# Reduce Borrow Collateral Factor for rsETH to 0 on Ethereum Markets
This proposal reduces the collateral factor utilized on borrow for rsETH--once executed, rsETH on Ethereum markets can not be used as collateral for new loans. Note that this proposal will not directly trigger any liquidations as the liquidation collateral factor remains unchanged.
Please see the forums for further details
* [Kelp Dao Exploit Discussions](https://www.comp.xyz/t/kelp-daos-rseth-hack-response/7732)
# Return Accidentally Sent Funds #4
Following the precedent set in previous proposals, this proposal returns 90% of assets accidentally sent to cUSDCv3 on mainnet. In this [TX](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x8fc3e89dbde7e308fc6a34ee93cdf41396dabf7b717c35077c31780e62a52bf8) the WBTC was sent to the protocol. Shortly after, it was automatically sold off for USDC by the protocol in this [TX](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xf10466bd9f46be1f49d05173e1cbe6e2e4870793e03e3eafe7c44ce10019d5b3).
The net proceeds to the protocol were 64,927.72518 USDC, so 58,434.952662 USDC will be returned in this proposal. This USDC will be removed from the cUSDCv3 reserves and be sent to the accidental sender (0x14e3cb36fdc4427533d90eeFE32D0bc3aa0c5230).
[Forum Discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/implement-ctoken-sweeptoken-and-return-accidentally-sent-funds/1147/58?u=arr00)
vCompound Governor Bravo`HGovernorBravo::_setVotingPeriod:`DGovernorBravo::_setVotingPeriod:`DGovernorBravo::_setProposalThres`DRohold: admin only`GovernorBravo::_setProposalThres`Dhold: invalid proposal threshold`dGovernorBravo::_setVotingDelay: `DGovernorBravo::_setVotingDelay: `DRsinvalid voting delay``RvCompound Governor Bravo`HGovernorBravo::castVoteBySig: in`DRnvalid signature`GovernorBravo::state: invalid pr`DGovernorBravo::cancel: cannot ca`DGovernorBravo::cancel: proposer `DGovernorBravo::cancel: whitelist`DGovernorBravo::_setWhitelistAcco`DuntExpiration: admin onlyGovernorBravo::proposeBySig: inv`DRvCompound Governor Bravo`HGovernorBravo::proposeBySig: inv`DRmalid signature`GovernorBravo::_setWhitelistGuar`DRodian: admin only`GovernorBravo:_setPendingAdmin: `DRvCompound Governor Bravo`HGovernorBravo::castVoteWithReaso`DnBySig: invalid signatureGovernorBravo::initialize: can o`DRrnly initialize once`hGovernorBravo::initialize: admin`DRrid timelock address`hRnid comp address`Rnid voting delay`GovernorBravo::queue: proposal can only be queued if it is succe`dGovernorBravo::_setProposalGuard`DRnian: admin only`GovernorBravo:_acceptAdmin: pend`DRming admin only`GovernorBravo::_initiate: admin `DGovernorBravo::_initiate: can on`DRoly initiate once`GovernorBravo::execute: proposal`D can only be executed if it is q`dGovernorBravo::castVoteInternal:`DGovernorBravo::castVoteInternal:`DRq invalid vote type`pGovernorBravo::castVoteInternal:`DGovernor Bravo not activeproposer votes below proposal th`dproposal function information ar`dRsmust provide actions``Rotoo many actions`one live proposal per proposer, `dfound an already active proposal`one live proposal per proposer, `dfound an already pending proposa`GovernorBravo::queueOrRevertInte`Drnal: identical proposal action `dRtalready queued at eta`XfGovernorBravo::initialize: invalGovernorBravo::proposeInternal:
v3-official-markets# Initialize cUSDCv3 on Base
This proposal initializes the Compound III USDC market on Base as a first step to fully migrating to native USDC on base. The entirety of this proposal was simulated and indicates success. The [parameters for this deployment](https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-usdc-native-comet-market-to-compound-base-02-09-24/4982) and the [rewards configuration](https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-native-usdc-base-comet-incentives-recommendations/5009) were recommended by Gauntlet.
See links for more details:
- [proposal pull request](https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/pull/828)
- [forum discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-usdc-native-comet-market-to-compound-base-02-09-24/4982)
## Proposal Actions
1) The first proposal action sets the configurator factory address, sets Comet configuration, and deploys a new Comet implementation on Base. It also sets the rewards config for the new market to 20 COMP/Day for suppliers and 8 COMP/Day for borrowers.
