# Compound Governor Contracts Upgrade
## Proposal Details
This proposal will upgrade Compound's GovernorBravoDelegator and GovernorBravoDelegate contracts. **This proposal also marks the beginning of a moratorium period where new proposals should not be submitted to the governor until after the execution of this proposal. This period will end around Feb. 4th.** The design approach for the new governor was discussed in [this forum post](https://www.comp.xyz/t/new-compound-governor-design-approach/5748) and the upgrade details are discussed in [this forum post](https://www.comp.xyz/t/governance-contracts-upgrade-and-proposal-moratorium-period/6220).
We've used the latest contracts from OpenZeppelin(OZ) library with some modifications to preserve many of the existing features of the Governors including:
Enumerable Proposal IDs: Unlike out of the box OZ governors, where proposalIds are calculated from hashing the contents of a proposal, we will keep the incrementing proposalId pattern of Governor Bravo. To implement this, we will use the GovernorStorage extension with some modifications to incorporate enumerability of proposalIds.
Proposal Guardian, Whitelist Guardian, and whitelisted proposers: Current Governor Bravo's flow of cancelling a proposal will be preserved. The DAO will have control over the management of the roles mentioned above.
The upgrade comes with a number of advantages outlined in [the original upgrade proposal](https://www.comp.xyz/t/new-compound-governor-design-approach/5748) and also additional benefits such as:
Updatable Governor Settings: Proposal threshold, Voting Delay, and Voting Period will be adjustable through the governance process without min and max bounds.
Updatable Quorum: The DAO will also be able to set the quorum, which will be a non-fractional, updatable value using a simple, customized extension contract.
Extended quorum when it is reached late: As a way to help protect against various Governance attacks, we will implement OZ's extension that automatically extends quorum if it is reached late in the voting cycle.
No Limits: There will be no limits on the number of operations a proposal can have.
Flexible Voting: Flexible Voting is an extension to the OZ Governor developed by ScopeLift. It allows for the integration of novel voting schemes without changing or compromising the core security model of the DAO. Examples include voting with tokens while earning yield in DeFi, cross chain voting, shielded voting, and more. Flexible Voting is supported by Tally. It's been audited and is now an OZ governor extension.
Upgradeability: We will use the upgradeable versions of the OZ contracts, and any future upgrades can be done through the upgradeable proxy functionality.
# Update USDC, USDT and USDS Comets on Mainnet to support more collaterals
## Proposal summary
Compound Growth Program [AlphaGrowth] proposes to update 3 Comet to a new version, which supports up to 24 collaterals. This proposal takes the governance steps recommended and necessary to update a Compound III USDC, USDT and USDS markets on Ethereum. Simulations have confirmed the market’s readiness, as much as possible, using the [Comet scenario suite](https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/tree/main/scenario).
Detailed information can be found on the corresponding [proposal pull request](https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/pull/904), [deploy market GitHub action run](<>) and [forum discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/increase-amount-of-collaterals-in-comet/5465).
## Proposal Actions
The first action sets the factory for cUSDCv3 to the newly deployed factory.
The second action sets the factory for cUSDSv3 to the newly deployed factory.
The third action sets the factory for cUSDTv3 to the newly deployed factory.
The fourth action sets the extension delegate for cUSDCv3 to the newly deployed contract.
The fifth action sets the extension delegate for cUSDSv3 to the newly deployed contract.
The sixth action sets the extension delegate for cUSDTv3 to the newly deployed contract.
The seventh action deploys and upgrades cUSDCv3 to a new version.
The eighth action deploys and upgrades cUSDSv3 to a new version.
The ninth action deploys and upgrades cUSDTv3 to a new version.
# Compound Safe Harbor
Summary:
To activate [<u>Safe Harbor</u>](https://immunefi.com/safe-harbor/) for the [<u>Compound Finance Bug Bounty Program</u>](https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/compoundfinance/information/#top) on Immunefi, we are pleased to share the full details of the program to align the Compound DAO.
