0x0bef…7494

All memos sent from and to 0x0bef…7494.

TIP-121d: Disable DAO Timelock This proposal would complete TIP-121. It permanently removes all future governance and leaves the protocol in a minimal state with FEI and TRIBE Redemptions open and ongoing, in perpetuity, per the TIP-121 discussion here: https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-121-proposal-for-the-future-of-the-tribe-dao/4475. Should the proposal go through, the only remaining system roles would be the MINTER role allowing FEI to be 1:1 backed by DAI in perpetuity, and roles related to TIP-121c: veBAL OTC with Aave Companies. The proposal also includes clean-up actions such as un-delegating DAO owner TRIBE and disabling future TRIBE minting. Should this vote pass FEI and TRIBE Redemptions will remain unaffected.
TIP-121c: veBAL OTC with Aave Companies TIP-121c: veBAL OTC with Aave Companies This proposal sets up the protocol to transfer 112k veBAL to Aave Companies for OTC trade. Aave Companies will send 1,000,000 DAI to be escrowed on a 2/3 multisig with Aave Companies, Balancer DAO, and Tribe DAO (with eswak.eth as the designated representative). In addition, the proposal moves 1M DAI from the FEI PSM to the escrow multisig to be sent to the TRIBE Redeemer. After the Aave Companies team confirms they can properly use the veBAL-holding smart contracts, the 2/3 multisig will transfer 1M DAI to the TRIBE Redeemer, giving TRIBE holders access to the optimal amount of excess PCV for redemptions. After the DAO Vote to disable governance, the final 1M DAI from Aave Companies would be sent back to the FEI PSM from the ⅔ Multisig. Lastly, the proposal further cleans up unused roles in the system and performs maintenance on the collateralization oracle so that it is in the most up to date state.
TIP-121c: Start FEI and TRIBE Redemption TIP-121c: Start FEI and TRIBE Redemption This proposal implements zero fee redemption of FEI 1:1 to DAI and pro-rata TRIBE redemptions for remaining PCV assets. It transfers 51,450,791 DAI to an immutable, zero-fee, FEI to DAI wrapper contract (SimpleFeiDaiPSM). In addition, all DAI from the existing PSM will be transferred to maintain a complete 1:1 backing against a changing circulating FEI value. The remaining 30,666,344 DAI would be transferred to the TribeRedeemer along with all 50.3k stETH, 15,316,691 FOX and 1,101,298 LQTY. The effective circulating TRIBE value with pro rata claims to these tokens is 458,964,340. For simplicity, this means each 10,000 TRIBE would receive at least: - 668.15 DAI - 1.096 stETH - 333.71 FOX - 23.98 LQTY The ability to redeem TRIBE is at holder discretion and would be open indefinitely, allowing people to claim TRIBE at the time of their choosing. Two additional sources of remaining funding would be added after the completion of the consolidation steps approved in TIP-121a: - Selling the remaining assets in the Tribal Council Safe: 0x2EC598d8e3DF35E5D6F13AE2f05a7bB2704e92Ea - Completion of the veBAL for 1M DAI OTC with Aave Companies: https://tribe.fei.money/t/aave-companies-otc-proposal-for-tribe-dao-s-vebal/4544 Any assets pending consolidation to the PCV, such as the above, would be added to the pro-rata distribution of PCV for TRIBE holders when available. Note that any TRIBE that claims before these consolidations will forfeit the pro-rata redemption value of these last assets from consolidation. Each TRIBE address can only redeem once. The proposal also transfers the BAL and bb-a-USD yield from the veBAL contract to the Tribal Council Safe for the purpose of selling to DAI and distributing back in the TribeRedeemer. This is in preparation for the OTC with the Aave Companies, described above. Lastly, it cleans up smart contract ACL roles and the collateralization oracle in line with the old contracts removed in this vote. The code went through extensive testing, internal QA and external audits like https://code4rena.com/contests/2022-09-fei-and-tribe-redemption-contest.
