0x2723723f…0411sent to0xbeccb6bb…9bf6·#25,941,556·0xa9e3678d…1fff4a
# Increase Govnernance Quorum and Proposal Threshold
## Summary
The Risk Working Group (RWG) proposes increasing the governance quorum from 15,500 to 24,000 votes and the proposal threshold from 1,900 to 7,270 INV, aligning both parameters with current delegated voting power and INV supply. Quorum was last revised in January 2024 through [Proposal 165](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/165), which set it at 7.5% of delegated voting power. Delegated voting power has since grown to approximately 340,000 INV, leaving the current setting at 4.6% of that base. The proposal threshold was last revised in October 2022 and now represents 0.26% of supply, against the 1.00% anchor the DAO applied at deployment and reaffirmed in [Proposal 34](https://www.inverse.finance/governance/proposals/mills/34).
Proposed Changes:
| Parameter | Current | Proposed | Change |
|---|---:|---:|---:|
| Quorum | 15,500 | 24,000 | +8,500 |
| Proposal threshold | 1,900 | 7,270 | +5,370 |
Both adjustments restore bases the DAO has already adopted, and neither exceeds a level that recent turnout demonstrates the electorate can meet. No action is required from delegates or borrowers at this time.
## Background
Quorum and the proposal threshold are absolute INV values held in mutable storage on GovernorMills. They do not adjust as conditions change, and each therefore represents the DAO as it stood at the point it was last set.
Measured against the current and unchanged supply of 727,000 INV, quorum represents 2.13% and the proposal threshold 0.26%. Both sit materially below the levels the DAO has historically considered appropriate for these parameters.
## Participation data
Delegated voting power across 68 delegates stands at approximately 340,000 INV, or 46.8% of supply. Quorum is tested against votes cast rather than against supply, which is why Proposal 165 moved the basis to delegated power and why RWG retains that basis here.
| Measure | INV | % of supply |
|---|---:|---:|
| Total supply | 727,000 | 100% |
| Delegated voting power | 340,004 | 46.8% |
| Peak turnout recorded | 167,994 | 23.1% |
| Median turnout, last 45 proposals | 28,458 | 3.91% |
| Current quorum | 15,500 | 2.13% |
The five largest delegates hold 85.6% of all delegated voting power. At the current setting of 15,500, each of the five can satisfy quorum unilaterally.
## Proposed Parameter Changes
These parameters govern two distinct functions. Quorum determines the participation required for a decision to bind the DAO. The proposal threshold determines who may place a binding decision in front of it. RWG has sized each against the constraint that actually applies to it rather than against a single common denominator.
### Quorum (15,500 to 24,000)
Applying the 7.5% of delegated voting power basis adopted in Proposal 165 to current delegated power gives approximately 25,500 INV. This proposal sets 24,000 INV, marginally below that figure, representing 7.06% of delegated voting power and 3.30% of supply. The proposed level is a restoration of an existing policy rather than the introduction of a new one.
Recent participation supports the change on three counts. Median turnout across the last 45 proposals is 28,458 INV, comfortably above the proposed level. The highest turnout recorded is 167,994 INV, several times the proposed quorum. The four largest delegates can each meet 24,000 INV unilaterally, so the change does not introduce a risk of routine governance stalling.
The trade-off should be acknowledged. At 24,000 INV, quorum sits marginally below the voting power of the delegate that carries the majority of routine votes, so the proposed level raises the participation bar materially without guaranteeing that every proposal attracts a second participant. RWG considers this an acceptable trade in favour of a change the DAO can adopt without disruption to its ordinary business, and will revisit the level once a cycle of live data is available under the new setting.
### Proposal threshold (1,900 to 7,270)
7,270 INV is 1.00% of supply, restoring the anchor the DAO applied at deployment and reaffirmed exactly in Proposal 34. No subsequent proposal has replaced that anchor with an alternative basis, so it remains stated DAO policy rather than a new standard introduced here. At 0.26% of supply the current threshold no longer performs the function the DAO specified for it, namely that the right to place a binding proposal before the DAO, and to occupy the governance queue while it is voted on, should represent a meaningful stake in the protocol.
GovernorMills also maintains a proposer whitelist which grants proposal rights independently of the threshold. All active Inverse Finance contributors and working group members are currently whitelisted, so routine DAO business continues uninterrupted at any threshold, and the whitelist can be extended by ordinary proposal. In practice the threshold applies to unaffiliated addresses seeking to place a binding proposal before the DAO, which is the case the parameter exists to govern.
## Governance as an attack surface
Governance parameters are administrative settings with security consequences. On August 23, 2026, Term Finance lost approximately $8.5 million when an attacker acquired a controlling share of a thinly held governance token, for a reported outlay of under one thousand dollars, and passed proposals redirecting vault assets. A seven day timelock and liquidity provider veto rights were in place and did not prevent execution. Beanstalk lost approximately $182 million to a comparable attack in 2022. In both cases the cost of acquiring decisive voting power was small relative to the value that power could direct.
Inverse is differently exposed. The Inverse Finance DAO is not governed through a thinly held vault token, and INV governance is active and well established, with 68 delegates and median turnout above the level proposed here. Combined delegate weight substantially exceeds either proposed parameter. RWG does not consider governance capture an imminent threat to the DAO.
The parameters nonetheless bear on it. Moving quorum from 15,500 to 24,000 raises the voting power an address must accumulate and delegate to carry a proposal unaided from 2.13% to 3.30% of supply, and 7,270 INV raises the cost of placing a binding proposal in the queue by approximately a factor of four. Their function is to keep the cost of influencing DAO decisions proportionate to the value those decisions control, and that proportionality erodes whenever the parameters are left unrevised.
## On-Chain Actions
- Set the minimum quorum required for a vote to pass to 24,000 INV, by calling `updateProposalQuorum` on GovernorMills.
- Set the minimum voting power required to create a proposal to 7,270 INV, by calling `updateProposalThreshold` on GovernorMills.