Safe Harbor:
Safe Harbor is a legal framework developed by the [<u>Security Alliance (SEAL)</u>](https://github.com/security-alliance/safe-harbor) for protocols to empower whitehat security researchers to rescue protocol funds during an active blackhat attack — and redirect those funds back to a protocol-controlled [<u>Vault</u>](https://immunefi.com/vaults/) on Immunefi. In return, whitehats receive 10% of the funds saved, with a maximum of up to 60% of the project’s maximum critical reward.
Safe Harbor provides Compound Finance a secure solution for the whitehat recovery of funds during an active blackhat exploit. Immunefi’s implementation of the Security Alliance’s robust Safe Harbor framework, coupled with our extensive community of security researchers, provides a solution that integrates seamlessly with Compound’s bug bounty infrastructure. This ensures that our top-tier security researcher community has a credible and safe channel for returning funds when other security measures fail.
Cost:
If Safe Harbor is utilized during a blackhat attack, the payment to the security researcher is 10% of the funds saved, up to 60% of the project’s maximum critical reward. With Compound Finance’s $1M max critical payout, the rewards paid to a whitehat security researcher would be capped at $600,000.
There are no additional costs payable to Immunefi or to SEAL.
Activation of Safe Harbor:
Once we have the full support of the Compound DAO for the activation of Safe Harbor, the current program administrators will be able to activate Safe Harbor through the Immunefi dashboard, which is where the program administrators are receiving bug reports from the security researcher community.
Once Safe Harbor is activated, we will include all [<u>assets</u>](https://immunefi.com/bug-bounty/compoundfinance/scope/#top) that are currently in scope of the bug bounty program on Safe Harbor. A vault address will also be provided which is the address that security researchers will use to return Compound’s funds.
By approving this proposal, you agree to the unified [<u>Terms & Conditions</u>](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1v83f6s-2_Oav7PtPsaPEeHPA7tf_uLsG/edit) for Safe Harbor Program.
This proposal will upgrade Compound's GovernorBravoDelegator and GovernorBravoDelegate contracts. We'll use the latest contracts from OpenZeppelin(OZ) library with some modifications to preserve many of the existing features of the Governors including:
Enumerable Proposal IDs: Unlike out of the box OZ governors, where proposalIds are calculated from hashing the contents of a proposal, we will keep the incrementing proposalId pattern of Governor Bravo. To implement this, we will use the GovernorStorage extension with some modifications to incorporate enumerability of proposalIds.
Proposal Guardian, Whitelist Guardian, and whitelisted proposers: Current Governor Bravo's flow of cancelling a proposal will be preserved. The DAO will have control over the management of the roles mentioned above.
The upgrade comes with a number of advantages outlined in the original upgrade proposal 5 and also additional benefits such as:
Updatable Governor Settings: Proposal threshold, Voting Delay, and Voting Period will be adjustable through the governance process without min and max bounds.
Updatable Quorum: The DAO will also be able to set the quorum, which will be a non-fractional, updatable value using a simple, customized extension contract.
Extended quorum when it is reached late: As a way to help protect against various Governance attacks, we will implement OZ's extension that automatically extends quorum if it is reached late in the voting cycle.
No Limits: There will be no limits on the number of operations a proposal can have.
Flexible Voting: Flexible Voting is an extension to the OZ Governor developed by ScopeLift. It allows for the integration of novel voting schemes without changing or compromising the core security model of the DAO. Examples include voting with tokens while earning yield in DeFi, cross chain voting, shielded voting, and more. Flexible Voting is supported by Tally. It's been audited and is now an OZ governor extension.
Upgradeability: We will use the upgradeable versions of the OZ contracts, and any future upgrades can be done through the upgradeable proxy functionality.
# 2025 Compound Growth Program - Roadmap & Renewal
The Compound Growth Team is proud to present the Roadmap for the Growth Program for 2025:
The full scope of detailed work is here: [https://www.comp.xyz/t/renewal-of-compound-growth-program-2025/6054](https://www.comp.xyz/t/renewal-of-compound-growth-program-2025/6054)
We are looking forward to supporting the DAO. 
With your vote for the Compound Growth Program, we can strengthen the foundation of the Compound Protocol and drive its growth to new heights in 2025 and beyond.
