthly Bonus Rate: $500 in $COMP
TOTAL = $1.5k\*8 delegates= $12k/month
Monthly payments will be delivered by the Governance Working Group after the conclusion of each month. The base and bonus rates will adjust in proportion to monthly voting %. In other words, if a month has 5 onchain votes, and a delegates votes on 4 proposals, then the base rate compensation will be (4/5)\*Base Rate.
The same principle applies to the bonus rate, however, in order to attain the bonus fee, delegates must have voted on the proposal associated with the corresponding rationale. For example, if a delegate does not vote on “Proposal A” but issues a rationale for it, the delegate will not attain the bonus rate since the bonus is contingent on having voted for that proposal. Finally, to attain bonus rate points, a delegate must post their rationale behind a given proposal within a week of that proposal concluding. In other words, if a proposal’s voting period ends on February 12, then a delegate has until February 19 to post a rationale.
To remove subjectivity from the bonus fee process, we will be requiring that all delegates admitted into the program provide a rationale for ALL onchain votes, including the customary market updates recommended by teams like Gauntlet. There isn’t an expectation for delegates to express their rationales with verbosity. For basic votes, it’s okay if delegates disclose why they voted in a particular manner with just a sentence or two. However, for the introduction of important markets, organizational changes, alterations to governance contracts, selection of service providers, or the movement of treasury funds, we do expect delegates to provide more comprehensive rationales. Although there isn’t an overt criteria for judging the quality of rationales for determining the pilot program’s compensation, there is a social expectation that paid delegates engage actively during important proposals. It may also be the case that a rationale-based scoring system is implemented in the future—so delegates keen on partaking in future iterations of compensation initiatives should do their best to engage in active forum discussions.
## Next Steps
Upon execution of this onchain vote, the CGWG will create an application on the forum for delegates to register for the program. Once the week-long selection process is complete, admitted delegates will be tracked on their participation by the CGWG and rewarded based on the above compensation breakdown monthly. This program will run between March - August 2025.
# Upgrade Compound v2 Oracle To Disable UAV
**Details**
Set new price oracle to 0x8cf42b08ad13761345531b839487aa4d113955d9
**Info**
Arana is proposing on behalf of Chainlink Labs to upgrade Compound v2’s oracle to a new contract that directly consumes data from Chainlink Price Feeds, similar to Compound III.
[<u>Forum Post</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/cip-4-upgrade-compound-v2-oracle-to-disable-uav/4728)
Updates include:
* The Uniswap Anchored View is replaced by a Chainlink-based PriceOracle, improving reliability and precision by retrieving prices directly from Chainlink Price Feeds.
* Updates stablecoin valuation to use Chainlink Feeds instead of hardcoded values.
* Write methods to update configs on the PriceOracle contracts to allow the Compound community to update or add new feeds without a contract redeployment.
* Use fixed prices to account for the pricing of deprecated assets SAI, FEI, and REP.
The community can review the PriceOracle Contract [<u>here</u>](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8cf42b08ad13761345531b839487aa4d113955d9), with [<u>OpenZeppelin’s audit here</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compound-v2-price-oracle-contract-audit/5586) and successful fork test results [<u>here</u>](https://www.comp.xyz/t/cip-4-upgrade-compound-v2-oracle-to-disable-uav/4728/9?u=chainlink_labs).