TIP-121b: Rari Fuse Hack Payment TIP-121b: Rari Fuse Hack Payment If passed (i.e. “For” wins), this proposal would issue a payment to those affected by the Fuse Hack corresponding to the full amount stolen by the hacker. This on-chain vote follows from the snapshot vote: https://snapshot.org/#/fei.eth/proposal/0xd5359654b34bba833843fb64ad38e813b4ff6cc21e6f5ea323b704d2ceb25d96. The payment would be in FEI for end-users in return for the cTokens from the affected Fuse pools. Users would also have to sign a message releasing any liability. For the affected DAOs and smart contracts, there would be a direct payment in DAI. The total payment amount is ~12.68M FEI and ~26.61M DAI. Here is a spreadsheet detailing the payments per address: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1h6VTKPyyA4FzB1yQNDniyROR4-FkGqYa8A97LWm8470/edit#gid=0
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#15,534,721·0x3c71bf09…19e949
TIP-121a (cont.): Sell last LUSD, Timelock and Role Cleanup + La Tribu Clawback TIP-121a (cont.): Sell last LUSD, Timelock and Role Cleanup + La Tribu Clawback This proposal is a continuation of the first stage of TIP-121 (https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-121-proposal-for-the-future-of-the-tribe-dao/4475). This proposal sells the last ~100k LUSD for DAI using a curve swap. It also claws back ~1M FEI and TRIBE from La Tribu, closing out the last DAO funded initiative. It disables the PCV Sentinel Aave/Compound Fei withdrawal guard as the Fei has been withdrawn. It cleans up the timelocks and deprecated roles in the system, where any of these changes can be reversed in a further DAO vote if needed.
TIP-121a (cont.): Sell last LUSD, Timelock and Role Cleanup + La Tribu Clawback TIP-121a (cont.): Sell last LUSD, Timelock and Role Cleanup + La Tribu Clawback This proposal is a continuation of the first stage of TIP-121 (https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-121-proposal-for-the-future-of-the-tribe-dao/4475). This proposal sells the last ~100k LUSD for DAI using a curve swap. It also claws back ~1M FEI and TRIBE from La Tribu, closing out the last DAO funded initiative. It disables the PCV Sentinel Aave/Compound Fei withdrawal guard as the Fei has been withdrawn. It cleans up the timelocks and deprecated roles in the system, where any of these changes can be reversed in a further DAO vote if needed.
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#15,534,502·0x688c626c…99a79b
TIP-121c: INDEX OTC TIP-121c: INDEX OTC This proposal sets up the protocol to be able to OTC its 100,000 INDEX to Wintermute for OTC trade, in exchange of 200,000 DAI. By passing this proposal, the Tribe DAO authorizes La Tribu SARL to operate this OTC trade between the Tribe DAO and Wintermute Trading and KYC on behalf of the DAO, but this delegation of power is scope-limited to this operation only. The Tribe DAO does not authorize La Tribu SARL to represent it in other contexts or take any other engagements on its behalf. The Tribe DAO shall bear all responsibilities regarding this trade, including accounting and reporting requirements, or tax obligations. The Tribe DAO shall keep custody of the exchanged funds at all times, and La Tribu SARL only acts as a technical operator for this transaction.
TIP-121c: INDEX OTC TIP-121c: INDEX OTC This proposal sets up the protocol to be able to OTC its 100,000 INDEX to Wintermute for OTC trade, in exchange of 200,000 DAI. By passing this proposal, the Tribe DAO authorizes La Tribu SARL to operate this OTC trade between the Tribe DAO and Wintermute Trading and KYC on behalf of the DAO, but this delegation of power is scope-limited to this operation only. The Tribe DAO does not authorize La Tribu SARL to represent it in other contexts or take any other engagements on its behalf. The Tribe DAO shall bear all responsibilities regarding this trade, including accounting and reporting requirements, or tax obligations. The Tribe DAO shall keep custody of the exchanged funds at all times, and La Tribu SARL only acts as a technical operator for this transaction.