###
Due to the evolving legal landscape related to DAOs, THIS PROPOSAL INCLUDES A WAIVER AND INDEMNIFICATION PROVISION THAT INDEMNIFIES ALPHAGROWTH AGAINST LIABILITY. This means that if the proposal passes AlphaGrowth will have broad legal protection from certain lawsuits. For word count reasons, the full Indemnification and Waiver language has been incorporated by reference here:
[https://www.comp.xyz/t/renewal-of-compound-growth-program-2025/6054/2#p-15239-entity-update-indemnification-6](https://www.comp.xyz/t/renewal-of-compound-growth-program-2025/6054/2#p-15239-entity-update-indemnification-6)
This proposal cuts the red tape for routine market updates, saving time and money while letting the community focus on bigger decisions. It keeps things secure with a timelock and puts experts in charge of handling the details.
\
# Compound Sandbox: Development Proposal
## Background
WOOF! team offers to build Compound Sandbox - a Compound v3-based permissionless money-market platform, an extension of Compound Finance.
The scope of work is detailed in the [forum post](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compound-sandbox-development-proposal/5938).
WOOF! team will start the development on January 1. WOOF! team will develop and deploy a testnet within 24 weeks. Production deployment date will vary on community feedback and audit timeline.
This proposal initiates a $600K payment in USDC: 50% will be available to WOOF! immediately, while the remaining 50% will be streamed over six months starting at the date of proposal execution.
## Compensation Structure
With the adoption of [Proposal 249](https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/249), there is now a standard payment process for all Compound DAO service vendors utilizing payment streams in USDC.
The first proposal action calls withdrawTo on a cUSDCv3, via the Compound Aera vault’s execute function. The withdrawTo transfers upfront 300K USDC to WOOF.
The second proposal action calls createStream on a Llama Pay Router, via the Compound Aera vault's execute function. The stream will pay out on a per-second basis over 6 months. $300K USDC over 15552000 seconds gives a rate of 0.0192901235 USDC/sec.
WOOF! will be able to withdraw the vested funds at any time.
By approving this proposal, you agree that any services provided by WOOF! shall be governed by the [Terms of Service](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1hvpHj9Sk73knuRUA5-Tlp-a6Iwqv2EDGMZxnuy06tfY/edit?usp=sharing) that were updated as of November 29, 2024.
We are deploying rewards and incentivizes incorrectly. The current market conditions don't need to incentivize any borrows. Utilization is at max capacity across almost every market. We should be solely focusing on incentivizing lending side. The response time to market conditions is wasteful.
# Add mETH as collateral into cUSDTv3 on Mainnet
## Proposal summary
Compound Growth Program [AlphaGrowth] proposes to add mETH into cUSDTv3 on Ethereum network. This proposal takes the governance steps recommended and necessary to update a Compound III USDT market on Ethereum. Simulations have confirmed the market’s readiness, as much as possible, using the [Comet scenario suite](https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/tree/main/scenario). The new parameters include setting the risk parameters based on the [recommendations from Gauntlet](https://www.comp.xyz/t/add-meth-market-on-ethereum/5647/5).
Further detailed information can be found on the corresponding [proposal pull request](https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/pull/918) and [forum discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/add-meth-market-on-ethereum/5647).
## Proposal Actions
The first action adds mETH asset as collateral with corresponding configurations.
The second action deploys and upgrades Comet to a new version.
sendMessage(address,bytes,uint32)# Alternate Governance track for Market Updates - Optimism
## Proposal summary
DoDAO has been examining various areas where improvements can be made to governance in Compound through tooling or automation. A significant issue raised repeatedly by many members concerns the time and effort required to apply Market Updates.
Currently, approximately 70-90% of the proposals pertain solely to updating market parameters. Gauntlet uses analytics and algorithms to determine new parameters based on current market conditions. These proposals are highly specific and require unique skills for validation. So far, we have seen minimal participation from other community members or teams in validating these parameters.
Assuming the total cost of reviewing a proposal (including the effort of all delegates) is $2,000 per proposal, we are spending upwards of $300,000 per year on a process that currently acts more as a friction layer without much safeguard, as these market update proposals are rarely reviewed thoroughly.
This not only slows down the process but also diverts focus from reviewing essential proposals related to new partnerships, the addition of new chains, and the introduction of assets, etc.