2) The second action updates the ENS TXT record `v3-official-markets` on `v3-additional-grants.compound-community-licenses.eth`, updating the official markets JSON to include the new Base cUSDCv3 market.
3) The third action pays arr00 115 COMP for the development effort for this proposal.
v3-official-markets# Initialize cUSDCv3 on Base
This proposal initializes the Compound III USDC market on Base as a first step to fully migrating to native USDC on base. The entirety of this proposal was simulated and indicates success. The [parameters for this deployment](https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-usdc-native-comet-market-to-compound-base-02-09-24/4982) and the [rewards configuration](https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-native-usdc-base-comet-incentives-recommendations/5009) were recommended by Gauntlet.
See links for more details:
- [proposal pull request](https://github.com/compound-finance/comet/pull/828)
- [forum discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-usdc-native-comet-market-to-compound-base-02-09-24/4982)
## Proposal Actions
1) The first proposal action sets the configurator factory address, sets Comet configuration, and deploys a new Comet implementation on Base. It also sets the rewards config for the new market to 20 COMP/Day for suppliers and 8 COMP/Day for borrowers.
2) The second action updates the ENS TXT record `v3-official-markets` on `v3-additional-grants.compound-community-licenses.eth`, updating the official markets JSON to include the new Base cUSDCv3 market.
3) The third action pays arr00 108 COMP for the development effort for this proposal.
# Compound Governor Bravo Update
This proposal updates the implementation contract for Compound Governor Bravo. The update has been audited by OpenZeppelin and reviewed by various community members. There is full test coverage along with fork simulations demonstrating the successful usage of the new implementation. The changes are as follows:
- Upgrade from solc 0.5.17 to 0.8.10
- Enable propose by sig
- Enable vote with reason by sig
[Governance Repo](https://github.com/compound-finance/compound-governance/)
[OZ Audit](https://github.com/compound-finance/compound-governance/blob/main/audit/OZ-Sept-23.pdf)
[Forum post](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compound-governor-update/4714)
vCompound Governor Bravo`HGovernorBravo::_setVotingPeriod:`DGovernorBravo::_setVotingPeriod:`DGovernorBravo::_setProposalThres`DRohold: admin only`GovernorBravo::_setProposalThres`Dhold: invalid proposal threshold`dGovernorBravo::_setVotingDelay: `DGovernorBravo::_setVotingDelay: `DRsinvalid voting delay``RvCompound Governor Bravo`HGovernorBravo::castVoteBySig: in`DRnvalid signature`GovernorBravo::state: invalid pr`DGovernorBravo::cancel: cannot ca`DGovernorBravo::cancel: whitelist`DGovernorBravo::cancel: proposer `DGovernorBravo::_setWhitelistAcco`DuntExpiration: admin onlyGovernorBravo::proposeBySig: inv`DRvCompound Governor Bravo`HGovernorBravo::proposeBySig: inv`DRmalid signature`GovernorBravo::_setWhitelistGuar`DRodian: admin only`GovernorBravo:_setPendingAdmin: `DRvCompound Governor Bravo`HGovernorBravo::castVoteWithReaso`DnBySig: invalid signatureGovernorBravo::initialize: can o`DRrnly initialize once`hGovernorBravo::initialize: admin`DRrid timelock address`hRnid comp address`Rnid voting delay`GovernorBravo::queue: proposal can only be queued if it is succe`dGovernorBravo:_acceptAdmin: pend`DRming admin only`GovernorBravo::_initiate: admin `DGovernorBravo::_initiate: can on`DRoly initiate once`GovernorBravo::execute: proposal`D can only be executed if it is q`dGovernorBravo::castVoteInternal:`DGovernorBravo::castVoteInternal:`DRq invalid vote type`pGovernorBravo::castVoteInternal:`DGovernor Bravo not activeproposer votes below proposal th`dproposal function information ar`dRsmust provide actions``Rotoo many actions`one live proposal per proposer, `dfound an already active proposal`one live proposal per proposer, `dfound an already pending proposa`GovernorBravo::queueOrRevertInte`Drnal: identical proposal action `dRtalready queued at eta`XV[aH݁aHׄTaDnV[fGovernorBravo::initialize: invalGovernorBravo::proposeInternal:
# Resume cUSDC minting
As the price of USDC fell through $0.90, cUSDC minting on Compound V2 was paused out of caution by the community multisig. This proposal resumes minting of cUSDC.