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#15,479,699·0x455a8210…ca727c
TIP_121a (cont.): Consolidation ops and technical cleanup TIP-121a (cont.): Consolidation ops and technical cleanup This proposal performs various protocol cleanup actions related to the Consolidation step of TIP-121, including: Cleanup auction contracts ------------------------------ Cleans up the LUSD->DAI and WETH->DAI auction contracts that were used to sell those assets by withdrawing remaining liquidity. Sends the DAI to the DAI Holding deposit, last LUSD to the LUSD holding deposit, and deposit the last 50-100 WETH in Lido for simplicity. Remove remaining assets from the Tribal Council Timelock --------------------------------------------------------- Burns the 2.7M FEI previously clawed back from the Rari Infrastructure team timelock and sends the 2.7M TRIBE also recovered to the DAO Treasury. Oracle and PCV maintenance ---------------------------------- Performs several collaterization oracle and PCV updates: 1. Updates the ETH oracle use a stETH/USD price feed, as remaining ETH-denominated PCV will be stETH 2. Removes deprecated and empty contracts from the oracle 3. Removes now deprecated contracts from being marked as safe deposit addresses
TIP_121a (cont.): Consolidation ops and technical cleanup TIP-121a (cont.): Consolidation ops and technical cleanup This proposal performs various protocol cleanup actions related to the Consolidation step of TIP-121, including: Cleanup auction contracts ------------------------------ Cleans up the LUSD->DAI and WETH->DAI auction contracts that were used to sell those assets by withdrawing remaining liquidity. Sends the DAI to the DAI Holding deposit, last LUSD to the LUSD holding deposit, and deposit the last 50-100 WETH in Lido for simplicity. Remove remaining assets from the Tribal Council Timelock --------------------------------------------------------- Burns the 2.7M FEI previously clawed back from the Rari Infrastructure team timelock and sends the 2.7M TRIBE also recovered to the DAO Treasury. Oracle and PCV maintenance ---------------------------------- Performs several collaterization oracle and PCV updates: 1. Updates the ETH oracle use a stETH/USD price feed, as remaining ETH-denominated PCV will be stETH 2. Removes deprecated and empty contracts from the oracle 3. Removes now deprecated contracts from being marked as safe deposit addresses
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#15,411,853·0x820a5d9d…a83fa2
TIP-121a: Consolidation TIP-121a: Consolidation - Sell 22k WETH to DAI through a 2-day LBP auction on Balancer - Sell 18.7M LUSD to DAI through a 2-day LBP auction on Balancer - Move all protocol-owned DAI out of Compound - Finalize the deprecation of TRIBE buyback contracts - Move gOHM to an OTC contract where Olympus can get it back by returning TRIBE (FIP-108) - Withdraw as much as possible protocol FEI when liquidity available from various PCV deployments
TIP-121a: Consolidation TIP-121a: Consolidation - Sell 22k WETH to DAI through a 2-day LBP auction on Balancer - Sell 18.7M LUSD to DAI through a 2-day LBP auction on Balancer - Move all protocol-owned DAI out of Compound - Finalize the deprecation of TRIBE buyback contracts - Move gOHM to an OTC contract where Olympus can get it back by returning TRIBE (FIP-108) - Withdraw as much as possible protocol FEI when liquidity available from various PCV deployments
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#15,385,299·0x0c0257a4…a8e9f2
Would have been nice to have some open discussion on this BEFORE the proposal was posted. I could have revoked my delegation to 3rd party and self delegated before the vote started.
Would have been nice to have some open discussion on this BEFORE the proposal was posted. I could have revoked my delegation to 3rd party and self delegated before the vote started.
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#15,372,909·0x8d3b66ad…fe5cc4
TIP-120: Return Unvested Tokens TIP-120: Return Unvested Tokens Fei Labs will stop participating in the Tribe DAO upon completion of the TIP-121 proposal here https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-121-proposal-for-the-future-of-the-tribe-dao/4475. This DAO vote will only transfer any unvested Fei Labs tokens to the DAO and move TRIBE from the DAO timelock to the treasury, with no actions related to TIP-121. There are two timelocks of such unvested tokens of note, the TRIBE timelock which has 88909000000000000000000000 (~88.9M) unvested TRIBE and the FEI-TRIBE LP Timelock which has 132453262024125114893965413 (~132.4M) unvested LP tokens. The end date for the vesting used is July 1, 2022. All of these tokens will be returned to the DAO by granting ownership of the timelocks to the DAO. The DAO could claim the tokens from the timelocks as needed or simply account for them as not in circulation. Note the LP Timelock includes a portion 23996686013920804984559112 (~24M) LP tokens which are locked for Fei Labs early supporters. These will be transferred to a new timelock and remain as liquidity, after returning the team’s unvested LP tokens to the DAO. The FEI-TRIBE LP Tokens which return to the DAO would be broken up into FEI, which would be burned, and TRIBE, which would be sent to the treasury. The benefit of breaking up these LP tokens is having certainty on the number of TRIBE in the treasury and FEI removed from circulation for accounting purposes.