We propose a parallel process specifically for market updates that can bypass the normal governance lifecycle. This would enable us, as a Compound community, to move faster and concentrate on the most critical decisions.
This proposal has already been discussed here - https://www.comp.xyz/t/market-updates-alternate-governance-track/5379
The forum post includes two solutions, and OpenZeppelin has provided details and feedback on those solutions.
After discussing with OpenZeppelin, DoDAO and OZ together believe that given the amount of changes, updating the Configurator could be the best solution. OpenZeppelin mentioned a couple of important points in the forum post:
1. Grant the market admin role to an Safe address, which can be maintained by Gauntlet or other community members.
2. Market Updates to the Configurator will go through a timelock, providing sufficient time for the community to review or even block the market updates via this alternate route.
sendMessage(address,bytes,uint32)DoDAO has been examining various areas where improvements can be made to governance in Compound through tooling or automation. A significant issue raised repeatedly by many members concerns the time and effort required to apply Market Updates.
Currently, approximately 70-90% of the proposals pertain solely to updating market parameters. Gauntlet uses analytics and algorithms to determine new parameters based on current market conditions. These proposals are highly specific and require unique skills for validation. So far, we have seen minimal participation from other community members or teams in validating these parameters.
Assuming the total cost of reviewing a proposal (including the effort of all delegates) is $2,000 per proposal, we are spending upwards of $300,000 per year on a process that currently acts more as a friction layer without much safeguard, as these market update proposals are rarely reviewed thoroughly.
This not only slows down the process but also diverts focus from reviewing essential proposals related to new partnerships, the addition of new chains, and the introduction of assets, etc.
We propose a parallel process specifically for market updates that can bypass the normal governance lifecycle. This would enable us, as a Compound community, to move faster and concentrate on the most critical decisions.
This proposal has already been discussed here - https://www.comp.xyz/t/market-updates-alternate-governance-track/5379
The forum post includes two solutions, and OpenZeppelin has provided details and feedback on those solutions.
After discussing with OpenZeppelin, DoDAO and OZ together believe that given the amount of changes, updating the Configurator could be the best solution. OpenZeppelin mentioned a couple of important points in the forum post:
1. Grant the market admin role to an Safe address, which can be maintained by Gauntlet or other community members.
2. Market Updates to the Configurator will go through a timelock, providing sufficient time for the community to review or even block the market updates via this alternate route.
createRetryableTicket(address,uint256,uint256,address,address,uint256,uint256,bytes)deployAndUpgradeTo(address,address)# Add wUSDM as collateral into cUSDCv3 on Arbitrum
## Proposal summary
Compound Growth Program [AlphaGrowth] proposes to add wUSDM into cUSDCv3 on Arbitrum network. This proposal takes the governance steps recommended and necessary to update a Compound III USDC market on Arbitrum. Simulations have confirmed the market’s readiness, as much as possible, using the [Comet scenario suite](https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/tree/main/scenario). The new parameters include setting the risk parameters based off of the [recommendations from Gauntlet](https://www.comp.xyz/t/list-wusdm-as-a-collateral-on-usdc-usdt-markets-on-arbitrum-and-ethereum/5590/3).
Further detailed information can be found on the corresponding [proposal pull request](https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/pull/931) and [forum discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/list-wusdm-as-a-collateral-on-usdc-usdt-markets-on-arbitrum-and-ethereum/5590).
## Proposal Actions
The first proposal action adds wUSDM to the USDC Comet on Arbitrum. This sends the encoded `addAsset` and `deployAndUpgradeTo` calls across the bridge to the governance receiver on Arbitrum.
Voting "yes" on this proposal enables the implementation of sweepToken functionality for cTokens, providing a standardized method to recover accidentally sent funds. This proposal addresses a recurring pain point for users, enhances security, and improves the user experience within the Compound ecosystem. By implementing this solution, the protocol demonstrates its commitment to safeguarding user assets and maintaining trust.
Over the past six months, the GWG has demonstrated its value by increasing voter turnout, maintaining quorum, and addressing governance vulnerabilities, while proposing future initiatives like active delegate rewards and governance tooling. With a proven track record and a clear roadmap for further strengthening governance, this renewal ensures Compound's resilience and competitiveness in the DeFi ecosystem.