# Unpause Seize
This is a proactive proposal to unpause Compound V2 market liquidations IF the Pause Guardian decides to pause liquidations ahead of the execution of Proposal 119. This ensures that a pause action will only last ~23 hours as opposed to the usual 7 day governance process.
The motivation for pausing liquidations is to ensure that any users or downstream protocols have ample time to rebalance their positions once the price feed for cETH is restored. The Pause Guardian will decide to pause only if it is necessary based on the market conditions and state of existing positions. If the Pause Guardian decides that pausing is unnecessary, this proposal will be canceled.
# Unpause Seize
This is a proactive proposal to unpause Compound V2 market liquidations IF the Pause Guardian decides to pause liquidations ahead of the execution of Proposal 119. This ensures that a pause action will only last ~23 hours as opposed to the usual 7 day governance process.
The motivation for pausing liquidations is to ensure that any users or downstream protocols have ample time to rebalance their positions once the price feed for cETH is restored. The Pause Guardian will decide to pause only if it is necessary based on the market conditions and state of existing positions. If the Pause Guardian decides that pausing is unnecessary, this proposal will be canceled.
# Enable Sending ETH from Timelock (Revised)
There has been a longstanding quirk in the Compound Governor which requires all ETH spent in a proposal to come from the executor of the proposal. This disallows sending ETH stored in the Timelock. This proposal changes the implementation of GovernorBravo to allow for sending ETH from the Timelock. This proposal has been audited and signed off by [OpenZeppelin](https://gist.github.com/cylon56/752f9061713a8d737e526fdce4b85f1f). Arr00 is granted $8k in COMP for his contribution.
[Discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/enable-transfer-eth-from-timelock/2689)
[New Governor Bravo Implementation](https://etherscan.io/address/0xef3b6e9e13706a8f01fe98fdcf66335dc5cfdeed#code)
[Fork Simulations](https://github.com/compound-finance/compound-protocol/tree/bba97f95c28b473945e90347f315703067145dd5/spec/sim/0115-timelock-send-eth)
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# Enable Sending ETH from Timelock
There has been a longstanding quirk in the Compound Governor which requires all ETH spent in a proposal to come from the executor of the proposal. This disallows sending ETH stored in the Timelock. This proposal changes the implementation of GovernorBravo to allow for sending ETH from the Timelock. This proposal has been audited and signed off by [OpenZeppelin](https://gist.github.com/cylon56/752f9061713a8d737e526fdce4b85f1f). Arr00 is granted $8k in COMP for his contribution.
[Discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/enable-transfer-eth-from-timelock/2689)
[New Governor Bravo Implementation](https://etherscan.io/address/0x44b68e6f47b4eb2f3b6d8158b60a5fa681a5b911#code)
[Fork Simulations](https://github.com/arr00/compound-protocol/tree/8930b0ff7460337f0303b16942f79f5aa63dfde8/spec/sim/0114-timelock-send-eth)
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# Return Accidentally Sent Funds #3
## Background
Following the two proposal which returned accidentally sent funds, this proposal will return 90% of the accidentally sent WBTC to a user that sent the WBTC to the Comptroller [here](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5a4e6a6f29894914be5250d793fa2bb6d98a01d13528ea0d1f39afa731934629).
## Mechanics
In order to returns the accidentally sent funds, this proposal sets a transient Comptroller implementation which implements a sweep function. This proposal sweeps the desired tokens to the Timelock and then returns the Comptroller implementation to the current implementation. The Timelock then disburses the funds. On top of the WBTC, orphaned UNI, BAT, and SAI will be swept from the Comptroller to the Timelock. Arr00 will be granted a bounty of 89k cUNI (~1790 UNI), which is part of the fee collected by the protocol from returning accidentally sent funds in proposal 37.
## Security
The execution of this proposal will not alter the Comptroller state at all—the method of a transient Comptroller implementation was chosen to reduce risk as much as possible. Additionally, there are [proposal simulations](https://github.com/arr00/compound-protocol/tree/2320ea601f150ba1f4d34a4111003f021bc2261b/spec/sim/0112-sweep-comptroller) which simulate proposal execution and normal market functionality afterword. Finally, the proposal was audited and signed off by Open Zeppelin as can be verified [here](https://gist.github.com/cylon56/752f9061713a8d737e526fdce4b85f1f?permalink_comment_id=4187802#gistcomment-4187802).
[Discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/implement-ctoken-sweeptoken-and-return-accidentally-sent-funds/1147/51?u=arr00)
ComptrollerSweeper::_sweep: can not sweep compComptrollerSweeper::_become: change not authorizedComptrollerSweeper::_sweep: only admin can sweepComptrollerSweeper::_become: only unitroller admin can change brainsComptrollerSweeper::_sweep: transfer failed
_setContributorCompSpeed(address,uint256)_setContributorCompSpeed(address,uint256)# Migrate Contributor Streams to Sablier
This proposal transfers all existing contributor streaming payments, which are currently indefinite, over to Sablier for one year terms from the start date. The payments remain the same and are calculated assuming there are 6350 blocks per day.
On proposal execution, the full amount of Comp required to complete these payments will be transferred to the Sablier contract from Timelock and be linearly streamed to each recipient. If any of the payments are canceled, by the recipient or governance, the remaining Comp will be transferred back to Timelock.
The final interaction pays Arr00 20 Comp for carrying out this proposal.
[Discussion](https://www.comp.xyz/t/migrate-gfx-labs-and-gauntlet-comp-streams-over-to-sablier/2785)
[Sablier Contract](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCD18eAa163733Da39c232722cBC4E8940b1D8888)
# End cCOMP Borrow Rewards
This proposal stops COMP rewards for cCOMP borrowing using the new Comptroller function allowing for splitting COMP speeds. COMP rewards will remain the same for cCOMP suppliers.
Currently, there are COMP rewards given to cCOMP borrowers while the borrow cap is in use. This creates a situation where the net rate for borrowing COMP is negative. As such, COMP borrowing is forced to the borrow CAP, and the market is unable to reach equilibrium. This proposal will cause the net rate of borrowing COMP to be positive and will result in the market reaching equilibrium.
# Temporarily Disable COMP Rewards
## Objective
Disable the distribution of COMP rewards, temporarily
## Justification
[Proposal 62](https://compound.finance/governance/proposals/62) introduced a bug in the COMP distribution logic that allowed users borrowing certain assets to claim more than their intended share of COMP. This puts all of the COMP tokens in the Comptroller contract at risk, but not those in the Reservoir contract. For more details, [see Leshner's tweets here](https://twitter.com/rleshner/status/1443380518498848768). This change will prevent further COMP from being distributed until the correct logic is restored.
## Details
This change disables distributing accrued COMP until a long-term fix is tested and implemented. As this change was pushed out as quickly as possible, please follow along in the forum thread where we will provide more information during the review period
### [Forum Thread](https://www.comp.xyz/t/compound-proposal-63-temporary-patch-for-comp-distribution-bug-9-29-21/2327)
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balance could not be calculatedmarker method returned falsesetting comptroller failedborrow rate is absurdly highcould not calculate block deltaPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPamarker method returned falseadd reserves unexpected overflow`DTOKEN_TRANSFER_OUT_FAILEDMINT_EXCHANGE_CALCULATION_FAILED`DLIQUIDATE_SEIZE_TOO_MUCHTOKEN_TRANSFER_IN_FAILEDTOKEN_TRANSFER_IN_OVERFLOWonly admin may initialize the marketmarket may only be initialized onceCErc20::sweepToken: can not sweep underlying tokeninitial exchange rate must be greater than zero.only the admin may set the comp-like delegatesetting interest rate model failedonly the admin may call _resignImplementationMINT_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILEDborrowBalanceStored: borrowBalanceStoredInternal failedREPAY_BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILEDREPAY_BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILEDLIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_CALCULATE_AMOUNT_SEIZE_FAILEDexchangeRateStored: exchangeRateStoredInternal failedMINT_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILEDone of redeemTokensIn or redeemAmountIn must be zeroreduce reserves unexpected underflowonly the admin may call _becomeImplementation
CErc20Delegator:fallback: cannot send value to fallbackCErc20Delegator::_setImplementation: Caller must be admin2CErc20Delegator::_setImplementation: Caller must be adminCompound Collateral
CErc20Delegator:fallback: cannot send value to fallbackCErc20Delegator::_setImplementation: Caller must be admin2CErc20Delegator::_setImplementation: Caller must be adminCompound Collateral
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