TIP-120: Return Unvested Tokens TIP-120: Return Unvested Tokens Fei Labs will stop participating in the Tribe DAO upon completion of the TIP-121 proposal here https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-121-proposal-for-the-future-of-the-tribe-dao/4475. This DAO vote will only transfer any unvested Fei Labs tokens to the DAO and move TRIBE from the DAO timelock to the treasury, with no actions related to TIP-121. There are two timelocks of such unvested tokens of note, the TRIBE timelock which has 88909000000000000000000000 (~88.9M) unvested TRIBE and the FEI-TRIBE LP Timelock which has 132453262024125114893965413 (~132.4M) unvested LP tokens. The end date for the vesting used is July 1, 2022. All of these tokens will be returned to the DAO by granting ownership of the timelocks to the DAO. The DAO could claim the tokens from the timelocks as needed or simply account for them as not in circulation. Note the LP Timelock includes a portion 23996686013920804984559112 (~24M) LP tokens which are locked for Fei Labs early supporters. These will be transferred to a new timelock and remain as liquidity, after returning the team’s unvested LP tokens to the DAO. The FEI-TRIBE LP Tokens which return to the DAO would be broken up into FEI, which would be burned, and TRIBE, which would be sent to the treasury. The benefit of breaking up these LP tokens is having certainty on the number of TRIBE in the treasury and FEI removed from circulation for accounting purposes.
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#15,091,330·0x75ff37a0…aed762
TIP_118: PSM deprecation, Incentives withdrawal, agEUR redemption TIP_118: Deprecating PSMs, deprecating TRIBE incentives system, redeem agEUR This proposal deprecates the ETH, LUSD and RAI PSMs and completes items from TIP-109: Discontinue TRIBE incentives and TIP-110: Simplify PCV (redeeming all agEUR in the PCV to DAI). Forum post: https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-118-psm-deprecation-incentives-withdrawal-ageur-redemption/4424 Code changes: https://github.com/fei-protocol/fei-protocol-core/pull/922 PSM deprecation -------------------------------------------- The proposal deprecates the ETH, LUSD and RAI PSMs. This involves transferring all assets off these PSMs, revoking their MINTER_ROLE and ensuring they are fully paused. It also pauses the the associated PCV drip controllers and deprecates the Fei skimmers. Going forward, the only active PSM will be the DAI PSM. The DAI FEI skimmer is also activated by granting the PCV_CONTROLLER_ROLE and excess FEI burned. In addition, a new type of PCV deposit, the ERC20HoldingPCVDeposit, is deployed. This is a deposit which has the deposit() method as a no-op and is intended to just hold assets. The DAO's gOHM and VOLT assets are transferred from the DAO timelock to the relevant holding deposits. TIP-109: Deprecate TRIBE Incentives system (https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-109-discontinue-tribe-incentives/4291) -------------------------------------------- The proposal finishes the deprecation of the TRIBE incentives system by withdrawing the excess TRIBE from the incentives system and deprecating the Tribal Chief contract. Specifically it: - Withdraws remaining TRIBE from the TribalChief, leaving enough behind to fully fund existing commitments - Withdraws all TRIBE from 3Crv and D3 Votium briber contracts - Withdraws remaining TRIBE from ERC20 Dripper - Revokes no longer needed TRIBAL_CHIEF_ADMIN_ROLE roles TIP-110: Simply PCV, specifically the agEUR & Angle redemption (https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-110-simplify-pcv/4323) ----------------------------------------------- Convert all agEUR in the PCV to DAI, and deprecate all Angle Protocol-related contracts, except the contract that is holding vote-escrowed ANGLE. This proposal will perform the following actions : - Move all ANGLE rewards to TC Multisig where they can be sold - Unstake from Angle Protocol's Gauge all agEUR/FEI Uniswap tokens - Move all agEUR/FEI Uniswap tokens to PCV deposit - Remove all agEUR/FEI Uniswap liquidity & burn FEI - Redeem agEUR for DAI, and send proceeds to DAI PSM - Unset agEUR safe addresses & CR oracle entries Additional cleanup items: ---------------------------- - Transfers the admin of the Aave Tribe Incentives Controller Proxy to Aave Governance - Claim 23k AURA airdrop and lock it for 16 weeks to avoid 30% penalty