# Renewing the Compound Governance Working Group (GWG)
### Renewing the Compound Governance Working Group (GWG)
Co-authors: @PGov, @Doo\_StableLab, @AranaDigital
### Overview
Over the past six months, it has become increasingly evident that robust and resilient governance remains fundamental to Compound’s growth and security. Having played a significant role in expanding the governance ecosystem amid ongoing volatility, we are committed to building upon our work from the 6 month iteration of the [GWG](https://www.comp.xyz/t/establish-the-compound-governance-support-working-group-gswg/5270), and further strengthening the protocol’s governance framework by boosting both the quality and quantity of delegate participation.
We believe that initiatives focused on enhancing Compound governance are vital to the long-term sustainability of the DAO, and by extension, the protocol itself. This is especially critical as we strive to maintain a competitive edge against protocols like Aave and other emerging money markets. Our original rationale, detailed [here](https://www.comp.xyz/t/establish-the-compound-governance-support-working-group-gswg/5270), remains as compelling today as it was six months ago, and we bring the same unwavering enthusiasm to this mission.
Note: If images aren't loading, please review the forum post here: [Forum](https://www.comp.xyz/t/renewing-the-compound-governance-working-group-gwg/5963)
### Governance Activity Retrospective
One of our highest priority items during the trial period was to achieve and maintain a consistent level of participation, along with constant attainment of quorum. Since initiating the delegate race and onboarding the working group in July, we’ve observed a notable uptick in the voting participation rate, rebounding back to earlier year highs.
*(Year-to-date Voting Participation Rate)*
As shown in the above data, participation fell steadily from February, dropping from around 28% to just over 20% by July. This calculation displays the amount of voting participation over the number of total delegates votes. With no coincidence, the governance attack occurred during July. The establishment of the working group during this period of decline has already yielded a tangible improvement, with participation rates rebounding to over 28% by October.
Persistent participation is vital for the success of Compound since its success is now fully community-driven. More operations in the future are likely to be conducted using decentralized governance rails, therefore requiring a well-oiled process and high voter turnout. This is especially important since the average number of proposals created over the past six months hit an average of 18, considerably higher than the monthly average of 5 proposals/month maintained between Apr 2021 - Jan 2024.
*(Number of new proposals each month since July 2021 - October 2024)*
As for quorum, since the [delegate race](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/compound/proposal/315) was instituted on September 2nd, 100% of proposals have attained quorum. This race enabled the DAO to delegate 250k COMP to 8 individuals/entities that demonstrated active participation in the Compound governance. The year prior to this delegate race saw approximately 8% of proposals fail to reach quorum, a result that has proven frustrating for parties managing the protocol’s risk, requiring them to rerun proposals. Relative to H1 2024, which saw an average voting turnout of 508k COMP, the post-delegate race average turnout stands at 713k, a near 40% increase.
At the beginning of the term, before the delegate race commenced, a malicious proposal from Humpy and the Golden Boys managed to pass. Regrettably, we were just under a week away from having sufficient trusted governance participation to prevent this outcome. Nonetheless, after a few stressful days, the GWG worked hand-in-hand with multiple DAO entities in many battle rooms to quell this debacle. Special thanks to the @Alphagrowth and @OpenZepelin teams for their hard work on the frontlines during this situation. Based on the above data, and due to the reinstatement of the Guardian, such governance attacks will more than likely be evaded.
### Added Scope During Trial Period
Over the past few months, the GWG has formally and informally taken on additional responsibilities relative to the mandate initially outlined at the start of the trial period. The goals to start with primarily hinged around enhancing governance participation, but some alterations and additions were made as a way to best position this working group to serve the DAO. Moving forward, we propose to have explicit purview over:
* Funding and escrowing capital for DAO programs: For unestablished teams looking to come to the DAO and request funding, it is often advantageous to have approved funds go through a trusted intermediary, allowing for the option to send funds on a periodic basis or based upon the completion of certain milestones. This ensures a layer of trusted accountability and prevents an excess of onchain votes.