TIP_118: PSM deprecation, Incentives withdrawal, agEUR redemption TIP_118: Deprecating PSMs, deprecating TRIBE incentives system, redeem agEUR This proposal deprecates the ETH, LUSD and RAI PSMs and completes items from TIP-109: Discontinue TRIBE incentives and TIP-110: Simplify PCV (redeeming all agEUR in the PCV to DAI). Forum post: https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-118-psm-deprecation-incentives-withdrawal-ageur-redemption/4424 Code changes: https://github.com/fei-protocol/fei-protocol-core/pull/922 PSM deprecation -------------------------------------------- The proposal deprecates the ETH, LUSD and RAI PSMs. This involves transferring all assets off these PSMs, revoking their MINTER_ROLE and ensuring they are fully paused. It also pauses the the associated PCV drip controllers and deprecates the Fei skimmers. Going forward, the only active PSM will be the DAI PSM. The DAI FEI skimmer is also activated by granting the PCV_CONTROLLER_ROLE and excess FEI burned. In addition, a new type of PCV deposit, the ERC20HoldingPCVDeposit, is deployed. This is a deposit which has the deposit() method as a no-op and is intended to just hold assets. The DAO's gOHM and VOLT assets are transferred from the DAO timelock to the relevant holding deposits. TIP-109: Deprecate TRIBE Incentives system (https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-109-discontinue-tribe-incentives/4291) -------------------------------------------- The proposal finishes the deprecation of the TRIBE incentives system by withdrawing the excess TRIBE from the incentives system and deprecating the Tribal Chief contract. Specifically it: - Withdraws remaining TRIBE from the TribalChief, leaving enough behind to fully fund existing commitments - Withdraws all TRIBE from 3Crv and D3 Votium briber contracts - Withdraws remaining TRIBE from ERC20 Dripper - Revokes no longer needed TRIBAL_CHIEF_ADMIN_ROLE roles TIP-110: Simply PCV, specifically the agEUR & Angle redemption (https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-110-simplify-pcv/4323) ----------------------------------------------- Convert all agEUR in the PCV to DAI, and deprecate all Angle Protocol-related contracts, except the contract that is holding vote-escrowed ANGLE. This proposal will perform the following actions : - Move all ANGLE rewards to TC Multisig where they can be sold - Unstake from Angle Protocol's Gauge all agEUR/FEI Uniswap tokens - Move all agEUR/FEI Uniswap tokens to PCV deposit - Remove all agEUR/FEI Uniswap liquidity & burn FEI - Redeem agEUR for DAI, and send proceeds to DAI PSM - Unset agEUR safe addresses & CR oracle entries Additional cleanup items: ---------------------------- - Transfers the admin of the Aave Tribe Incentives Controller Proxy to Aave Governance - Claim 23k AURA airdrop and lock it for 16 weeks to avoid 30% penalty
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#15,019,531·0xf43f342c…dfd3b4
TIP-117: Oracles, Roles, and OA Cleanup TIP-117: Oracles, Roles, and OA Cleanup This proposal performs various technical maintenance, cleanup and deprecation tasks. It also completes tasks from TIP-110 (https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-110-simplify-pcv/4323) and deprecates the optimistic approval and ops timelocks, which as of FIP-82: Governance Enhancements (https://tribe.fei.money/t/fip-82-governance-enhancements/3945) are no longer required. Specifically, it: 1. Deprecates old collaterization oracle caching Features : - collateralizationOracle is now read directly by pcvEquityMinter (buybacks) and tribeReserveStabilizer (backstop) - collateralizationOracleWrapper and collateralizationOracleWrapperImpl are no longer used anywhere in the system - collateralizationOracleGuardian (used to update the cache) is no longer used (revoked ORACLE_ADMIN_ROLE role) - collateralizationOracleKeeper (used to incentivize updates of the cache) is no longer used (revoked MINTER_ROLE role) 2. Removes empty or deprecated PCV deposits from the collaterization oracle: - DPI->DAI LBP swapper lenses - B.AMM LUSD Deposit (deprecated, would need to redeploy to use the new B.AMM) - Fuse pool 7 (Tetranode) LUSD deposit (0$ left) - Fuse pool 6, 19, and 24 FEI deposit (114$, 0$, and 6k$ left) - DAO Timelock lenses for agEUR and WETH - Curve/Convex d3 deposits (0$ left) - Withdraw remaining ETH/FEI liquidity from Uniswap v2 (0$ left) - Aave/Compound FEI/ETH deposits (0$ left) - Balancer FEI/WETH deposit (0$ left) 3. Unsets deprecated contracts from the safe addresses list, so funds can no longer be transferred to these deprecated contracts by the PCV Guardian 4. Implements components of TIP-110 Simplify PCV (https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-110-simplify-pcv/4323): - Move LM rewards (COMP, stkAAVE, CRV, CVX) to the TC Multisig where they can be sold. - Move leftover RAI that is in PSM to the TC Multisig where it can be sold. - Move LQTY to TC Timelock where it can be moved to a proper PCVDeposit later. 