* Ex: We helped facilitate the recently passed [ImmuneFi Bug Bounty Program](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/compound/proposal/354) and set up a multisig to escrow bug bounty funds until they are needed.
* Community payroll functionality: In concert with the above points, there may come times in the future where different community members will receive funding from the DAO. Rather than running a separate one-off vote for each instance, we propose escrowing the budget for said program from the start—and then distributing as needed.
* Ex: As mentioned prior, the Bug Bounty Program funds will be distributed a few thousand at a time from an already approved budget, called upon as needed. In the future, if the DAO implements other working groups or delegate/contributor incentives, the GWG will act as the operational team tasked with verifying and executing payments.
* Compound MetaGov: In the future, there may be instances where it is in the DAO's best interest to take a more active role in the governance of other chains or projects. Having the GWG take on these actions when necessary is logical and ensures we maximize our chances of working together in other DAOs. Voting power may also enable Compound DAO to exert influence in attaining grants. We will work hand-in-hand with the Alphagrowth team to ensure cohesiveness and efficiency in this domain.
* Ex: With Compound recently launching on Scroll, we were allocated an airdrop by their team. The GWG and Alphagrowth created a shared [multisig](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compound-scroll-multisig/5923) to receive this airdrop on behalf of the DAO, where funds will be used for growth in line with Alphagrowth’s mandate, as well as strategic governance involvement to ensure Compound’s continued success on the chain.
### What to Expect in the Future
* Publishing of a “Constitution” for multisig signers on the Compound Proposal Guardian and Community Multisig in collaboration with @cylon and DefiSafety. This will include a formalization of the role and expectations for a critical piece of security within the DAO. Our team has been collaborating with the noted parties since the governance attack to ensure the Guardian ruleset is properly and safely administered.
* The DAO will see a proposal in the coming months to institute an active delegate rewards program to further increase the level of engagement from existing delegates and to further entice competent external parties to partake in Compound governance. The[ grant given to WOOF](https://www.comp.xyz/t/cgwg-compound-governance-metrics-analysis-request/5826?u=aranadigital) last month will allow us to track individual delegates’ participation, allowing for the creation of a score, which should help benchmark if a delegate qualifies for compensation. As a part of this initiative, we also plan to reinstate the active usage of the forums for delegates to communicate their voting rationales in a threaded form.
* After analyzing the results of the first delegate race, we will look to structure a second cycle, and if needed, alter any voting power from the existing set of Franchisers. After the governance attack, one of our priorities was increasing the participation rate based on voting power. Since the delegate race, we are less worried about reaching quorum on proposals and attaining the perspective of a supermajority of stakeholders. However, this does not directly tackle the issue of enabling a diverse set of delegates to partake in Compound governance. A key focus during the next year will be to broaden the overall set of delegates. We will likely aim to index on drawing a higher quantity of knowledgeable participants in the governance space over to Compound, along with a focus on including CGP grantees and other stakeholders in the voting process. A second version of the delegate race for these underrepresented delegates is worth exploring.
* In an ad hoc manner, as we see the need to develop more governance tooling for the DAO—as was the case with the governance metrics grant awarded to WOOF in October—mini grants will be allocated. These can vary in scope, from data analytics to product development. As more tools are put in place, we will continue taking a data-driven approach to analyzing the state of Compound governance and creating corresponding initiatives to address foreseeable needs. There have been grants from the CGP given to a couple of teams like Karma to explore governance tools; we hope to revisit some of these completed grants and foster a longer term relationship with such partners. We will also commit to maintain the developments from these microgrants, ensuring that deliverables like dashboards are maintained and accessible to delegates.
* In DAO wide future accounting processes are needed, our team will work with relevant parties to report on token flows for the DAO, clearly outlining operational expenses. This function may result as a direct consequence of the payroll and escrow services that we have begun providing. An aggregated report of flows and balances for these programs may prove to be useful.
* We will conduct a review of the existing guidelines for delegates to get involved in Compound governance. Many of the documents flagged on the forums are from 2022 or before, so it is worth polishing and renewing those posts as relevant, especially for new entrants.