5. Deprecates the optimistic approval timelock by removing its various access roles. This is cleanup from FIP-82: Governance Enhancements (https://tribe.fei.money/t/fip-82-governance-enhancements/3945), the optimistic approval timelock is no longer required. The following roles are removed: - ORACLE_ADMIN ROLE - SWAP_ADMIN_ROLE - FUSE_ADMIN - PCV_GUARDIAN_ADMIN_ROLE - METAGOVERNANCE_GAUGE_ADMIN - PCV_MINOR_PARAM_ROLE - TOKEMAK_DEPOSIT_ADMIN_ROLE 6. Deprecates the ops optimistic timelock, which as of FIP-82: Governance Enhancements (https://tribe.fei.money/t/fip-82-governance-enhancements/3945), is no longer required. The following roles are removed: - METAGOVERNANCE_TOKEN_STAKING - METAGOVERNANCE_VOTE_ADMIN - METAGOVERNANCE_TOKEN_STAKING
TIP-117: Oracles, Roles, and OA Cleanup TIP-117: Oracles, Roles, and OA Cleanup This proposal performs various technical maintenance, cleanup and deprecation tasks. It also completes tasks from TIP-110 (https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-110-simplify-pcv/4323) and deprecates the optimistic approval and ops timelocks, which as of FIP-82: Governance Enhancements (https://tribe.fei.money/t/fip-82-governance-enhancements/3945) are no longer required. Specifically, it: 1. Deprecates old collaterization oracle caching Features : - collateralizationOracle is now read directly by pcvEquityMinter (buybacks) and tribeReserveStabilizer (backstop) - collateralizationOracleWrapper and collateralizationOracleWrapperImpl are no longer used anywhere in the system - collateralizationOracleGuardian (used to update the cache) is no longer used (revoked ORACLE_ADMIN_ROLE role) - collateralizationOracleKeeper (used to incentivize updates of the cache) is no longer used (revoked MINTER_ROLE role) 2. Removes empty or deprecated PCV deposits from the collaterization oracle: - DPI->DAI LBP swapper lenses - B.AMM LUSD Deposit (deprecated, would need to redeploy to use the new B.AMM) - Fuse pool 7 (Tetranode) LUSD deposit (0$ left) - Fuse pool 6, 19, and 24 FEI deposit (114$, 0$, and 6k$ left) - DAO Timelock lenses for agEUR and WETH - Curve/Convex d3 deposits (0$ left) - Withdraw remaining ETH/FEI liquidity from Uniswap v2 (0$ left) - Aave/Compound FEI/ETH deposits (0$ left) - Balancer FEI/WETH deposit (0$ left) 3. Unsets deprecated contracts from the safe addresses list, so funds can no longer be transferred to these deprecated contracts by the PCV Guardian 4. Implements components of TIP-110 Simplify PCV (https://tribe.fei.money/t/tip-110-simplify-pcv/4323): - Move LM rewards (COMP, stkAAVE, CRV, CVX) to the TC Multisig where they can be sold. - Move leftover RAI that is in PSM to the TC Multisig where it can be sold. - Move LQTY to TC Timelock where it can be moved to a proper PCVDeposit later. 5. Deprecates the optimistic approval timelock by removing its various access roles. This is cleanup from FIP-82: Governance Enhancements (https://tribe.fei.money/t/fip-82-governance-enhancements/3945), the optimistic approval timelock is no longer required. The following roles are removed: - ORACLE_ADMIN ROLE - SWAP_ADMIN_ROLE - FUSE_ADMIN - PCV_GUARDIAN_ADMIN_ROLE - METAGOVERNANCE_GAUGE_ADMIN - PCV_MINOR_PARAM_ROLE - TOKEMAK_DEPOSIT_ADMIN_ROLE 6. Deprecates the ops optimistic timelock, which as of FIP-82: Governance Enhancements (https://tribe.fei.money/t/fip-82-governance-enhancements/3945), is no longer required. The following roles are removed: - METAGOVERNANCE_TOKEN_STAKING - METAGOVERNANCE_VOTE_ADMIN - METAGOVERNANCE_TOKEN_STAKING
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#14,979,918·0xf4014829…5d1856
This repayment plan in not good because of the instant reduction in Fei's collateralization. Therefore, I am abstaining. Either the repayment plan is thoroughly laid out in a manner that does not materially increase the risk on Fei's collateralization, or no repayment plan is executed.
This repayment plan in not good because of the instant reduction in Fei's collateralization. Therefore, I am abstaining. Either the repayment plan is thoroughly laid out in a manner that does not materially increase the risk on Fei's collateralization, or no repayment plan is executed.
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#14,973,706·0x8cc38742…cdc688
If acquiring Rari DAO is the correct use of PCV, then be responsible for Rari DAO is the correct use of PCV. Read my comments when the merge happens: https://tribe.fei.money/t/fip-51-fei-rari-token-merge/3642/9
If acquiring Rari DAO is the correct use of PCV, then be responsible for Rari DAO is the correct use of PCV. Read my comments when the merge happens: https://tribe.fei.money/t/fip-51-fei-rari-token-merge/3642/9
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#14,973,626·0xa462d6e3…31867b
We don't believe this is the proper use of PCV. Fei needs all the defenses necessary, and shouldn't be responsible for repaying the complete sum of Rari losses during an unprecedented market downturn. Rari positions carry smart contract risk, and while we believe in a future where Rari can provide compensation to users who lost out from a hack, it's an unwise choice to put the stable coin at risk for complete repayment. Falling collateralization to ~120% is not an option: Fei still has exposure to stEth, and repayement would primarily reduce exposure to stablecoins (90% -> 70%). This risk portfolio is not safe in any market, especially this one. We support alternative solutions to repay hack-affected users - such as a safety staking pool - but do not support the use of PCV to repay for the attack. Fei peg is of the highest priority to us.
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#14,972,571·0xb9c9bcee…74a29d
I'm voting for because paying back what is owed is the right thing to do. Whether this is the right approach for that matters, but that should have been decided in a separate discussion. Voting against this approach to repaying the debt can be assumed to be voting against paying back the debt altogether which is something that was already decided months ago.
I'm voting for because paying back what is owed is the right thing to do. Whether this is the right approach for that matters, but that should have been decided in a separate discussion. Voting against this approach to repaying the debt can be assumed to be voting against paying back the debt altogether which is something that was already decided months ago.
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#14,972,303·0x5c1095ec…a024d9
Guys. I'm on both sides of the equation, let's not be another false-positive. Do what's right, build trust and reimburse
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#14,972,187·0xf8228bad…f1b5b2
TIP-111: Increase FEI Stable backing to 90-100% TIP-111: Increase FEI Stable backing to 90-100% This on-chain proposal will perform the following actions : - Migrate stETH (Lido staked ETH) to a PCVDeposit where the Chainlink oracle is used to check for slippage, instead of a hardcoded 1:1 peg (the parameter for slippage check keeps the same behavior, but will tolerate a slippage vs the Chainlink oracle price, and not vs a theorhetical 1:1 peg). - Unstake all B-70WETH-30FEI from Balancer gauge, remove FEI/WETH liquidity from Balancer, burn the FEI, and move WETH to PSM These actions are part of TIP-111 and will allow Guardian to perform actions to defend the FEI peg and continue to increase the stable backing (percentage of stable assets in the PCV). ------------------------------- Also contains code from FIP_104b: Withdraw all liquidity from the DPI LBP. This FIP cleans up and finishes elements of the PCV reinforcement process snapshotted here: https://snapshot.fei.money/#/proposal/0x2fd5bdda0067098f6c0520fe309dfe90ca403758f0ce98c1854a00bf38999674 and discussed here: https://tribe.fei.money/t/fip-104-fei-pcv-reinforcement-proposal/4162 . Specifically it: - Exits the LBP pool and withdraws all liquidity to the compound DAI deposit - Withdraws the DPI from the deposit to the TribalCouncil multisig, using the ratioPCVController - Deposits the DAI on the deposit into Compound