### Composition
The GWG will consist of the same three members (PGov, StableLab, & Arana Digital) to ensure a diversity of perspectives, while maintaining operational efficiency and experience. As we conclude our trial period, the GWG will be renewed for 12 months between December 2024 - December 2025. For the duration of the 12 months, we request a total of $280,000 in COMP tokens, in line with our prior 6 month request ([$131,000]([here]\(https://www.comp.xyz/t/establish-the-compound-governance-support-working-group-gswg/5270\))), to cover funding and operational expenses for the team. Unlike the trial run, we will not be requesting separate funds for multisig management, as this is included within the total. Additionally, with this funding, we will re-top the budget allocated for research and data tools included in the trial run ($50,000), which will include funding select high impact mini grants that contribute to governance.
Total request for 12 months: $280k in COMP.
### Timeline
We welcome any and all feedback on the forums. Above all, we will continuously look for new ideas and suggestions on how we can best steward governance at Compound. We will seek to propose an on chain vote after at least a week of RFC.
### Terms and Conditions:
The Compound GWG shall be governed by the [Terms of Service](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1gowx0CGvnxdn9v3GgL8MlyvthjaE5OsRxOktC6pzJ54) that were updated as of Nov 22nd, 2024.
Note: A 30 day TWAP price has been used to convert from Comp to USD @ 46.6
# Return Accidentally Sent Funds #4
Following the precedent set in previous proposals, this proposal returns 90% of assets accidentally sent to cUSDCv3 on mainnet. In this [TX](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x8fc3e89dbde7e308fc6a34ee93cdf41396dabf7b717c35077c31780e62a52bf8) the WBTC was sent to the protocol. Shortly after, it was automatically sold off for USDC by the protocol in this [TX](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xf10466bd9f46be1f49d05173e1cbe6e2e4870793e03e3eafe7c44ce10019d5b3).
The net proceeds to the protocol were 64,927.72518 USDC, so 58,434.952662 USDC will be returned in this proposal. This USDC will be removed from the cUSDCv3 reserves and be sent to the accidental sender (0x14e3cb36fdc4427533d90eeFE32D0bc3aa0c5230).
[Forum Discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/implement-ctoken-sweeptoken-and-return-accidentally-sent-funds/1147/58?u=arr00)
sendMessage(address,bytes,uint32)# Add wUSDM as collateral into cUSDCv3 on Optimism
## Proposal summary
Compound Growth Program [AlphaGrowth] proposes to add wUSDM into cUSDCv3 on Optimism network. This proposal takes the governance steps recommended and necessary to update a Compound III USDC market on Optimism. Simulations have confirmed the market’s readiness, as much as possible, using the [Comet scenario suite](https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/tree/main/scenario). The new parameters include setting the risk parameters based off of the [recommendations from Gauntlet](https://www.comp.xyz/t/add-wusdm-as-a-collateral-on-usdc-usdt-markets-on-optimism/5664/4).
Further detailed information can be found on the corresponding [proposal pull request](https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/pull/944) and [forum discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/add-wusdm-as-a-collateral-on-usdc-usdt-markets-on-optimism/5664).
## Proposal Actions
The first proposal action adds wUSDM to the USDC Comet on Optimism. This sends the encoded `addAsset` and `deployAndUpgradeTo` calls across the bridge to the governance receiver on Optimism.
# Add sUSDS as collateral into cUSDSv3 on Mainnet
## Proposal summary
Compound Growth Program [AlphaGrowth] proposes to add sUSDS into cUSDSv3 on Ethereum network. This proposal takes the governance steps recommended and necessary to update a Compound III USDS market on Ethereum. Simulations have confirmed the market’s readiness, as much as possible, using the [Comet scenario suite](https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/tree/main/scenario). The new parameters include setting the risk parameters based on the [recommendations from Gauntlet](https://www.comp.xyz/t/add-collateral-usds-market-on-eth-mainnet/5781/5).
Further detailed information can be found on the corresponding [proposal pull request](https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/pull/947) and [forum discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/add-collateral-usds-market-on-eth-mainnet/5781).
## Proposal Actions
The first action adds sUSDS asset as collateral with corresponding configurations.
The second action deploys and upgrades Comet to a new version.