TIP-111: Increase FEI Stable backing to 90-100% TIP-111: Increase FEI Stable backing to 90-100% This on-chain proposal will perform the following actions : - Migrate stETH (Lido staked ETH) to a PCVDeposit where the Chainlink oracle is used to check for slippage, instead of a hardcoded 1:1 peg (the parameter for slippage check keeps the same behavior, but will tolerate a slippage vs the Chainlink oracle price, and not vs a theorhetical 1:1 peg). - Unstake all B-70WETH-30FEI from Balancer gauge, remove FEI/WETH liquidity from Balancer, burn the FEI, and move WETH to PSM These actions are part of TIP-111 and will allow Guardian to perform actions to defend the FEI peg and continue to increase the stable backing (percentage of stable assets in the PCV). ------------------------------- Also contains code from FIP_104b: Withdraw all liquidity from the DPI LBP. This FIP cleans up and finishes elements of the PCV reinforcement process snapshotted here: https://snapshot.fei.money/#/proposal/0x2fd5bdda0067098f6c0520fe309dfe90ca403758f0ce98c1854a00bf38999674 and discussed here: https://tribe.fei.money/t/fip-104-fei-pcv-reinforcement-proposal/4162 . Specifically it: - Exits the LBP pool and withdraws all liquidity to the compound DAI deposit - Withdraws the DPI from the deposit to the TribalCouncil multisig, using the ratioPCVController - Deposits the DAI on the deposit into Compound
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#14,971,094·0x2dcbc76c…d67c94
I think a partial refund to users up to 50-100k would make a lot of sense, in the current form the proposal will hurt Fei/Tribe more than anything, it would mean the end of the stablecoin. I think going with a KPI options or something along CORN by Pickle makes way more sense.. In favor of a Repay but with different terms. The DAOs involved will be fine in the short term but the users should be taken care of.
I think a partial refund to users up to 50-100k would make a lot of sense, in the current form the proposal will hurt Fei/Tribe more than anything, it would mean the end of the stablecoin. I think going with a KPI options or something along CORN by Pickle makes way more sense.. In favor of a Repay but with different terms. The DAOs involved will be fine in the short term but the users should be taken care of.
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#14,970,734·0xaf894665…6d7d50
Very unfortunate situation for all parties involved, but Tribe is no longer in a position to repay the hack. PCV health has to come first to ensure Tribe weathers the market and comes out stronger.
Very unfortunate situation for all parties involved, but Tribe is no longer in a position to repay the hack. PCV health has to come first to ensure Tribe weathers the market and comes out stronger.
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#14,970,421·0x0d66a03c…9e6c30
"everyone using these products should be aware of these risks and manage their funds and expectations accordingly." is an incredibly arrogant position to take here. This was a blatant technical miscalculation by the Rari core-team and subsequently the Tribe DAO having merged with Rari. This is NOT a scenario where partners and users should be absorbing the risk. Stop hiding behind this false dichotomy of "it's risky and experimental so you should have known better."
"everyone using these products should be aware of these risks and manage their funds and expectations accordingly." is an incredibly arrogant position to take here. This was a blatant technical miscalculation by the Rari core-team and subsequently the Tribe DAO having merged with Rari. This is NOT a scenario where partners and users should be absorbing the risk. Stop hiding behind this false dichotomy of "it's risky and experimental so you should have known better."
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#14,970,238·0x4ca508e1…63828c
Fei PCV is not intended to be used as an insurance fund for Fuse. I am in favor of devising other solutions for hack repayment and would support a community effort to create pool-specific insurance funds similar to the Aave safety module. Permissionless lending markets are an important frontier in DeFi and are extremely high risk, everyone using these products should be aware of these risks and manage their funds and expectations accordingly.
Fei PCV is not intended to be used as an insurance fund for Fuse. I am in favor of devising other solutions for hack repayment and would support a community effort to create pool-specific insurance funds similar to the Aave safety module. Permissionless lending markets are an important frontier in DeFi and are extremely high risk, everyone using these products should be aware of these risks and manage their funds and expectations accordingly.
unknown sendersent to0x0bef27fe…7494·#14,970,077·0x4bbcf54a…ddd0d6
Despite the huge equity hit, the DAO needs to maintain its reputation, talent, and legal security. Repaying the hack in full accomplishes this.
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